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PREFACE

The author has attempted in this volume to present the

equality of states as it appears in the theory of international

'3 -.3 - ..Z0
J ;;.Ho '8"

law and also as it is affected by common usage. Theoretical

aspects of the subject are considered in chapters dealing with

the sources of the principle, its origin, and its significance in

PREFACE

the writings of modern publicists and in illustrative docu-

ments. The opinion that Grotius first established the prin-

ciple in international law is examined and evidence is adduced

which indicates that the opinion is erroneous. The equality

of states as affected by common usage is really their inequal-

ity or status. It involves the study of internal and external

factors which limit the capacity of the state as an interna-

tional person in a variety of ways. Attention has been given

to certain features of the organic constitution of the state and

also to certain external relationships with other states which

are regarded as limitations upon international legal capacity.

Political capacity has been viewed as a distinct problem and

the limitations of which international relationships afford
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illustrations have received separate consideration.

Everything in the volume except the Supplementary Chap-

ter was written during the World War and the manuscript

was in the printer's hands before the Peace Conference as-

sembled. The materials on the work of the Peace Conference

which have since become available are considered in the

Supplementary Chapter. This chapter is of necessity incom-

plete, but it is believed that the relevancy of the subject

matter justifies its inclusion.

The investigation of an underlying legal principle is never

an easy undertaking. It is peculiarly difficult in international

law where so much is ill-defined and unsettled and where

THE author has attempted in this volume to present the
equality of states as it appears in the theory of international
law and also as it is affected by common usage. Theoretical
aspects of the subject are considered in chapters dealing with
the sources of the principle, its origin, and its significance in
the writings of modem publicists and in illustrative documents. The opinion that Grotius first established the principle in international law is examined and evidence is adduced
which indicates that the opinion is erroneous. The equality
of states as affected by common usage is really their inequality or status. It involves the study of internal and external
factors which limit the capacity of the state as an international person in a variety of ways. Attention has been given
to certain features of the organic constitution of the state and
also to certain external relationships with other states which
are regarded as limitations upon international legal capacity.
Political capacity has been viewed as a distinct problem and
the limitations of which international relationships afford
illustrations have received separate consideration.
Everything in the volume except the Supplementary Chapter was written during the World War and the manuscript
was in the printer's hands before the Peace Conference assembled. The materials on the work of the Peace Conference
which have since become available are considered in the
Supplementary Chapter. This chapter is of necessity incomplete, but it is believed that the relevancy of the subject
matter justifies its inclusion.
The investigation of an underlying legal principle is never
an easy undertaking. It is peculiarly difficult in international
law where so much is ill-defined and unsettled and where
vii

PREFACE

Vlll

PREFACE

there is such an extraordinary divergence between accepted

theories and common practice. The author entertains no

illusions as to his own success in meeting the difficulties in-

herent in his undertaking. The late John Chipman Gray once

remarked that "on no subject of human interest, except

theology, has there been so much loose writing and nebulous

speculation as on International Law." The author would

like to feel that a realistic outlook and the application to the

subject matter of established principles of legal analysis have

at least saved him from the pitfalls of "loose writing and

nebulous speculation." Beyond that he will feel amply re-

paid if his effort contributes something to the understanding

of an important subject which has been too casually treated

hitherto. It will be especially gratifying if the volume stimu-

lates further research.

The bibliography, it should be noted, is not what the ac-

cepted meaning of the term implies. Perhaps it would be

better to call it a guide to the materials used. A bibliography

in the accepted sense is impossible. On the one hand, there

is next to nothing on the subject of equality in the literature
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of international law which puiports to be the result of special

study. On the other hand, almost every modern writer on

international law has had something to say about equality

and almost everything written is more or less relevant. The

bibliography printed with the present volume includes every-

thing that has been of any use in connection with the study

undertaken. It is, as suggested, a guide to sources rather than

a bibliography.

This volume was written originally as a doctoral disserta-

tion under the direction of Professor George Grafton Wilson

of Harvard University. The author takes this occasion to

express his immeasurable debt to Professor Wilson for arous-

ing interest in the subject, encouraging at every stage with

kindly criticism and helpful suggestion, and inspiriting with

there is such an extraordinary divergence between accepted
theories and common practice. The author entertains no
illusions as to his own success in meeting the difficulties inherent in his undertaking. The late John Chipman Gray once
remarked that "on no subject of human interest, except
theology, has there been so much loose writing and nebulous
speculation as on International Law." The author would
like to feel that a realistic outlook and the application to the
subject matter of established principles of legal analysis have
at least saved him from the pitfalls of "loose writing and
nebulous speculation." Beyond that he will feel amply repaid if his effort contributes something to the understanding
of an important subject which has been too casually treated
hitherto. It will be especially gratifying if the volume stimulates further research.
The bibliography, it should be noted, is not what the accepted meaning of the term implies. Perhaps it would be
better to call it a guide to the materials used. A bibliography
in the accepted sense is impossible. On the one hand, there
is next to nothing on the subject of equality in the literature
of international law which purports to be the result of special
study. On the other hand, almost every modern writer on
international law has had something to say about equality
and almost everything written is more or less relevant. The
bibliography printed with the present volume includes everything that has been of any use in connection with the study
undertaken. It is, as suggested, a guide to sources rather than
a bibliography.
This volume was written originally as a doctoral dissertation under the direction of Professor George Graf ton Wilson
of Harvard University. The author takes this occasion to
express his immeasurable debt to Professor Wilson for arousing interest in the subject, encouraging at every stage with
kindly criticism and helpful suggestion, and inspiriting with

PREFACE

PREFACE

IX

the generous enthusiasm of a great teacher. The author is

deeply indebted also to Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard

Law School for an opportunity to attend his lectures on

Roman Law in 1917-18, while the present volume was in

preparation, and for assistance in seeing the book through the

press. Further acknowledgments are due to Professor Frank

M. Anderson of Dartmouth College for helpful suggestions in

connection with the revision of the manuscript, to Miss Eliza-

beth C. Roth of Ann Arbor for a critical reading of several

of the translations from the French and the German, to Mr.

Stephen Scatori of the University of Michigan for a critical

reading of certain passages translated from the Italian, to

Dr. Hessel E. Yntema of the University of Michigan for

reading the proof of the earlier chapters, to Mr. Harold G.

Rugg of Dartmouth College for assistance in procuring books

and verifying references, to Mr. George E. Osborne of Cam-

bridge for assistance in verifying references, and to Miss May

M. McCarthy of Cambridge, whose services have been gen-

erously placed at the author's disposal by Dean Pound, and

who has read the proof and verified a host of references which
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could not be conveniently verified outside the Harvard li-

braries. A generous share of credit for any merit which the

book may have belongs to the author's wife, whose untiring

assistance in the assembling of materials, the preparation of

manuscript, and the reading of proof has made her an indis-

pensable copartner in the enterprise and companion in

research.

E. D. D.

Ann Arbor, Michigan,

April 20,1920.

the generous enthusiasm of a great teacher. The author is
deeply indebted also to Dean Roscoe Pound of the Harvard
Law School for an opportunity to attend his lectures on
Roman Law in 1917-18, while the present volume was in
preparation, and for assistance in seeing the book through the
press. Further acknowledgments are due to Professor Frank
M. Anderson of Dartmouth College for helpful suggestions in
connection with the revision of the manuscript, to Miss Elizabeth C. Roth of Ann Arbor for a critical reading of several
of the translations from the French and the German, to Mr.
Stephen Scatori of the University of Michigan for a critical
reading of certain passages translated from the Italian, to
Dr. Hessel E. Yntema of the University of Michigan for
reading the proof of the earlier chapters, to Mr. Harold G.
Rugg of Dartmouth College for assistance in procuring books
and verifying references, to Mr. George E. Osborne of Cambridge for assistance in verifying references, and to Miss May
M. McCarthy of Cambridge, whose services have been generously placed at the author's disposal by Dean Pound, and
who has read the proof and verified a host of references which
could not be conveniently verified outside the Harvard libraries. A generous share of credit for any merit which the
book may have belongs to the author's wife, whose untiring
assistance in the assembling of materials, the preparation of
manuscript, and the reading of proof has made her an indispensable copartner in the enterprise and comparuon m
research.
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THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN

INTERNATIONAL LAW

CHAPTER I

THE SOURCES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY

Equality as a Principle of Law

The word "equality " has been used in so many different

senses in the literature of politics, philosophy, and law that

it seems essential, in a study having equality for its theme,

to begin by laying down certain definitions and limitations.

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW

When the word is used with reference to the law of nations,

particularly when it is used as a term of juridical significance,

it indicates commonly either of two important legal princi-

ples. In the first place, it may mean what is perhaps best

CHAPTER I

described as the equal protection of the law or as equality

before the law. International persons are equal before the

THE SOURCES OF THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY

law when they are equally protected in the enjoyment of

their rights and equally compelled to fulfil their obligations.

This would seem to have been the significance of the remark,

made by the first French delegate at the Second Hague Con-

ference in 1907, that "each nation is a sovereign person,

equal to others in moral dignity, and having, whether small
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or great, weak or powerful, an equal claim to respect for its

rights, an equal obligation in the performance of its duties." 1

Equal protection of the law is not inconsistent with the

grouping of states into classes, each of which the law regards

differently. The legal condition of each class is its status,

1 Bourgeois, La Deux. Confer., II, 88. See also his declaration before the First

Hague Conference, La Conjer. Int., Pt. IV, p. 76, quoted infra, p. 181. Cf. Kent,

Commentaries, I, 2i.

s

EQUALITY AS A PRINCIPLE OF LAw

THE word "equality" has been used in so many different
senses in the literature of politics, philosophy, and law that
it seems essential, in a study having equality for its theme,
to begin by laying down certain definitions and limitations.
When the word is used with reference to the law of nations,
particularly when it is used as a term of juridical significance,
it indicates commonly either of two important legal principles. In the :first place, it may mean what is perhaps best
described as the equal protection of the law or as equality
before the law. International persons are equal before the
law when they are equally protected in the enjoyment of
their rights and equally compelled to fulfil their obligations.
This would seem to have been the significance of the remark,
made by the :first French delegate at the Second Hague Conference in 1907, that "each nation is a sovereign person,
equal to others in moral dignity, and having, whether small
or great, weak or powerful, an equal claim to respect for its
rights, an equal obligation in the performance of its duties." 1
Equal protection of the law is not inconsistent with the
grouping of states into classes, each of which the law regards
differently. The legal condition of each class is its status,
1 Bourgeois, La Deux. Conftr., II, 88. See also his declaration before the First
Hague Conference, IA C(lnfa. lnl., Pt. IV, p. 76, quoted infra, p. 181. Cf. Kent,
Commmtaries, I, :n.

3

4

THE IYJUALITY OF STATES

4

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

and that status is shared by each member of the class and

becomes the measure of each member's capacity for rights.

It should be noted that the word " rights " in the law of na-

tions is used very loosely to comprehend what scientific juris-

prudence would distinguish as natural, legal, and political

rights. In the second place, the word " equality" may be

used to mean an equal capacity for rights. This is com-

monly described in the law of nations as an equality of

rights and obligations, or more often simply as an equality

of rights. Here again the unscientific comprehensiveness of

the word " rights " must be noted, for it may include, not

only all that was indicated above, but the conception of

legal transactions and of legal acts as well. The equality of

states in this sense means, not that all have the same rights,

but that all are equally capable of acquiring rights, entering

into transactions, and performing acts. When used in this

significance equality may be said to constitute the negation

of status.1

It will be observed at once that there is a fundamental
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difference between these two conceptions, not only in their

meaning, but also in their importance. Equal protection of

the law or equality before the law is essential to any legal

system. In municipal law it is the alternative to an un-

guarded tyranny of magistrates. In the law of nations it is

the necessary consequence of the denial of universal empire,

and of the claim of separate states to live together in an

international society controlled by law. An equality of ca-

pacity for rights, on the other hand, is a postulate by no

means essential to the rule of law. Within reasonable limi-

tations it is commonly regarded as a desideratum, as an ideal

toward which the law should seek to develop, assuming that

1 Status and capacity are discussed in Digest, I, 5, and in Austin, Jurisprudence,

II, 683-725, and passim; Ehrlicb, Die RechtsfShigkcit; Holland, Jurisprudence,

pp. 135-145, 3Si-3S7. 395; Markby, Elements, §§ 168-180, 300; Planiol, Troitt

(lementaire de droit civil, I, §§ 419-432; Poste, Gai institutiones, Bk. I.

and that status is shared by each member of the class and
becomes the measure of each member's capacity for rights.
It should be noted that the word " rights " in the law of nations is used very loosely to comprehend what scientific jurisprudence would distinguish as natural, legal, and political
rights. In the second place, the word " equality " may be
used to mean an equal capacity for rights. This is commonly described in the law of nations as an equality of
rights and obligations, or more often simply as an equality
of rights. Here again the unscientific comprehensiveness of
the word " rights " must be noted, for it may include, not
only all that was indicated above, but the conception of
legal transactions and of legal acts as well. The equality of
states in this sense means, not that all have the same rights,
but that all are equally capable of acquiring rights, entering
into transactions, and performing acts. When used in this
significance equality may be said to constitute the negation
of status. 1
It will be observed at once that there is a fundamental
difference between these two conceptions, not only in their
meaning, but also in their importance. Equal protection of
the law or equality before the law is essential to any legal
system. In municipal law it is the alternative to an unguarded tyranny of magistrates. In the law of nations it is
the necessary consequence of the denial of universal empire,
and of the claim of separate states to live together in an
international society controlled by law. An equality of capacity for rights, on the other hand, is a postulate by no
means essential to the rule of law. Within reasonable limitations it is commonly regarded as a desideratum, as an ideal
toward which the law should seek to develop, assuming that
1 Status and capacity are discussed in Digest, I, 5, and in Austin, Jurisprudence,
II, 683-725, and passim; Ehrlich, Die Rechtsf<JhigkciJ; Holland, Jurisprudence,
pp. 135-145, '351-357, 395; Markby, Elements, H 168-18o, 300; Planiol, Traut
lltmenlaire de droit cir>il, I,§§ 41cr432; Poste, Gai institutiones, Bk. I.
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there is a certain homogeneity of characteristics among the

persons included in the number of its subjects. In systems

of municipal law history reveals that such an equality is

never present in the rudimentary stages, and is only at-

tained imperfectly as the law develops. It is a curious cir-

cumstance that in the law of nations what would seem to

be the natural course of development has been turned about.

Through the powerful influence of certain theories, to be

considered presently, an absolute equality of capacity for

rights among international persons was established as a fun-

damental postulate when the science was still in a primitive

stage. The subsequent history of international relations

shows a continuous struggle to impose limitations upon that

equality. The primary cause for this inversion of what seems

to be a normal course of development is found in the ex-

traordinary influence of text-writers upon the law of nations

in its formative period.

There is a remarkable confusion of thought and of state-

ment with reference to these two principles. Writers and
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statesmen refer frequently to equality before the law, equal

protection of the law, and equality of rights as though they

meant the same thing.1 It is rare that the distinction is

drawn clearly and with logical precision. Notwithstanding

this unfortunate confusion it is evident enough that when

publicists refer to the equality of states they usually mean

an equality of capacity for rights. Unless otherwise indi-

cated, equality is to be understood in this significance

throughout the following pages.

Sources: The Law or Nature in Antiquity

The principle that states have an equal capacity for

rights in the law of nations is a creation of the publicists.4

1 See infra, p. 104, note 2.

* It is frequently said that equality was established by the Peace of Westphalia.

On this see infra, pp. 231-233, 247-248.

there is a certain homogeneity of characteristics among the
persons included in the number of its subjects. In systems
of municipal law history reveals that such an equality is
never present in the rudimentary stages, and is only attained imperfectly as the law develops. It is a curious circumstance that in the law of nations what would seem to
be the natural course of development has been turned about.
Through the powerful influence of certain theories, to be
considered presently, an absolute equality of capacity for
rights among international persons was established as a fundamental postulate when the science was still in a primitive
stage. The subsequent history of international relations
shows a continuous struggle to impose limitations upon that
equality. The primary cause for this inversion of what seems
to be a normal course of development is found in the extraordinary influence of text-writers upon the law of nations
in its formative period.
There is a remarkable confusion of thought and of statement with reference to these two principles. Writers and
statesmen refer frequently to equality b~fore the law, equal
protection of the law, and equality of rights as though they
meant the same thing. 1 It is rare that the distinction is
drawn clearly and with logical precision. Notwithstanding
this unfortunate confusion it is evident enough that when
publicists refer to the equality of states they usually mean
an equality of capacity for rights. Unless otherwise indicated, equality is to be understood in this significance
throughout the following pages.

THE LAW OF NATURE IN ANTIQUITY
The principle that states have an equal capacity for
rights in the law of nations is a creation of the publicists.2
SOURCES:

1

See infra, p. 104, note

2.

It is frequently said that equality was established by the Peace of Westphalia.
On this see infra, pp. 231-233, 247-248.
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It had its inception in four important sources or formulating

agencies used by writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth

centuries: (a) the law of nature, (b) the idea of natural

equality, (c) the conception of the state of nature, and

(d) the analogy between natural persons and separate states

in the international society. Of these sources, the first

three had a very ancient history. The last was one of the

major premises upon which the law of nations was founded

in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The law of nature 1 was a very important part of the

common stock of mediaeval learning. It derived popularity

from the opportunities which it afforded for nice and ab-

stract speculation, and authority from the respectable an-

tiquity of its conceptions. Its place in the theory of a great

legal system had been taken for granted since the age of the

classical Roman jurists. In philosophy its history could be

traced to the sages of ancient Greece. Heraclitus and Soc-

rates suggested the theory of natural right. Its essential

idea was recognized in the writings of Plato. Among the
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Sophists, and from the Sophists until the time of Aristotle,

it provided a favorite subject for disputation.2 Aristotle

distinguished natural justice from that which is conven-

tional:

1 On the law of nature, see Brini, Jus naturale; Bryce, Studies, pp. 55(Hio6;

Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I,4-6,10-20,36-44, 71-76,82-83,102-110, and passim,

II, 28-33, 102-113, and passim, III, passim; Dunning, Political Theories, Ancient

and Mediaeval, and Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, passim; Hfly,

tiude, pp. 207 ff.; Holland, Jurisprudence, pp. 31-40; Korkunov, General Theory

of Law, pp. 116-138; Maine, Ancient law, chs. 3 and 4, and Pollock's Notes E, G,

and H; Muirhead, Law of Rome, pp. 270-273; Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom, I,

ch. 3, and passim; Pollock, in /. S. C. L. (1900) N.8., II, 418-433, and (1901) n. b.,

III, 204-213; Reeves, in A. J. I. L. (1909), III, 547-561; Ritchie, Natural Rights,

pp. 20-47; Salmond, in L. Q. R. (1895), XI, 121-143; Vaunois, De la notion

du droit natural chez Ies Romains; Voigt, Das jus naturale; Walker, History,

passim.

* On the Hellenic conception of universal law, see Bonucci, La legge comune nel

Pensiero greco; Bryce, Studies, pp. 562-569; Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom, I,

It had its inception in four important sources or formulating
agencies used by writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries: (a) the law of nature, (b) the idea of natural
equality, (c) the conception of the state of nature, and
(d) the analogy between natural persons and separate states
in the international society. Of these sources, the first
three had a very ancient history. The last was one of the
major premises upon which the law of nations was founded
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
The law of nature 1 was a very important part of the
common stock of mediaeval learning. It derived popularity
from the opportunities which it afforded for nice and abstract speculation, and authority from the respectable antiquity of its conceptions. Its place in the theory of a great
legal system had been taken for granted since the age of the
classical Roman jurists. In philosophy its history could be
traced to the sages of ancient Greece. Heraclitus and Socrates suggested the theory of natural right. Its essential
idea was recognized in the writings of Plato. Among the
Sophists, and from the Sophists until the time of Aristotle,
it provided a favorite subject for disputation. 2 Aristotle
distinguished natural justice from that which is conventional:

ch. 2; Ritchie, Natural Rights, pp. 21 ff.; Voigt, Das jus naturale, I, §§ 17-34.

1 On the law of nature, see Brini, Jus naturale; Bryce, Studies, pp. 556-fio6;
Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 4-6, 1~20, 36-441 71-761 82-83, 102-no, and passim,
II, 28-33, 102-113, and passim, III, passim; Dunning, PolUical Theories, Ancient
and Mediaeval, and Political Theorns from Luther to Monksqu~, passim,· Rely,
&ude, pp. 207 ff.; Holland, Jurisprudence, pp. 31-40; Korkunov, Gemral Theory
of Law, pp. u6-138; Maine, Ancient Law, chs. 3 and 4, and Pollock's Notes E, G,
and H; Muirhead, Law of Rome, pp. 270-273; Phillipson, lnl. Law and Custom, I,
ch. 3, and passim; Pollock, in J. S. C. L. {1900) N.B., II, 418-433, and (1901) N. s.,
III, 204-213; Reeves, in A. J. l. L. (1909), III, 547-561; Ritchie, Natural Rights,
pp. 20-47; Salmond, in L. Q. R. (18<)5), XI, 121-143; Vaunois, De la notion
du droit nalural cha les Rrnnains; Voigt, Das jus naturale; Walker, History,
passim.
1 On the Hellenic conception of universal law, see Bonucci, La legge comu~ nel
Pensiero greco; Bryce, Studies, pp. 562-569; Phillipson, Int. Law and Cush>m, I,
ch. 2; Ritchie, Natural Righls, pp. 21 ff.; Voigt, Dasjus naturale, I, H 17-34.
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Political justice is partly natural and partly conventional.

The part which is natural is that which has the same authority

everywhere, and is independent of opinion; that which is conven-

tional is such that it does not matter in the first instance whether it

takes one form or another, it only matters when it has been laid

down, . .

He divided law into that which is common, being in ac-

cordance with nature and admitted among civilized men,

Political justice is partly natural and partly conventional.
The part which is natural is that which has the same authority
everywhere, and is independent of opinion; that which is conventional is such that it does not matter in the first instance whether it
takes one form or another, it only matters when it has been laid
down, . . . 1

and that which is particular because settled by each com-

munity for itself:

Law, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar

to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to

itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that

law universal, which is conformable merely to dictates of nature; for

there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong, which,

He divided law into that which is common, being in accordance with nature and admitted among civilized men,
and that which is particular because settled by each community for itself:

in a certain degree, all intuitively divine, even should no intercourse

with each other, nor any compact have existed;. . .*

Aristotle's conception of nature included more than the

mere notion of principles of conduct admitted wherever
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there was settled government; it implied a rational design

for the universe, a design which is manifested though never

perfectly realized in the material world.3

These theories were widely discussed and diffused in the

following centuries. They were taken up and developed,

especially on the ethical side, by the Stoics.4 This school

Law, now, I understand, to be either peculiar or universal; peculiar
to be that which has been marked out by each people in reference to
itself, and that this is partly unwritten, partly written. I call that
law universal, which is conformable merely to dictates of nature; for
there does exist naturally an universal sense of right and wrong, which,
in a certain degree, all intuitively divine, even should no intercourse
with each other, nor any compact have existed; ...2

of philosophers conceived of nature in a pantheistic sense

as the embodiment of supreme universal law. They pre-

sented the law of nature as the sum of those principles which

1 Nicomachean Ethics, V, 10 (Welldon's transl.).

* Rhetoric, I, 13, 2 (Buckley's transl.). Cf. ibid., I, 10, 3.

* On Aristotle's conception of nature and universal law, see Bryce, Studies,

p. 567; Cope, Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 230-244; Pollock, in /. S.

C. L. (1900) N. 8., II, 418; Ritchie, Natural Rights, pp. 27 ff.; Voigt, Das jus

naturale, I, §§ 24-25.

4 On the law of nature in Stoic philosophy, see Arnold, Roman Stoicism; Bryce,

Studies, p. 568; Pollock, in /. 5. C. L. (1900) n. s., II, 419; Ritchie, Natural

Rights, pp. 33 ff.; Voigt, Das jus naturale, I, §§ 27-28.

Aristotle's conception of nature included more than the
mere notion of principles of conduct admitted wherever
there was settled government; it implied a rational design
for the universe, a design 'vhich is manifested though never
perfectly realized in the material world. 3
These theories were widely discussed and diffused in the
following centuries. They were taken up and developed,
especially on the ethical side, by the Stoics. 4 This school
of philosophers conceived of nature in a pantheistic sense
as the embodiment of supreme universal law. They presented the law of nature as the sum of those principles which
Nicomachean Elhics, V, 10 (Welldon's transl.).
Rhetoric, I, 13 1 2 (Buckley's transl.) . Cf. ibid., I, 10, 3.
~ On Aristotle's conception of nature and universal law, see Bryce, Studies,
p. 567; Cope, lnJ.roduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, pp. 23()-244; Pollock, in J . S .
C. L. (I<)OO) N. s., II, 418; Ritchie, Nat1miJ Rights, pp. 27 fl.; Voigt, Das jus
naturale, I, §§ 24-25 .
• On the law of nature in Stoic philosophy, see Arnold, Roman Stoicism; Bryce,
Stud~, p. 568; Pollock, in J. S. C. L. (1900) N. s., II, 419; Ritchie, Natural
Rig/JJs, pp. 33 ff.; Voigt, Das jus nalurale, I,§§ 27- 28.
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are founded in human nature, and which determine the

conduct befitting man as a rational and social being. The

ideal life was the life in conformity with these principles.

From the practical point of view such conformity was to be

sought through the cultivation of human reason. The

Stoics recognized the difference between the ideal character

of society and its actually existing institutions. Their ideal

continued to be valid; but they realized that human life

would be impossible without the existence of institutions

and rules of law which, although far from perfect, were

necessary if men were to lead an orderly life and progress

towards the ideal.

The conception of natural right founded upon reason at-

tained a mature development in the teachings of Stoicism.

During the last days of the Republic it found its way to

Rome, where Cicero,1 pupil of Posidonius, made it the

source and foundation of the highest law.2 Although Cicero

would hardly have described himself as a Stoic, the appeal

to the feelings implanted by God and nature in the heart of

every man, to the common sense or the universal opinion of
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mankind, was the very essence of his teaching. In Greek

philosophy the emphasis had been placed upon the meta-

physical and moral aspects of the idea of nature. In Roman

thought, as represented by Cicero, the notion was brought

into more intimate relationship with law in the sense of rules

of human conduct. Cicero's law of nature came from God,3

and was inborn in men.4 It was older than the ages,6 was

everywhere the same,6 and was permanent and immutable.

1 "Cicero is a political writer of great interest, not because he possesses any

great originality of mind, or any great power of political analysis, but rather be-

cause, in the eclectic fashion of an amateur philosopher, he sums up the common-

places of the political theory of his time." Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 3.

1 De legibus, I, 6-16; De republica, III, 22. Among secondary authorities, see

Bryce, Studies, p. 575; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, ch. 1; Gasquy, Ciceron juris-

consult*; Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 36; Voigt, Das jus naiuraie, I, §§ 27-28.

• De legibus, I, 7. 4 Ibid., I, 10. » Ibid., I, 6. 'Ibid., 1,12.

are founded in human nature, and which determine the
conduct befitting man as a rational and social being. The
ideal life was the life in conformity with these principles.
From the practical point of view such conformity was to be
sought through the cultivation of human reason. The
Stoics recognized the difference between the ideal character
of society and its actually existing institutions. Their ideal
continued to be valid; but they realized that human life
would be impossible without the existence of institutions
and rules of law which, although far from perfect, were
necessary if men were to lead an orderly life and progress
towards the ideal.
The conception of natural right founded upon reason attained a mature development in the teachings of Stoicism.
During the last days of the Republic it found its way to
Rome, where Cicero,1 pupil of Posidonius, made it the
source and foundation of the highest law. 2 Although Cicero
would hardly have described himself as a Stoic, the appeal
to the feelings implanted by God and nature in the heart of
every man, to the common sense or the universal opinion of
mankind, was the very essence of his teaching. In Greek
philosophy the emphasis had been placed upon the metaphysical and moral aspects of the idea of nature. In Roman
thought, as represented by Cicero, the notion was brought
into more intimate relationship with law in the sense of rules
of human conduct. Cicero's law of nature came from God,3
and was inborn in men.4 It was older than the ages,6 was
everywhere the same,6 and was permanent and immutable.
1 " Cicero is a political writer of great inteust, not because he possesses any
great originality of mind, or any great power of political analysis, but rather because, in the eclectic fashion of an amateur philosopher, he sums up the commonplaces of the political theory of his ti.me." Carlyle, Mra. Pol. Theory, I, 3.
2 De legibus, I, 6-16; De republica , III, 22. Among secondary authorities, see
Bryce, Sludies, p. 575; Carlyle, Mra. Pol. Tkory, I, ch. 1; Gasquy, Cictronjurisconsulk; Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 36; Voigt, Das jus nalurale, I, H 27-28.
4 Ibid., I, 10.
6 Ibid., I, 6.
1 De legibus, I, 7.
• Ibid., I, 12.
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In a passage in De republico, preserved by Lactantius,

Cicero is quoted as having said:

True law is, indeed, right reason, conformable to nature, pervading

In a passage in De republica, preserved by Lactantius,
Cicero is quoted as having said:

all things, constant, eternal; it incites to duty by commanding, and

deters from crime by forbidding; it does not by its behest command

or deter good men, nor appeal to bad men, in vain. It is not lawful to

alter this law, to derogate from it, or to repeal it. Nor can we possibly

be absolved from this law, either by the senate or the people; nor is

any other explanation or interpretation of it to be found; nor will it

be one law for Rome and another for Athens; one thing today and

another tomorrow; but it is a law eternal and unchangeable for all

people and in every age; and it becomes as it were, the one common

god, master and governor of all. Reason is the author, publisher, and

proposer of this law; he who does not share this sentiment flies from

himself and nature as a man despised; and deserves the severest

punishments, even if he escape the penalty of death which may be

deserved.1

Here is the first distinct formulation of the idea of natural

law in the very form in which it survived in mediaeval
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thought. For Cicero it furnished the basis of all morality

and the ideal for positive law. It was an ethereal principle,

beyond all the actual laws and customs of men, a supreme

and permanent law to which all human order should strive

to conform.

The Law of Nature in the Legal System of Rome

True law is, indeed, right reason, conformable to nature, pervading
all things, constant, eternal; it incites to duty by commanding, and
deters from crime by forbidding; it does not by its behest command
or deter good men, nor appeal to bad men, in vain. It is not lawful to
alter this law, to derogate from it, or to repeal it. Nor can we possibly
be absolved from this law, either by the senate or the people; nor is
any other explanation or interpretation of it to be found; nor will it
be one law for Rome and another for Athens; one thing today and
another tomorrow; but it is a law eternal and unchangeable for all
people and in every age; and it becomes as it were, the one common
god, master and governor of all. Reason is the author, publisher, and
proposer of this law; he who does not share this sentiment flies from
himself and nature as a man despised; and deserves the severest
punishments, even if he escape the penalty of death which may be
deserved. 1

This idea of the law of nature as the source of morality

and the true ideal for all civil laws came to pervade the

minds of thinking men, whatever their philosophy might be.

Similar doctrines were taught by Seneca at the beginning of

the Christian era.2 It was his opinion that

no good can be without reason; and reason always follows nature.

What then is reason? The imitation of nature. And what is the sum-

1 De republica, III, 22 (Hardingham's transl.).

1 De beneficiis, III, 18; IV, 7-8, and passim; Ad Lucilium cpistularum moraiium,

Epiat. 25, 48, 50. 72,120.

Here is the first distinct formulation of the idea of natural
law in the very form in which it survived in mediaeval
thought. For Cicero it furnished the basis of all morality
and the ideal for positive law. It was an ethereal principle,
beyond all the actual laws and customs of men, a supreme
and permanent law to which all human order should strive
to conform.

Tm: LAW OF NATURE IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF RoME
This idea of the law of nature as the source of morality
and the true ideal for all civil laws came to pervade the
minds of thinking men, whatever their philosophy might be.
Similar doctrines were taught by Seneca at the beginning of
the Christian era. 2 It was his opinion that
no good can be without reason; and reason always follows nature.
Wiza# then is reason? The imitation of nature. And what is the sum1
1

De republica, III, :z:z (Hanlingham's transl.).
D. beMjiciis, III, 18; IV, 7-8, and passim," Ad LuciliuM eflislularum 1n0ralium,

Epist.

25,

48,

501 72, 120.
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mum bonum, or chief good of man? The behaving himself agreeably

to the dictates of nature.1

mum bonum, or chief good of man ? The behaving himself agreeably
to the dictates of nature. 1

It was chiefly through Cicero's graceful Latin and the teach-

ing of Seneca that the conception of the law of nature passed

from philosophy into Roman juristic speculation. The

greatest of the Roman jurists were of Stoic tendencies.

They gave the characteristic doctrines of the Stoic philos-

ophy a juristic application as well as a clearness and pre-

cision which had been wholly lacking in the days of Cicero.2

And so the universal law of the philosophers became the

speculative jus naturaie of the Roman jurists, a body of ideal

principles supposed to be characterized by universal appli-

cability to all men, among all peoples, and in all ages, and

by their correspondence with an innate conviction of right.3

This transition from Stoic philosophy to juristic specu-

lation was made easier by the existence at Rome of the jus

gentium,4 an important body of case law which had been

growing up in the praetorian edicts for more than two cen-

turies before the Christian era. Originally the jus gen-
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tium had been the practical outcome of the necessity that

pressed upon the Romans to provide rules of law for the

settlement of disputes between Roman citizens and aliens,

and between aliens and aliens. Some of its principles were

influenced by usages prevailing among other peoples, par-

ticularly among the Greeks, but for the most part it was

1 Epist. 66 (Morell's transl.).

2 See Laferriere, L'influence du stoicisme sur la doctrine desjurisconsultes romoins,

in Memoires de l'academie des sciences moral et politiques (1860), X, 579-685.

* Voigt, Das jus naturaie, I, § 59.

4 On the jus gentium, see Bryce, Studies, pp. 570-575; Clark, Practical Juris-

prudence, pp. 353-363; Cuq, Les institutions juridiques des Remains, I, 487-491;

Rarlowa, Romische Rechtsgeschichte, I, 451-458; Mitteis, Romisches Privatrechi,

pp. 62-72; Moyle, Institutes, pp. 26-43; Muirhead, Law of Rome, pp. 215 ff.;

Nettleship, in Journal of Philology (1885), XIII, 169-181; Phillipson, Int. Law

and Custom, I, ch. 3; Poste, Gat institutiones, pp. 1-4; Sherman, in A. J. I. L.

(1918), XII, 56-63; Sohm, Institutes, pp. 64 ff.; Voigt, Das jus naturaie, I, §§ 13-

15, 79-98, and passim; Westlake, Collected Papers, pp. 18-21.

It was chiefly through Cicero's graceful Latin and the teaching of Seneca that the conception of the law of nature passed
from philosophy into Roman juristic speculation. The
greatest of the Roman jurists were of Stoic tendencies.
They gave the characteristic doctrines of the Stoic philosophy a juristic application as well as a clearness and precision which had been wholly lacking in the days of Cicero.2
And so the universal law of the philosophers became the
speculative jus naturale of the Roman jurists, a body of ideal
principles supposed to be characterized by universal applicability to all men, among all peoples, and in all ages, and
by their correspondence with an innate conviction of right. 3
This transition from Stoic philosophy to juristic speculation was made easier by the existence at Rome of the jus
gentium,4 an important body of case law which had been
growing up in the praetorian edicts for more than two centuries before the Christian era. Originally the jus gentium had been the practical outcome of the necessity that
pressed upon the Romans to provide rules of law for the
settlement of disputes between Roman citizens and aliens,
and between aliens and aliens. Some of its principles were
influenced by usages prevailing among other peoples, particularly among the Greeks, but for the most part it was
Epist. 66 (Morell's transl.).
See Laferriere, L'influence du stoicisme sur la doclrine des jurisconsultes romains,
in M~moires de l'academie des sciences moral et politiques (1860), X, 579-685.
a Voigt, Das jus naturale, I, § 59.
' On the jtts gentium, see Bryce, Studies, pp. 570--575; Clark, Practical Jurisprnaence, pp. 353-363; Cuq, Les institutions j uridiques des Roma ins, I, 487-491;
Karlowa, Romische RecJusgeschichU, I, 451- 458; Mitteis, Romisches Privatreclil,
pp. 62-72; Moyle, Institutes, pp. 26-43; Muirhead, Law of Rome, pp. 215 ff.;
Nettleship, in J01trnal of Philology (1885), XIII, i&)-181; Phillipson, Int. Law
and Custom, I, ch. 3; Poste, Cai instituliones, pp. i-4; Sherman, in A. J. I. L.
(1918), XII, 56-63; Sohm, Institutes, pp. 64 ff.; Voigt, Das j1'5 n<Jturale, I,§§ 1315, 7~8, and passim; Westlake, Colkcted Papers, pp. i8-21.
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pure Roman law mitigated by the praetor's idea of what

was equitable and just. Long before the notion of natural

law was borrowed from the philosophers the^ws gentium had

attained a high stage of development, and had commenced

to influence the old law of Rome and the administration of

Roman courts in the provinces. While the edict of the alien

praetor made its liberal principles law for aliens, its precepts

were gradually transferred to regulate the mutual inter-

course of citizens by means of the city praetor's edict and

the writings of the jurists. Because of its equitable char-

acter, compared with the stricter rules of the jus civile, the

jus gentium came to be regarded as a kind of universal law

for all mankind, a law established by natural reason among

all men. Thus, according to Gaius,

The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are

partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules

established by a given state for its own members are peculiar to itself,

and are called jus civile; the rules constituted by natural reason for

all are observed by all nations alike, and are called jus gentium.1
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This did not alter the character of the jus gentium as a part

of the positive and private law of Rome. It was simply as-

sumed that because of its inherent reasonableness it must

pure Roman law mitigated by the praetor's idea of what
was equitable and just. Long before the notion of natural
law was borrowed from the philosophers the jus gentium had
attained a high stage of development, and had commenced
to influence the old law of Rome and the administration of
Roman courts in the provinces. While the edict of the alien
praetor made its liberal principles law for aliens, its precepts
were gradually transferred to regulate the mutual intercourse of citizens by means of the city praetor's edict and
the writings of the jurists. Because of its equitable character, compared with the stricter rules of the jus civile, the
jus gentium came to be regarded as a kind of universal law
for all mankind, a law established by natural reason among
all men. Thus, according to Gaius,

be in accord in its fundamental conceptions with the positive

and private law of other peoples.

It was easy for jurists, in the course of this progressive

liberalization of the Roman Law, to see a relationship be-

tween the working system with which they were familiar

and the theoretical law of nature of the philosophers.2 What

1 Gaius, Institutes, I, i (Poste's transl.). Cf. Justinian's Institutes, I, 2, 2;

Digest, I, i, 1, 4; I, 1, 5; I, 1, 9.

The laws of every people governed by statutes and customs are
partly peculiar to itself, partly common to all mankind. The rules
established by a given state for its own members are peculiar to itself,
and are called jus civile; the rules constituted by natural reason for
all are observed by all nations alike, and are called jus gentium.1

s On the relation between jus naturale and jus gentium, see Bryce, Studies, pp.

575-586; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-54, 71-77; Dunning, Political Theory,

Ancient and Mediaeval, pp. 126-120; Nettleship, in lournal of Philology (1885),

XIII, 179-181; Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom, I, ch. 3; Pollock, in J. S. C. L.

(1900) N. b., II, 420; Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 36; Voigt, Das jus naturale, I,

§§ 42, 89-96, and passim; Walker, History, p. 152, and passim.

This did not alter the character of the jus gentium as a part
of the positive and private law of Rome. It was simply assumed that because of its inherent reasonableness it must
be in accord in its fundamental conceptions with the positive
and private law of other peoples.
It was easy for jurists, in the course of this progressive
liberalization of the Roman Law, to see a relationship between the working system with which they were familiar
and the theoretical law of nature of the philosophers.2 What
1 Gaius, Institutes, I, 1 (Poste's transl.). Cf. Justinian's Institutes, I, 2, 2;
Digest, I, 1, 1, 4; I, 1, 5; I, 1, 9.
2 On the relation betweenjtlS naturale and jus gentiilm, see Bryce, Studies, pp.
575-586; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-54, 71-77; Dunning, Political Theory,
Ancient and Mediaeval, pp. 126-129; Nettleship, in Jo11rnal of Phil-Ology (1885),
XIII, 179-181; Phillipson, Int. Law and Custom, I, ch. 3; Pollock, in J. S. C. L.
(H)OO) N. s., II, 420; Ritchie, Nat1u-al Rights, p. 36; Voigt, Das jus naturale, I,
H 42, 8cr96, and passim; Walker, Hislor'J, p. 152, and passim.
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could be more natural than that the latter should furnish

the ideal foundation for the former. The substance of the

jus gentium, when actually applied in practice, was thought

to harmonize in greater part with the precepts of natural

justice. It is easy to see how its theory would tend to co-

alesce with that of the jus naturale, once the latter had

found its way from Greek philosophy into the minds of

Roman lawyers. The jus naturale came to represent the

ideal, what ought to be established; the^MS gentium repre-

sented the real, what was universally established. The

principles of the former could hardly be expected to exist

in universal practice, but they were in any case to be desired.

The latter was positive law, enforced everywhere in the

Roman Empire, and conceived of as common to all man-

kind. As the two systems apparently converged towards

the same goal there was a tendency to call one by the name

of the other. Cicero came very near to suggesting such an

identity. Gaius in the second century impliedly recognized

it as complete.1 A group of jurists at the beginning of the
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third century, however, denied a complete identification.

It is a significant circumstance that the appearance in

Roman juristic writings of this disposition to distinguish

us gentium and jus naturale corresponds in point of time

with the appearance of certain new phrases about human

1 Institutes, I, i, incorporated in Justinian's Digest, I, 1, 9. This passage from

Gaius has been taken frequently as authority for the proposition that there was no

real distinction between the jus gentium and the jus naturale in Roman Law. See

Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, 1, notes 1 and 4; Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23,

note 3; Blackstone, Commentaries, Introd., I, 43; Taylor, Summary of Roman

Law, p. 53. Sir Henry Maine gave popular currency to this interpretation in the

nineteenth century, particularly among English and American writers. Ancient

Law, p. 55. See Lawrence, Essays, p. 196; Lawrence, Int. Law, p. 39; Salmond, in

L. Q. R. (1895), XI, 129; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 2, 22, 76; Westlake, Collected

Papers, pp. 22, 47. More recent investigation has discredited this interpretation

and has done much to clear up one of the most difficult points in Roman legal theory.

See Bryce, Studies, pp. 583-585; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-54; Voigt, Das

jus naturale, I, §§ 42, 89-96, 100, and passim. See the explanation for the above

passage from Gaius in Kniep, Gai institutionum, I, 90 ff.

could be more natural than that the latter should furnish
the ideal foundation for the former. The substance of the
jus gentium, when actually applied in practice, was thought
to harmonize in greater part with the precepts of natural
justice. It is easy to see how its theory would tend to coalesce with that of the jus natural.e, once the latter had
found its way from Greek philosophy into the minds of
Roman lawyers. The jus naturale came to represent the
ideal, what ought to be established; the jus gentium represented the real, what was universally established. The
principles of the former could hardly be expected to exist
in universal practice, but they were in any case to be desired.
The latter was positive law, enforced everywhere in the
Roman Empire, and conceived of as common to all mankind. As the two systems apparently converged towards
the same goal there was a tendency to call one by the name
of the other. Cicero came very near to suggesting such an
identity. Gaius in the second century impliedly recognized
it as complete.1 A group of jurists at the beginning of the
third century, however, denied a complete identification.
It is a significant circumstance that the appearance in
Roman juristic writings of this disposition to distinguish
us gentium and jus natural.e corresponds in point of time
with the appearance of certain new phrases about human
1 Institutes, I, 1 1 incorporated in Justinian's Digest, I, 1, 9. This passage from
Gaius has been taken frequently as authority for the proposition that there was no
real distinction between the jus gentium and the jus nalurale in Roman Law. See
Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, 1, notes 1 and 4; Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23,
note 3; Blackstone, Commentaries, Introd., I, 43; Taylor, Summary of Roman
Law, p. 53. Sir Henry Maine gave popular currency to this interpretation in the
nineteenth century, particularly among English and American writers. Ancien#
Law, p. 55. See Lawrence, Essays, p. 196; Lawrence, Int. Law, p. 39; Salmond, in
L. Q. R. (1895), XI, 129; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 2, 22, 76; Westlake, Collected
Papers, pp. 22 1 47. More recent investigation has discredited this interpretation
and has done much to clear up one of the most difficult points in Roman legal theory.
See Bryce, Studies, pp. 583-585; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-54; Voigt, Das
jus naturale, I, H 42, 8c)-96, 100, and passim. See the explanation for the above
passage from Gaius in Kniep, Gai institutionum, I, 90 ff.
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nature and with the dogmatic assertion of the natural liberty

and equality of men.1

The Idea of Natural Equality in Antiquity

nature and with the dogmatic assertion of the natural liberty
and equality of men.1

The origin of the idea of natural equality is lost in the

THE IDEA

obscurity that prevails with reference to the period between

Aristotle and Cicero. Somewhere in that period there oc-

curred at least one decisive change in political thinking, a

change that is of profound significance in connection with

the present subject. Aristotle taught the natural inequality

of human nature. "But is there a slave by nature," he

queried, and his answer was affirmative:

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and

for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not

all slavery a violation of nature?

There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both

Of reason and of fact. Fnj that wmf should rule, g,nd "thers he

ruledjs a thing. not only necessary, but expedientj_from the hour of

tbgir birth, iome are marked out for subjection, others for-rule.

... It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others

OF NATURAL EQUALITY IN ANTIQUITY

The origin of the idea of natural equality is lost in the
obscurity that prevails with reference to the period between
Aristotle and Cicero. Somewhere in that period there occurred at least one decisive change in political thinking, a
change that is of profound significance in connection with
the present subject. Aristotle taught the natural ineguallty
of human nature. "But is there a slave by nature," he
queried, and his answer was affirmative:
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slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.*

Cicero, on the other hand, proclaimed the natural equal-

ity of mankind:

For there is no one thing so like or so equal to another, as in every

instance man is to man. And if the corruption of customs, and the

variation of opinions, did not induce an imbecility of minds, and turn

them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly re-

semble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore,

whatever definition we give of man, will be applicable to the whole

human race. And this is a good argument that there is no dissimi-

larity of kind among men; because if this were the case, one defini-

tion could not include all men.

In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over

But is there any one thus intended by nature to be a slave, and
for whom such a condition is expedient and right, or rather is not
all slavery a violation of nature?
There is no difficulty in answering this question, on grounds both
of reason and of fact. £.gr that same should_.rule.. and others J:>e
ruled is a thing, not only nece_ssazy.. b.u_t_~ie~~_i__[rom the .b.our_of
their birth, some are....marked out ioI subjection, otherUoi: .rule.
. . . It is clear, then, that some men are by nature free, and others
slaves, and that for these latter slavery is both expedient and right.2

--

beasts, by means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and

1 Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 45.

» Politics, I, 5 (Jowett's transl.).

Cicero, on the other hand, proclaimed the natural equality of mankind:
For there is no one thing so like or so equal to another, as in every
instance man is to man. And if the corruption of customs, and the
variation of opinions, did not induce an imbecility of minds, and tum
them aside from the course of nature, no one would more nearly resemble himself than all men would resemble all men. Therefore,
whatever definition we give of man, will be applicable to the whole
human race. And this is a good argument that there is no dissimilarity of kind among men; because if this were the case, one definition could not include all men.
In fact, reason, which alone gives us so many advantages over
beasts, by ·means of which we conjecture, argue, refute, discourse, and
1
2

Carlyle, Med. Pvl. Theory, I, 45•
PolUics, I, s Uowett's transl.).
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accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men;

for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds,

though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the

same senses we all perceive the same objects, and those things which

move the senses at all, do move in the same way the senses of all men.

And those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before

observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly im-

pressed upon all men; and that faculty of speech which is the inter-

preter of the mind, agrees in the ideas which it conveys, though it may

differ in the words by which it expresses them. And therefore there

exists not a man in any nation, who, if he adopts nature for his guide,

may not arrive at virtue.1

Thus Cicero distinguished the true or ideal character of man

from the actual. He maintained the theory of natural

human equality, but realized that account must be taken

of the actual facts of human diversity and corruption.2

accomplish and conclude our designs, is assuredly common to all men;
for the faculty of acquiring knowledge is similar in all human minds,
though the knowledge itself may be endlessly diversified. By the
same senses we all perceive the same objects, and those things which
move the senses at all, do move in the same way the senses of all men.
And those first rude elements of intelligence which, as I before
observed, are the earliest developments of thought, are similarly impressed upon all men; and that faculty of speech which is the interpreter of the mind, agrees in the ideas which it conveys, though it may
differ in the words by which it expresses them. And therefore there
exists not a man in any nation, who, if he adopts nature for his guide,
may not arrive at virtue. 1

Under the early Empire Seneca developed Cicero's con-

ception of natural equality in somewhat greater detail.3

Unus omnium parens mundus est, he declared, and those who
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denied the natural capacity of slaves he denounced as ig-

norant of human right. To the notion of natural equality,

Seneca added the conception of a primitive state of nature

in which men were innocent and happy.4 This enabled him

to draw out somewhat more sharply the distinction between

the conditions suitable to man in a state of natural equality

and those made necessary by the actual corruption of human

nature. He regarded the great institutions of society —

property, slavery, and government — as the consequences

of and remedies for human corruption. They were good as

remedies, but not properly to be considered as good in them-

selves. "It can scarcely be doubted," remarks Mr. A. J.

Carlyle of the theories represented by Cicero and Seneca,

1 De legibus, I, 10 (Barham's transl.). See Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, ch. 1.

1 De legibus, I, 12.

* De beneficiis, III, 18; III, 20; III, 28; Ad Lucilium epistularum moraUum,

Epist. 47. See Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, ch. 2.

4 Epist., 90.

Thus Cicero distinguished the true or ideal character of man
from the actual. He maintained the theory of natural
human equality, but realized that account must be taken
of the actual facts of human diversity and corruption.2
Under the early Empire Seneca developed Cicero's conception of natural equality in somewhat greater detail. 3
Unus omnium parens mundus est, he declared, and those who
denied the natural capacity of slaves he denounced as ignorant of human right. To the notion of natural equality,
Seneca added the conception of a primitive state of nature
in which men were innocent and happy.4 This enabled him
to draw out somewhat more sharply the distinction between
the conditions suitable to man in a state of natural equality
and those made necessary by the actual corruption of human
nature. He regarded the great institutions of societyproperty, slavery, and government- as the consequences
of and remedies for human corruption. They were good as
remedies, but not properly to be considered as good in themselves. "It can scarcely be doubted," remarks Mr. A. J.
Carlyle of the theories represented by Cicero and Seneca,
De kgibus, I, 10 (Barham's transl.). Sec Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, ch. x.
De legib11s, I, 12.
a De bemficiis, III, 18; III, 20; III, 28; Ad Lucilium epistularum mMalium,
Epist. 47. See Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, ch. :z.
' Epist., 90.
i
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"that we have here presented to us the foundation of those

dogmatic statements of the lawyers like Ulpian and Floren-

tinus, in which all men are presented to us as being by na-

ture free, by nature equal." 1 It seems equally certain that

we are here very close to the origin of that conception of

natural equality which writers of the seventeenth century

were to translate into the theory of the law of nations and

apply to separate states.

The Idea of Natural Equality in the

Legal System of Rome

The idea of natural equality followed the conception of

the law of nature into the speculations of the Roman jurists

and ultimately became one of the fundamental postulates of

"that we have here presented to us the foundation of those
dogmatic statements of the lawyers like Ulpian and Florentinus, in which all men are presented to us as being by nature free, by nature equal." 1 It seems equally certain that
we are here very close to the origin of that conception of
natural equality which writers of the seventeenth century
were to translate into the theory of the law of nations and
apply to separate states.

the jus naturale. It helped to accentuate the essentially

THE

ideal character of that body of principles, and checked the

tendency which had appeared in some of the earlier jurists

IDEA OF NATURAL EQUALITY IN THE
LEGAL SYSTEM OF ROME

to identify those principles with the rules of the jus gentium.

Later jurists clearly opposed the jus gentium to the jus natu-

rale on at least one point of profound importance. Slavery
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was universal in the ancient world and so must be regarded

as part of the jus gentium; but it was contrary to the jus

naturale, for by the law of nature all men should be free and

equal. The distinction was stated explicitly by Ulpian, who

declared that "by natural law all were born free," while

"slavery came in through the jus gentium." 2 Florentinus

said:

Slavery is a creation of the jus gentium, by which a man is sub-

jected, contrary to nature, to ownership on the part of another.3

And Tryphoninus made the same distinction:

Liberty we know exists in virtue of natural law and command over

men was introduced by the law of the world (jus gentium), . . .*

1 Med. Pol. Theory, I, 9. • Ibid., I, 5, 4 (Monro's transl.).

* Digest, I, x, 4. * Ibid., XII, 6, 64 (Monro's transl.).

The idea of natural equality followed the conception of
the law of nature into the speculations of the Roman jurists
and ultimately became one of the fundamental postulates of
the jus naturale. It helped to accentuate the essentially
ideal character of that body of principles, and checked the
tendency which had appeared in some of the earlier jurists
to identify those principles with the rules of the jus gentium.
Later jurists clearly opposed the jus gentium to the jus naturale on at least one point of profound importance. Slavery
was universal in the ancient world and so must be regarded
as part of the jus gentium; but it was contrary to the jus
natural-e, for by the law of nature all men should be free and
equal. The distinction was stated explicitly by Ulpian, who
declared that "by natural law all were born free," while
"slavery came in through the jus gentium." 2 Florentinus
said:
Slavery is a creation of the jus gentium, by which a man is subjected, contrary to nature, to ownership on the part of another.3

And Tryphoninus made the same distinction:
Liberty we know exists in virtue of natural law and command over
men was introduced by the law of the world (jus gentium), ...4
1

Med. Pol. Theory, I, 9.

1

Digest, I,

1,

4.

' Ibid., I, 5, 4 (Monro's transl.).
• Ibid., XII, 6, 64 (Monro's transl.).
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In Ulpian's famous phrase, quod ad jus naturale attinet, om-

nes homines cequales sunt} Through Ulpian, Tryphoninus,

and Florentinus, at the beginning of the third century, the

theory of the natural equality of men passed into the system

of the Roman Law.2 It became the goal of the law's de-

velopment, an ideal never perfectly attained but still to be

desired.

The maxim of equality had never been denned with any

great precision by the philosophers. In a general way they

seem to have had in mind an equality of capacity for learn-

ing, virtue, or natural rights. For the lawyers of Rome the

idea had a significance which can be stated somewhat defi-

nitely; their ideal of equality was an equality of capacity

for legal rights. The old jus civile had contained many ar-

bitrary distinctions between classes of persons.3 When the

later jurists declared that omnes homines (equales sunt they

intended to affirm that under the ideal jus naturale, and in

so far as positive law approximated to it, these arbitrary

distinctions were swept away. The conflict which they dis-

covered on the subject of slavery illustrates the point. In-
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equalities of condition like slavery were contrary to the law

of nature and could only be justified by positive law. The

opinions held by the later jurists were embodied in the Cor-

pus Juris Civilis. So also were certain confusing extracts from

Gaius. By the time of Justinian, however, equality in the

Roman Law had acquired that significance which it retained

throughout the Middle Ages. The jus naturale had come to

mean a body of ideal principles which men could rationally

apprehend and which included the perfect standards of

1 Digest, L, 17, 32. "Quod attinet ad jus civile, servi pro nullis habentur; non

tamen et jure naturali, quia, quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines sequales

sunt."

1 Institutes, I, 2, 2. On slavery in Roman Law, see Bryce, Studies, p. 583;

Buckland, Roman Law of Slavery; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-54, 71-77.

* See Poste, Gat institutiones, §§ 9 ff.

In Ulpian's famous phrase, quod ad jus natural.e attinet, omnes homines <Equal.es sunt.1 Through Ulpian, Tryphoninus,
and Florentinus, at the beginning of the third century, the
theory of the natural equality of men passed into the system
of the Roman Law.2 It became the goal of the law's development, an ideal never perfectly attained but still to be
desired.
The maxim of equality had never been defined with any
great precision by the philosophers. In a general way they
seem to have had in mind an equality of capacity for learning, virtue, or natural rights. For the lawyers of Rome the
idea had a significance which can be stated somewhat definitely; their ideal of equality was an equality of capacity
for legal rights. The old jus civile had contained many arbitrary distinctions between classes of persons.3 When the
later jurists declared that omnes homines <Equal.es sunt they
intended to affirm that under the ideal jus natural.e, and in
so far as positive law approximated to it, these arbitrary
distinctions were swept away. The conflict which they discovered on the subject of slavery illustrates the point. Inequalities of condition like slavery were contrary to the law
of nature and could only be justified by positive law. The
opinions held by the later jurists were embodied in the Corpus Juris Civilis. So also were certain confusing extracts from
Gaius. By the time of Justinian, however, equality in the
Roman Law had acquired that significance which it retained
throughout the Middle Ages. The jus natural.e had come to
mean a body of ideal principles which men could rationally
apprehend and which included the perfect standards of
1 Digest, L, x7, 32. "Quod attinet ad jus civile, servi pro nullis habentur; non
tamen et jure naturali, quia, quod ad jus naturale attinet, omnes homines requales
sunt."
2 /nstituks, I, :z, :z.
On slavery in Roman Law, see Bryce, Sllldies, p. 583;
Buckland, Roman Law of Slavery; Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theury, I, 36-54, 71-77.
1 See Poste, Gai institutiones, H 9 ff.
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right conduct and justice. Equality by the jus naturale was

an ideal norm of theoretical perfection meaning an equality

of capacity for rights. From Rome the idea of natural equal-

ity passed to the cloistered scholars of the Middle Ages.

The Law of Nature and Natural Equality in

Patristic Writings

Similar conceptions in slightly different guise were trans-

right conduct and justice. Equality by the jus natural.e was
an ideal norm of theoretical perfection meaning an equality
of capacity for rights. From Rome the idea of natural equality passed to the cloistered scholars of the Middle Ages.

mitted to the Middle Ages by the Fathers of the Christian

Church.1 The Greek theory of natural law obtained a

THE

prominent place in theology at the very beginning of the

LAW OF NATURE AND NATURAL EQUALITY IN

Christian era. St. Paul's conception of law written in the

PATRISTIC WRITINGS

hearts of men 2 was not unlike Cicero's law universal. At

any rate his words were taken in that sense by the early

Fathers. The theories of Cicero and the later philosophers

were adopted by the Fathers with only such changes of de-

tail as were convenient for the teaching of Christianity.

Nature was identified with God, and the law of nature with

the unwritten law of God. The theory of natural law be-

came a commonplace of patristic thought.3

The early Church held also a conception of human equal-
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ity which was quite similar to that of contemporary philos-

ophy. Faith in Jesus was made the primary test, and in this

faith there were no distinctions of rich or poor, high or low,

free or slave. So there developed among the lowly classes a

notion of equality which coincided in many respects with

the theory which Stoicism was propagating at the social

apex. As Christianity spread upward its way was made

easier by the Stoic conception of the identity of human na-

ture over all the world. The prevalence of this theory is

suggested by the treatment of slavery in the New Testa-

1 The best secondary account in English is in Carlyle, Med. Pol. Theory, I, 82-

89, 102-124. The author is indebted to this work for many valuable references.

'Romans, II, 12 ff.

'See St. Isidore of Seville, Elymologiarum, V, 2 and 4.

Similar conceptions in slightly different guise were transmitted to the Middle Ages by the Fathers of the Christian
Church.1 The Greek theory of natural law obtained a
prominent place in theology at the very beginning of the
Christian era. St. Paul's conception of law written in the
hearts of men 2 was not unlike Cicero's law universal. At
any rate his words were taken in that sense by the early
Fathers. The theories of Cicero and the later philosophers
were adopted by the Fathers with only such changes of detail as were convenient for the teaching of Christianity.
Nature was identified with God, and the law of nature with
the unwritten law of God. The theory of natural law became a commonplace of patristic thought. 3
The early Church held also a conception of human equality which was quite similar to that of contemporary philosophy. Faith in Jesus was made the primary test, and in this
faith there were no distinctions of rich or poor, high or low,
free or slave. So there developed among the lowly classes a
notion of equality which coincided in many respects with
the theory which Stoicism was propagating at the social
apex. As Christianity spread upward its way was made
easier by the Stoic conception of the identity of human nature over all the world. The prevalence of this theory is
suggested by the treatment of slavery in the New Testa1

The best secondary account in :English is in Carlyle, Med. Pol. T/teQry, I, 82-

ScJ, 1o:z-124. The author is indebted to this work for many valuable references.
1 Romans, II, 1 :z ff.
' See St. Isidore of Seville, .EJymqlogiarum, V,

2

and 4.
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ment.1 Distinctions of condition were regarded as belong-

ing to the outer man. Whether slave or free, all men were

considered equal in capacity for the moral and spiritual life.

The same idea was developed by the Christian Fathers,

who simply restated in their own fashion the theories of

Cicero, Seneca, and the lawyers. The transition to the pa-

tristic conception of natural equality is well illustrated by

Lactantius, who said:

For God, who produces and gives breath to men, willed that all

should be equal, that is, equally matched. He has imposed on all the

same condition of living; He has produced all to wisdom; He has

promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heavenly

ment.1 Distinctions of condition were regarded as belonging to the outer man. Whether slave or free, all men were
considered equal in capacity for the moral and spiritual life.
The same idea was developed by the Christian Fathers,
who simply restated in their own fashion the theories of
Cicero, Seneca, and the lawyers. The transition to the patristic conception of natural equality is well illustrated by
Lactantius, who said:

benefits. For as He distributes to all alike His one light, sends forth

His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives the most pleasant rest

of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight no one

is a slave, no one a master; for if all have the same Father, by an

equal right we are all children.2

Salvian referred to slaves quos etsi nobis servitutis conditio

inferiores, humana tamen sors reddit aquales.3 St. Augustine
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declared that men as created by God were free and equal.4

St. Gregory the Great insisted upon the same conception, and

his phrase omms namque homines natura cequales sumus6 was

the patristic parallel of Ulpian's quod ad jus naturale attinet,

omnes homines (equales sunt. The Fathers discussed the

idea of equality in greatest detail in connection with slavery.

For God, who produces and gives breath to men, willed that all
should be equal, that is, equally matched. He has imposed on all the
same condition of Jiving; He has produced all to wisdom; He has
promised immortality to all; no one is cut off from His heaven1y
benefits. For as He distributes to all alike His one light, sends forth
His fountains to all, supplies food, and gives the most pleasant rest
of sleep; so He bestows on all equity and virtue. In His sight no one
is a s]ave, no one a master; for if all have the same Father, by an
equal right we are all children.2

Adopting Seneca's suggestion, they argued that coercion had

been unnecessary in the state of nature and perfect equality

had been the rule, but when sin came into the world men re-

quired discipline and coercion to make them observe the

principles of justice and right. Hence much which was

1 See I Corinthians, XII, 13; Galatians, III, 26-28; Colossians, III, 1x.

* Divinarum institutionum, V, 15 (Fletcher's transl.).

* De gubcrnatione Dei, III, 7.

4 De civitate Dei, XIX, 15.

* Moralium libri, XXI, 15. Cf. his Regulce pastoralis liber, Pt. Ill, c. 5, " Quo-

modo admonendi servi et domini."

Salvian referred to slaves quos etsi nobis servitutis conditio
inferiores, humana tamen sors re,ddit mquales. 3 St. Augustine
declared that men as created by God were free and equal.4
St. Gregory the Great insisted upon the same conception, and
his phrase omnes namque homines natura <Equates sumus 6 was
the patristic parallel of Ulpian's quod ad jus naturale attinet,
omnes homines <equales sunt. The Fathers discussed the
idea of equality in greatest detail in connection with slavery.
Adopting Seneca's suggestion, they argued that coercion had
been unnecessary in the state of nature and perfect equality
had been the rule, but when sin came into the world men required discipline and coercion to make them observe the
principles of justice and right. Hence much which was
1 See I Corinthians, XII, 13; Galatians, III, 26-28; Colossians, III, 11.

Divinarum institutionum, V, 15 (Fletcher's transl.).
De gubcrnatione Dei, III, 7.
4 De civitate Dei, XIX, 15.
5 Morali11m libri, XXI, 15. Cf. his Regula pas#Qralis liber, Pt. III, c. 5, "Quomodo admonendi servi et domini."
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contrary to nature in the primitive state became necessary

in the actual conditions of human life, and slavery became

a legitimate and useful institution. This explanation of

the contrast between actual institutions and the ideal of

equality was stated clearly by St. Augustine:

Sin therefore is the mother of servitude, and first cause of man's

subjection to man: which notwithstanding comes not to pass but by

the direction of the highest, in whom is no injustice, and who alone

knows best how to proportionate his punishment unto man's offences:

. . . But take a man as God created him at first, and so he is neither

slave to man nor to sin. But penal servitude had the institution from

that law which commands the conservation, and forbids the disturb-

ance of nature's order: for if that law had not first been transgressed,

penal servitude had never been enjoined.1

The theory of the Fall deprived the idea of equality of much

of the practical significance which it had for the lawyers.

So far from being a goal toward which mankind could hope

to progress on earth, it became an ideal condition from which

mankind had long since fallen. An equality of capacity for
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the moral and spiritual life was all that remained of the per-

fect equality of the age of innocence.

contrary to nature in the primitive state became necessary
in the actual conditions of human life, and slavery became
a legitimate and useful institution. This explanation of
the contrast between actual institutions and the ideal of
equality was stated clearly by St. Augustine:
Sin therefore is the mother of servitude, and first cause of man's
subjection to man: which notwithstanding comes not to pass but by
the direction of the highest, in whom is no injustice, and who alone
knows best how to proportionate his punishment unto man's offences:
... But take a man as God created him at first, and so he is neither
slave to man nor to sin. But penal servitude had the institution from
that law which commands the conservation, and forbids the disturbance of nature's order: for if that law had not first been transgressed,
penal servitude had never been enjoined. 1

Thus far attention has been directed briefly to the rise of

the idea of natural law in Greek philosophy, its further de-

velopment in Stoicism, its influence at Rome in the age of

Cicero, and its incorporation into the theory of Roman Law

by the classical jurists and into the theory of the Church by

the Christian Fathers. The ideal character of natural law

has been emphasized both in relation to Roman Law and to

patristic theory. An important change has been indicated

between the time of Aristotle and the age of Cicero with

reference to the conception of natural equality; and it has

been pointed out that this conception became one of the

principles of the Roman jus naturale and one of the postu-

1 De civitate Dei, XIX, 15 (XV, 15, Healey's transl.). Cf. St. Ambrose, De

Joseph patriarchs, c. 4.

The theory of the Fall deprived the idea of equality of much
of the practical significance which it had for the lawyers.
So far from being a goal toward which mankind could hope
to progress on earth, it became an ideal condition from which
mankind had long since fallen. An equality of capacity for
the moral and spiritual life was all that remained of the perfect equality of the age of innocence.
Thus far attention has been directed briefly to the rise of
the idea of natural law in Greek philosophy, its further development in Stoicism, its influence at Rome in the age of
Cicero, and its incorporation into the theory of Roman Law
by the classical jurists and into the theory of the Church by
the Christian Fathers. The ideal character of natural law
has been emphasized both in relation to Roman Law and to
patristic theory. An important change has been indicated
between the time of Aristotle and the age of Cicero with
reference to the conception of natural equality; and it has
been pointed out that this conception became one of the
principles of the Roman jus naturale and one of the postu1 De civit<Ue Dei, XIX, 15 (XV, 15, Healey's transl.).
Joseph palriarclul, c. 4.

Cf. St. Ambrose, De
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lates of patristic speculation. It is important to remember

that these ideas had a perfectly continuous history down to

the period of the classical writers on the law of nations in the

sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The philosophers of

the ancient world, the Roman jurists, and the Christian

Fathers were the fount and inspiration of mediaeval thought.

The Law of Nature in the Middle Ages

The history of the law of nature illustrates this essential

continuity of ideas throughout the Middle Ages. The me-

lates of patristic speculation. It is important to remember
that these ideas had a perfectly continuous history down to
the period of the classical writers on the law of nations in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The philosophers of
the ancient world, the Roman jurists, and the Christian
Fathers were the fount and inspiration of mediaeval thought.

diaeval civilians were certain to adhere closely to the lines

laid down by their classical predecessors, if for no other rea-

son because of the extraordinary value which they attached

THE

LAW OF NATURE IN THE MIDDLE AGES

to the letter of written texts.1 It never occurred to them to

challenge the existence of an immutable law of nature which

could be ascertained by reason. The canonists repeated the

tripartite classification of law, and in addition identified the

immutable law of nature with the law of God revealed in

human reason. The definitions formulated by St. Isidore

of Seville at the beginning of the seventh century were taken
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over almost literally in Gratian's Decretum:

All laws are either divine or human. Divine laws are in accord

with nature, human laws with custom; and therefore the latter vary,

since some are suited to one nation, some to another. . . .

Law, moreover, is either natural, or civil, or of nations.

Natural law is common to all nations in that it is adhered to every-

where by an instinct of nature without legislation.*

These conceptions were blended into a single system in

the theory of law presented by St. Thomas Aquinas in the

1 See Accursius, Institutionum juris civilis . . . cum Accursiana interpretation*,

1,2; Azo, Summa Azonis, Inst., I, 2; Brachylogos totius iuris civilis, p. 6; Irnerius

De aquitate, HI, and Questiones de iuris subtilitatibus, II; Rogerius, Summa codicis,

I, 14.

1 Decretum, Distinctio prima, cc. 1, 6, and 7. Cf. St. Isidore, Etymologiarum,

V, 2-4. See Legnano, Tractatus, chs. 11, 80, 171, and passim.

The history of the law of nature illustrates this essential
continuity of ideas throughout the Middle Ages. The mediaeval civilians were certain to adhere closely to the lines
laid down by their classical predecessors, if for no other reason because of the extraordinary value which they attached
to the letter of written texts. 1 It never occurred to them to
challenge the existence of an immutable law of nature which
could be ascertained by reason. The canonists repeated the
tripartite classification of law, and in addition identified the
immutable law of nature with the law of God revealed in
human reason. The definitions formulated by St. Isidore
of Seville at the beginning of the seventh century were taken
over almost literally in Gratian's Decretum:
All laws are either divine or human. Divine laws are in accord
with nature, human laws with custom; and therefore the latter vary,
since some are suited to one nation, some to another....
Law, moreover, is either natural, or civil, or of nations.
Natural law is common to all nations in that it is adhered to everywhere by an instinct of nature without legislation.2

These conceptions were blended into a single system in
the theory of law presented by St. Thomas Aquinas in the
1 See Accursius, lnstiluti<m11m juris cittilis ... cum Accursiana interpretalione,
I, 2; Azo, Summa Azonis, !11SI., I, 2; Braclsylogos totius iuris ciuilis, p. 6; Imerius
De «qumue, III, and Qiusliones de iuris subtilitatibu.s, II; Rogerius, Summa codicis,
I, 14.
2 DecreJum, Distinctio prima, cc. x, 6, and 7. Cf. St. Isidore, Etymologiarum,
V, 2-4. See Legnano, Tractatus, chs. 11, So, 171 1 and passim.
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thirteenth century. His fourfold classification had an en-

during influence. Law according to St. Thomas was eternal,

natural, human, and divine.1 The eternal law was the ex-

pression of the reason of God the supreme Lawgiver. That

part of the eternal law which was not revealed, but was

made known to man by his own reason was the law of na-

ture.2 Throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth

centuries there was a tendency to recur to the ancient phi-

losophers and to such ecclesiastical authorities as Gratian

and Aquinas, with the result that the law of nature was

more commonly used in an ethical or theological signifi-

cance.3 In the course of the Reformation, however, there

was a reversion to Roman texts.4 Protestant writers did

not acknowledge the authority of the Church or the Canon

Law. Catholic disputants were anxious to meet them on

their own ground, and so the tendency was to bring the

classical Roman Law into greater prominence. Thus a more

secular and legal cast was given to the whole discussion of

natural law, and the way was prepared for the great writers
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on the modern law of nations.

Among the schoolmen a great deal of controversy about

the law of nature turned upon the question which asks

whether the essence of law is will or reason.6 According to

one view the law of nature was an intellectual act independ-

ent of will. It was the dictate of reason as to what is right,

and though grounded in the being of God it was unalterable

even by him. The other opinion saw in the law of nature a

divine command which was right and binding because willed

by God the supreme lawgiver. According to either view

God was the ultimate cause of natural law. The prevailing

1 Summa theologica, IT, 1, 91.

» Ibid., II, 1, 91, 1-2; II, 1, 94.

* Bryce, Studies, p. 595.

* Pollock, in /. 5. C. L. (1900) n. s., II, 429.

* Gierke, Political Theory, p. 172.

thirteenth century. His fourfold classification had an enduring influence. Law according to St. Thomas was eternal,
natural, human, and divine. 1 The eternal law was the expression of the reason of God the supreme Lawgiver. That
part of the eternal law which was not revealed, but was
made known to man by his own reason was the law of nature.2 Throughout the thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth
centuries there was a tendency to recur to the ancient philosophers and to such ecclesiastical authorities as Gratian
and Aquinas, with the result that the law of nature was
more commonly used in an ethical or theological significance. 3 In the course of the Reformation, however, there
was a reversion to Roman texts.4 Protestant writers did
not acknowledge the authority of the Church or the Canon
Law. Catholic disputants were anxious to meet them on
their own ground, and so the tendency was to bring the
classical Roman Law into greater prominence. Thus a more
secular and legal cast was given to the whole discussion of
natural law, and the way was prepared for the great writers
on the modern law of nations.
Among the schoolmen a great deal of controversy about
the law of nature turned upon the question which asks
whether the essence of law is will or reason. 6 According to
one view the law of nature was an intellectual act independent of will. It was the dictate of reason as to what is right,
and though grounded in the being of God it was unalterable
even by him. The other opinion saw in the law of nature a
divine command which was right and binding because willed
by God the supreme lawgiver. According to either view
God was the ultimate cause of natural law. The prevailing
1

Summa theologica, II,

1,

91.

a Ibid., II, r, 91, 1-2; II, r, 94.
• Bryce, Studies, p. 595.
4 Pollock, in J. S. C. L. (1900) N. s., II, 429.
• Gierke, Political TJseqry, p. 172.
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opinion seems to have been of a mediating kind. It regarded

the substance of natural law as the dictate of reason flowing

from the divine being and unalterably determined by the

nature of things which is comprised in God. Its binding

force, and that alone, was traced to God's will. Thus St.

Thomas Aquinas denned law as

an ordinance of reason for the general good, emanating from him who

has the care of the community, and promulgated.1

According to this definition,

opinion seems to have been of a mediating kind. It regarded
the substance of natural law as the dictate of reason flowing
from the divine being and unalterably determined by the
nature of things which is comprised in God. Its binding
force, and that alone, was traced to God's will. Thus St.
Thomas Aquinas defined law as

Every law emanates from the reason and will of the lawgiver: divine

and natural law from the reasonable will of God; human law from

the will of man regulated by reason.*

an ordinance of reason for the general good, emanating from him who
has the care of the community, and promulgated.1

The same opinion was presented later by Suarez.3

Another difficulty common to all speculation on the law

of nature was concerned with its immutability. Through-

According to this definition,

out the Middle Ages it was described as supreme and im-

mutable law; and yet it was always recognized that the

rules of natural law must be amplified or restricted to suit

the world of realities. So a distinction was often drawn be-
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tween the immutable first principles and the mutable second-

Every law emanates from the reason and will of the lawgiver: divine
and natural law from the reasonable will of God; human law from
the will of man regulated by reason. 2

ary rules. This distinction was stated clearly by St. Thomas

Aquinas:

A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. One

way is the way of addition; and in that way there is nothing to hinder

the natural law being changed: for many enactments useful to human

life have been added over and above the natural law, as well by the

divine law as by human laws. Another conceivable way in which the

natural law might be changed is the way of subtraction, that some-

thing should cease to be of the natural law that was of it before. Un-

derstanding change in this sense, the natural law is absolutely im-

mutable in its first principles: but as to secondary precepts, which

1 Summa theologica, II, 1, 90, 4 (Rickaby's transl.).

1 Ibid., II, 97, 3 (Rickaby's transl.).

* Trociatus ic legibus, II, 5-16.

The same opinion was presented later by Suarez. 3
Another difficulty common to all speculation on the law
of nature was concerned with its immutability. Throughout the Middle Ages it was described as supreme and immutable law; and yet it was always recognized that the
rules of natural law must be amplified or restricted to suit
the world of realities. So a distinction was often drawn between the immutable first principles and the mutable secondary rules. This distinction was stated clearly by St. Thomas
Aquinas:
A change in the natural law may be understood in two ways. One
way is the way of addition; and in that way there is nothing to hinder
the natural law being changed: for many enactments useful to human
life have been added over and above the natural law, as well by the
divine law as by human laws. Another conceivable way in which the
natural law might be changed is the way of subtraction, that something should cease to be of the natural law that was of it before. Understanding change in this sense, the natural law is absolutely immutable in its first principles: but as to secondary precepts, which
Summa theologica, II, 1, 90, 4 (Rickaby's transl.).
Ibid., II, 97, 3 (Rickaby's transl.).
• Traclatus de legibus, II, 5-16.
1
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are certain detailed conclusions closely related to the first principles,

the natural law is not so changed as that its dictate is not right in

most cases steadily to abide by: it may, however, be changed in some

particular case, and in rare instances, through some special causes

impeding the observance of these secondary precepts, as has been

said above.1

In the next century William of Ockham offered a classifica-

tion of jus naturale into (a) the universal rules of conduct

dictated by natural reason, (b) the rules binding on a society

are certain detailed conclusions closely related to the first principles,
the natural law is not so changed as that its dictate is not right in
most cases steadily to abide by: it may, however, be changed in some
particular case, and in rare instances, through some special causes
impeding the observance of these secondary precepts, as has been
said above.1

governed by natural reason without any positive or custom-

ary law, and (c) the rules which, while deduced from the

precepts of natural justice, are not concerned with funda-

mentals and hence may be modified by positive authority.2

The " Secondary law of nature " could be referred to either

the second or third category in Ockham's classification.

Whatever disputes arose with respect to its attributes, the

ground of its obligatory force, or its immutability, all were

agreed that there was a law of nature which was true and

perfectly binding law. Bodin, in the second half of the six-

teenth century, accepted without question or discussion the
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existence of a law of nature apart from all positive law.3

His opinion was simply added evidence of that widespread

and deeply rooted conviction which was already receiving a

new application among the forerunners of Hugo Grotius.

The Idea of Natural Equality in the

Middle Ages

There is a similar continuity in the mediaeval develop-

ment of the idea of natural equality. The opinions of the

Roman jurists on equality and slavery were repeated many

times by the civilians of the Middle Ages, and never with

any important variation from classical texts. It was uni-

1 Summa theologica, II, 1, 94, 5 (Rickaby's transl.).

• Dialogus, III, 2, 3, 6.

3 Dela republique, I, 8, and passim.

In the next century William of Ockham offered a classification of jus natura/.e into (a) the universal rules of conduct
dictated by natural reason, (b) the rules binding on a society
governed by natural reason without any positive or customary law, and (c) the rules which, while deduced from the
precepts of natural justice, are not concerned with fundamentals and hence may be modified by positive authority.2
The " Secondary law of nature" could be referred to either
the second or third category in Ockham's classification.
Whatever disputes arose with respect to its attributes, the
ground of its obligatory force, or its immutability, all were
agreed that there was a law of nature which was true and
perfectly binding law. Bodin, in the second half of the sixteenth century, accepted without question or discussion the
existence of a law of nature apart from all positive law. 3
His opinion was simply added evidence of that widespread
and deeply rooted conviction which was already receiving a
new application among the forerunners of Hugo Grotius.
THE llEA OF NATURAL EQUALITY IN THE
l\1rDDLE AGES

There is a similar continuity in the mediaeval development of the idea of natural equality. The opinions of the
Roman jurists on equality and slavery were repeated many
times by the civilians of the Middle Ages, and never with
any important variation from classical texts. It was um1

2
3

Summa lheologica, II, 1, 94, 5 (Rickaby's transl.).
Dialogus, III, 2, 3, 6.
De la republique, I, 8, and passim.
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f ormly held that all men were equal by the jus naturale, but

that slavery had been introduced by the jus civile and the

jus gentium.1 For the glossators, as for the classical jurists,

equality by the jus naturale was an ideal norm rather than

a practical rule.

Similarly, the patristic theory of natural equality, and of

slaveiy as a disciplinary check upon the license and disorder

of sinful men, was repeatedly affirmed in the writings of the

canonists and theologians of the Middle Ages. St. Isidore's

assertion that by the law of nature there is omnium una

libertas reappeared in Gratian's Decretum2 in the twelfth

century and was frequently repeated thereafter. Rufinus,

one of the most important twelfth century commentators

on Gratian, explained the conflict between the jus naturale

and the jus gentium in regard to equality by dividing the

former into commands, prohibitions, and demonstrations.3

Included in the demonstrations were those things which

natural law neither commands nor forbids, but simply shows

to be good and therefore desirable. The commands and

prohibitions were unalterable; but the demonstrations
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could be changed by positive law. Rufinus thought, in fact,

that they must be changed on occasion in order that the true

ends of natural law might be realized. Natural liberty was

included among the demonstrations, and the conclusion was

reached that institutions like slavery, which appeared to

violate natural law, were really the means by which men

were trained to obey it. Along with their assertion of the

dogma of equality, the canonists tolerated slavery and even

justified it. No more convincing proof is needed than the

1 Cf. a commission of manumission granted by Queen Elizabeth of England, in

Howell, State Trials, XX, 1372; and the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in The

Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 120 (1825).

1 Cf. St. Isidore's Eiymologiarum, V, 4, and the Decretum, Distinctio, I, c. 7.

* Rufinus, Summa decretorum, Distinctio I. Cf. Stephen of Tournai, Summa

decretorum, Distinctio I.

forrnly held that all men were equal by the jus naturale, but
that slavery had been introduced by the jus civile and the
jus gentium. 1 For the glossators, as for the classical jurists,
equality by the jus naturale was an ideal norm rather than
a practical rule.
Similarly, the patristic theory of natural equality, and of
slavery as a disciplinary check upon the license and disorder
of sinful men, was repeatedly affirmed in the writings of the
canonists and theologians of the Middle Ages. St. Isidore's
assertion that by the law of nature there is omnium una
libertas reappeared in Gratian's Decretum 2 in the twelfth
century and was frequently repeated thereafter. Rufi.nus,
one of the most important twelfth century commentators
on Gratian, explained the conflict between the jus naturale
and the jus gentium in regard to equality by dividing the
former into commands, prohibitions, and demonstrations.3
Included in the demonstrations were those things which
natural law neither commands nor forbids, but simply shows
to be good and therefore desirable. The commands and
prohibitions were unalterable; but the demonstrations
could be changed by positive law. Rufi.nus thought, in fact,
that they must be changed on occasion in order that the true
ends of natural law might be realized. Natural liberty was
included among the demonstrations, and the conclusion was
reached that institutions like slavery, which appeared to
violate natural law, were really the means by which men
were trained to obey it. Along with their assertion of the
dogma of equality, the canonists tolerated slavery and even
justified it. No more convincing proof is needed than the
1 Cf. a commission of manumission granted by Queen Elizabeth of England, in
Howell, State Trials, XX, 1372; and the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, in The
Antelope, 10 Wheaton 66, 120 (1825).
1 Cf. St. Isidore's Etymologiorum, V, 4, and the Decrelum, Distinctio, I, c. 7.
' Rufinus, Summa decrelMum, Distinctio I. Cf. Stephen of Toumai, Summa
decretorum, Distinctio I.
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provision which the Canon Law made for the position of the

Church as a slave-owner.1

It was common learning throughout the Middle Ages that

there were no natural distinctions in human nature, but that

differences of condition had been introduced by positive law.

St. Thomas Aquinas argued that all men were equal by the

law of nature, but that the natural law had been changed

by addition in this respect "by the reason of men for the

utility of human life." 2 He justified slavery, not only as a

punishment for sin, but also as an incentive to bravery on

the part of soldiers who might be enslaved if vanquished.3

Traditional theories were presented by William of Ockham,4

Wycliffe,6 and countless others after Aquinas. It is unneces-

sary to multiply illustrations. Civilians, canonists, theo-

logians, and mediaeval law writers generally 6 affirmed the

natural equality of all mankind.

The heritage of mediaeval learning from which classical

writers on the modern law of nations derived the materials

for their treatises contained few conceptions of greater im-
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portance than that of the equality of men by the natural law.

This natural equality was not immutable. It had been

seriously restricted by the positive jus gentium. It was es-

sentially an ideal equality, whether the ideal was posterior

as with the theologians, or anterior as with the lawyers. It

was an equality of capacity, among the theologians a resid-

uary equality of capacity for the moral and spiritual life,

and among the lawyers an ideal equality of capacity for

rights.

1 Gratian, Decretum, Distinctio LIV.

1 Summa theologica, II, 1, 94, 5.

* De regimine principum, II, 10.

* Dialogus, III, 2, 3, 6.

* Decivili dominio, I, 32-34.

* See Britton, I, 32, x; and Des Sachsenspiegels erstcr Theil, III, 42, 1, " Gleich-

heit der Menschen vor Gott."

provision which the Canon Law made for the position of the
Church as a slave-owner.1
It was common learning throughout the Middle Ages that
there were no natural distinctions in human nature, but that
differences of condition had been introduced by positive law.
St. Thomas Aquinas argued that all men were equal by the
law of nature, but that the natural law had been changed
by addition in this respect "by the reason of men for the
utility of human life." 2 He justified slavery, not only as a
punishment for sin, but also as an incentive to bravery on
the part of soldiers who might be enslaved if vanquished. 3
Traditional theories were presented by \Villiam of Ockham,4
Wycliffe,b and countless others after Aquinas. It is unnecessary to multiply illustrations. Civilians, canonists, theologians, and mediaeval law writers generally 6 affirmed the
natural equality of all mankind.
The heritage of mediaeval learning from which classical
writers on the modern law of nations derived the materials
for their treatises contained few conceptions of greater importance than that of the equality of men by the natural law.
This natural equality was not immutable. It had been
seriously restricted by the positive jus gentium. It was essentially an ideal equality, whether the ideal was posterior
as with the theologians, or anterior as with the lawyers. It
was an equality of capacity, among the theologians a residuary equality of capacity for the moral and spiritual life,
and among the lawyers an ideal equality of capacity for
rights.
' Gratian, Decrelum, Distinctio LIV.
Summa lhuJlogica, II, 1, 94, 5.
a De regimine J>rincipum, II, 10.
• DiaJogus, III, 2, 3, 6.
• De civili dominio, I, 32-34.
• See Brillon, I, 32, 1; and Des Sachsenspiegels ersler Thdl, III, 42 1
heit der Menschen vor Gott."
1
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THE CONCEPTION OF A STATE OF NATURE

The Conception of a State of Nature

The conception of an original state of nature was the

third important agency constantly relied upon by the pub-

licists who translated the idea of natural equality into the

law of nations. This conception had no necessary con-

nection with natural law or natural equality, although his-

torically it was closely associated with them both. The

literature of antiquity abounds in allusions to the con-

dition of man prior to the institution of human government

and indeed prior to any social life. This natural condition

was of no great interest to philosophers like Aristotle or

Cicero, who held that man was by nature adapted to politi-

cal society. For later philosophers, however, it had an ab-

sorbing interest. It occupied an important place in the

political theories of Seneca at the beginning of the Christian

era. One of the most important differences between the

political theories of Cicero and of Seneca is to be found in

the latter's conception of the primitive state of innocence.

According to Seneca's opinion there was a golden age ante-
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dating the age of conventional institutions:

But the first men and their immediate descendants followed Na-

ture; pure and uncorrupt; and held the same both for their leader

and the law; by an orderly submission of the worse to the better: for

this was ever the rule of simple Nature. . . . Exquisitely happy then

must the people have been, among whom none could obtain power

but he that was a good man: for he may do whatever he pleases, who

thinks he can do no more than what he ought to do. Posidonius there-

fore judgeth, that wise men only ruled in the age that was called the

golden. . . .

What could be happier than the race of man? They enjoyed all

Nature in common; she as a kind parent was the protectress of all

men; and gave them secure possession of the public wealth.*

The contrast which Seneca drew between primitive and

conventional institutions probably represented a tradition

1 Ad Lucilium epistularum morolium, Epist. 90 (Morell's transl.).

The conception of an original state of nature was the
third important agency constantly relied upon by the publicists who translated the idea of natural equality into the
law of nations. This conception had no necessary connection with natural law or natural equality, although historically it was closely associated with them both. The
literature of antiquity abounds in allusions to the condition of man prior to the institution of human government
and indeed prior to any social life. This natural condition
was of no great interest to philosophers like Aristotle or
Cicero, who held that man was by nature adapted to political society. For later philosophers, however, it had an absorbing interest. It occupied an important place in the
political theories of Seneca at the beginning of the Christian
era. One of the most important differences between the
political theories of Cicero and of Seneca is to be found in
the latter's conception of the primitive state of innocence.
According to Seneca's opinion there was a golden age antedating the age of conventional institutions:
But the first men and their immediate descendants followed Nature; pure and uncorrupt; and held the same both for their leader
and the law; by an orderly submission of the worse to the better: for
this was ever the rule of simple Nature. . . . Exquisitely happy then
must the people have been, among whom none could obtain power
but he that was a good man: for he may do whatever he pleases, who
thinks he can do no more than what he ought to do. Posidonius therefore judgeth, that wise men only ruled in the age that was called the
golden . •.•

What could be happier than the race of man ? They enjoyed all
Nature in common; she as a kind parent was the protectress of all
men; and gave them secure possession of the public wealth.\

The contrast which Seneca drew between primitive and
conventional institutions probably represented a tradition
1

Ad Lucilium epistularum '1Wt'alium, Epist. 90 (Morell's transl.).
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which was current among at least some of the Stoic thinkers

of his time.

Apparently this tradition had no great influence on the

Roman jurists. Mr. Carlyle thinks that he has detected a

disposition in Ulpian, Tryphoninus, and Florentinus to con-

trast the primitive with the conventional state of society

in connection with the institution of slavery; he suggests

that this disposition may have had something to do with the

rise of the distinction between the jus gentium and the jus

naturale.1 The evidence is not very conclusive. In general

it may be said that the jus naturale of the Roman lawyers

had no connection with the primitive state of nature. The

jurists were not troubled about primitive man, nor did they

believe that in the jus naturale they had discovered a " lost

code of nature." They were content to leave such specula-

tions to the poets and the philosophers.

The Fathers, on the other hand, were very much under

the influence of this conception. They conceived of the

state of man before the Fall much as Seneca conceived of the
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Golden Age. They professed to believe that there had been

a time when men were free and equal, goods were possessed

in common, and government was not necessary. "And this

is not to be regarded as a poetic fiction, but as the truth,"

declared Lactantius.2 They held that because of sin man

passed out of this primitive state and into that condition in

which the conventional institutions of society became nec-

essary.3 The patristic view of slavery, property, and gov-

ernment turned upon this distinction between the primitive

and the conventional.

The theory of a state of nature was reproduced in a va-

riety of forms by writers of the Middle Ages. Although it

1 Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-44. Cf. Digest, I, 1, 4; I, 1, S; I, S. 4! XII, 6, 64^

Institutes, I, 2, 2.

* Divinarum institutionum, V, 5.

'St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX, 15.

which was current among at least some of the Stoic thinkers
of his time.
Apparently this tradition had no great influence on the
Roman jurists. Mr. Carlyle thinks that he has detected a
disposition in Ulpian, Tryphoninus, and Florentinus to contrast the primitive with the conventional state of society
in connection with the institution of slavery; he suggests
that this disposition may have had something to do with the
rise of the distinction between the jus gentium and the jus
naturale.1 The evidence is not very conclusive. Jn general
it may be said that the jus naturale of the Roman lawyers
had no connection with the primitive state of nature. The
jurists were not troubled about primitive man, nor did they
believe that in the jus naturale they had discovered a " lost
code of nature." They were content to leave such speculations to the poets and the philosophers.
The Fathers, on the other hand, were very much under
the influence of this conception. They conceived of the
state of man before the Fall much as Seneca conceived of the
Golden Age. They professed to believe that there had been
a time when men were free and equal, goods were possessed
in common, and government was not necessary. "And this
is not to be regarded as a poetic fiction, but as the truth,"
declared Lactantius.2 They held that because of sin man
passed out of this primitive state and into that condition in
which the conventional institutions of society became necessary. 3 The patristic view of slavery, property, and government turned upon this distinction between the primitive
and the conventional.
The theory of a state of nature was reproduced in a variety of forms by writers of the Middle Ages. Although it
1

Med. Pol. Theory, I, 36-44. Cf. Digest, I,

Institutes, I, 2, 2 .
1 Divinarum institutionum, V, 5.
1 St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIX, 15.
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was not a subject of great interest to the civilians, they

frequently accounted for the existence of institutions con-

trary to natural law by assuming that the law of nature was

appropriate to a natural or primitive condition of mankind,

while the actual institutions of society had perforce been

accommodated to other and less perfect conditions. The idea

found occasional expression in the treatises of other mediae-

val lawyers. There is a passage in Britton, in the chapter

on villenage, which illustrates the conception's influence:

This condition was of ancient time changed from freedom to bondage

by the constitution of nations, and not by the law of nature, as it

stood at the time of the flood and earlier, when all things were com-

mon to every one, and all men were entirely free, and lived according

to the law of nature.1

was not a subject of great interest to the civilians, they
frequently accounted for the existence of institutions contrary to natural law by assuming that the law of nature was
appropriate to a natural or primitive condition of mankind,
while the actual institutions of society had perforce been
accommodated to other and less perfect conditions. The idea
found occasional expression in the treatises of other mediaeval lawyers. There is a passage in Britton, in the chapter
on villenage, which illustrates the conception's influence:

The canonists did not occupy themselves to any great extent

with speculation about the state of nature, but they ap-

parently held an opinion of the Golden Age of innocence

and of the Fall which was based upon the theory developed

by Seneca and the Fathers. In the scholastic literature of
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the later Middle Ages there is a great deal of speculation

about the primitive state of man. Marsilius of Padua's

This condition was of ancient time changed from freedom to bondage
by the constitution of nations, and not by the law of nature, as it
stood at the time of the flood and earlier, when all things were common to every one, and all men were entirely free, and lived according
to the law of nature. 1

account of the origin of civil communities began with the

state of nature.2 The conception was presented with un-

usual literary grace in the fifteenth century by ^Eneas Syl-

vius, who blended the Biblical description of paradise and

the fancies of pagan philosophy to produce a complete ac-

count of the state of nature previous to the formation of

political society.3 The anti-monarchic writers found a new

1 I, 32, 1 (Nichols* transl.). Cf. Beaumanoir, Coutumes de Beauvaisis, § 1453,

II, 235. A commission of manumission granted by Queen Elizabeth of England

states that in the beginning God created all men free by nature, and that after-

wards the law of nations placed some under the yoke of slavery. See Howell,

Slate Trials, XX, 1372.

1 Defensor pacts, I, 3 ff.

■ De ortu el authoritate Imperii Romani, in Goldast, Monarchio, II, 1558-1566.

The canonists did not occupy themselves to any great extent
with speculation about the state of nature, but they apparently held an opinion of the Golden Age of innocence
and of the Fall which was based upon the theory developed
by Seneca and the Fathers. In the scholastic literature of
the later Middle Ages there is a great deal of speculation
about the primitive state of man. Marsilius of Padua's
account of the origin of civil communities began with the
state of nature. 2 The conception was presented with unusual literary grace in the fifteenth century by LEneas Sylvius, who blended the Biblical description of paradise and
the fancies of pagan philosophy to produce a complete account of the state of nature previous to the formation of
political society. 3 The anti-monarchic writers found a new
I, 32, 1 (Nichols' transl.). Cf. Beaumanoir, CouJunus de Beauvaisis, § 1453,
II, 235. A commission of manumission granted by Queen Elizabeth of England
states that in the beginning God created all men free by nature, and that afterwards the law of nations placed some under the yoke of slavery. See Howell,
State Trials, XX, 1372.
1 Defensor pacis, I, 3 ff.
• De orlu et auJ/wrilale Imperii Romani, in Goldast, Monarchia, II, 1558-1566.
1
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use for the conception in the sixteenth century;1 and by

this time the idea had become well established in the com-

mon tradition of political speculation.

There was always considerable diversity of opinion as to

the character and significance of the state of nature. The

present importance of the notion does not depend upon the

particular forms in which men held it, but in the prevalence

everywhere of the notion of a primitive condition of man-

kind in which natural equality prevailed, and in which men

were subject to no law beyond the precepts of the law of

nature. Such a concept was pregnant with possibilities for

the seventeenth century jurist, seeking an explanation for

the new international society which was gradually taking

shape in the polity of Europe.

The Analogy between Natural Persons and

the State

The conception of natural equality was introduced into

the law of nations by drawing an analogy between natural

persons and separate states or international persons.2 This
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analogy made its appearance, of course, only with the rise

of the modern law of nations; but it had its roots in certain

habits of thought which were characteristic of the Middle

use for the conception in the sixteenth century; 1 and by
this time the idea had become well established in the common tradition of political speculation.
There was always considerable diversity of opinion as to
the character and significance of the state of nature. The
present importance of the notion does not depend upon the
particular forms in which men held it, but in the prevalence
everywhere of the notion of a primitive condition of mankind in which natural equality prevailed, and in which men
were subject to no law beyond the precepts of the law of
nature. Such a concept was pregnant with possibilities for
the seventeenth century jurist, seeking an explanation for
the new international society which was gradually taking
shape in the polity of Europe.

Ages. Mediaeval thought proceeded from the idea of a

single whole. It was a common practice, under the influence

of biblical allegories and the models adopted by Greek and

THE ANALOGY BETWEEN NATURAL PERSONS AND

Roman writers, to compare mankind at large and indeed

every human organization to an animate body.3 So not only

THE STATE

1 See Buchanan, De jure regni apud Scolos, § 8; and the Vindicia contra ty-

rannos, Q. Ill, 108.

• The author has discussed the subject of the analogy in an article in Y. L. J.

(1917), XXVI, 564-591.

* On the organic conception of society in the Middle Ages, see Gierke, Political

Theory, pp. 22-30. On pp. 120-137 there are excellent bibliographical notes from

which the following illustrations have been selected. See also evidence of anthropo-

morphism in Legnano, Tractatus, chs. 1o, 79, 123, 125, and passim.

The conception of natural equality was introduced into
the law of nations by drawing an analogy between natural
persons and separate states or international persons.2 This
analogy made its appearance, of course, only with the rise
of the modern law of nations; but it had its roots in certain
habits of thought which were characteristic of the ~Iiddle
Ages. Mediaeval thought proceeded from the idea of a
single whole. It was a common practice, under the influence
of biblical allegories and the models adopted by Greek and
Roman writers, to compare mankind at large and indeed
every human organization to an animate body.3 So not only
1 See Buchanan, De jure regni apud Scotos, § 8; and the Vindicite contra ty~
rannos, Q. III, 1o8.
2 The author has discussed the subject of the analogy in an article in Y. L. J,
(1917), XXVI, 564-591.
1 On the organic conception of society in the Middle Ages, see Gierke, Political
Themy, pp. 22-30. On pp. 12<Jl37 there are excellent bibliographical notes from
which the following illustrations have been selected. See also evidence of anthropomorphism in Legnano, Tractatus, chs. 10, 79, 123, 125, and passim.
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the universal Church and the universal Empire, but also

every particular church and every particular state, were

compared to the natural body. They were thought of and

commonly described as mystical bodies.

The comparison with the natural body was frequently

spun out into amusing detail. One of the earliest attempts

to find some member of the natural body which would cor-

respond to each part of the state was made by John of Salis-

bury. He represented the servants of religion as the soul of

the state, the prince as the head, the senate as the heart,

officers and judges as the eyes, ears, and tongue, the execu-

tive as the unarmed and the army as the armed hand, the

financial department as the belly and intestines, and land

folk, handicraftsmen, and the like as the feet, so that the

state exceeded the centipede numerositate pedum, while pro-

tection of the people became the shoeing and their distress

the state's gout.1 Ptolomaeus of Lucca based state life upon

a harmony analogous to that harmony of organic forces which

obtains in the natural body, and he argued that it is reason
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in the one body as in the other that brings those forces into

correlation and perfects their unity. Engelbert of Volkers-

dorf based his whole exposition of the well ordered state

upon the assumption that there is a complete analogy be-

tween state and individual. Marsilius of Padua founded

his theory of the state upon the proposition civitas est velut

animata sen animalis natura quaedam? Prominent writers

of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries found a variety of

uses for this analogy; but it was never more elaborately de-

veloped than by Nicholas of Cues, who utilized all of con-

temporary medical knowledge in perfecting his comparison

between the state and the natural body.

1 Polycraticus, V, i ff. Webb's recent edition of this work is the most satis-

factory. The above summary is from Gierke's note 76, p. 131.

1 Defensor pacts, I, 2, in Goldast's Monorchia, II, 156. The analogy is de-

veloped in I, 15.

the universal Church and the universal Empire, but also
every particular church and every particular state, were
compared to the natural body. They were thought of and
commonly described as mystical bodies.
The comparison with the natural body was frequently
spun out into amusing detail. One of the earliest attempts
to find some member of the natural body which would correspond to each part of the state was made by John of Salisbury. He represented the servants of religion as the soul of
the state, the prince as the head, the senate as the heart,
officers and judges as the eyes, ears, and tongue, the executive as the unarmed and the army as the armed hand, the
financial department as the belly and intestines, and land
folk, handicraftsmen, and the like as the feet, so that the
state exceeded the centipede numerositate pedum, while protection of the people became the shoeing and their distress
the state's gout. 1 Ptolomaeus of Lucca based state life upon
a harmony analogous to that harmony of organic forces which
obtains in the natural body, and he argued that it is reason
in the one body as in the other that brings those forces into
correlation and perfects their unity. Engelbert of Volkersdorf based his whole exposition of the well ordered state
upon the assumption that there is a complete analogy between state and individual. Marsilius of Padua founded
his theory of the state upon the proposition civitas est velut
animata seu animalis natura quaedam. 2 Prominent writers
of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries found a variety of
uses for this analogy; but it was never more elaborately developed than by Nicholas of Cues, who utilized all of contemporary medical knowledge in perfecting his comparison
between the state and the natural body.
1 Polycraticiis, V, 1 ff.
Webb's recent edition of this work is the most satisfactory. The above summary is from Gicrke's note 76, p. 131.
2 Defensor pacis, I, 2, in Goldast's Monarchia, II, 156. The analogy is developed in I, 15.
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The organic conception of the state did not develop into

the legal idea of state personality during the Middle Ages,

but that consummation was not far in the future. Nor was

it a far cry to the principles soon to be proclaimed by Hobbes

and Pufendorf that civitates setnel institutae induunt propri-

eties hominum personales and are therefore the subjects of

that identical law of nature which controls natural indi-

viduals. It was through such principles as these that the

idea of the analogy was soon to have an influence of far

reaching significance.

The Reception of the Sources by the

Classical Publicists

This preliminary sketch of the four main sources from

which the principle of state equality was derived should

make it somewhat easier to understand the use that was

made of them by the classical publicists. The ideas were

The organic conception of the state did not develop into
the legal idea of state personality during the l\.1iddle Ages,
but that consummation was not far in the future. Nor was
it a far cry to the principles soon to be proclaimed by Hobbes
and Pufendorf that civitales semel institutae induunt proprietates hominum persona/,es and are therefore the subjects of
that identical law of nature which controls natural individuals. It was through such principles as these that the
idea of the analogy was soon to have an influence of far
reaching significance.

accepted by the publicists substantially as they had come

down from antiquity, through mediaeval thought, to the

modern age. The law of nature was regarded as a body of

THE RECEPTION OF THE SOURCES BY THE

ideal principles grounded in the being of God, ascertained by
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reason, and distinct from the jus gentium and all positive

CLASSICAL PUBLICISTS

law. Its reality was in no way qualified by its somewhat

ethereal attributes. That it was permanent and immutable

was emphasized with tiresome reiteration; but it was agreed

also that it consisted of primary or fundamental piinciples

which were immutable and principles which were secondary

or less than fundamental and therefore mutable. So the

hypothetical inimutability lost most of its practical signifi-

cance. The concept of natural equality was accepted by

everyone; and with equal unanimity it was included, either

expressly or by implication, among the demonstrations or

secondary principles of the law of nature. The most im-

portant distinction between the rules of the jus naturale and

This preliminary sketch of the four main sources from
which the principle of state equality was derived should
make it somewhat easier to understand the use that was
made of them by the classical publicists. The ideas were
accepted by the publicists substantially as they had come
down from antiquity, through mediaeval thought, to the
modern age. The law of nature was regarded as a body of
ideal principles grounded in the being of God, ascertained by
reason, and distinct from the jus gentium and all positive
law. Its reality was in no way qualified by its somewhat
ethereal attributes. That it was permanent and immutable
was emphasized with tiresome reiteration; but it was agreed
also that it consisted of primary or fundamental principles
which were immutable and principles which were secondary
or less than fundamental and therefore mutable. So the
hypothetical immutability lost most of its practical significance. The concept of natural equality was accepted by
everyone; and with equal unanimity it was included, either
expressly or by implication, among the demonstrations or
secondary principles of the law of nature. The most important distinction betwee~ the rules of the jus naturale and
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the jus gentium turned on the principle of equality. By the

latter conventional differences of status had been instituted.

The state of nature in which there was no law but nature's

law and in which uncorrupted natural equality prevailed

was common tradition. It was accepted by some as an his-

torical condition antedating civil society, by others as a

useful analytical conception in distinguishing natural from

conventional institutions. Finally, there was a deeply

rooted disposition to draw analogies between corporate and

natural bodies and to apply to states theories and principles

which had their origin in the relations of human beings.

A new use for these conceptions was discovered after the

Reformation.1 The old theory of a common superior had

decayed on account of the incapacity of either Emperor or

Pope to command universal obedience. The notion of a

society of states supplanted the idea of universal empire.

It was the task of the early publicists to find an explanation

for this society, its members, and its law. There were dif-

ferences of opinion among them on some of the most im-

portant points, and divergent tendencies appeared which
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produced different schools of thought. Certain of these dif-

ferences were of very great importance in connection with

the principle of state equality. Viewing the work of the

early publicists as a whole, however, it may be said that

they derived the law applicable to the relations between

separate states from two sources. In the first place, finding

some rules already in existence, especially in connection

with diplomacy and warfare, they referred to established

customs, usages, and understandings. Finding that large

parts of the field of international relations were not covered

1 On the use made of these sources by the classical publicists, see Bryce, Studies,

p. 602; Franck, Rlformateurs, p. 276; Mackintosh, Discourse; Maine, Ancient

Law, pp. 99-114; Nys, Le droit int., II, 235-237, and Les origines, p. 8; Olney,

in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 420; Pollock, in C. L. R. (1902), II, 511-524; Pollock, in

/. 5. C. L (1901) N.8., III, 204-207; Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 10.

the jus gentium turned on the principle of equality. By the
latter conventional differences of status had been instituted.
The state of nature in which there was no law but nature's
law and in which uncorrupted natural equality prevailed
was common tradition. It was accepted by some as an historical condition antedating civil society, by others as a
useful analytical conception in distinguishing natural from
conventional institutions. Finally, there was a deeply
rooted disposition to draw analogies between corporate and
natural bodies and to apply to states theories and principles
which had their origin in the relations of human beings.
A new use for these conceptions was discovered after the
Reformation. 1 The old theory of a common superior had
decayed on account of the incapacity of either Emperor or
Pope to command universal obedience. The notion of a
society of states supplanted the idea of universal empire.
It was the task of the early publicists to find an explanation
for this society, its members, and its law. There were differences of opinion among them on some of the most important points, and divergent tendencies appeared which
produced different schools of thought. Certain of these differences were of very great importance in connection with
the principle of state equality. Viewing the work of the
early publicists as a whole, however, it may be said that
they derived the law applicable to the relations between
separate states from two sources. In the first place, finding
some rules already in existence, especially in connection
with diplomacy and warfare, they referred to established
customs, usages, and understandings. Finding that large
parts of the field of international relations were not covered
1 On the use made of these sources by the classical publicists, see Bryce, Studies,
p. 6o2; Franck, Rtformaleurs, p. 276; Mackintosh, Diswurse; Maine, Ancient
Law, pp. 9<1u4; Nys, Le droil int., II, 235-237, and Les origi~, p. 8; Olney,
in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 420; Pollock, in C. L. R . (1902) , II, 511-524; Pollock, in
J. S. C. L. (1901) N.s., III, 204-207; Westlake, CollectM Papers, p. 10.
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by established custom, they sought a more general and per-

manent basis whereon to build a system of positive rules.

They recurred, in the second place, to the law of nature, a

law grounded on reason and valid for all mankind, and ap-

plied it to the relations between separate states. There was

a tendency to reason that men in a state of nature were con-

trolled by natural law, that since there was no common su-

perior to control the relations of separate states they must

be in a state of nature with respect to each other, and that

by analogy with men in a state of nature they must be con-

trolled by natural law. From such premises it was an easy

step to the conclusion that the principle of natural equality

applied to separate states in the international society. This

conclusion to be sure was not a logical necessity. Even if

accepted it did not need to have great practical significance.

Both the conclusion and its significance were contingent

upon the use which the publicists made of the ideas whose

evolution has been sketched briefly in this chapter. What

was the significance of these ideas in the classical treatises

on the law of nations? Before attempting to answer this
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question it is necessary to examine the great treatises written

in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, be-

ginning with the system initiated by the forerunners of

Grotius and established in the work of the great Dutch

jurist.

by established custom, they sought a more general and permanent basis whereon to build a system of positive rules.
They recurred, in the second place, to the law of nature, a
law grounded on reason and valid for all mankind, and applied it to the relations between separate states. There was
a tendency to reason that men in a state of nature were controlled by natural law, that since there was no common superior to control the relations of separate states they must
be in a state of nature with respect to each other, and that
by analogy with men in a state of nature they must be controlled by natural law. From such premises it was an easy
step to the conclusion that the principle of natural equality
applied to separate states in the international society. This
conclusion to be sure was not a logical necessity. Even if
accepted it did not need to have great practical significance.
Both the conclusion and its significance were contingent
upon the use which the publicists made of the ideas whose
evolution has been sketched briefly in this chapter. What
was the significance of these ideas in the classical treatises
on the law of nations ? Before attempting to answer this
question it is necessary to examine the great treatises written
in the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, beginning with the system initiated by the forerunners of
Grotius and established in the work of the great Dutch
jurist.

CHAPTER II

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE

SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

The Tradition that Grotius Established

State Equality

There is a widespread tradition that the principle of state

CHAPTER II

equality, as formulated in most modern textbooks and

treatises, had its inception in the De Jure Belli ac Pacis of

Hugo Grotius.* The influence of the principle has been

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE
SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

greatly enhanced, particularly in England and America, by

the common assumption that it was supported by his opin-

ion. Now the truth is that his opinion did not support it

THE TRAnhmN THAT GROTIUS ESTABLISHED

at all. Grotius never applied the theory of natural equality

to the society of separate states, except in certain particular

STATE EQUALITY

instances and for a limited purpose. The idea of a general

principle of state equality was never developed by him,

either expressly, or by necessary implication. He did not

base his system upon any such postulate.

There are several factors which contribute to explain the

contrary tradition, and among them the following should

be particularly noted. In the first place, there is a common
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tendency to attribute to Grotius the origin of almost every-

thing that is regarded as in any way fundamental in the

modern law of nations. This undiscriminating disposition

1 See Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 190, 216, 220, 242; Hershey, Essentials, pp.

.58,148; Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 531-532; Hicks, in A. S. I. L. Proceedings

(1909), IH, 239; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 194-204; Lawrence, Int. Law, pp. 52, 268;

Maine, Ancient Law, p. 103; Moore, Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 197;

Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 418; Reeves, in The University Record (1917), III,

254; Scott, The Hague Peace Conferences, I, 456; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, §§ 51, 69,

f>P- 75» 98; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. xvii; Vena. Arbit. (Cohen's argument), p.

1259; Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, pp. 241-242; White, Seven Great Statesmen, p. 77.
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THERE is a widespread tradition that the principle of state
equality, as formulated in most modern textbooks and
treatises, had its inception in the De Jure Bel.li ac Pacis of
Hugo Grotius. J The influence of the principle has been
greatly enhanced, particularly in England and America, by
the common assumption_that it was supported by his opinion. Now the truth is that his opinion did not support it
at all. Grotius never applied the theory of natural equality
to the society of separate states, except in certain particular
instances and for a limited purpose. The idea of a general
principle of state equality was never developed by him,
either expressly, or by necessary implication. He did not
base his system upon any such postulate.
There are several factors which contribute to explain the
contrary tradition, and among them the following should
be particularly noted. In the first place, there is a common
tendency to attribute to Grotius the origin of almost everything that is regarded as in any way fundamental in the
modern law of nations. This undiscriminating disposition
See Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 190, 216, 220, 242; Hershey, Essentials, pp.
58, 148; Hicks, in A. J. I. L. {1908), II, 531-532; Hicks, in A. S. /. L. Proceedings
(1909), III, 239; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 194-204; Lawrence, lnl. Law, pp. 52, 268;
Maine, Ancient Law, p. 103; Moore, Principles of A~rican Diplomacy, p. 197;
Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 418; Reeves, in The University Record (1917), III,
254; Scott, The Hag~ Peace Conferences, I, 456; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, H 51, 6<),
pp. 75, 98; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. xvii; Venez. Arbit. (Cohen's argument), p .
.1259; Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, pp. 241-242; White, Seven Great Statesmen, p. 77.
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has occasionally been the cause of serious error, and rarely

more conspicuously than with reference to the idea of state

equality. In the second place, there has been a good deal

of confusion with reference to the meaning of state equality.

If all that is meant is the equal protection of the law, then

of course equality was a fundamental principle of the Gro-

tian system. Grotius did not state the principle in so many

words; he took it for granted. It was absolutely prerequi-

site to his assumption that there existed a society of sepa-

rate states controlled by law. It is another matter, however,

if equality is taken to mean equality of capacity for

rights. Such a principle was not an essential prerequisite to

the system of Grotius. Indeed, the tendencies of his age

would have been much more accurately reflected by another

principle. So far from assuming equality in this significance

as a fundamental postulate, there is evidence that Grotius

would have repudiated it. In the third place, Grotius drew

freely from all those sources from which later writers de-

rived the general doctrine of state equality; he made use of
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everyone of those ideas which were his heritage from ancient

and mediaeval learning. Therefore, it is not infrequently

inferred, he must have reached the conclusion that the theory

of natural equality was applicable to states. What later

writers have too often failed to understand is the fact that

such a conclusion was contingent upon the use made of the

premises. About his use of the premises there has been a

great deal of misunderstanding. In general, in his applica-

tion of the law of nature, the idea of natural equality, the

conception of the state of nature, and the analogy between

the natural person and the state, Grotius followed the broad

lines laid down by his predecessors. Before investigating

the system of Grotius it will be profitable to consider briefly

certain of the leading principles announced by his fore-

runners of the sixteenth century.

has occasionally been the cause of serious error, and rarely
more conspicuously than with reference to the idea of state
equality. In the second place, there has been a good deal
of confusion with reference to the meaning of state equality.
If all that is meant is the equal protection of the law, then
of course equality was a fundamental principle of the Grotian system. Grotius did not state the principle in so many
words; he took it for granted. It was absolutely prerequisite to his assumption that there existed a society of separate states controlled by law. It is another matter, however,
if equality is taken to mean equality of capacity for
rights. Such a principle was not an essential prerequisite to
the system of Grotius. Indeed, the tendencies of his age
would have been much more accurately reflected by another
principle. So far from assuming equality in this significance
as a fundamental postulate, there is evidence that Grotius
would have repudiated it. In the third place, Grotius drew
freely from all those sources from which later writers derived the general doctrine of state equality; he made use of
everyone of those ideas which were his heritage from ancient
and mediaeval learning. Therefore, it is not infrequently
inferred, he must have reached the conclusion that the theory
of natural equality was applicable to states. What later
writers have too often failed to understand is the fact that
such a conclusion was contingent upon the use made of the
premises. About his use of the premises there has been a
great deal of misunderstanding. In general, in his application of the law of nature, the idea of natural equality, the
conception of the state of nature, and the analogy between
the natural person and the state, Grotius followed the broad
lines laid down by his predecessors. Before investigating
the system of Grotius it will be profitable to consider briefly
certain of the leading principles announced by his forerunners of the sixteenth century.
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The Leading Principles of Grotius' Forerunners

THE

LEADING PRINCIPLES OF GROTIUS' FORERUNNERS

There is no statement of the principle that states have

equal rights by the law of nations in the treatises of Victoria,1

Vasquez,2 Ayala,3 or Suarez,4 four of the most illustrious of

the Catholic precursors of Grotius.6 Neither is there any

satisfactory evidence that the premises which these writers

defended made the principle of equality a necessary con-

clusion. They accepted the common conception of a law of

nature. Thus Victoria referred to natural law grounded

upon reason;6 Ayala cited the law of nature in support of

the right of defense, and declared it immutable and para-

mount to the authority of all kings and princes;7 while

Suarez developed in considerable detail the theory of natu-

ral law presented by St. Thomas Aquinas.8 The Catholic

writers referred occasionally to what Victoria described as

the beginning of the world " when everything was in com-

mon," 9 and Ayala as "that primitive time which pagans

1 Victoria lived 1480-1546. His Relectiones theological was published in 1557.

The Salamanca edition of 1565, and Relectiones V and VI, published in the Classics
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of International Law, have been consulted. Page references are to J. P. Bate's

transl. in the latter edition. See Barthfilemy, in Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 1-36;

Walker, History, pp. 214-230; Wright, Francisci de Victoria.

2 Vasquez lived 1509-1566. His Controversiarum illuslrium was published in

1564. References are to the first edition. See Walker, History, passim.

1 Ayala lived 1548-1584. His Dejure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari was

published in 1582. References are to the edition in the Classics of International

Law, and page references are to J. P. Bate's transl. in Vol. II. See Walker, His-

tory, passim.

There is no statement of the principle that states have
equal rights by the law of nations in the treatises of Victoria,1
Vasquez,2 Ayala,3 or Suarez,4 four of the most illustrious of
the Catholic precursors of Grotius. 5 Neither is there any
satisfactory evidence that the premises which these writers
defended made the principle of equality a necessary conclusion. They accepted the common conception of a law of
nature. Thus Victoria referred to natural law grounded
upon reason; 6 Ayala cited the law of nature in support of
the right of defense, and declared it immutable and paramount to the authority of all kings and princes; 7 while
Suarez developed in considerable detail the theory of natural law presented by St. Thomas Aquinas.8 The Catholic
writers referred occasionally to what Victoria described as
the beginning of the world " when everything was in common," 9 and Ayala as " that primitive time which pagans

4 Suarez lived 1548-1617. His Tractatus de legibus ac Deo legislators was pub-

lished in 1612. References are to the Mayence edition of 1619. See Dunning,

History of Political Theories from Luther 10 Montesquieu, pp. 135-149; Rolland, in

Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 95-124.

6 The following secondary authorities have also been consulted: Figgis, Cerson

to Grotius, pp. 190-217; Hallam, Introduction to the Literature of Europe; Kalten-

born, Vorl&ufer des Hugo Grotius, pp. 124-190; Nys, Le droit int., I, 224-244, and

Les origines; Ompteda, Litteratur; Wheaton, History.

6 Rel. V, De Indis, §§ 2-3, passim; Rel. VI, De iure belli, passim. Cf. Vasquez,

I, 27, 11.

7 I, 2, p. 10; I, 5, p. 41; I, 7, p. 81.

"II, 5-16. • Re).V,§3,p. 151.

1 Victoria lived 1480-1546.
His Relectiones thcologiae was published in 1557.
The Salamanca edition of 1565, and Relectiones V and VI, published in the Classics
of International Law, have been consulted. Page references are to J. P. Bate's
transl. in the latter edition. Sec Barthelemy, in Pillet, Les fo11dateurs, pp. 1-36;
Walker, History, pp. 214-230; Wright, Francisci de V ictcrria.
2 Vasquez lived 1509-1566. His Conlrot•ersiarum illustrium was published in
1564. References are to the first edition. See Walker, History, passim.
3 Ayala lived 1548-1584. His Dejure et ojficiis bcllicis et discipli11a militari was
published in 1582. References are to the edition in the Classics of International
Law, and page references arc to J.P. Batc's transl. in Vol. II. See Walker, His-

tory, paHim.
4 Suarez lived 1548-1617. His Traclal11s de legibus ac Deo legislatore was published in 1612. References are to the Maycnce edition of 1619. See Dunning,
Histcry of Political Theories from Luther 10 }./011/esquieu, pp. 135-149; Rolland, in
Pill et, Les f ondateurs, pp. 95- 124.
6 The following secondary authorities have also been consulted: Figgis, Gerson
lo Grotius, pp. 190-217; Hallam, Introduction to the Literat11re of Europe; Kaltcnbom, V orla11fer des Hugo Grotius, pp. 124-190; Nys, Le droit int., I, 224-244, and
Les origines; Ompteda, Litteratur; Wheaton, History.
8 Rel. V, De bldis, §§ 2-3, passim; Rel. VI, De fore belli, passim. Cf. Vasquez,

I, 27,

II.

7

I, 2, p. 10; I, 5, p. 41; I, 71 p. 8r.

8

II, 5-16.

11

Rel. V, § 3, p. 151.
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used to call the Golden Age." 1 They were agreed that by

nature men were equal, and they were just as unanimous in

holding that natural equality had been restricted by positive

law.2 They distinguished the ideal jus naturale from positive

jus gentium according to the common tradition. Vasquez

distinguished jus gentium primcevum, which was natural law,

from jus gentium secundarium, which was positive law derived

from custom.3 Suarez worked out a similar distinction at

great length, and thereby was able to adapt the immutable

jus naturale to the practical life of men.4

The jus gentium with these writers began to take on a

modern aspect. To the ancient conception of a law com-

mon to many peoples, they added the modern conception of

a law between separate states.6 One and all they rejected

the notion of universal sovereignty,6 and represented Chris-

tendom as a society of separate states with rights and obli-

gations inter se? Their conception of the separate state was

that of a perfect political community acknowledging no

temporal superior; their law between nations was in part
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natural and in part positive as founded on usage. No one

of these writers ever completely identified the law of nature

and the law of nations. They all believed in a state of na-

ture antecedent to the state of corruption; but they did not

develop the thesis that the relation between separate states

was natural and analogous to the relation between men in a

state of nature. Now it was precisely the identification and

1 I, 5, P- 41-

* Victoria, ReL V, § 1, p. 128, § 2, p. 131, § 3, p. 161; Rel. VI, p. 181; Ayala, I,

5, pp. 40-42.

» I, 10, 18; I, 41, 30; I, 46, 12; II, S3, 3; II, 54, 4.

* II, 17-20.

• Victoria, Rel. V, § 3, pp. 151-153; Rel. VI, pp. 169,172, 183; Ayala, I, 2, p.

8; Suarez, II, 19, 9; Walker, History, pp. 154, 214. See also Legnano, Tractatus,

chs. 59, 60, 123, 124.

• Victoria, Rel. V, § 2, pp. 131, 135; Vasquez, I, 20-22; Ayala, I, 2, p. 20.

7 Victoria, Rel. V, § 2, p. 133; Rel. VI, pp. 169, 172; Ayala, I, 2, pp. 9,15, 22;

Suarez, II, 19, 9.
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used to call the Golden Age." 1 They were agreed that by
nature men were equal, and they were just as unanimous in
holding that natural equality had been restricted by positive
law. 2 They distinguished the idealjus natura/.e from positive
jus gentium according to the common tradition. Vasquez
distinguished jus gentium prim<:rvum, which was natural law,
fromjus gentium secundarium, which was positive law derived
from custom.3 Suarez worked out a similar distinction at
great length, and thereby was able to adapt the immutable
jus natura/.e to the practical life of men.4
The jus gentium with these writers began to take on a
modern aspect. To the ancient conception of a law common to many peoples, they added the modern conception of
a law between separate states. 0 One and all they rejected
the notion of universal sovereignty,6 and represented Christendom as a society of separate states with rights and obligations inter se.7 Their conception of the separate state was
that of a perfect political community acknowledging no
temporal superior; their law between nations was in part
natural and in part positive as founded on usage. No one
of these writers ever completely identified the law of nature
and the law of nations. They all believed in a state of nature antecedent to the state of corruption; but they did not
develop the thesis that the relation between separate states
was natural and analogous to the relation between men in a
state of nature. Now it was precisely the identification and
I, 5, p. 41.
2 Victoria, Rel. V, § 1, p. 128, § 2, p. 131, § 3, p. 161; Rel. VI, p. 181; Ayala, I,
5, pp. 40-42.
I I, 10, 18; I, 41, 30; I, 46, 12; II, 53, 3; II, 54, 4.
4 II, I 7-20.
' Victoria, Rel. V, § 3, pp. 151-153; Rel. VI, pp. 169, 172, 183; Ayala, I, 2, p.
8; Suarez, II, 191 9; Walker, History, pp. 154, 214. See also Legnano, Tractat11s,
chs. 59, 60, 123 1 I 24.
e Victoria, Rel. V, § 2, pp. 131, 135; Vasquez, I, 20-22; Ayala, I, 2, p. 20.
7 Victoria, Rel. V, § 21 p. 133; Rel. VI, pp. 169, 172; Ayala, I, 2, pp. 9, 15, 22;
Suarez, II, 19, 9.
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analogy suggested above that made the principle of state

equality a necessary conclusion for certain publicists of the

following century.1 The Catholic writers of the sixteenth

century were under no such necessity and drew no such

conclusion. The theory of the natural equality of men was

common learning, but it still awaited the innovator bold

enough to translate it into the law of nations.

The leading principles announced by the Protestant

writers who preceded Grotius appear to have accorded in all

essential points with those of their Catholic contemporaries.2

They, too, conceived of a new international order composed

of separate states. They, too, applied to that order a law

between nations derived partly from natural reason and

partly from custom. Of all those who wrote before Grotius

Albericus Gentilis was probably the most distinctly modern

in his tendencies.3 Gentilis was thoroughly familiar with

all those conceptions which have already been considered in

other writers, but he made few a priori deductions from

them. His jus gentium was a law between states that ac-

knowledged no superior.4 Even infidel and barbarian com-
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munities might be included in this international society.6

He found the sources of the law of nations in custom and

nature.6 While he was always ready to appeal to natural

reason to explain the origin of this law, or to provide an

additional sanction for a particular rule, the emphasis was

1 See infra, pp. 75 ff.

* See Kaltenborn, Vorlitufer des Hugo Grotius, pp. 190-246; and works cited

supra, p. 36, note 5.

3 Gentilis lived 1552-1608. His De legationibus was published in 1585, De

jure belli in 1588-1589, and Hispanica advocationis in 1613. References are to

the Hanover edition of De legationibus of 1594, and to Holland's edition of De jure

belli. The following secondary works have been consulted; Abbott, in A .J.I. L.

(1916), X, 737-748; Balch, in ibid. (1911), V, 665-679; Holland, Studies, pp. 1-39;

Nezard, in Pillet, Lesfondateurs, pp. 37-93; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson,

Great Jurists, pp. 109-143; Walker, History, pp. 249-276.

4 Dejure belli, I, 3; I, 16; HI, 15. • Ibid., I, 1; III, 9.

1 De legationibus, II, 11; Dejure belli, I, 25; III, 19.

analogy suggested above that made the principle of state
equality a necessary conclusion for certain publicists of the
following century.1 The Catholic writers of the sixteenth
century were under no such necessity and drew no such
conclusion. The theory of the natural equality of men was
common learning, but it still awaited the innovator bold
enough to translate it into the law of nations.
The leading principles announced by the Protestant
writers who preceded Grotius appear to have accorded in all
essential points with those of their Catholic contemporaries. 2
They, too, conceived of a new international order composed
of separate states. They, too, applied to that order a law
between nations derived partly from natural reason and
partly from custom. Of all those who wrote before Grotius
Albericus Gentilis was probably the most distinctly modern
in his tendencies.3 Gentilis was thorough]y familiar with
all those conceptions which have already been considered in
other writers, but he made few a priori deductions from
them. His jus gentium was a law between states that acknowledged no superior. 4 Even infidel and barbarian communities might be included in this international society. 6
He found the sources of the law of nations in custom and
nature. 6 While he was always ready to appeal to natural
reason to explain the origin of this law, or to provide an
additional sanction for a particular rule, the emphasis was
See infra, pp. 75 ff.
See Kaltenbom, V orllJufer des Hugo Grotius, pp. 190-246; and works cited
supra, p. 36, note 5.
' Gentilis lived 1552-16o8. His De legalfonibus was published in 1585, De
jwe belli in 1588-1589, and Hispanica adf!ocatt'onis in 1613. References are to
the Hanover edition of De legalionibus of 1594, and to Holland's edition of Dej11re
be/Ji. The following secondary works have been consulted; Abbott, in A. J. I. L.
(1916), X, 737-748; Balch, in ibid. (1911), V, 665-679; Holland, Studies, pp. 1-39;
Nezard, in Pillet, Les fondakurs, pp. 3 7-<)3; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson,
Great Jurists, pp. 10<)-143; Walker, History, pp. 24(/276.
4 Dejure belli, I, 3; I, 16; III, 15.
'Ibid., I, 1; III, 9.
•De legalionibus, II, 11; Dejure be/Ji, I, 25; III, 19.
1

1

IN THE SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

IN THE SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

39

39

constantly upon the positive aspects of his subject. Gen-

tilis avoided dogmatic methods, undiscriminating adoration

of the law of nature, and fallacious presumptions of an

analogy between rules suited to natural persons and rules

suited to separate states. In many respects he anticipated

the positivist tendencies of Zouche, Rachel, and Bynker-

shoek. So far from deducing the principle of state equality

from abstract premises, he left evidence that he was aware

of the practical significance of another principle.1

The Sources of the Grotian System

The learning of his predecessors, the common traditions

of the Middle Ages, and the wisdom of antiquity, all blended

into a single system under the hand of Hugo Grotius. If

there was little that was original in either the matter or the

constantly upon the positive aspects of his subject. Gentilis avoided dogmatic methods, undiscriminating adoration
of the law of nature, and fallacious presumptions of an
analogy between rules suited to natural persons and rules
suited to separate states. In many respects he anticipated
the positivist tendencies of Zouche, Rachel, and Bynkershoek. So far from deducing the principle of state equality
from abstract premises, he left evidence that he was aware
of the practical significance of another principle. 1

arrangement of his De Jure Belli ac Paris,2 certainly there

was almost nothing of any value in the vast literature of

THE SOURCES OF THE GROTIAN SYSTEM

his field that he neglected. He called Aristotle, Cicero,

Seneca, the classical jurists, and the Christian Fathers to

testify to the soundness of his conclusions. He ransacked
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1 See, for example, De legationibus, I, 4; Dejure belli, I, 3; III, 10.

1 Grotius lived 1583-1645. The De jure belli ac pacts was published in 1625.

The following editions have been consulted: the text of 1646 reproduced in the

Classics of International Law, the text and abridged translation in Whewell's

edition, the French translation of Barbeyrac, the French translation of Pradier-

Fodere1, and an English translation of 1738. Mare liberum was published in 1609.

References are to R. V. D. Magoffin's transl., ed. by J. B. Scott. Among secondary

authorities, see Basdevant, in Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 125-267; Burginy, Vie de

Grotius; Butler, Life of Grotius; Caumont, Etude sur la vie et les travaux de Grotius;

t)unning, Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, ch. 5; Franck, Réforma-

teurs, pp. 253-332; Hallam, Introduction to the Literature of Europe, II, 141-162;

Hfly, Etude sur le droit de la guerre de Grotius; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 163-207;

Luden, Hugo Grotius nach seinen Schicksalen und Schriften; Ompteda, Litteratur,

pp. 174-248; Pradier-FoderG, Essai biographique, in the first volume of his transl.

of De jure belli ac pacts; Rattigan, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, pp.

160-184; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 73-92; Vreeland, Hugo Grotius; Walker,

History, pp. 278-329; Walker, Science, pp. 91-m; Westlake, Collected Papers,

pp. 36-51; Wheaton, History, pp. 54-60; White, Seven Great Statesmen, pp. 55-
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The learning of his predecessors, the common traditions
of the Middle Ages, and the wisdom of antiquity, all blended
into a single system under the hand of Hugo Grotius. If
there was little that was original in either the matter or the
arrangement of his De Jure Belli ac Pacis,2 certainly there
was almost nothing of any value in the vast literature of
his field that he neglected. He called Aristotle, Cicero,
Seneca, the classical jurists, and the Christian Fathers to
testify to the soundness of his conclusions. He ransacked
See, for example, De /egationibus, I, 4; Dejurc belli, I, 3; III, 10.
Grotius lived 1583-1645. The De jrm~ be/U ac pads was published in 1625.
The following editions have been consulted: the text of 1646 reproduced in the
Classics of International Law, the text and abridged translation in Whcwcll's
edition, the French translation of Barbcyrac, the French translation of PradicrFodere, and an English translation of 1738. Mare liber11m was published in 1609.
References are to R. V. D. Magoffin's transl., ed. by J.B. Scott. Among secondary
authorities, see Basdevant, in Pillet, Les fottdateurs, pp. 125-267; Burginy, Vie de
Grotius; Butler, Life of Grotius; Caumont, Ett«fe sur la vie et /es trava1'x de Grotius;
"Dunning, Political The<nies from Luther to M ontesq11icu 1 ch. 5; Franck, Rtformateurs, pp. 253-332; Hallam, l11trod11ction to the Literature of Europe, II, 141-162;
H~ly, £.Jruie rnr le droit de la guerre de Groti11-S; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 163-207;
Luden, Hugo GrotittS nach seinen Schicksalen und Schriflen; Ompteda, Lillerat11r,
pp. 174-248; Pradier-Fodere, Essai biographiq11e, in the first volume of his transl.
of De jttre belli ac pacis; Rattigan, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, pp.
16~184; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, pp. 73-92; Vreeland, H11go Grotius; Walker,
History, pp. 278-329; Walker, Science, pp. 91-1n; Westlake, Collected Paper.v,
pp. 36--51; Wheaton, History, pp. 54-60; White, S~n Great Statesmen, pp. 551
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history, philosophy, theology, and law for his materials.1

It is commonplace to observe that he was thoroughly fa-

miliar with the development of those ideas briefly considered

in the preceding chapter. An examination of the use which

he made of those sources reveals, first, that his premises did

not require the conclusion that states have an equal ca-

pacity by the law of nations, and second, that Grotius

neither formulated a statement of the principle of state

equality nor made it an essential element of his system.

The Law of Nature in the System of Grotius

The principle of state equality was not a necessary in-

ference from the use which Grotius made of the law of na-

ture. He defined law —jus in the broader sense — as "a

rule of moral acts obliging to what is right " (regula actuum

history, philosophy, theology, and law for his materials. 1
It is commonplace to observe that he was thoroughly familiar with the development of those ideas briefly considered
in the preceding chapter. An examination of the use which
he made of those sources reveals, first, that his premises did
not require the conclusion that states have an equal capacity by the law of nations, and second, that Grotius
neither formulated a statement of the principle of state
equality nor made it an essential element of his system.

moralium obligans ad id quod rectum est).2 He divided law

into jus naturale or natural law, and jus voluntarium, i. e.,

instituted or positive law. Positive law was in turn sub-

THE LAw OF NATURE IN THE SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

divided into jus divinum and jus humanum according as it

was ordained by God or prescribed by man; and the jus
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humanum included the law of particular states, called jus

civile, the law of a particular condition, as the commands of

a parent, and the law of nations ox jus gentium? The natural

law was defined as

the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, from its agree-

ment or disagreement with the rational nature has in it a moral

turpitude or a moral necessity; and consequently that such act is

forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.4

Its threefold basis was right reason, the sociable character

of mankind, and divine will.6 Its existence was proved a

1 Proleg., 42-55- Subdivisions of the Prolegomena are numbered differently

in different editions. Citations in the present work follow the numbering in Whe-

well's edition.

* I, 1, 9, 1. 4 I, 1, 10, 1 (Whewell's transl.). See Mare liberum, p. 5.

'I, 1, 9-15. 'Proleg., 6, 8, 9, 12, 40; I, 2, 1, 3; I, 2, 1, 5.

The principle of state equality was not a necessary inference from the use which Grotius made of the law of nature. He defined law -jus in the broader sense- as "a
rule of moral acts obliging to what is right" (regula actuum
moralium obligans ad id quod rectum est). 2 He divided law
i~to jus naturale or natural law, and jus voluntarium, i.e.,
instituted or positive law. Positive law was in turn subdivided into jus divinum and jus humanum according as it
was ordained by God or prescribed by man; and the jus
humanum included the law of particular states, called jus
civile, the law of a particular condition, as the commands of
a parent, and the law of nations or jus gentium. 3 The natural
law was defined as
the Dictate of Right Reason, indicating that any act, from its agreement or disagreement with the rational nature has in it a moral
turpitude or a moral necessity; and consequently that such act is
forbidden or commanded by God, the author of nature.~

Its threefold basis was right reason, the sociable character
of mankind, and divine will. 6 Its existence was proved a
1 Proleg., 42-55.
Subdivisions of the Prolegomena are numbered differently
in different editions. Citations in the present work follow the numbering in Whewell's edition.
4 I, 1, 10, 1 <Whewell's transl.). See Mare liberum, p. 5.
I I, 1, 9, I .
1 Proleg., 6, 8, 9, 12, 40; I, 2, 1, 3; I, 2, 1, 5.
I I, I, ~15.
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priori by showing its agreement with the rational and social

nature of man and a posteriori by showing that all the more

civilized nations observed it.1

Grotius distinguished the law of nature from positive law

in general,2 and also from the law of nations in particular.3

The law of nations, jus gentium, he denned as the law which

regards the relations of several peoples or rulers of peoples,

the law which has received its obligatory force from the will

of all nations or of many, and which belongs to that society

which is established by nations amongst themselves.4

Further: as the Laws of each Community regard the Utility of

that Community, so also between different Communities, all or most,

Laws might be established, and it appears that Laws have been es-

tablished, which enjoined the Utility, not of special communities, but

of that great aggregate System of Communities. And this is what is

called the Law of Nations, or International Law; when we distinguish

it from Natural Law.6

The law of nations in this broader significance was derived

from nature, divine command, and custom;6 its ultimate
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sanction was the good faith of that greater society to which

its rules applied.7

It was only on occasion that Grotius appeared to identify

the law of nations with the natural law, and then only in

respect to certain rules which he held to be the same in both,

as where he argued for freedom of the seas from premises

grounded mainly in the natural law,8 or where he said that

1 Proleg., 46; I, 1, 12; I, 2, 1-3; 1,3, 2, 2.

1 Proleg., 16, 30; I, 1, 9.

• Proleg., 17, 37, 40, S3! I, ». Hi H, 3, 10; II, 8, 1; II, 18, 4; HI, I, ij HI,

x, 5, 5; HI, 2,1-2; IH, 3, 6 and 12; III, 4, 15; III, 6, 1-2; III, 18, 1, 1. For

a naturalist's opinion of this distinction, see Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3;

II, 8, 1, notes 1 and 3; II, 18, 4, note 2; III, 2, 2, note 1; III, 4, 15, note 1; III,

6, 2,1, note 1; and infra p. 44, note 5.

4 Proleg., 1,17, 18, 26, 28; I, 1, 14; II, 8,1; II, 18, 2,1; IH, 3,12.

1 Proleg., 17 (WhewelTs transl.).

• Proleg., 1, 26, 40, 46; II, 16, 31; II, 18, 4, 2; III, 2, 2; III, 19,11,1.

'III, 25, 1. • See Mare liberum.
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contracts between sovereigns as such were controlled en-

tirely by the law of nature.1 It is misleading to say, with

reference to these or similar illustrations, that he identified

jus naturale and jus gentium; it would convey a more ac-

curate impression of his method and point of view to say

that he derived certain rules almost entirely from reason

and the precepts of nature. There is a passage defining jus

gentium in his first chapter that has given some difficulty.

He says:

Law in a wider sphere is Jus Gentium, the Law of Nations, that Law

which has received an obligatory force from the will of all nations, or

of many.

I have added " or of many," because scarce any Law is found, ex-

cept Natural Law, (which also is often called Jus Gentium,) common

contracts between sovereigns as such were controlled entirely by the law of nature.1 It is misleading to say, with
reference to these or similar illustrations, that he identified
jus natura/.e and jus gentium; it would convey a more accurate impression of his method and point of view to say
that he derived certain rules almost entirely from reason
and the precepts of nature. There is a passage defining jus
gentium in his first chapter that has given some difficulty.
He says:

to all nations. Indeed that is often Jus Gentium in one part of the

world which is not so in another; as we shall shew when we come to

speak of captivity and of postliminium.1

So far from suggesting an identity between the law of nature

and the law of nations, however, this passage was really an
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attempt to contrast the universality of the ideal law, to

which Grotius frequently appealed, with the more limited

scope in respect to many of its rules of positive law founded

on consent or custom. The naturalists, who succeeded Gro-

tius and who themselves identified the law of nature and

the law of nations, found no suggestion of an identity in the

passage in question.3 Their inference, in fact, was quite the

Law in a wider sphere is Jus Gentium, the Law of Nations, that Law
which has received an obligatory force from the will of all nations, or
of many.
I have added "or of many," because scarce any Law is found, except Natural Law, (which also is often called Jus Gentium,) common
to all nations. Indeed that is often Jus Gentium in one part of the
world which is not so in another; as we shall shew when we come to
speak of captivity and of postliminium.2

contrary. Elsewhere, in passage after passage, Grotius

proved his grasp of the distinction between those ideal prin-

ciples which are ascertained by reason and those positive

rules which are grounded on consent. He regretted that

1 n, i1, 5.

1 I, 1, 14 (Whewell's transl.).

a See Pufendorf, De jure naiurce el gentium, II, 3, 23; Barbeyrac's Grotius, I,

1, 14, note 3; Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, notes 2 and 3. On the naturalists,

see infra, pp. 75 ff.

So far from suggesting an identity between the law of nature
and the law of nations, however, this passage was really an
attempt to contrast the universality of the ideal law, to
which Grotius frequently appealed, with the more limited
scope in respect to many of its rules of positive law founded
on consent or custom. The naturalists, who succeeded Grotius and who themselves identified the law of nature and
the law of nations, found no suggestion of an identity in the
passage in question. 3 Their inference, in fact, was quite the
contrary. Elsewhere, in passage after passage, Grotius
proved his grasp of the distinction between those ideal principles which are ascertained by reason and those positive
rules which are grounded on consent. He regretted that
II, II, S·
I, 1, 14 (Whewell's transl.).
3 See Pufendorf, De jure nat11r<Z el gentium, II, 3, 23; Barbeyrac's Grotius, I,
1, 14, note Ji Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, notes 2 and J. On the naturalists,
see infra, pp. 75 ff.
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scriptores voces juris naturce et gentium permiscent, criticised

those who had confused the two,1 and maintained that many

things forbidden by natural law were permitted by the law

of nations, and, contrariwise, that things permitted by

natural law might be forbidden by the law of nations.2

It is evident that Grotius used nature chiefly as a source

from which to derive rules applicable to nations.3 The plan

and purpose of his work did not require an exhaustive treat-

ment of nature's law. Barbeyrac has pointed this out in

comparing the work of Grotius and Pufendorf:

As to the subject matter, I have already taken notice, that Grotius

pretended not to give a complete system; which might be easily seen,

though he himself had not declared it. Tis only occasionally that he

touches upon even the greatest part of the principal subject matters

of natural right. So that, though his views had been more extensive,

scriptores voces juris

natur~

43

et gentium permiscent, criticised

those who had confused the two,1 and maintained that many
things forbidden by natural law were permitted by the law
of nations, and, contrariwise, that things permitted by
natural law might be forbidden by the law of nations. 2
It is evident that Grotius used nature chiefly as a source
from which to derive rules applicable to nations.3 The plan
and purpose of his work did not require an exhaustive treatment of nature's law. Barbeyrac has pointed this out in
comparing the work of Grotius and Pufendorf:

and less imperfect, than they seem in many things to have been; his

plan did not lead him to a full discussion of them; it was enough for

him to handle them so far, as might be sufficient to decide the ques-

tions, which concerned the principal subject of his book. In a system

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of the law of nature, an author ought, without dispute, to begin with

instructing his reader in the nature of moral entities or beings; in the

principles and different qualities of humane actions; and what it is

that makes them imputable either as good or evil; in the nature of

laws in general; and their different kinds, etc. But we meet with

scarce anything in Grotius, relating to all these matters; which com-

pose the first book of my original.4

Grotius presented a less comprehensive discussion of natural

law than either Suarez before him or Pufendorf who came

after. He did not write a philosophical disquisition. His

primary purpose was to lay down rules for the international

society, that great aggregate system of communities. Had

1 Proleg., 37, 40, 53.

« II, 3, 10; II, 18, 4, 3; III, 4, 1S. i-

'Its relation to his method is suggested in I, 2, 1-3; II, 18, 1; and III, 1, 5, 5.

Cf. Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, p. 171.

4 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prff., § 31 (Carew's transl.). Cf. Bonfils, Manuelr

i *3S. P- 140; Pradier-Foderf, Train, § 166,1, 286.

As to the subject matter, I have already taken notice, that Grotius
pretended not to give a complete system; which might be easily seen,
though he himself had not declared it. 'Tis only occasionally that he
touches upon even the greatest part of the principal subject matters
of natural right. So that, though his views had been more extensive,
and less imperfect, than they seem in many things to have been; his
plan did not lead him to a full discussion of them; it was enough for
him to handle them so far, as might be sufficient to decide the questions, which concerned the principal subject of his book. In a system
of the law of nature, an author ought, without dispute, to begin with
instructing his reader in the nature of moral entities or beings; in the
principles and different qualities of humane actions; and what it is
that makes them imputable either as good or evil; in the nature of
laws in general; and their different kinds, etc. But we meet with
scarce anything in Grotius, relating to all these matters; which compose the first book of my original. 4

Grotius presented a less comprehensive discussion of natural
law than either Suarez before him or Pufendorf who came
after. He did not write a philosophical disquisition. His
primary purpose was to lay down rules for the international
society, that great aggregate system of communities. Had
Proleg., 37, 40, 53.
II, 3, 10; II, 18, 4, 3; III, 4, 15, 1.
3 Its relation to his method is suggested in I, 2, 1-3; II, 18, lj and III, l, 5, 5.
Cf. Vreeland, Hugo Grotius, p. qr.
4 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, pref., § 31 (Carew's transl.).
Cf. Bonfils, M aniul~
§ :z35, p. 140; Pradier-Fodere, Traill, § 166, I, 286.
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he referred to practice alone he would have defeated his

purpose as a reformer. So he recurred to the law of nature

and natural justice, and sought

to refer the truth of the things which belong to Natural Law to some

he referred to practice alone he would have defeated his
purpose as a reformer. So he recurred to the law of nature
and natural justice, and sought

notions, so certain, that no one can deny them, without doing violence

to his own nature.1

It was of the utmost importance that Grotius distin-

guished the law of nature and the law of nations. It was

because Pufendorf and the naturalists identified the two

to refer the truth of the things which belong to Natural Law to some
notions, so certain, that no one can deny them, without doing violence
to his own nature. 1

that they were under a logical necessity of concluding that

states have equal rights.2 Nor can responsibility for later

blending of the two conceptions into one be attributed to

Grotius, as some have argued.3 Whatever confusion there

may have been in his method, Grotius left no doubt in the

minds of his successors as to his opinion on this much con-

troverted question. When the naturalists asserted that the

law of nature and the law of nations were the same thing

they had no thought of referring to Grotius. On this point,

they recurred to the opinion of Thomas Hobbes and founded
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their system upon reason unadulterated by custom or con-

sent. Pufendorf expressly condemned the distinction which

Grotius labored so hard to establish.4 Barbeyrac denounced

it as une pure chimbre} Thomasius' reason for rejecting the

distinction is significant. It all comes to this, he declared:

1 Proleg., 39 (Whewell's transl.).

• Infra, pp. 75 ff.

• Dunning, Political Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, p. 175 Cf. Walker,

History, p. 335.

4 Dejure naturœ el gentium, II, 3, 23.

• Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3; Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prfif., § 31.

Barbeyrac said: "pour 6tre convaincu, que Grotius avoit encore sur plusieurs

choses des idees fausses, ou du moins assez confuses, il suffit de considerer un de

ses principes, qui se repand sur tout son Systeme, je veux dire, la supposition d'un

Droit des Gens arbitraire qu'il concoit fondf i sur le consentement tacite des Peuples,

& aiant neanmoins par lui-meme force de Loi, autant que le Droit Noturel."

It was of the utmost importance that Grotius distinguished the law of nature and the law of nations. It was
because Pufendorf and the naturalists identified the two
that they were under a logical necessity of concluding that
states have equal rights. 2 Nor can responsibility for later
blending of the two conceptions into one be attributed to
Grotius, as some have argued. 3 Whatever confusion there
may have been in his method, Grotius left no doubt in the
minds of his successors as to his opinion on this much controverted question. \Vhen the naturalists asserted that the
law of nature and the law of nations were the same thing
they had no thought of referring to Grotius. On this point,
they recurred to the opinion of Thomas Hobbes and founded
their system upon reason unadulterated by custom or consent. Pufendorf expressly condemned the distinction which
Grotius labored so hard to establish.4 Barbeyrac denounced
it as une pure chimere. 6 Thomasius' reason for rejecting the
distinction is significant. It all comes to this, he declared:
Proleg., 39 (Whewcll's transl.).
Infra, pp. 75 ff.
• Dunning, Political Thu>ries from LUiher to Montesquieu, p. 175
His/Qry, p. 335.
1

2

Cf. Walker,

De j11re nat1mz et gcntium, II, 3, 23.
• Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, r, r4, note 3; Ilarbeyrac's Pufcndorf, pref., § 3r.
Barbeyrac said: "pour etre convaincu, que Grotius avoit encore sur plusieurs
choses des idees fausses, ou du moins asscz confuses, il suffit de considerer un de
ses principes, qui se repand sur tout son Systeme, jc veux dire, la supposition d'un
Droit des Gens arbitraire qu'il com;oit fonde sur le consentement tacite des Peuples,
& aiant nearunoins par lui-m~me force de Loi, autant que le Droit Nature!."
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Nations are equal among themselves; neither do they recognize a

superior among men. Therefore, they cannot be bound by human

law.1

The same point was stated a little more fully by Burlamaqui,

Nations are equal among themselves; neither do they recognize a
superior among men. Therefore, they cannot be bound by human
law. 1

who declared that Grotius' pretended law of nations distinct

from the natural law was an idea destitute of all foundation,

and who denied the existence of a positive law of nations

proved by custom

because, first, all nations are with regard to one another in a natural

independence and equality. If, therefore, there is any common law

between them, it can proceed only from God their common sovereign.2

The naturalists entertained no illusions as to the bearing

of the principles of Grotius on the natural equality of states.

The same point was stated a little more fully by Burlamaqui,
who declared that Grotius' pretended law of nations distinct
from the natural law was an idea destitute of all foundation,
and who denied the existence of a positive law of nations
proved by custom

If it be suggested that there was the germ of naturalistic

tendencies in the use which Grotius made of the law of na-

ture, it may be said with equal force that there was also the

germ of positivism in his emphasis upon the importance of

because, first, all nations are with regard to one another in a natural
independence and equality. If, therefore, there is any common law
between them, it can proceed only from God their common sovercign.2

usage. The translation of the theory of equality into the

law of nations depended upon the superstructure which his
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successors should build upon the foundations that he laid.

It has been suggested that the immutability of the law of

nature made equality a necessary inference from its appli-

cation to separate states.3 According to Grotius the law of

nature was sp immutable that it could not be changed by

God himself;4 but by adopting the traditional division of

jus naturale into that which was characteristic of primitive

nature and that which was characteristic of a period of more

1 Institutionum jurisprudentice divina, I, 2, 105. See infra, p. 83. To the same

effect, Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, note 2, infra, p. 85, note 2.

* Principes du droit naturel, II, 6, 8, p. 223. "Car 1° toutes les Nations sont

les unes a 1'egard des autres dans une independance & une egalitf naturelle. Si

done il y a entr'elles quelque Loi commune, elle ne peut venir que de Dieu, leur

commun Souverain."

* Lawrence, Essays, pp. 194-195; Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 418.

4 I, 1, 10. S-

The naturalists entertained no illusions as to the bearing
of the principles of Grotius on the natural equality of states.
If it be suggested that there was the germ of naturalistic
tendencies in the use which Grotius made of the law of nature, it may be said with equal force that there was also the
germ of positivism in his emphasis upon the importance of
usage. The translation of the theory of equality into the
law of nations depended upon the superstructure which his
successors should build upon the foundations that he laid.
It has been suggested that the immutability of the law of
nature made equality a necessary inference from its application to separate states. 3 According to Grotius the law of
nature was SQ immutable that it could not be changed by
God himself; 4 but by adopting the traditional division of
jus naturale into that which was characteristic of primitive
nature and that which was characteristic of a period of more
l Institulionum }ttrisprndcntia divinlE, I, 21 105. See infra, p. 83. To the same
effect, Barbcyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, note 2, infra, p. 85, note 2.
' Principcs du droit nalurcl, II, 6, 8, p. 223 . "Car 1° toutes !cs Nations sont
!es uncs A l'egard des autrcs dans une independance & une egalite naturelle. Si
done ii y a entr'elles quelque Loi commune, elle ne peut venir que de Dieu, leUl'
commun Souverain."
1 Lawrence, Essays, pp. 194-195; Olney, in A . J.1. L. (1901), I, 418.
4 I, l, 10, 5.
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complete development, Grotius was able to free himself

from most of the restrictions of this hypothetical immuta-

bility.1 It is significant that this very division was used to

justify restrictions upon the principle of natural equality,

both with respect to individuals and with respect to com-

munities.2

There has been a good deal of misunderstanding about

the use which Grotius made of the jus naturale and jus

gentium of the Roman Law. It has been suggested that he

assumed that they were two names for the same thing, and

that he drew heavily from the substance of Roman jus gen-

tium, which he assumed to be identical with jus naturale,

under the mistaken impression that it was intended to be

a "law of nations" in the modern significance of that ex-

pression.3 The truth is that Grotius was guilty of neither

one of these errors. He had a clearer understanding of the

relation between jus naturale and jus gentium in Roman

Law than many of his modern commentators. He was

thoroughly familiar, for example, with the difference between
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them with respect to slavery, a distinction which he em-

bodied in his system.4 He was careful to point out that they

were essentially different;B and he was sufficiently explicit

to provoke a note from his naturalist translator and editor,

Barbeyrac, denying that the Roman Lawyers understood

anything more by the jus gentium than " what the modern

interpreters call the jus naturale secundarium."6 The

Roman jus gentium was the nearest approximation in posi-

1 II, 8, 1 and 26. See Mare liberum, ch. 7, p. 53, where Grotius approves of

Vasquez' distinction between primary and secondary laws of nature.

• II, 22, 11; III, 7, 1.

* Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 531-532; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 196 ff.;

Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 102-103; Ritchie, Natural Rights, p. 36.

4 II, 22, xx; m, 7, 1.

* Proleg., 53; II, 8, 1 and 26.

• Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, t, note 1. See also Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3,

23, note 3.

complete development, Grotius was able to free himself
from most of the restrictions of this hypothetical immutability.1 It is significant that this very division was used to
justify restrictions upon the principle of natural equality,
both with respect to individuals and with respect to communities. 2
There has been a good deal of misunderstanding about
the use which Grotius made of the jus naturale and jus
gentium of the Roman Law. It has been suggested that he
assumed that they were two names for the same thing, and
that he drew heavily from the substance of Roman jus gentium, which he assumed to be identical with jus naturale,
under the mistaken impression that it was intended to be
a "law of nations" in the modern significance of that expression.3 The truth is that Grotius was guilty of neither
one of these errors. He had a clearer understanding of the
relation between jus naturale and jus gentium in Roman
Law than many of his modern commentators. He was
thoroughly familiar, for example, with the difference between
them with respect to slavery, a distinction which he embodied in his system.4 He was careful to point out that they
were essentially different; 6 and he was sufficiently explicit
to provoke a note from his naturalist translator and editor,
Barbeyrac, denying that the Roman Lawyers understood
anything more by the jus gentium than " what the modern
interpreters call the jus naturale secundarium." 6 The
Roman jus gentium was the nearest approximation in posi1 II, 8, 1 and 26.
See Mare liberum, ch. 7, p. 53, where Grotius approves of
Vasquez' distinction between primary and secondary Jaws of nature.
2 II, 22, u; III, 7, r.
3 Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (19o8), II, 531-532; Lawrence, Essays, pp. 196 ff.;
Maine, Ancient Law, pp. 102-103; Ritchie, h'at11ral Rights, p. 36.
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II,

22, 11;

III, 7,

I.

• Proleg., 53; II, 8, 1 and 26.
1 Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, 1 1 note
23, note 3.

1.

See also Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3,
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tive law to the ideal principles of the jus naturale. It was

certain to have a tremendously important influence on Gro-

tius as well as on later writers; but it is a mistake to say

that Grotius did not see any difference between the two. It

is an even more violent injustice to say that he took the

Roman jus gentium for a " law of nations " in the modern

sense. Unfortunately, he used the same expression to de-

scribe both the Roman and the modern conception, some-

times leaving it to the reader to determine from the content

the sense in which the term jus gentium was used. This was

almost certain to result in confusion, but the misunderstand-

ing appears to have been greater among scholars of the last

century than among his immediate successors. Grotius

tried repeatedly, as he said, to get rid of ambiguity, and to

make it clear that the jus gentium of the Romans was not

the law which pertained to the mutual society of nations

among themselves. H<zc ergo ut discernerentur, laboravimus.1

j The State of Nature in the System of Grotius

There was nothing in Grotius' conception of the inter-
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national society which made the equality of states an es-

sential principle. He advanced little that was new in this

respect. Like Suarez he conceived of a society of nations

and alleged the necessity of law for that great aggregate sys-

tem of communities.2 Unlike the naturalists, who wrote

later in the century, he placed no great emphasis upon the

idea that international society was analogous to the state

of nature. He made comparatively few references to the

natural condition of mankind and then quite incidentally

in the discussion of other themes. For illustration, he said

l> 1 Proleg., x, 17, 36, 53; I, 1, 14; II, 8, ij II, 8, 26; II, 16, 31; II, 18, 2, 1;

III, 1, 8, 2; Clark, Practical Jurisprudence, p. 362; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, p. 77;

Twiss, Law of Nations, p. xviii.

* Proleg., 17, 23; n, 18, 2; III, 25, 1. Cf. Suarez Tractatus de legibus, II, 19,

9, and Wolff's conception of the civitas maxima, infra, p. 06.
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that civil society was the result of the inability of separate

families to protect themselves,1 that among primitive men

in what the poets had sometimes portrayed as the golden

age all things were held in common,2 that a natural con-

dition of mankind existed before political society was formed

and judges constituted,3 that such a condition still prevailed

where men lived distributed into families and not into

states,4 and that in the primeval state of nature no men were

slaves.6 The state of nature of which Grotius conceived was

one of normally peaceful relationship between men as heads

of families and owing no subjection to any higher human

authority.6 However, he made no more than an incidental

use of the notion. His appeal was not to men in a state of

nature, but to the reason of men in a state of civilization.

Grotius did not develop the argument that men had

abandoned the state of nature only in so far as national

governments had been formed, while remaining in the natu-

ral condition so far as international relations were concerned.

This might, perhaps, be implied from one or two passages,
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but it is characteristic of Grotius that the argument was

invoked, if at all, only to provide an answer to particular

questions, and when other resources failed. There is a sug-

gestion of the argument in the passages in which he sets

forth his theory of punitive war. Consider, for example,

the following:

It is to be understood also that kings, and they whose rights are of

the nature of royal rights, have the right of requiring punishment,

not only for injuries committed against them and their subjects, but

for those also which do not peculiarly touch them, but which enor-

mously violate the law of nature and nations in any persons. For

the liberty of providing for human society by punishment, which at

1 -1.4, 7,3-

* II, 2, 2; II, 1o, 1, 2; Mare liberum, p. 23.

« II, 20, 8-9. • III, 7( 1.

* II, 20, 40, 1 and 4. • I, 4, 7, 3; II, 15, 5; HI, 9, 18-19.

that civil society was the result of the inability of separate
families to protect themselves, 1 that among primitive men
in what the poets had sometimes portrayed as the golden
age all things were held in common,2 that a natural condition of mankind existed before political society was formed
and judges constituted,3 that such a condition still prevailed
where men lived distributed into families and not into
states, 4 and that in the primeval state of nature no men were
slaves. 6 The state of nature of which Grotius conceived was
one of normally peaceful relationship between men as heads
of families and owing no subjection to any higher human
authority. 6 However, he made no more than an incidental
use of the notion. His appeal was not to men in a state of
nature, but to the reason of men in a state of civilization.
Grotius did not develop the argument that men had
abandoned the state of nature only in so far as national
governments had been formed, while remaining in the natural condition so far as international relations were concerned.
This might, perhaps, be implied from one or two passages,
but it is characteristic of Grotius that the argument was
invoked, if at all, only to provide an answer to particular
questions, and when other resources failed. There is a suggestion of the argument in the passages in which he sets
forth his theory of punitive war. Consider, for example,
the following:
It is to be understood also that kings, and they whose rights are of ·
the nature of royal rights, have the right of requiring punishment,
not only for injuries committed against them and their subjects, but
for those also which do not peculiarly touch them, but which enormously violate the law of nature and nations in any persons. For
the liberty of providing for human society by punishment, which at
1

-I, 4, 7, 3·

2

II,

2, 2;

3

II,

20,

4

II,

20,

II,

10, 1, 2;

8-<J.
40, 1 and 4.

:Mare liber11m, p.

23.

III, 7, 1.
• I, 4, 7, 3; II, 15, 5; III, 9, 18-19.
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first, as we have said, was in the hands of individuals, did, when states

and tribunals were instituted, fall to the share of the supreme au-

thorities, not properly as commanding others, but as being themselves

subject to none.1

The suggestion is misleading, however, for his whole theory

first, as we have said, was in the hands of individuals, did, when states
and tribunals were instituted, fall to the share of the supreme authorities, not properly as commanding others, but as being themselves
subject to none. 1

of punitive war was irreconcilable, as later writers have

pointed out,2 with the conception of a natural state of equal-

ity among nations.

There is evidence that Grotius saw the possibility of an

analogy between the society of nations and the state of na-

ture. He used something like such an analogy to explain

the reason for certain rules of law, as where he compared

the pacts of sovereigns with pacts made between men at sea

or on a desert island, all of which he said were governed by

the natural law;3 but he never used it in a systematic way

to explain the nature of the society of nations.4 In so far as

he developed the idea of a positive law of nations he denied,

at least by implication, the idea of an international state of

nature.6 Grotius elaborated upon none of those subtle com-
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parisons by which later writers established the equality of

states as a maxim of the law of nations.

The Analogy in the System of Grotius

The analogy between natural persons and the juristic

persons of the law of nations was used extensively in the

1 n, 20, 40 (Whewell's transl.). Cf. Victoria, Rel. VI, De iure bdli, pp. 172,

185, 187.

! Fiore says: "Que dire alors de la theorie de Grotius, qui voulait, en certains

cas, legitimer la guerre faite dans le but de punir, bellum punitivum? Admettre

un juridiction penale entre les Etats, ce ne serait pas seulement delruire l'figalitfi

juridique, mais encore porter atteinte aux regies fondamentales du droit de punir,

qui ne peut legalement s'exercer en l'absence d'une loi qui puisse 6tre violee, d'un

jugement, d'une condamnation et des moyens legaux destines a en assurer l'exfi-

cution." (Antoine's transl.). Nouveau droit int. pub., § 438,1, 380.

The suggestion is misleading, however, for his whole theory
of punitive war was irreconcilable, as later writers have
pointed out,2 with the conception of a natural state of equality among nations.
There is evidence that Grotius saw the possibility of an
analogy between the society of nations and the state of nature. He used something like such an analogy to explain
the reason for certain rules of law, as where he compared
the pacts of sovereigns with pacts made between men at sea
or on a desert island, all of which he said were governed by
the natural law; 3 but he never used it in a systematic way
to explain the nature of the society of nations.4 In so far as
he developed the idea of a positive law of nations he denied,
at least by implication, the idea of an international state of
nature. 6 Grotius elaborated upon none of those subtle comparisons by which later writers established the equality of
states as a maxim of the law of nations.

'n, 11,5,3.

* See Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 48.

THE fu'l"ALOGY IN THE SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

6 See Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, p. 285, note 13.

The analogy between natural persons and the juristic
persons of the law of nations was used extensively in the
II, 20, 40 (Whewell's transl.). Cf. Victoria, Rel. VI, De iure bel/i, pp. 172,
185, 187.
2 Fiore says: "Que dire alors de la theorie de Grotius, qui voulait, en ccrtains
cas, legitimer la gucrre faite clans le but de punir, helium p1111iliv11m? Admettre
un juridiction pfoale entrc Jes Etats, cc nc serait pas sculcment dctruire l'egalitc
juridique, mais encore porter attcintc aux rcglcs fondamcntales du droit de punir,
qui nc peut Jegalcmcnt s'exercer en !'absence d'une Joi qui puissc etre violee, d'un
jugement, d'une condamnation ct des moycns legaux destines a en assurer !'execution." (Antoine's transl.). No11t•ea14 droit int. p11b., § 438, I, 38o.
1
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II,

4

See Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 48.
See Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, p. 285, note 13.
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work of Grotius and in a characteristic fashion. As already

pointed out, he made only an occasional use of the analogy

between separate states and men in a state of nature. Of

much more importance was his use of an analogy between

states and men in political society. While he recognized

many defects in such an analogy,1 he recurred to it fre-

quently to support the rules laid down. He compared the

ruler of a state to the master of a family,2 clients under the

protection of patrons to international persons protected by

an unequal alliance,3 and natural persons reduced to slavery

to states reduced by conquest.4 "And these artificial bodies

have plainly an analogy with natural bodies," he said, in

discussing the termination of sovereignty. Plane autem

corpora hoc artificialia instar habent corporis naturalist

Passages like the above illustrate the use which Grotius

made of the analogy, but they hardly suggest the importance

of his indebtedness to municipal law. His whole treatise

fairly bristled with borrowings. The atmosphere of legal

science in his day was an atmosphere of Roman Law. Gro-

tius had an unfailing supply of principles in the jus gentium
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of Rome and he used it unsparingly. His classification was

based upon the divisions of municipal law; he borrowed

from municipal law whole categories of rules relating to

property, obligations, and other topics. He borrowed heav-

ily from the jurists, but relatively little, compared to later

publicists, from the theorists. He did not dilate upon the

analogy as a means of explaining the nature of international

relations or of translating the theory of equality into the

law of nations.

1 I, 3, 7; II, 6, 4; II, 16, 31; Mare liberum, p. 47-

1 I, 3, 16.

• I. 3, »x.

4 n, u, 7,2; in, 8,1-4.

•n.9,3.

work of Grotius and in a characteristic fashion. As already
pointed out, he made only an occasional use of the analogy
between separate states and men in a state of nature. Of
much more importance was his use of an analogy between
states and men in political society. While he recognized
many defects in such an analogy,1 he recurred to it frequently to support the rules laid down. He compared the
ruler of a state to the master of a family, 2 clients under the
protection of patrons to international persons protected by
an unequal alliance,3 and natural persons reduced to slavery
to states reduced by conquest.4 "And these artificial bodies
have plainly an analogy with natural bodies," he said, in
discussing the termination of sovereignty. Plane autem
corpora hax artificialia instar habent corporis naturalis. 6
Passages like the above illustrate the use which Grotius
made of the analogy, but they hardly suggest the importance
of his indebtedness to municipal law. His whole treatise
fairly bristled with borrowings. The atmosphere of legal
science in his day was an atmosphere of Roman Law. Grotius had an unfailing supply of principles in the jus gentium
of Rome and he used it unsparingly. His classification was
based upon the divisions of municipal law; he borrowed
from municipal law whole categories of rules relating to
property, obligations, and other topics. He borrowed heavily from the jurists, but relatively little, compared to later
publicists, from the theorists. He did not dilate upon the
analogy as a means of explaining the nature of international
relations or of translating the theory of equality into the
law of nations.
I, 3, 7i II, 6, 4i II, 16, 31; Mare libernm, p. 47.
I, 31 16.
' I, 31 21.
' II, :n, 71 2; III, 8, 1-4.
I II, 9, 3.
1
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The Idea of Natural Equality in the System

of Grotius

If it is true, as even the naturalists suggested, that the

use which Grotius made of the law of nature was inconsistent

THE

IDEA OF NATURAL EQUALITY IN THE SYSTEM
OF GROTIUS

with the notion of state equality, then it is certainly true

that his use of the conception of natural equality required

no such conclusion. He was thoroughly familiar with the

theory of the natural equality of men:

By nature, that is, in the primeval state of nature, and without the

act of man, no men are slaves, as we have elsewhere said; and in this

sense we may assent to what the jurists say, that slavery is against

nature. But that slavery should have its origin in human act, that

is, in convention or delict, is not repugnant to natural justice, as we

have also shewn.1

If it is true, as even the naturalists suggested, that the
use which Grotius made of the law of nature was inconsistent
with the notion of state equality, then it is certainly true
that his use of the conception of natural equality required
no such conclusion. He was thoroughly familiar with the
theory of the natural equality of men:

If he had been the pioneer in translating this theory into in-

ternational law, it would be reasonable to anticipate a state-

ment of it somewhere in his works. However, he nowhere

asserted the general equality of states, either expressly or

by necessary implication.2 It was only with regard to cer-
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1 III, 7,1 (Whewell's transl.). See also passages in I, 5,1; II, 2, 2; II, 10,1-2.

In his address "To the Rulers and to the Free and Independent Nations of Christen-

dom," at the beginning of Mare liberum (p. 1), Grotius included a truly Ciceronian

statement of the natural basis for the theory of equality among men, although he

By nature, that is, in the primeval state of nature, and without the
act of man, no men arc slaves, as we have elsewhere said; and in this
sense we may assent to what the jurists say, that slavery is against
nature. But that slavery should have its origin in human act, that
is, in convention or delict; is not repugnant to natural justice, as we
have also shewn. 1

said nothing expressly of the theory.

* It is noteworthy that Pradier-Foderfi, one of the most reliable of nineteenth

century authorities on Grotius, does not attribute the idea of state equality to him.

He says that Grotius recognized the rights of self-preservation, property, and em-

bassy, but that " les diverses questions concernant ces differents droits ainsi que

les devoirs qui correspondent a ces droits, ne sont pas traitfies par lui d'une mani-

Sre distincte; elles se confondent dans l'exposition du vaste sujet de son immortel

ouvrage sur le droit de la guerre et de la paix, et se perdent dans l'abondance des

matenaux accumules par son opulente Erudition." Pradier-Fodirfi cites Vattel as

If he had been the pioneer in translating this theory into international law, it would be reasonable to anticipate a statement of it somewhere in his works. However, he nowhere
asserted the general equality of states, either expressly or
by necessary implication. 2 It was only with regard to cer-

deriving the fundamental rights of states from an application of the theories of the

law of nature, the state of nature, and natural equality to the international society.

Traitt, §§ 166-167,1, 286.

Bonds says: "Dans son immortel ouvrage, Grotius n'a pas traitfi d'une maniere

distincte des droits et des devoirs des Etats. Cette matiire est comme ensevelie

sous les elements accumules de sa stupfifiante irudition." Manuel, § 235, p. 140.

1 III, 7, l (Whewell's transl.). See also passages in I, s, l; II, 2, 2; II, lO, 1-2.
Jn his address" To the Rulers and to the Free and Independent Nations of Christendom," at the beginning of Mare liberum (p. 1) 1 Grotius included a truly Ciceronian
statement of the natural basis for the theory of equality among men, although he
said nothing expressly of the theory.
1 It is noteworthy that Pradier-Fodfae, one of the most reliable of nineteenth
century authorities on Grotius, does not attribute the idea of state equality to him.
He says that Grotius recognized the rights of self-preservation, property, and emLassy, but that "les diverses questions concemant ces differents droits ainsi que
Jes devoirs qui correspondent a ces droits, ne sont pas traitees par lui d'une maniere distincte; elles se confondent clans l'exposition du vaste sujet de son immortel
ouvrage sur le droit de la guerre et de la pau, et se perdent clans l'abondance des
materiaux accumules par son opulente erudition." Pradier-Fodere cites Vattel as
deriving the fundamental rights of states from an application of the theories of the
law of nature, the state of nature, and natural equality to the international society.
Traill,§§ 166-167, I, 286.
Bonfils says: "Dans son immortel ouvrage, Grotius n'a pas traite d'une maniere
distincte des droits et des devoirs des ~tats. Cette matiere est comme ensevelie
sous Jes elements accumules de sa stupefiante erudition." Manuel, § 235, p. 140.
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tain particular interests that Grotius ever attributed to

states an equal capacity for rights. There is a notable in-

stance of such an interest in Mare Liberum, where he argued

that the right to travel and trade with other peoples be-

longed equally to all nations:

There is not one of you who does not openly proclaim that every

man is entitled to manage and dispose of his own property; there is

tain particular interests that Grotius ever attributed to
states an equal capacity for rights. There is a notable instance of such an interest in Mare Liberum, where he argued
that the right to travel and trade with other peoples belonged equally to all nations:

not one of you who does not insist that all citizens have equal and

indiscriminate right to use rivers and public places; not one of you

who does not defend with all his might the freedom of travel and

trade.

If it be thought that the small society which we call a state cannot

exist without the application of these principles (and certainly it can-

not), why will not those same principles be necessary to uphold the

social structure of the whole human race and to maintain the har-

mony thereof ?1

Hoc igitur jus ad cunctas gentes <zqualiter pertinet? Mare

Liberum was a chapter in his treatise on the law of prize, and

was written somewhat after the fashion of a lawyer's brief
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to prove that the Dutch had a right to sail to the East Indies

and engage in trade there.3 The argument was based pri-

marily upon natural right.4 In substance Grotius contended

that with respect to the use of the seas that natural equality

There is not one of you who does not openly proclaim that every
man is entitled to manage and dispose of his own property; there is
not one of you who does not insist that all citizens have equal and
indiscriminate right to use rivers and public places; not one of you
w40 does not defend with all his might the freedom of travel and
trade.
If it be thought that the small society which we call a state cannot
exist without the application of these principles (and certainly it cannot), why will not those same principles be necessary to uphold the
social structure of the whole human race and to maintain the harmony thereof ? 1

of right which primitive nature had established had not

been and ought not to be restricted. He declared that

all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serv-

ing some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other

persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same con-

dition as when it was first created by nature.6

In other words, with respect to this particular interest states

might be said to be in a state of nature. This was a clear

1 Mare liberum, p. 3 (Magoffin's transl.).

* Ibid., p. 8. Cf. Stoiy, The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheaton 1, 42 (1826).

« Ibid., p. 7.

* Ibid., pp. 5, and passim.

1 Ibid., p. 27 (Magoffin's transl.).

Hoc igitur jus ad cunctas gentes cequaUter pertinet. 2 Mare
Liberum was a chapter in his treatise on the law of prize, and
was written somewhat after the fashion of a lawyer's brief
to prove that the Dutch had a right to sail to the East Indies
and engage in trade there.3 The argument was based primarily upon natural right.4 In substance Grotius contended
that with respect to the use of the seas that natural equality
of right which primitive nature had established had not
been and ought not to be restricted. He declared that
all that which has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the common use of all other
persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the same condition as when it was first created by nature. 5

In other words, with respect to this particular interest states
might be said to be in a state of nature. This was a clear
Mare liberum, p. 3 (Magoffin's transl.).
Ibid., p. 8. Cf. Story, The Marianna Flora,
I Ibid., p. 7.
' Ibid., pp. 5, and passim.
• Ibid., p. 27 (Magoffin's transl.).
1
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statement of equality of capacity with respect to a certain

category of rights, but it was not intended to establish a

like equality in respect to all rights. There is no evidence

that Grotius intended this or similar statements to have a

general significance.

The statements in Mare Liberum were much more explicit

than anything which appeared in De Jure Belli ac Pacts. In

the first chapter, where he defined helium and jus, Grotius

said that anything was unjust which was contrary to the

nature of a society of rational creatures, and added:

But society is either that of equals, as among brothers, citizens,

friends, and allies; or it is unequal, by preeminence as Aristotle says,

as between parent and children, master and servant, King and sub-

jects, God and men. So justice is either that which prevails among

equals, or between governors and the governed in whatever degree.

The latter in my opinion may be called the right of superiority (jus

statement of equality of capacity with respect to a certain
category of rights, but it was not intended to establish a
like equality in respect to all rights. There is no evidence
that Grotius intended this or similar statements to have a
general significance.
The statements in Mare Liberum were much more explicit
than anything which appeared in De Jure Belli ac Pacis. In
the first chapter, where he defined bellum and jus, Grotius
said that anything was unjust which was contrary to the
nature of a society of rational creatures, and added:

Rectorium), the former the right of equality (Mqualorium reck)}

However, Grotius was not using jus in a legal sense in this

passage at all; and in any event the passage is too vague
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and ambiguous to have general significance. In the chapter

in which Grotius discussed the termination of sovereignty

and the division of a state to form several states, he said

that when a colony separated from the mother country a

new state was created, and he quoted with approval from

Thucydides: "They are sent out not to be slaves, but to

have equal rights."2 The quotation referred probably

But society is either that of equals, as among brothers, citizens,
friends, and allies; or it is unequal, by preeminence as Aristotle says,
as between parent and children, master and servant, King and subjects, God and men. So justice is either that which prevails among
equals, or between governors and the governed in whatever degree.
The latter in my opinion may be called the right of superiority (jus
Rectorium), the former the right of equality (k'.quatorium recte). 1

to the rights of the colonists as individuals rather than to

rights of the colony as a separate state. It had no legal

significance, and so far as Grotius may have intended to

apply it to states it carried nothing more than the idea of

separateness as opposed to the idea of incorporation in the

mother state. In another chapter, he remarked of the right

1 I, 1, 3, 2. Whewell's rendition of jus Rectorium and Mquatorium recte as

"rectorial rights " and " equatorial rights " respectively is hardly satisfactory.

* II, 9. io.

However, Grotius was not using jus in a legal sense in this
passage at all; and in any event the passage is too vague
and ambiguous to have general significance. In the chapter
in which Grotius discussed the termination of sovereignty
and the division of a state to form several states, he said
that when a colQny separated from the mother country a
new state was created, and he quoted \vith approval from
Thucydides: "They are sent out not to be slaves, but to
have equal rights." 2 The quotation referred probably
to the rights of the colonists as individuals rather than to
rights of the colony as a separate state. It had no legal
significance, and so far as Grotius may have intended to
apply it to states it carried nothing more than the idea of
separateness as opposed to the idea of incorporation in the
mother state. In another chapter, he remarked of the right
i I, 1, 3, 2.
Whewell's rendition of jus Rectorium and ,£quatorium recte as
" rectorial rights" and " equatorial rights" respectively is hardly satisfactory.
' II, 9, IO.
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of persons to defend themselves and their property against

attack by subjects of a state with which peace had been

concluded:

For peace is concluded, that all the subjects may be in safety: peace

of persons to defend themselves and their property against
attack by subjects of a state with which peace had been
concluded:

is the act of the state for the whole and for the parts. And even if a

new cause do arise, it will be lawful, notwithstanding the peace, for

the persons attacked to defend themselves and their property. For it

is natural, as Cassius says, to repel arms by arms: and therefore we

are not readily to believe that this right is abdicated between equals.1

It is clear enough, however, that the passage refers to equal-

ity among individuals belonging to different states and has

no very precise legal significance. There is no evidence

that Grotius intended such passages as the above to carry

For peace is concluded, that all the subjects may be in safety: peace
is the act of the state for the whole and for the parts. And even if a
new cause do arise, it will be lawful, notwithstanding the peace, for
the persons attacked to defend themselves and their property. For it
is natural, as Cassius says, to repel arms by arms: and therefore we
are not readily to believe that this right is abdicated between equals. 1

any general import apart from the discussion of particular

topics. Barbeyrac, who translated and edited the De Jure

Belli ac Pacts and the De Jure Natures et Gentium of Pufen-

dorf with a multitude of notes and cross-references, and who

was quite explicit in his own declaration of the principle of

state equality,2 found nothing in any of these passages to
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warrant a reference to the much less ambiguous statements

in Pufendorf. It is incredible that Grotius, who was fa-

miliar with the theories of every leading exponent of natural

equality among men, and who ransacked all history for au-

thorities in minutiae, could have considered the principle of

state equality as of fundamental consequence and have left

it with such uncertain support.

There are much less ambiguous passages in the work of

Grotius which seem to contradict the idea of state equality.

A noteworthy example is found in the second book, where

he divided treaties into those establishing that which is con-

formable to natural law, and those adding something to

natural law. The latter were either equal or unequal:

1 III, 20,32 (Whewell's transl.).

• Infra, p. 85.

It is clear enough, however, that the passage refers to equal-

ity among individuals belonging to different states and has
no very precise legal significance. There is no evidence
that Grotius intended such passages as the above to carry
any general import apart from the discussion of particular
topics. Barbeyrac, who translated and edited the De Jure
Belli ac Pacis and the De Jure Natur~ et Gentium of Pufendorf with a multitude of notes and cross-references, and who
was quite explicit in his own declaration of the principle of
state equality,2 found nothing in any of these passages to
warrant a reference to the much less ambiguous statements
in Pufendorf. It is incredible that Grotius, who was familiar with the theories of every leading exponent of natural
equality among men, and who ransacked all history for authorities in minutiae, could have considered the principle of
state equality as of fundamental consequence and have left
it with such uncertain support.
There are much less ambiguous passages in the work of
Grotius which seem to contradict the idea of state equality.
A noteworthy example is found in the second book, where
he divided treaties into those establishing that which is conformable to natural law, and those adding something to
natural law. The latter were either equal or unequal:
1
1

III, 20, 32 (Whewell's transl.).
Infra, p. 85.
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From the explanation of what are equal conventions, it is easily

understood what are unequal. Unusual [unequal] Treaties are either

proposed by the superior party, or by the inferior. By the superior,

as if he promises assistance without any reciprocal stipulation: by the

inferior, when there is an inferiority of claim, are what we have spoken

of as Conventions of Command. And these are either without in-

fringement of the sovereignty of the inferior, or such as infringe it.1

The treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians, in

which it was provided that Carthage should not make war

without the consent of Rome, was cited as an example of an

From the explanation of what are equal conventions, it is easily
understood what are unequal. Unusual [unequal] Treaties are either
proposed by the superior party, or by the inferior. By the superior,
as if he promises assistance without any reciprocal stipulation: by the
inferior, when there is an inferiority of claim, are what we have spoken
of as Conventions of Command. And these are either without infringement of the sovereignty of the inferior, or such as infringe it. 1

unequal treaty impairing sovereignty. In unequal treaties

without impairment of sovereignty the burden imposed on

the inferior state might be transitory or permanent. Then

followed a long list of examples of permanent burdens,

several of which it would be quite impossible to reconcile

with later notions of sovereignty. Passages like this one at

least suggest that Grotius would have included in the jus

gentium a great many conventional and customary limita-

tions upon the equality of states. More will be said of in-
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equality among states in the system of Grotius in connection

with his conception of sovereignty.

Elsewhere in his treatise Grotius used aqualitas or its

equivalent in a great variety of meanings, but without any

significance for the law of nations. He was thinking of a

kind of moral equality when he spoke of equality between

belligerents with respect to the justice of a war. He was

not thinking of the law of nations at all, but of municipal

law in its ethical aspects, in what he said about equality of

ownership and equality in contracts.2

Sovereignty m the System of Grottos

The principle of state equality was not the result of Gro-

tius' use of the law of nature, the state of nature, natural

1 II, 1S, 7 (Whewell's transl.).

* II, 1o, 2; III, 1, 2, 2; II, 12, 8-13.

The treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians, in
which it was provided that Carthage should not make war
without the consent of Rome, was cited as an example of an
unequal treaty impairing sovereignty. In unequal treaties
without impairment of sovereignty the burden imposed on
the inferior state might be transitory or permanent. Then
followed a long list of examples of permanent burdens,
several of which it would be quite impossible to reconcile
with later notions of sovereignty. Passages like this one at
least suggest that Grotius would have included in the jus
gentium a great many conventional and customary limitations upon the equality of states. lVIore will be said of inequality among states in the system of Grotius in connection
with his conception of sovereignty.
Elsewhere in his treatise Grotius used cequalitas or its
equivalent in a great variety of meanings, but without any
significance for the law of nations. He was thinking of a
kind of moral equality when he spoke of equality between
belligerents with respect to the justice of a war. He was
not thinking of the law of nations at all, but of municipal
law in its ethical aspects, in what he said about equality of
ownership and equality in contracts. 2
SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SYSTEM OF GROTIUS

The principle of state equality was not the result of Grotius' use of the law of nature, the state of nature, natural
II, 15, 7 (Whewcll's transl.).
2 II, lo, 2; III, 1, 2, 2; II, 12, 8-13.
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equality, or the analogy. Was it the consequence of his

conception of sovereignty? This is an important question.

It has been suggested that the principle of equality was the

inevitable outcome of the doctrine of sovereignty as defined

by Grotius and his contemporaries.1 It is certain that

theories of sovereignty were defended in the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries which pointed straight to that con-

clusion. More recently the theory of sovereignty has been

offered frequently as an analytical explanation for the prin-

ciple that states have equal rights.2 The definition of sover-

eignty adopted by Grotius, however, provided neither an

adequate premise for the conclusion of state equality, nor a

satisfactory explanation for such a principle. A compara-

tive study of the classical treatises on international law pro-

duced in these two centuries shows that the idea of state

equality did not come into the law of nations through the

doctrine of sovereignty. It came in through the theories of

natural law, natural equality, and the state of nature, that

important trilogy of ideas which had dominated speculation

since the age of antiquity. The doctrine of sovereignty was
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offered later as an analytical explanation and justification;

it was never an historical reason for the origin of the principle.

The notion of state power superior to all positive law and

limited only by the laws of God and nature had its incep-

tion in the Middle Ages.3 It received its most adequate

expression before Grotius in the De la Republique of Bodin

published in 15764 Bodin defined sovereignty as supreme

power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by laws.6 The

first and principal function of sovereignty was to give laws

to citizens and subjects without the consent of superior,

1 Hershey, Essentials, pp. 58, 148; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, §§ 51, 69, pp. 75, 98.

* See infra, p. 114.

'See Gierke, Political Theory, pp. 87-100, and passim.

A I, 8-10, pp. 89-183. See Nys, Le droit int., II, 235.

'I, 8, p. 89. Cf. also the Latin edition, De republica (Frankfort, 1622), I, 8,

p. 123.

•

equality, or the analogy. Was it the consequence of his
conception of sovereignty ? This is an important question.
It has been suggested that the principle of equality was the
inevitable outcome of the doctrine of sovereignty as defined
by Grotius and his contemporaries.1 It is certain that
theories of sovereignty were defended in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries which pointed straight to that conclusion. More recently the theory of sovereignty has been
offered frequently as an analytical explanation for the principle that states have equal rights. 2 The definition of sovereignty adopted by Grotius, however, provided neither an
adequate premise for the conclusion of state equality, nor a
satisfactory explanation for such a principle. A comparative study of the classical treatises on international law produced in these two centuries shows that the idea of state
equality did not come into the law of nations through the
doctrine of sovereignty. It came in through the theories of
natural law, natural equality, and the state of nature, that
important trilogy of ideas which had dominated speculation
since the age of antiquity. The doctrine of sovereignty was
offered later as an analytical explanation and justification;
it was never an historical reason for the origin of the principle.
The notion of state power superior to all positive law and
limited only by the laws of God and nature had its inception in the Middle Ages.3 It received its most adequate
expression before Grotius in the De la Republique of Bodin
published in 1576.4 Bodin defined sovereignty as supreme
power over citizens and subjects unrestrained by laws. 6 The
first and principal function of sovereignty was to give laws
to citizens and subjects without the consent of superior,
Hershey, Essentials, pp. 58, 148; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law,§§ 51, 6Q, pp. 75, 98.
See infra, p. 114.
1 See Gierke, Political Theory, pp. 87-100, and passim.
4 I, 8-10, pp. 8\r183. See Nys, Le droit int., II, 235.
' I, 8, p. &). Cf. also the Latin edition, De republica (Frankfort, 1622), I, 8,
p. 123.
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equal, or inferior,1 a function which vested in that person

who, after God, acknowledged no one greater than himself.

As for the laws of God and nature, sovereigns and subjects

were equally bound by them;2 but the law of nations could

not bind a sovereign any more than his own laws, except in

so far as it might be in accord with the laws of God and

nature.3 If certain of the laws of nations were unjust the

sovereign might abrogate them, as, for example, in respect to

slavery. Suarez presented a similar theory at the beginning

of the seventeenth century in his exposition of the ultimate

law-making authority.4

The treatment of sovereignty in Grotius reflected the in-

fluence of Bodin and Suarez in some respects, but it differed

widely from the conception of each of them, both in point

of view and in details. Grotius denounced all notions of

universal authority 6 and recognized the existence of a great

society of states.6 His state was a perfect community of

free men, united for the sake of enjoying the advantages of

jus and for the common welfare.7 Sovereignty was the es-
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sential attribute of the state, the bond that holds the state

together, the breath of life that so many thousands breathe:

That Power is called Sovereign, whose acts are not subject to the

control of another, so that they can be rendered void by the act of

any other human will.8

Here were included two notions, the positive notion of gov-

ernment, and the negative notion of independence. In most

1 I, 1o, p. 161.

"I, 8, pp. 97, 109 ff.

* I, 8, p. 118.

4 Tractatus de legibus, III, 9.

5 II, 22, 13-14; Mare liberum, pp. 16, 45, 50, 66.

« Proleg., 17; H, 18, 2; III, 2S, 1.

'I, 1, 14; II, 6, 4. Cf. Twiss, Law of Nations, p. 4.

» I, 3, 7 (Whewell's transl.); I, 3, S; II, 9, 3. See Dunning, Political Theories

equal, or inferior ,1 a function which vested in that person
who, after God, acknowledged no one greater than himself.
As for the laws of God and nature, sovereigns and subjects
were equally bound by them; 2 but the law of nations could
not bind a sovereign any more than his own laws, except in
so far as it might be in accord with the laws of God and
nature.3 If certain of the laws of nations were unjust the
sovereign might abrogate them, as, for example, in respect to
slavery. Suarez presented a similar theory at the beginning
of the seventeenth century in his exposition of the ultimate
law-making authority. 4
The treatment of soverejgnty in Grotius reflected the influence of Bodin and Suarez in some respects, but it differed
widely from the conception of each of them, both in point
of view and in details. Grotius denounced all notions of
universal authority 5 and recognized the existence of a great
society of states. 6 His state was a perfect community of
free men, united for the sake of enjoying the advantages of
jus and for the common welfare. 7 Sovereignty was the essential attribute of the state, the bond that holds the state
together, the breath of life that so many thousands breathe:

from Luther to Montesquieu, pp. 179-186; Merriam, History of Sovereignty, pp. 21-

24; Walker, History, p. 288.

That Power is called Sovereign, whose acts are not subject to the
control of another, so that they can be rendered void by the act of
any other human will. 8

Here were included two notions, the positive notion of government, and the negative notion of independence. In most
1
I
1

I,

10, p. 161.
I, 8, pp. 97, 109 ff.
I, 8, p. 118.

Traclatus de kgibus, III, 9.
II, 22, 13-14; Mare liberum, pp. 16, 45, 50, 66.
1 Proleg., 17; II, 18, 2; III, 25, 1.
7 I, 1, 14; II, 6, 4. Cf. Twiss, Law of Nations, p. 4.
1 I, 3, 7 (Whewell's transl.); I, 3, 5; II, 9, 3. See Dunning, Political Theories
from Luther to Montesquieu, pp. 17cr-186; Merriam, History of Sovereignty, pp. 2124; Walker, History, p. 288.
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of his discussion of sovereignty Grotius was concerned with

the former of the two notions. His understanding of the

latter must be constructed chiefly from materials which are

scattered throughout his work. These materials, when col-

lected and coordinated, present an interpretation of sover-

eignty in its external significance which has been all too

frequently overlooked. They also cast a helpful light upon

the society of states as itwas conceived in the Grotian system.

The international society of which Grotius conceived was

not grounded upon an equal capacity for rights among its

members. There was a disposition to recognize quite the

contrary principle. He held that important limitations upon

the exercise of political power were consistent with the en-

joyment of international personality and even of perfect

sovereignty. States could be united in a federal bond and

yet remain sovereign.1 Feudal vassals might be sovereign.2

Sovereignty was not infringed by an unequal alliance which

imposed a permanent obligation upon the inferior state to

concede precedence, to have the same friends and enemies,
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to refrain from fortifying or posting armies in designated

localities, or from acquiring more than a limited number of

vessels, to abstain from building cities, engaging in trade,

or levying soldiers in certain localities, or to renounce all

former treaties with other states.3 Even protected or tribu-

tary states, analogous to clients in Roman Law, enjoyed

their sovereignty unimpaired; but Grotius admitted that if

such leagues were perpetual, and the superior state was

much the more powerful and had the right of introducing

garrisons, the inferior state was likely to be absorbed by the

superior, or at teast to lose a part of its sovereignty.4 Partly

sovereign states could be the result of treaty or of conquest.8

11.3,7. i- * i, 3. *3- 'n, iS, j.

4 I, 3, 21. On clients in the Roman Law, see Muirhead, Law of Rome, p. 8, and

references there cited.

'H, iS, 7; III, 19, 1o.

of his discussion of sovereignty Grotius was concerned with
the former of the two notions. His understanding of the
latter must be constructed chiefly from materials which are
scattered throughout his work. These materials, when collected and coordinated, present an interpretation of sovereignty in its external significance which has been all too
frequently overlooked. They also cast a helpful light upon
the society of states as it was conceived in the Grotian system.
The international society of which Grotius conceived was
not grounded upon an equal capacity for rights among its
members. There was a disposition to recognize quite the
contrary principle. He held that important limitations upon
the exercise of political power were consistent with the enjoyment of international personality and even of perfect
sovereignty. States could be united in a federal bond and
yet remain sovereign.1 Feudal vassals might be sovereign.2
Sovereignty was not infringed by an unequal alliance which
imposed a permanent obligation upon the inferior state to
concede precedence, to have the same friends and enemies,
to refrain from fortifying or posting armies in designated
localities, or from acquiring more than a limited number of
vessels, to abstain from building cities, engaging in trade,
or levying soldiers in certain localities, or to renounce all
former treaties with other states. 3 Even protected or tributary states, analogous to clients in Roman Law, enjoyed
their sovereignty unimpaired; but Grotius admitted that if
such leagues were perpetual, and the superior state was
much the more powerful and had the right of introducing
garrisons, the inferior state was likely to be absorbed by the
superior, or at least to lose a part of its sovereignty.4 Partly
sovereign states could be the result of treaty or of conquest. 5
2 I, J, 23.
I, 3, 7, 2.
• II, 15, 7.
I, J, 2r. On clients in the Roman Law, see Muirhead, Law of Rome, p. 8, and
references there cited .
• II, 15, 7; III, 19, IO.
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Grotius recognized the legitimacy, according to the strict

rules of the jus gentium, of the practice of enslaving captives

in war.1 The present significance of what he said about

slavery lies in the analogy which he drew between slaves and

states whose sovereignty had been diminished as a result of

conquest. The import of this analogy is suggested by the

following passages:

Since the victor can subject individuals to personal servitude, it is

not surprising that he should be allowed to reduce a body of men,

whether they be a State, or part of a State, to a servitude, either civil

or domestic, or mixed. . . .

Grotius recognized the legitimacy, according to the strict
rules of thejus gentium, of the practice of enslaving captives
in war. 1 The present significance of what he said about
slavery lies in the analogy which he drew between slaves and
states whose sovereignty had been diminished as a result of
conquest. The import of this analogy is suggested by the
following passages:

And hence we may understand what is that mixed government

compounded of mastership and civil rule, of which we have spoken;

namely, when servitude is combined with a certain personal liberty.

Thus we read of peoples whose arms were taken from them, and who

were commanded not to possess any iron except for agriculture; and

of others who were compelled to change their language and habits of

living. ...

Even if any victor leave to the conquered people the rights of then-
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state, he may take to himself some things which belonged to the state:

for it depends on his own will what limit he chooses to fix to the bene-

fits which he gives.2

In his chapter on restraints respecting conquests Grotius

recommended that where it was not safe for the conqueror

to relinquish all authority over the conquered he should at

least leave them as much of their former independence and

authority as possible.3 States whose sovereignty had been

thus impaired nevertheless remained international persons

as far as they remained sovereign; and in the same measure

that they retained sovereignty they were capable of the

right of legation,4 the right to make war,6 and other rights

by the law of nations.

Since the victor can subject individuals to personal servitude, it is
not surprising that he should be allowed to reduce a body of men,
whether they be a State, or part of a State, to a servitude, either civil
or domestic, or mixed. . . .
And hence we may understand what is that mixed government>
compounded of mastership and civil rule, of which we have spoken;
namely, when servitude is combined with a certain personal liberty.
Thus we read of peoples whose arms were taken from them, and who
were commanded not to possess any iron except for agriculture; and
of others who were compelled to change their language and habits of
living. . . •
Even if any victor leave to the conquered people the rights of their
state, he may take to himself some things which belonged to the state:
for it depends on his own will what limit he chooses to fix to the benefits which he gives. 2

1 III, 8, and 14. He contended that among Christian nations it had become

the practice to hold for ransom instead. Ill, 7, 8-9; III, 21, 25 and 28.

• III, 8, 1-4 (Whewell's transl.).

»in, iS, 9- 4 n, 18,2. »in, 3,4-

In his chapter on restraints respecting conquests Grotius
recommended that where it was not safe for the conqueror
to relinquish all authority over the conquered he should at
least leave them as much of their former independence and
authority as possible. 3 States whose sovereignty had been
thus impaired nevertheless remained international persons
as far as they remained sovereign; and in the same measure
that they retained sovereignty they were capable of the
right of legation;' the right to make war, 6 and other rights
by the law of nations.
III, 8, and 14. He contended that among Christian nations it had become
the practice to hold for ransom instead. III, 7, 8-9; III, 21, 25 and 28.
I III, 8, 1-4 (Whewell's transl.) .
4 II, 18, 2.
• III, 15, 9·
I III, 3, 4.
1
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Moreover, when states had come by legitimate course into

this partially sovereign status they should remain contented

with their condition, for the natural liberty of men or of

states was not an inalienable attribute.

Nor again can we say of the liberty, either of individuals, or of

cities, or states, (that is, autonomy or self-government,) that it is

Moreover, when states had come by legitimate course into
this partially sovereign status they should remain contented
with their condition, for the natural liberty of men or of
states was not an inalienable attribute.

either by natural law, and at all times, an attribute of all, or that in

the cases in which it is, it furnishes just ground for war. For when

we say that liberty by nature belongs to men or to peoples, we are to

understand that, of a natural right preceding all human pacts; and

of liberty by negation of slavery, not of liberty in opposition to

slavery; so that man is not a slave by nature, but he is not by nature

a creature that cannot be a slave.... Therefore they who have, by a

legitimate course, come into slavery, either personal or civil, ought

to be content with their condition; as St. Paul teaches, Art thou

called being a servant? Care not for it.1

So far as his conception of sovereignty was concerned,

Grotius was not interested in the elaboration of an abstract

theory. He could afford to leave that to political philoso-
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phers and others who were in less intimate contact with the

practical problems of international relations. His immedi-

ate concern was to establish criteiia for distinguishing public

and formal from private and informal wars. Both custom

Nor again can we say of the liberty, either of individuals, or of
cities, or states, (that is, autonomy or self-government,) that it is
either by natural law, and at all times, an attribute of all, or that in
the cases in which it is, it furnishes just ground for war. For when
we say that liberty by nature belongs to men or to peoples, we are to
understand that, of a natural right preceding all human pacts; and
of liberty by negation of slavery, not of liberty in opposition to
slavery; so that man is not a slave by nature, but he is not by nature
a creature that cannot be a slave .... Therefore they who have, by a
legitimate course, come into slavery, either personal or civil, ought
to be content with their condition; as St. Paul teaches, Art thou
called bei-ng a servant? Care not for it. 1

and humanity justified him in attributing regularity to the

wars of rulers possessing less than the widest powers. In-

stead of conceiving of a society of states having equal ca-

pacity for rights, Grotius deferred so far to contemporary

practice as to recognize the existence of a society among

whose members there were many differences of status, with

corresponding differences of capacity.

Illustrations or the Grotian Tradition

Enough has been said of the leading principles in the sys-

tem of Grotius to explain most of those errors into which

1 II, 22, 1i (Wbewell's transl.).

So far as his conception of sovereignty was concerned,
Grotius was not interested in the elaboration of an abstract
theory. He could afford to leave that to political philosophers and others who were in less intimate contact with the
practical problems of international relations. His immediate concern was to establish criteria for distinguishing public
and formal from private and informal wars. Both cusfom
and humanity justified him in attributing regularity to the
wars of rulers possessing less than the widest powers. In~
stead of conceiving of a society of states having equal capacity for rights, Grotius deferred so far to contemporary
practice as to recognize the existence of a society among
whose members there were many differences of status, with
corresponding differences of capacity.
ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE GROTIAN TRADITION

Enough has been said of the leading principles in the system of Grotius to explain most of those errors into which
1

II, n,

II

(Wbewell's transl.).
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later writers have fallen with respect to his supposed con-

tribution to the early development of the principle of state

equality. A few illustrations may be given of some of the

most common misunderstandings.

It not infrequently happens that the translation of the

idea of equality into the law of nations is attributed to Gro-

tius because the real significance of equality as a legal prin-

ciple is not fully understood. This seems to be the case with

Mr. Figgis, who says that the Catholic precursors of Grotius

asserted " the complete equality of sovereign states";

They combined the new recognition of political facts with ancient

ideals of unity, and the older conception of law, as an eternal verity.

These two elements of thought were both to be found and were neces-

sarily found in the system of politics of that day. Without the one

we could not have the conception of States as juristic and equal per-

sons, equal not in power any more than are individuals, but in the

later writers have fallen with respect to his supposed contribution to the early development of the principle of state
equality. A few illustrations may be given of some of the
most common misunderstandings.
It not infrequently happens that the translation of the
idea of equality into the law of nations is attributed to Grotius because the real significance of equality as a legal principle is not fully understood. This seems to be the case with
Mr. Figgis, who says that the Catholic precursors of Grotius
asserted " the complete equality of sovereign states ";

fact of being able to direct themselves to conscious ends. Without

the other the notion of a unity of these persons, of a bond binding

them together, of certain limits of activity they may not overpass,
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would not have been possible, or would have taken longer to discern.1

According to Figgis, this " equality before the Law" of all

states was becoming an accomplished fact by the time Gro-

tius wrote:

It is the world of seventeenth and eighteenth century diplomacy

which Grotius contemplates, with absolute princes for the most part,

territorial sovereignty and the equality of the juristic persons of In-

ternational Law. This latter doctrine, which we have seen in a more

concrete form in the grand dessein of Sully, was closely connected

with Netherland influences. William the Silent in his apology ap-

pealed against Philip II to the fact of his being a sovereign prince, as

They combined the new recognition of political facts with ancient
ideals of unity, and the older conception of law, as an eternal verity.
These two elements of thought were both to be found and were necessarily found in the system of politics of that day. Without the one
we could not have the conception of States as juristic and equal persons, equal not in power any more than are individuals, but in the
fact of being able to direct themselves to conscious ends. Without
the other the notion of a unity of these persons, of a bond binding
them together, of certain limits of activity they may not overpass,
would not have been possible, or would have taken longer to discern.t

good as he was. The juristic equality of sovereigns was not beginning

to be a fact until the close of the sixteenth century.2

If Mr. Figgis means the equality before the law of separate

states, as contrasted with the idea of universal empire, there

1 Gerson to Grotius, pp. 190, 216. 1 Ibid., pp. 220, 242.

According to Figgis, this " equality before the Law" of all
states was becoming an accomplished fact by the time Grotius wrote:
It is the world of seventeenth and eighteenth century diplomacy
which Grotius contemplates, with absolute princes for the most part,
territorial sovereignty and the equality of the juristic persons of International Law. This latter doctrine, which we have seen in a more
concrete form in the grand dessein of Sully, was closely connected
with Netherland influences. William the Silent in his apology ap·
pealed against Philip II to the fact of his being a sovereign prince, as
good as he was. The juristic equality of sovereigns was not beginning
to be a fact until the close of the sixteenth century.2

If Mr. Figgis means the equality before the law of separate
states, as contrasted with the idea of universal empire, there
1

Gerson to Grotius, pp.

•

190, 216.

2

Ibid., pp.

220, 242 •
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can be no quarrel with his conclusions. If he means equal-

ity of capacity for rights the statement is in error, not only

with respect to Grotius, but also with respect to the facts of

the seventeenth century.

More often the principle is attributed to Grotius because

of misinformation with reference to the place occupied by

the law of nature, the state of nature, and the idea of natural

equality in the Grotian system. Two chapters in Sir Henry

Maine's Ancient Law have been a most prolific source of

misconception in this respect, particularly among English

and American students.1 Maine started from two false

premises: first, that jus naturale and jus gentium in Roman

Law were identical;2 second, that Grotius and the early

publicists misconceived the meaning of jus gentium in the

Roman Law and took it for a law of nations in the modern

sense.3 He said:

Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults the position that the

Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturae were identical, Grotius, with his

immediate predecessors and his immediate successors, attributed to
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1 Ancient Law, chs. 3 and 4. In note E, pp. 73-77, Sir Frederick Pollock says:

"Maine's third and fourth chapters need more supplemental criticism than any

other part of ' Ancient Law.' The mediaeval doctrine of the Law of Nature, and

its continuity with the classical Roman doctrine, had been forgotten or misunder-

stood in England for quite two centuries at the time when these chapters were

written; and even many years later there was no obvious way for an English

can be no quarrel with his conclusions. If he means equality of capacity for rights the statement is in error, not only
with respect to Grotius, but also with respect to the facts of
the seventeenth century.
More often the principle is attributed to Grotius because
of misinformation with reference to the place occupied by
the law of nature, the state of nature, and the idea of natural
equality in the Grotian system. Two chapters in Sir Henry
Maine's Ancient Law have been a most prolific source of
misconception in this respect, particularly among English
and American students.1 Maine started from two false
premises: first, that jus nalurale and jus gentium in Roman
Law were identical; 2 second, that Grotius and the early
publicists misconceived the meaning of jus gentium in the
Roman Law and took it for a law of nations in the modern
sense.3 He said:

scholar to get back to the right historical lines. . . .

"Maine was not a mediaevalist or a canonist, and shared the general ignorance

of English lawyers and scholars of his time."

1 Ibid., p. 55. Cf. Bryce, Studies, p. 584, note 1; Pollock's Note E, p. 75;

supra, pp. 11,15.

Having adopted from the Antonine jurisconsults the position that the
Jus Gentium and the Jus Naturre were identical, Grotius, with his
immediate predecessors and his immediate successors, attributed to

• Ibid., p. 102. In Note H, p. 120, Sir Frederick Pollock says: "That Grotius

and his contemporaries misunderstood the classical ius gentium, or supposed the

modern rules of conduct between sovereign states to be contained in it, I am un-

able, with great respect for any suggestion of Maine's, to believe. ... He may or

may not have known that in its classical meaning it could, and sometimes did, in-

clude, among other rules of conduct sanctioned by general usage, whatever rules

are reasonable and customary as between sovereign states. But as a scholar he

must have known that gcntes is not the plural of civitas or populus, which are the

only apt words in classical Latin for a state or nation in its political capacity."

Cf. supra, p. 46.

1 Ancient Law, chs. 3 and 4. In note E, pp. 73-77, Sir Frederick Pollock says:
" Maine's third and fourth chapters need more supplemental criticism than any
other part of 'Ancient Law.' The mediaeval doctrine of the Law of Nature, and
its continuity with the classical Roman doctrine, had been forgotten or misunderstood in England for quite two centuries at the time when these chapters were
written; and even many years later there was no obvious way for an English
scholar to get back to the right historical lines....
" Maine was not a mediaevalist or a canonist, and shared the general ignorance
of English lawyers and scholars of his time.''
2 Ibid., p. 55.
Cf. Bryce, Studies, p. 584, note 1; Pollock's Note E, p. 75;
supra, pp. 11, 15.
1 Ibid., p. 102. In Note H, p. 120, Sir Frederick Pollock says: "That Grotius
and his contemporaries misunderstood the classical i11S gentium, or supposed the
modern rules of conduct between sovereign states to be contained in it, I am unable, with great respect for any suggestion of Maine's, to believe. . . . He may or
may not have known that in its classical meaning it could, and sometimes did, include, among other rules of conduct sanctioned by general usage, whatever rules
are reasonable and customary as between sovereign states. But as a scholar he
must have known that genies is not the plural of ci'llitas or populus, which are the
only apt words in classical Latin for a state or nation in its political capacity."
Cf. supra, p. 46.
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the Law of Nature an authority which would never perhaps have been

claimed for it, if "Law of Nations" had not in that age been an

ambiguous expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural

Law is the code of states, and thus put in operation a process which

has continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting

on the international system rules which are supposed to have been

evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception of

Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical im-

portance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early

modem history of Europe, was never clearly or universally ac-

knowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had prevailed.

If the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the atoms which

compose it must be absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre of

Nature are all equal, and accordingly commonwealths are equal if

the international state be one of nature. The proposition that inde-

pendent communities, however different in size and power, are all

equal in the view of the law of nations, has largely contributed to the

happiness of mankind, though it is constantly threatened by the po-

litical tendencies of each successive age. It is a doctrine which prob-
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ably would never have obtained a secure footing at all if International

Law had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature

by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters.1

What Maine said could have been applied with some quali-

fications to the teachings of the naturalist school in the last

half of the seventeenth century. It was obviously inappli-

cable to the system of Grotius.

Maine's errors were given somewhat wider circulation

through a popular book by Lawrence, entitled Essays on

Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law. That

part of the fourth essay which dealt with the influence of the

the Law of Nature an authority which would never perhaps have been
claimed for it, if "Law of Nations" had not in that age been an
ambiguous expression. They laid down unreservedly that Natural
Law is the code of states, and thus put in operation a process which
has continued almost down to our own day, the process of engrafting
on the international system rules which are supposed to have been
evolved from the unassisted contemplation of the conception of
Nature. There is, too, one consequence of immense practical importance to mankind which, though not unknown during the early
modern history of Europe, was never clearly or universally acknowledged till the doctrines of the Grotian school had prevailed.
If the society of nations is governed by Natural Law, the atoms which
compose it must be absolutely equal. Men under the sceptre of
Nature are all equal, and accordingly commonwealths are equal if
the international state be one of nature. The proposition that independent communities, however different in size and power, are all
equal in the view of the law of nations, has largely contributed to the
happiness of mankind, though it is constantly threatened by the political tendencies of each successive age. It is a doctrine which probably would never have obtained a secure footing at all if International
Law had not been entirely derived from the majestic claims of Nature
by the Publicists who wrote after the revival of letters. 1

theory of natural law upon the system of Grotius was little

more than an elaboration of the passage quoted above from

Ancient Law.2 Maine's mistaken notions were repeated; and

1 Ancient Law, p. 103.

* Essays, preface, p. x. Had Lawrence's Essays been other than a popular dis-

cussion, one would be tempted to quote against him his own words to the effect

that" publicists adopt too easily what they find in the works of their predecessors."

Ibid., p. 209.

What Maine said could have been applied with some qualifications to the teachings of the naturalist school in the last
half of the seventeenth century. It was obviously inapplicable to the system of Grotius.
Maine's errors were given somewhat wider circulation
through a popular book by Lawrence, entitled Essays on
Some Disputed Questions in Modern International Law. That
part of the fourth essay which dealt with the influence of the
theory of natural law upon the system of Grotius was little
more than an elaboration of the passage quoted above from
Ancient Law.2 Maine's mistaken notions were repeated; and
Ancient Law, p. 103.
Essays, preface, p. x. Had Lawrence's Essays been other than a popular discussion, one would be tempted to quote against him his own words to the effect
that" publicists adopt too easily what they find in the works of their predecessors."
Ibid., p. 209.
1
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in the elaborating process certain of them, particularly those

referring to Grotius' use of the state of nature, received added

emphasis. In discussing the system of Grotius, Lawrence

said:

We have now to discover how he utilized the theory of Natural

Law, and made it the mother of a new and better system of Inter-

in the elaborating process certain of them, particularly those
referring to Grotius' use of the state of nature, received added
emphasis. In discussing the system of Grotius, Lawrence
said:

national Law. His method was as follows. Seeing that nations had

no longer even in theory a common superior, he argued that they

were in a position similar to that of individuals before civil govern-

ment was established among them. Just as men in such a position

were bound by a Law of Nature, so also were states. Natural reason

dictated certain rules which were so sacred and immutable that even

the Almighty could not alter them. They were part of the very na-

ture and essence of things, and God Himself submitted to be judged

by them. These rules bound states as well as individuals, and were

the basis of International Law. The practice of all or of most nations

could add to them, or go beyond them, but it could not repeal them.

They were the immutable part of International Law, whereas the

part based upon general consent could vary from time to time. . . .
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In elaborating the rules which govern the intercourse of states

Grotius was led to adopt into his system a vast amount of pure Roman

Law. The later Roman lawyers divided their law into a Jus Civile

peculiar to Rome, and a Jus Gentium common to Rome and other

states; and with the single exception of Ulpian they identified the

Jus Gentium with that Jus Naturale which their profession of the

Stoic philosophy caused them to believe in. Grotius, seeing this,

thought he had discovered in the Roman Jus Gentium an international

code of antiquity, based upon ideas similar to his own of the appli-

cability of Natural Law to the intercourse of states. . . . When the

Roman lawyers became converts to the Stoic philosophy, they re-

garded their own Jus Gentium as a portion of the lost code of Nature,

and dignified it for the future by the appellation of Jus Naturale.

Thus it is not to be wondered at that Grotius imagined their Jus

Gentium or Jus Naturale to be a system of rules for guiding independ-

ent states in their mutual intercourse. . . .

... The Jus Gentium, regarded as a Natural Code, was applied to the

relations of states, because it was believed they stood to one another

as men were supposed to stand in a state of nature. One of the most

important effects of the change was to extend and intensify the con-

We have now to discover how he utilized the theory of Natural
Law, and made it the mother of a new and better system of International Law. His method was as follows. Seeing that nations had
no longer even in theory a common superior, he argued that they
were in a position similar to that of individuals before civil government was established among them. Just as men in such a position
were bound by a Law of Nature, so also were states. Natural reason
dictated certain rules which were so sacred and immutable that even
the Almighty could not alter them. They were part of the very nature and essence of things, and God Himself submitted to be judged
by them. These rules bound states as well as individuals, and were
the basis of International Law. The practice of all or of most nations
could add to them, or go beyond them, but it could not repeal them.
They were the immutable part of International Law, whereas the
part based upon general consent could vary from time to time....
In elaborating the rules which govern the intercourse of states
Grotius was led to adopt into his system a vast amount of pure Roman
Law. The later Roman lawyers divided their law into a ]us C1'vile
peculiar to Rome, and a ]us Gentium common to Rome and other
states; and with the single exception of Clpian they identified the
Jus Gentium with that Jus Xaturale which their profession of the
Stoic philosophy caused them to believe in. Grotius, seeing this,
thought he had discovered in the Roman Jus Gentium an international
code of antiquity, based upon ideas similar to his own of the applicability of Natural Law to the intercourse of states .... When the
Roman lawyers became converts to the Stoic philosophy, they regarded their own Jus Gcntium as a portion of the lost code of Nature,
and dignified it for the future by the appellation of Jus Naturale.
Thus it is not to be wondered at that Grotius imagined their ]us
Gentium or J us N aturale to be a system of rules for guiding independent states in their mutual intercourse ....
. . . The Jus Gentium, regarded as a Natural Code, was applied to the
relations of states, because it was believed they stood to one another
as men were supposed to stand in a state of nature. One of the most
important effects of the change was to extend and intensify the con-
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ception of territorial sovereignty, and another was to give effect as a

legal doctrine to the principle of the absolute independence and

equality of states.

. . . Here again Roman Law gave precision to a theory which had

been introduced independently of it. The classical jurists laid down

again and again that by nature all men were equal, and one of their

great objects in elaborating the Jus Gentium was to sweep away alt

the intricate distinctions between man and man of which the Jus

Civile was full. Thus Grotius in borrowing from the Jus Gentium

under the impression that it was meant to be a code of nature applied

to states, found ample confirmation of the theory of equality. He

made it a cardinal point of his system; and thereby conferred no-

small benefit upon mankind.1

The extracts quoted are replete with misinformation in re-

gard to the relation between jus naturale and jus gentium,

Grotius' understanding of the jus gentium, and his use of

natural law, natural equality, and the state of nature.

These chapters from Maine and Lawrence have been

widely read and not infrequently followed. For illustration,

ception of territorial sovereignty, and another was to give effect as a
legal doctrine to the principle of the absolute independence and
equality of states .
. . . Here again Roman Law gave precision to a theory which had
been introduced independently of it. The classical jurists laid down
again and again that by nature all men were equal, and one of their
great objects in elaborating the Jus Gentium was to sweep away all
the intricate distinctions between man and man of which the Jus
CiviJe was full. Thus Grotius in borrowing from the ]us Gentium
under the impression that it was meant to be a code of nature applied
to states, found ample confirmation of the theory of equality. He
made it a cardinal point of his system; and thereby conferred nosmall benefit upon mankind. 1

in a useful article by Mr. Hicks on The Equality of States and
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The Hague Conferences, it is asserted that

The doctrine was born with the publication of the great book of

Hugo Grotius, " De Jure Belli ac Pads," in 1625. ... He adopted

the theory, well known to his time, that a law of nature controls

the relations of man to man, and applied it to the relations be-

tween states. This was Grotius' great accomplishment — to find

in the law of nature a new and nonreligious ground for international

rights and duties. It was a common conception of the age that there

had once existed a time when organized communities were not yet

formed and when each individual was at liberty to do whatever he

wished. Further, that men in such a condition obeyed certain rules

discovered to them by their own reason. These rules were called the

laws of nature. People were in a state of nature with reference to

each other. Grotius used this law of nature in the following manner:.

No common superior being left to control the relations of states, the

states were free and independent, and they were in a " state of nature"

Essays, pp. 194-803.

The extracts quoted are replete with misinformation in regard to the relation between jus naturale and jus gentium,
Grotius' understanding of the jus gentium, and his use of
natural law, natural equality, and the state of nature.
These chapters from Maine and Lawrence have been
widely read and not infrequently followed. For illustration,
in a useful article by l\fr. Hicks on The Equality of States and
The Hague Conferences, it is asserted that
The doctrine was born with the publication of the great book of
Hugo Grotius, "De Jure Belli ac Pacis," in 1625 . ... He adopted
the theory, well known to his time, that a law of nature controls
the relations of man to man, and applied it to the relations between states. This was Grotius' great accomplishment - to find
in the law of nature a new and nonreligious ground for international
rights and duties. It was a common conception of the age that there
had once existed a time when organized communities were not yet
formed and when each individual was at liberty to do whatever he
wished. Further, that men in such a condition obeyed certain rules
discovered to them by their own reason. These rules were called the
laws of nature. People were in a state of nature with reference to
each other. Grotius used this law of nature in the following manner:
No common superior being left to control the relations of states, the
states were free and independent, and they were in a" state of nature"
1

Essays, pp. 194-:103.
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with respect to each other, just as individuals were before the organi-

zation of communities. Thus, states were bound by a law of nature.

As to what the law of nature was, recourse was had to Roman Law.

Now, the Romans in their judicial system identified the jus gentium

with the jus naturale. That is, when they discovered that there were

certain laws common to most of the countries with which they had

relations, they came to think of these rules as laws of nature. Grotius

followed them in this error, and when he applied the law of nature to

states it was really in large part the jus gentium which he was using.

One of the oft-repeated dogmas of the jus gentium was the equality

of men. When Grotius applied the system to states, he made an es-

sential part of his legal doctrine the absolute independence and

equality of states.1

The earliest exposition of state equality is ascribed to

Grotius by a third group of writers on the assumption that

equality was an inevitable corollary of his conception of

sovereignty and independence. This is the position taken

by Twiss, who says of the state-system established by the

Peace of Westphalia:

with respect to each other, just as individuals were before the organization of communities. Thus, states were bound by a law of nature.
As to what the law of nature was, recourse was had to Roman Law.
Now, the Romans in their judicial system identified the jus gentium
with the jus naturale. That is, when they discovered that there were
certain laws common to most of the countries with which they had
relations, they came to think of these rules as laws of nature. Grotius
followed them in this error, and when he applied the law of nature to
states it was really in large part the jus gentium which he was using.
One of the oft-repeated dogmas of the jus gentium was the equality
<>f men. When Grotius applied the system to states, he made an essential part of his legal doctrine the absolute independence and
equality of states.1

The realization of such a State-System would have been impracti-
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cable if Grotius had not previously familiarized the minds of States-

men with the conception of territorial sovereignty and the rights of

independence as incidental to such sovereignty, and further with the

doctrine of the equality of States considered as independent political

communities.2

Taylor declares that

the Grotian system depends upon a full and unqualified recognition

of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty from which flow the corolla-

ries that all states are formally equal, and that territory and juris-

The earliest exposition of state equality is ascribed to
Grotius by a third group of writers on the assumption that
equality was an inevitable corollary of his conception of
sovereignty and independence. This is the position taken
by Twiss, who says of the state-system established by the
Peace of Westphalia:

diction are coextensive.3

1 A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 531-532. See also A. S. I. L. Proceedings (1909), III,

239. Cf. Reeves, in The University Record (1917), III, 254. Mr. Hicks is ob-

viously wrong in what he says about the equality of men having been a dogma of

the jus gentium. Equality was a dogma of the jus naturale, and this was the prin-

cipal reason why the rules of the two could not be identified. See supra, pp. 11,15.

* Law of Nations, p. xvii.

■ Int. Pub. Law, § 69, p. 98. Also § 51, p. 75. Taylor's citations of Dejure

■belli ac pacis in the note on p. 76 have little or nothing to do with the question.

The realization of such a State-System would have been impracticable if Grotius had not previously familiarized the minds of Statesmen with the conception of territorial sovereignty and the rights of
independence as incidental to such sovereignty, and further with the
doctrine of the equality of States considered as independent political
communities. 2

Taylor declares that
the Grotian system depends upon a full and unqualified recognition
-0f the doctrine of territorial sovereignty from which flow the corollaries that all states are formally equal, and that territory and jurisdiction are coextensive.3
1 A. J . I. L. (1908), JI, 531-532. See also A . S. I. L. Proceedings (1909), Ill,
239. Cf. Reeves, in The University Record (1917), III, 254. Mr. Hicks is ob-

viously wrong in what he says about the equality of men having been a dogma of
the jus getJlium. Equality was a dogma of the jus naturale, and this was the prin·cipal reason why the rules of the two could not be identified. See supra, pp. II , 15.
t Law of Nations, p. xvii.
1 Int. Pub. Law,§ 69 1 p. 98. Also§ 51 1 p. 75. Taylor's citations of Dejure
.helli ac pacis in the note on p. 76 have little or nothing to do with the question.
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More recently the same opinion has been expressed by Her-

shey, who says:

the essential principles underlying the Grotian system remain the

More recently the same opinion has been expressed by Hershey, who says:

fundamental principles of International Law. Such are the doctrines

of the legal equality and of territorial sovereignty or independence of

States.

These fundamental principles, though not clearly stated by Gro-

tius, underlay his system and were fully developed by his successors,

more especially by Wolff, Vattel, and G. F. de Martens. They were

the inevitable outcome of the acceptance of the dogma of the supreme

power or sovereignty of States and princes, as denned by Bodin,

Grotius, Hobbes, and other political philosophers during the six-

teenth and seventeenth centuries.1

If the conclusion stated above with reference to sovereignty

in the system of Grotius is sound, then the opinion repre-

sented by these writers must be erroneous. Equal protec-

tion of the law was a necessary corollary of sovereignty and

independence in the Grotian system. Equality of capacity

for rights was not an essential corollary; in truth, it was not

the essential principles underlying the Grotian system remain the
fundamental principles of International Law. Such are the doctrines
of the legal equality and of territorial sovereignty or independence of
States.
These fundamental principles, though not clearly stated by Grotius, underlay his system and were fully developed by his successors,
more especially by Wolff, Vattel, and G. F. de Martens. They were
the inevitable outcome of the acceptance of the dogma of the supreme
power or sovereignty of States and princes, as defined by Bodin,
Grotius, Hobbes, and other political philosophers during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 1
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even a possible corollary.

It is submitted that the opinion represented by Maine,

Lawrence, and others must be revised. Publicists have

fallen into a careless way of attributing to Grotius theories

which he had no part in establishing, except as his appeal to

natural law contributed to prepare the way for a later school

of writers in which these theories received their complete

development. Much more has been read into the work of

Grotius than any student of the seventeenth century could

have found there. It is certain that for the seventeenth

century he was no authority for the proposition that states

have equal rights by the law of nations. Men had recourse

for that proposition to a group of publicists and moral phi-

losophers who were less concerned with the elaboration of a

practical code and more interested in attaining an abstract

perfection of ideas.

1 Essentials, p. 58.

If the conclusion stated above with reference to sovereignty
in the system of Grotius is sound, then the opinion represented by these writers must be erroneous. Equal protection of the law was a necessary corollary of sovereignty and
independence in the Grotian system. Equality of capacity
for rights was not an essential corollary; in truth, it was not
even a possible corollary.
It is submitted that the opinion represented by Maine,
Lawrence, and others must be revised. Publicists have
fallen into a careless way of attributing to Grotius theories
which he had no part in establishing, except as his appeal to
natural law contributed to prepare the way for a later school
of writers in which these theories received their complete
development. Much more has been read into the work of
Grotius than any student of the seventeenth century could
have found there. It is certain that for the seventeenth
century he was no authority for the proposition that states
have equal rights by the law of nations. Men had recourse
for that proposition to a group of publicists and moral philosophers who were less concerned with the elaboration of a
practical code and more interested in attaining an abstract
perfection of ideas.
1

Essentials, p. 58.

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY

Divergent Tendencies among the Successors of

Grottos

The modern law of nations was developed, in its formative

period, chiefly by great teachers and publicists. The body

CHAPTER III

of accumulated custom was meager, the evidence of its ex-

istence frequently inaccessible. The state of international

relations was worse than unsatisfactory to all right-thinking

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY

men. So it came about, partly from the want of common

usage, partly from the prevalence of certain theories, partly

DIVERGENT TENDENCIES AMONG THE SUCCESSORS OF

from the desire of the writers to ameliorate existing con-

ditions, and partly, perhaps, from the type of mind which

GROTIUS

was most frequently devoted to the law of nations, that the

primitive stages of the science were influenced largely by

those theoretical conceptions which were included in the

common heritage of learning from antiquity and the Middle

Ages. Development of the theory of the law of nations par-

ticularly, and of no inconsiderable part of its substance, was

determined by the force of these ideas.

The successors of Grotius were by no means agreed, how-
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ever, as to the precise application and significance of these

theories. Three tendencies appeared among the publicists,

represented by the naturalists, the positivists, and the eclec-

tics respectively. The writers are sometimes divided into

three schools corresponding to these tendencies.1 There is

no objection to the division, provided it be remembered that

1 On the three schools, see remarks of Despagnet, Cours, §§ 31-33, pp. 32-34;

Fenwick, in A.J. I. L. (1014), VIII, 38; Hely, &tude, p. 221; Hershey, Essentials,

pp. 59-63; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, p. 394.

68

'I'BE modern law of nations was developed, in its formative
period, chiefly by great teachers and publicists. The body
of ac~umulated custom was meager, the evidence of its existence frequently inaccessible. The state of international
relations was worse than unsatisfactory to all right-thinking
men. So it came about, partly from the want of common
usage, partly from the prevalence of certain theories, partly
from the desire of the writers to ameliorate existing conditions, and partly, perhaps, from the type of mind which
was most frequently devoted to the law of nations, that the
primitive stages of the science were influenced largely by
those theoretical conceptions which were included in the
common heritage of learning from antiquity and the Middle
Ages. Development of the theory of the law of nations particularly, and of no inconsiderable part of its substance, was
determined by the force of these ideas.
The successors of Grotius were by no means agreed, however, as to the precise application and significance of these
theories. Three tendencies appeared among the publicists,
represented by the naturalists, the positivists, and the eclectics respectively. The writers are sometimes divided into
three schools corresponding to these tendencies.1 There is
no objection to the division, provided it be remembered that
On the three schools, see remarks of Despagnet, Co1'rs, §§ 31-33, pp. 32-34;
Fenwick, in A. J. I . L. (1914), VIII, 38; Hely, £t11<ie, p. 221; Hershey, Essentials,
pp. 59"""f>3; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, p. 394.
1
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it is an arbitrary one, and that it does not always offer an

adequate explanation for the system of an individual writer.

It must be applied, as might be expected, not only to pub-

licists holding views that are widely divergent and hence

easily classified, but also to representatives of many shades

of opinion between the extremes. As might be expected,

also, modern authorities are not always agreed as to the

school to which certain of the classical publicists should be

accredited.

The divergent tendencies that found expression in these

so-called schools had their inception in different conceptions

of international society and the law of nations. The philo-

sophical or pure law of nature school held that the law of

nations was nothing more than the law of nature applied to

separate states in a state of nature; they accordingly denied

to the customary, conventional, or positive element any of

the attributes of true law apart from the natural law. The

positivist or historical school contended that the principles

underlying customs and treaties constituted a positive law
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of nations, distinct from the natural law and of superior

practical importance. The eclectics or Grotians, as they

are sometimes called, took an intermediate position, retain-

ing Grotius' distinction between the natural and the volun-

tary law of nations, while treating the two as about equal in

importance.

The Influence of Thomas Hobbes

The translation of the theory of natural equality into the

law of nations originated with and was first definitely stated

by the naturalists, whose inspiration was found in the writ-

ings of Thomas Hobbes and whose leader in the seventeenth

century was Samuel von Pufendorf. An illuminating chap-

ter might be written on the contributions of Thomas Hobbes

to the unreality of international law. His works on legal

it is an arbitrary one, and that it does not always offer an
adequate explanation for the system of an individual writer.
It must be applied, as might be expected, not only to publicists holding views that are widely divergent and hence
easily classified, but also to representatives of many shades
of opinion between the extremes. As might be expected,
also, modern authorities are not always agreed as to the
school to which certain of the classical publicists should be
accredited.
The divergent tendencies that found expression in these
so-called schools had their inception in difierent conceptions
of international society and the law of nations. The philosophical or pure law of nature school held that the law of
nations was nothing more than the law of nature applied to
separate states in a state of nature; they accordingly denied
to the customary, conventional, or positive element any of
the attributes of true law apart from the natural law. The
positivist or historical school contended that the principles
underlying customs and treaties constituted a positive law
of nations, distinct from the natural law and of superior
practical importance. The eclectics or Grotians, as they
are sometimes called, took an intermediate position, retaining Grotius' distinction between the natural and the voluntary law of nations, while treating the two as about equal in
importance.
THE

INFLUENCE OF THOMAS HOBBES

The translation of the theory of natural equality into the
law of nations originated with and was first definitely stated
by the naturalists, whose inspiration was found in the writings of Thomas Hobbes and whose leader in the seventeenth
century was Samuel von Pufendorf. An illuminating chapter might be written on the contributions of Thomas Hobbes
to the unreality of international law. His works on legal
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and political theory, particularly his Elementa Philosophica

de Cive and Leviathan,1 had an influence upon the subsequent

development of the law of nations that is not generally ap-

preciated. Although he wrote no treatise on the law of

nations, his influence on its theory was far-reaching and sig-

nificant. He revived, for the purposes of juridical philoso-

phy, the whole mediaeval theory of natural law, the state of

nature, and natural equality. Through his influence these

conceptions were handed down in a new and non-scholastic

guise to philosophers and jurists of the seventeenth, eight-

eenth, and nineteenth centuries.

The system of Hobbes was the antithesis of that of Gro-

tius in respect both to its method and its leading principles.

Hobbes' method was an undisguised attack upon the proc-

esses of the continental jurist. An extreme rationalist, he

had a supreme contempt for the erudition with which Gro-

tius sought witnesses for the soundness of his conclusions:

For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or

upon Scripture; Both which give credit to many, but never receive it
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from any Writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact,

but of Right, wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce

any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both him-

self, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly,

such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not

intrinsecally the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that

passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times

with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with

and political theory, particularly his Elementa Philosophica
de Cive and Leviathan, 1 had an influence upon the subsequent
development of the law of nations that is not generally appreciated. Although he wrote no treatise on the law of
nations, his influence on its theory was far-reaching and significant. He revived, for the purposes of juridical philosophy, the whole mediaeval theory of natural law, the state of
nature, and natural equality. Through his influence these
. conceptions were handed down in a new and non-scholastic
guise to philosophers and jurists of the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries.
The system of Hobbes was the antithesis of that of Grotius in respect both to its method and its leading principles.
Hobbes' method was an undisguised attack upon the processes of the continental jurist. An extreme rationalist, he
had a supreme contempt for the erudition with which Grotius sought witnesses for the soundness of his conclusions:

the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients

they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote

before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion; when Greek

1 Hobbes lived 1588-1670. His Elementa philosophica de cive was first pub-

lished in 1642, and again, for wider circulation, in 1647. References are to the

Amsterdam edition of 1657, and the English edition in Vol. II of Hobbes' Eng-

lish Works, edited by William Molesworth. Leviathan first appeared in 1651.

Page references are to A. R. Waller's edition in the Cambridge English Classics.

There is a brief sketch of Hobbes' life and work by Montmorency, in Macdonell

and Manson, Great Jurists, pp. 195-219.

For first, all Truth of Doctrine dependeth either upon Reason, or
upon Scripture; Both which give credit to many, but never receive it
from any Writer. Secondly, the matters in question are not of Fact,
but of Right, wherein there is no place for Witnesses. There is scarce
any of those old Writers, that contradicteth not sometimes both himself, and others; which makes their Testimonies insufficient. Fourthly,
such Opinions as are taken onely upon Credit of Antiquity, are not
intrinsecally the Judgment of those that cite them, but Words that
passe (like gaping) from mouth to mouth. Fiftly, it is many times
with a fraudulent Designe that men stick their corrupt Doctrine with
the Cloves of other mens Wit. Sixtly, I find not that the Ancients
they cite, took it for an Ornament, to doe the like with those that wrote
before them. Seventhly, it is an argument of Indigestion; when Greek
1 Hobbes lived 1588-1679. His F.lementa philosophica de ciT>e was first published in 1642, and again, for wider circulation, in 1647. References are to the
Amsterdam edition of 1657, and the English edition in Vol. II of Hobbes' English Works, edited by William Molesworth. Lelliathan first appeared in 1651.
Page references are to A. R. Waller's edition in the Cambridge Englliih Classics.
There is a brief sketch of Hobbes' life and work by Montmorency, in Macdonell
and Manson, Great Jurists, pp. 195-219.
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and Latin Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, un-

changed. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that

either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to

find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due:

For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. Of the An-

tiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such

honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that

am Writing: But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Au-

thors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the com-

petition, and mutuall envy of the Living.1

The contrast in essential principles was no less marked

than the contrast in method. All confusion involved in

Grotius' definition and use of the law of nature dissolved

before the merciless logic of the English philosopher. Where

and Latin Sentences unchewed come up again, as they use to doe, unchanged. Lastly, though I reverence those men of Ancient time, that
either have written Truth perspicuously, or set us in a better way to
find it out our selves; yet to the Antiquity it self I think nothing due:
For if we will reverence the Age, the Present is the Oldest. Of the Antiquity of the Writer, I am not sure, that generally they to whom such
honor is given, were more Ancient when they wrote, than I am that
am Writing: But if it bee well considered, the praise of Ancient Authors, proceeds not from the reverence of the Dead, but from the competition, and mutuall envy of the Living. 1

Grotius defined law in terms that left its binding force to be

inferred from its character as law, Hobbes anticipated Aus-

tin in defining it as the command of a sovereign power.2

Hobbes divided law into divine and human according to its

source, and the divine into natural and positive according
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to the means whereby God had made his will known to men

— natural reason in case of the former, revelation in case of

the latter.3 Natural or moral law was described as " that

which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born

with them, to wit, their natural reason." Elsewhere it was

defined as precepts or rules

found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which

is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the

same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best pre-

served.4

1 Leviathan, Review and Conclusion, pp. 526-527.

2 Dominion, XIV, 1, in English Works, II, 183; Leviathan, Pt. II, ch. 26, p. 189.

* Dominion, XIV, 4, in English Works, II, 186.

4 Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 14, p. 86; Liberty, II, 1, in English Works, II, 16. Cf.

Selden's definition: "I cannot fancy to myself what the law of nature means, but

the law of God. How should I know I ought not to steal, I ought not to commit

adultery, unless some body had told me so? Surely 'tis because I have been told

so. 'Tis not because I think I ought not to do them, nor because you think I ought

The contrast in essential principles was no less marked
than the contrast in method. All confusion involved in
Grotius' definition and use of the law of nature dissolved
before the merciless logic of the English philosopher. Where
Grotius defined law in terms that left its binding force to be
inferred from its character as law, Hobbes anticipated Austin in defining it as the command of a sovereign power. 2
Hobbes divided law into divine and human according to its
source, and the divine into natural and positive according
to the means whereby God had made his will known to men
- natural reason in case of the former, revelation in case of
the latter.3 Natural or moral law was described as " that
which God hath declared to all men by his eternal word born
with them, to wit, their natural reason." Elsewhere it was
defined as precepts or rules
found out by Reason, by which a man is forbidden to do, that, which
is destructive of his life, or taketh away the means of preserving the
same; and to omit, that, by which he thinketh it may be best preserved.4
Leviathan, Review and Conclusion, pp. 526- 527.
.
Drnninion, XIV, 1, in English Works, II, 183; U1Jiathan, Pt. II, ch. 26, 18<}.
• Dominion, XIV, 4, in English Works, II, 186.
~ Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 14, p. 86; Liberty, II, I, in Etiglish Works, II, 16. Cf.
Selden's definition: "I cannot fancy to myself what the law of nature means, but
the law of God. How should I know I ought not to steal, I ought not to commit
adultery, unless some body had told me so ? Surely 'tis because I have been told
so. 'Tis not because I think I ought not to do them, nor because you think I ought
1
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Hobbes criticized those who had confounded law and right,

and drew a clear distinction between natural law {lex natu-

ralis) and natural right {jus naturale). While the former im-

plied restraint, the latter implied liberty, the liberty of every

man to do whatever seemed best for the preservation of his

existence.1 The equal natural rights of men made the state

of nature in Hobbes' theory a state of war. The natural law,

on the other hand, was a body of rules designed to make life

secure. Its primary precepts were to seek peace and observe

it, to covenant to refrain from the exercise of natural liberty,

and to perform covenants.2 Its rules were immutable and

eternal,3 but they were not true law at all except in so far as

they had been delivered in the word of God.4 Hobbes com-

pletely identified the natural law and moral philosophy.6

Hobbes' conception of the state of nature is familiar learn-

ing. He used the term to describe the condition of mankind

apart from all human institutions, a condition in which there

was no coercive authority, no law but natural law, and in

which a perfect equality of natural rights prevailed.6 In
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such a state of nature every man was endowed with an equal

natural right of self-preservation, which carried with it a

natural right to do everything necessary for self-preserva-

not; if so, our minds might change: Whence then comes the restraint? From a

higher power, nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself, for I may untie myself

again; nor an equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. It must be a

superior power, even God Almighty. If two of us make a bargain, why should

either of us stand to it? What need you care what you say, or what need I care

what I say? Certainly because there is something about me that tells me, fides

est servanda, and if we after alter our minds, and make a new bargain, there is fides

servanda there too." Opera omnia, III, Pt. II, 2041.

1 Liberty, I, 7, in English Works, II, 8; Dominion, XIV, 3, in ibid., II, 186;

Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 14, p. 86.

'Liberty, II and III, in English Works, II, 16 ff.; Leviathan, Pt. I, chs. 14 and 15,

pp. 86 ff.

'Liberty, III, 29, in English Works, II, 46; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 15, p. 108.

Hobbes criticized those who had confounded law and right,
and drew a clear distinction between natural law (lex naturalis) and natural right (jus naturale). While the former implied restraint, the latter implied liberty, the liberty of every
man to do whatever seemed best for the preservation of his
existence. 1 The equal natural rights of men made the state
of nature in Hobbes' theory a state of war. The natural law,
on the other hand, was a body of rules designed to make life
secure. Its primary precepts were to seek peace and observe
it, to covenant to refrain from the exercise of natural liberty,
and to perform covenants.2 Its rules were immutable and
eternal,3 but they were not true law at all except in so far as
they had been delivered in the word of God.4 Hobbes completely identified the natural law and moral philosophy. 6
Hobbes' conception of the state of nature is familiar learning. He used the term to describe the condition of mankind
apart from all human institutions, a condition in which there
was no coercive authority, no law but natural law, and in
which a perfect equality of natural rights prevailed. 6 In
such a state of nature every man was endowed with an equal
natural right of self-preservation, which carried with it a
natural right to do everything necessary for self-preserva-

4 Liberty, III, 33, in English Works, II, 49; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 15, p. 109, and

Pt. II, ch. 26, p. 191.

* Liberty, III, 30, in English Works, II, 47; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 15, p. 109.

• Ibid., Pt. I, ch. 13, pp. 81-86, and passim.

not; if so, our minds might change: Whence then comes the restraint? From a
higher power, nothing else can bind. I cannot bind myself, for I may untie myself
again; nor an equal cannot bind me, for we may untie one another. It must be a
superior power, even God Almighty. If two of us make a bargain, why should
either of us stand to it? What need you care what you say, or what need I care
what I say ? Certainly because there is something about me that tells me, faks
esl senanda, and if we after alter our minds, and make a new bargain, there is faks
senanda there too." Opera omnia, III, Pt. II, 2041.
1 Liberty, I, 7, in English Works, II, 8; DominW1J, XIV, 3, in ibid., II, 186;
.Letnat/tan, Pt. I, ch. 14, p. 86.
1 Liberty, II and III, in English Works, II, 16 ff.; .Letnatlsan, Pt. I, cbs. 14 and 15,
pp. 86 ff.
1 Liberty, III, 29, in English Works, II, 46; .Letnatlsan, Pt. I, ch. 15, p. 1o8.
' Liberty, III, 33, in English Works, II, 49; Uviat/tan, Pt. I, ch. 15, p. 109, and
Pt. II, ch. 26, p. 191.
1 Liberty, III, 30, in English Works, II, 47; LnWt/tan, Pt. I, ch. lS, p. 109.
• Ibid., Pt. I, ch. lJ, pp. 81-861 and passim.
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tion, and to be supreme judge as to what was necessary to

that end.1 Everyone had a right to everything; profit was

the measure of right; natural rights were equivalent to

natural mights; and their sanction was force. In short, the

state of nature was a state of war.2

Aristotle's theory of inequality was rejected, and the idea

of natural equality among men was stated with new pre-

cision. Hobbes understood by it a natural equality of ca-

pacity for natural rights in the state of nature, and for legal

rights under the law of nature, in so far as the law of nature

could be called true law.3 The precepts of the law of nature

required " that every man be accounted by nature equal to

another," that each attribute equal right and power to

others, that those things which cannot be divided be used

in common in order to preserve equality, and that no man

act as arbiter in his own dispute because he could not ob-

serve " that same equality commanded by the law of nature,

so exactly as a third man would do." 4

The analogy between the state and the natural body, con-
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spicuous in the work of earlier writers, was at the very foun-

dation of Hobbes' philosophy. He began his Leviathan with

a detailed description of the state as an artificial man:

For by Art is created that great leviathan called a common-wealth,

or state, (in la tine civitas) which is but an Artificiall Man; though

of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protec-

tion and defence it was intended; and in which, the Soveraignty is an

Artificiall Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The

Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificiall

Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of

the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his

duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Naturall; The

1 Liberty, I, 8-10, in English Works, II, 9-11.

1 Liberty, I, 12, in English Works, II, 11; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 13, p. 83.

'Liberty, I, 3 and 10, in English Works, II, 6, 9; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 13, p. Si.

* Liberty, I, 13-21, in English Works, II, 38-42; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 15, pp.

104-107.

tion, and to be supreme judge as to what was necessary to
that end. 1 Everyone had a right to everything; profit was
the measure of right; natural rights were equivalent to
natural mights; and their sanction was force. In short, the
state of nature was a state of war. 2
Aristotle's theory of inequality was rejected, and the idea
of natural equality among men was stated with new precision. Hobbes understood by it a natural equality of capacity for natural rights in the state of nature, and for legal
rights under the law of nature, in so far as the law of nature
could be called true law.3 The precepts of the law of nature
required "that every man be accounted by nature equal to
another," that each attribute equal right and power to
others, that those things which cannot be divided be used
in common in order to preserve equality, and that no man
act as arbiter in his own dispute because he could not observe" that same equality commanded by the law of nature,
so exactly as a third man would do." 4
The analogy between the state and the natural body, conspicuous in the work of earlier writers, was at the very foundation of Hobbes' philosophy. He began his Leviathan with
a detailed description of the state as an artificial man:
For by Art is created that great LEVIATHAN called a COMMON-WEALTH,
or STATE, (in latine CIVITAS) which is but an Artificiall Man; though
of greater stature and strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended; and in which, the SOJJeraignty is an
Artificial! Soul, as giving life and motion to the whole body; The
Magistrates, and other Officers of Judicature and Execution, artificial!
Joynts; Reward and Punishment (by which fastned to the seate of
the Soveraignty, every joynt and member is moved to performe his
duty) are the Nerves, that do the same in the Body Natural!; The
l Liberty, I, 8-IO, in English Works, II, 9-11.
Liberty, I, x:r, in English Works, II, 11; LeT!iatlwn, Pt. I, ch. 13, p. 83.
a Liberty, I, 3 and 10, in English Works, II, 6, 9; Leviathan, Pt. I, ch. 13, p. 81.
' Liberty, I, 13-:u, in English Works, II, 38-42; LeT!iathan, Pt. I, ch. 15, pp.
104-107.
t
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Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength;

Salus Pofndi (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom

all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Mem-

ory; Equity and Lowes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord,

Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Civill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts

and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first

made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Lel us make

man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

Anthropomorphism was a dominant note in the system of

Hobbes; it was carried to an extreme which Grotius, freely

Wealth and Riches of all the particular members, are the Strength;
Salus Popu/,i (the peoples safety) its Businesse; Counsellors, by whom
all things needfull for it to know, are suggested unto it, are the Memory; Equity and Lawes, an artificiall Reason and Will; Concord,
Health; Sedition, Sicknesse; and Cirrill war, Death. Lastly, the Pacts
and Covenants, by which the parts of this Body Politique were at first
made, set together, and united, resemble that Fiat, or the Let us make

man, pronounced by God in the Creation.

as he used the analogy, would unquestionably have repudi-

ated.1

Finally, Hobbes propounded a conception of sovereignty

as supreme and unlimited power2 that was more extreme

than anything which had been defended previously. He

made the will of the state the source and criterion of all right,

thus eliminating all confusion as to the relation of the

sovereign to the laws of God, of nature, and of nations. So

far as subjects were concerned, the sovereign's judgment
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was the law of God, the law of nature, and the law of nations.

Thus all of Grotius' efforts to hedge in the sovereign by the

law of nations were cast aside, while the theoretical perfec-

tion of absolutism was attained.

These were the salient features of Hobbes' philosophy

which had the most Significant influence upon the theory of

the law of nations. By substituting the word " states " for

the word " men " in what he said about natural law, natural

right, the state of nature, and natural equality, it is possible

to form a series of postulates strikingly similar to those

which dominated thought on international relations for the

next two centuries. So far as he considered the law of na-

tions at all, this was precisely what Hobbes suggested. He

1 Cf., for example, remarks of Grotius in Dejure belli ac pacis, I, 3, 7, and II,

6,4-

'Dominion, VI, 18, in English Works, II, 88; Leviathan, Pt. II, ch. 18, pp.

120-128.

Anthropomorphism was a dominant note in the system of
Hobbes; it was carried to an extreme which Grotius, freely
as he used the analogy, would unquestionably have repudiated.1
Finally, Hobbes propounded a conception of sovereignty
as supreme and unlimited power 2 that was more extreme
than anything which had been defended previously. He
made the will of the state the source and criterion of all right,
thus eliminating all confusion as to the relation of the
sovereign to the laws of God, of nature, and of nations. So
far as subjects were concerned, the sovereign's judgment
was the law of God, the law of nature, and the law of nations.
Thus all of Grotius' efforts to hedge in the sovereign by the
law of nations were cast aside, while the theoretical perfection of absolutism was attained.
These were the salient features of Hobbes' philosophy
which had the most significant influence upon the theory of
the law of nations. By substituting the word " states" for
the word "men " in what he said about natural law, natural
right, the state of nature, and natural equality, it is possible
to form a series of postulates strikingly similar to those
which dominated thought on international relations for the
next two centuries. So far as he considered the law of nations at all, this was precisely what Hobbes suggested. He
1

Cf., for example, remarks of Grotius in De jure belli ac pacis, I, 3, 7, and II,

6, 4.
2

Dominion, VI, 181 in English Works, II, 88; Leviathan, Pt. II, ch.

120-128.

18,

pp.
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declared that states, once instituted, "do put on the per-

sonal proprieties of men," 1 and that with respect to each

other they were in a natural condition analogous to that

prevailing among men in the state of nature.2 It followed

that the same law

which speaking of the duty of single men we call natural, being applied

to whole cities and nations, is called the right of nations. And the

same elements of natural law and right, which have hitherto been

spoken of, being transferred to whole cities and nations, may be taken

for the elements of the laws and right of nations*

In other words, the law of nature and the law of nations were

the same thing. Thus Hobbes prepared the way for the re-

ception into the law of nations of the theory of natural equal-

ity. With him the premises were complete. It remained for

another to formulate the obvious conclusion that states are

declared that states, once instituted, " do put on the personal proprieties of men," 1 and that with respect to each
other they were in a natural condition analogous to that
prevailing among men in the state of nature.2 It followed
that the same law
which speaking of the duty of single men we call natural, being applied
to whole cities and nations, is called the right of nati<Jns. And the
same elements of natural law and right, which have hitherto been
spoken of, being transferred to whole cities and nations, may be taken
for the elements of the laws and right of nalions. 3

equal by the law and right of nature.

PUFENDORF AND THE NATURALISTS

The work of Hobbes placed him at once among the fore-

most political thinkers. His theories became the center of
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1 Dominion, XTV, 4, in English Works, II, 186.

* English Works, II, preface, p. xv; Dominion, XIII, 7, in English Works, II, p.

169. Ward says that Hobbes seems to have been the first to think of the state of

nature as the foundation of a system of law. Law of Nations, I, 5. Figgis thinks that

there was much to be said for the idea that the state of international relations was

a state of nature in the days of Hobbes. Gerson to Grotius, pp. 96, 114. Read what

1'abW de Saint-Pierre said in the preface to his L'abregl du projet de paix per-

In other words, the law of nature and the law of nations were
the same thing. Thus Hobbes prepared the way for the reception into the law of nations of the theory of natural equality. With him the premises were complete. It remained for
another to formulate the obvious conclusion that states are
equal by the law and right of nature.

petudie.

'Dominion, XIV, 4, in English Works, II, 186. See also Leviathan, Pt. II, ch. 30,

PUFENDORF AND THE NATURALISTS

p. 257. The passage quoted from the essay on dominion is the one that is cited as

De cive, XIV, 4, by all the naturalists from Pufendorf on: "Rursus naturalis

dividi potest, in naturalem hominum, quae sola obtinuit dici lex natura, et natu-

ralem civitatum, quae dici potest lex Gentium, vulgo autem jus Gentium appellatur.

The work of Hobbes placed him at once among the foremost political thinkers. His theories became the center of

Praecepta utriusque eadem sunt: sed quia civitates semel institutae induunt pro-

prietates hominum personales, lex quam loquentes de hominum singulorum officio,

naturalem dicimus, applicata totis civitatibus, nationibus, sive gentibus, vocatur

jus Gentium. Et quae Legis et juris naturalis Elementa hactenus tradita sunt,

translata ad civitates et gentes integras, pro legum et juris Gentium Elementis sumi

possunt."

1

2

Dominion, XIV, 4, in English Works, II, 186.
English Works, II, preface, p. xv; Dominion, XIII, 7, in English Works, II, p.

169. Ward says that Hobbes seems to have been the first to think of the state of
nature as the foundation of a system of law. La;;,· of Nations, I, 5. Figgis thinks that
there was much to be said for the idea that the state of international relations was
a state of nature in the days of Hobbes. Gerson to Grotitts, pp. 96, 114. Read what
l'abM de Saint-Pierre said in the preface to his L'abrr.ge du projet de paix perpet1ulle.
3 Dominion, XIV, 4, in English Works, II , 186. See also Leviathan, Pt. II, ch. 30,

p. 257. The passage quoted from the essay on dominion is the one that is cited as
De cive, XIV, 4, by all the naturalists from Pufendorf on: " Rursus nalllralis
dividi potest, in naturalem lwminum, quae sola obtinuit dici lex nat1ira, et naturalem civitatum, quae dici potest lex Geniium, vulgo autem jus Gentium appellatur.

Praecepta utriusque eadem sunt: sed quia civitates semel institutae induunt proprietates hominum pcrsonales, lex quam loquentes de hominum singulorum officio,
naJ1#Tolem dicimus, applicata totis civitatibus, nationibus, sive gentibus, vocatur
jus Gentittm. Et quae Legis el juris naturolis Elementa hactenus tradita sunt,
translata ad civitales el genies integras, pro leg um et j uris Gentium Elementis sumi
possunt."
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animated controversy as well as the source of enormous in-

fluence throughout western Europe. In 1658, Samuel von

Pufendorf spent eight months in a Danish prison, without

access to books, meditating on what he had read in Hobbes

and Grotius.1 Several years afterward he published a pon-

derous volume entitled De Jure Natures et Gentium,2 in which

he combined many of the theories of Hobbes with a large

part of the practical code elaborated by Grotius.3 Where

Grotius had united the inductive and the deductive methods

to produce a practical system leavened with a rational ideal-

ism, Pufendorf constantly subordinated the actual state of

international relations to a priori assumptions and unreal

conclusions. In an interesting comparison of the work of

the two publicists, Barbeyrac has pointed out that where

Grotius touched only incidentally upon such topics as natural

right, natural equality, and the state of nature, Pufendorf

devoted carefully planned chapters to these subjects, that

where Grotius used the natural law only to support his con-

clusions on particular questions, Pufendorf elaborated a
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complete system of the laws of nature.4 Where Pufendorf

1 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prff., § 30.

* Pufendorf lived 1632-1694. His Dejure natural et gentium was first published

in 1672. Materials for what follows have been taken from the Amsterdam edition

of 1704, Barbeyrac's French translation, and the English translation by Basil

Kennett. An abridged edition, entitled De officiis hominis et civis juxta legem

naturalem, appeared in 1673. See Avril, in Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 331-383;

Franck, Réformateurs, pp. 333-343; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Great

Jurists, pp. 30S-344-

* Avril says: "Son maltre de philosophic avec lequel il ne reste pas toujours

en parfaite communion, ce fut Hobbes. Son maltre pour la jurisprudence ne fut

autre que Grotius." Pillet, Les fondateurs, p. 378. According to Dunning, " Pufen-

dorf's system reveals most distinctly the influence of his two great predecessors,

animated controversy as well as the source of enormous influence throughout western Europe. In 1658, Samuel von
Pufendorf spent eight months in a Danish prison, without
access to books, meditating on what he had read in Hobbes
and Grotius. 1 Several years afterward he published a ponderous volume entitled De Jure Natur~ et Gentium,2 in which
he combined many of the theories of Hobbes with a large
part of the practical code elaborated by Grotius. 3 Where
Grotius had united the inductive and the deductive methods
to produce a practical system leavened with a rational idealism, Pufendorf constantly subordinated the actual state of
international relations to a priori assumptions and unreal
conclusions. In an interesting comparison of the work of
the two publicists, Barbeyrac has pointed out that where
Grotius touched only incidentally upon such topics as natural
right, natural equality, and the state of nature, Pufendorf
devoted carefully planned chapters to these subjects, that
where Grotius used the natural law only to support his conclusions on particular questions, Pufendorf elaborated a
complete system of the laws of nature.4 Where Pufendorf

and in general it may be said to be directed toward a conciliation of their conflict-

ing views. Where his philosophy is concerned with the concepts of ethics, he

clearly leans to the principles of Grotius; where he takes up more purely political

topics, the Hobbesian doctrine assumes the more conspicuous place." Political

Theories from Luther to Montesquieu, p. 318. Hfi1y says: "Que fait-il? il mele

aux idees de Grotius quelques opinions de Hobbes, et e'est tout." &tude, p. 214.

* Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prfif., § 31. See extract from this section, supra,

Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, pref.,§ 30.
Pufendorf lived 1632-1694. His Dejure natur~ et gemium was first published
in 1672. Materials for what follows have been taken from the Amsterdam edition
of 1704, Barbeyrac's French translation, and the English translation by Basil
Kennett. An abridged edition, entitled De offeciis lwminis el civis juxta legem
naJuralem, appeared in 1673. See Avril, in Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 331-383;
Franck, Riformateurs, pp. 333-343; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Gre<U
Jurists, pp. 305-344.
1 Avril says: "Son mattre de philosophie avec lequel il ne reste pas toujours
en parfaite communion, ce fut Hobbes. Son mattre pour la jurisprudence ne fut
autre que Grotius." Pillet, Les fondateurs, p. 378. According to Dunning," Pufendorf's system reveals most distinctly the influence of his two great predecessors,
and in general it may be said to be directed toward a conciliation of their conflicting views. Where his philosophy is concerned with the concepts of ethics, he
clearly leans to the principles of Grotius; where he takes up more purely political
topics, the Hobbesian doctrine assumes the more conspicuous place." Political
Theories from LuJ/ra to Monksquuu, p. 318. Hely says: "Que fait-il? il m!le
aux idees de Grotius quelqucs opinions de Hobbes, et c'est tout." ~fMk, p. 214.
4 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, pref., § 31. See extract from this section, suf>ra,
1

t

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE

THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLE

77

77

differed from Grotius his opinion was usually traceable to

the influence of Hobbes.

An important part of De Jure Natures et Gentium was de-

voted to a detailed exposition of the law of nature. Pufendorf

rejected Grotius' definition of law, and followed Hobbes in

defining it as the injunction or command "by which a sov-

ereign obliges a subject to conform his actions to what he

prescribes." 1 His classification of law as either divine or

human with reference to its source, and natural or positive

with reference to its subject-matter,2 was also borrowed from

Hobbes. Pufendorf rejected Grotius' definition of natural

law as only leading around in an inconclusive circle* He

defined it himself as that universal and perpetual law which

is deliberately ordained by the will of God, is "so exactly

congruous with the rational and social nature of man that

human kind can not maintain an honest and peaceful society

without it," and is capable of being discovered by unper-

verted human reason.4

The state of nature was the starting-point for an impor-
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tant part of Pufendorf's theory. He used the notion in two

senses; the first analytical, indicating " such a state as we

may conceive man to be placed in by his bare nativity, when

abstraction is made of all the rules and institutions, either of

human invention, or of the suggestion and revelation of

Heaven ";6 the second historical, as describing an actual

p. 43. It is sometimes said that Pufendorf was to Grotius what the systematizer

is to the inventor, what, for illustration, Wolff was to Leibnitz in the domain of

international law. See Franck, Rtformateurs, p. 336; Phillipson, in Macdonell

and Manson, Great Jurists, p. 315. The comparison seems misleading, however, in

view of the fundamental difference between their theories of international relations

and the law of nations. See Wildman, Institutes, I, 22-29.

1 I, 2, 6; I, 6,1-4; I, 6,14. * I, 6,18.

* II, 3, 4. Barbeyrac thought the difference between their definitions one of

words only, and that both traced natural law ultimately to the will of God. See

his notes to this section in his translation of Pufendorf.

4 I, 6,13 and 18; II, 3, where the definition is developed in great detail.

• n, 2,1.

differed from Grotius his opinion was usually traceable to
the influence of Hobbes.
An important part of De Jure Natur~ et Gentium was devoted to a detailed exposition of the law of nature. Pufendorf
rejected Grotius' definition of law, and followed Hobbes in
defining it as the injunction or command " by which a sovereign obliges a subject to conform his actions to what he
prescribes." 1 His classification of law as either divine or
human with reference to its source, and natural or positive
with reference to its subject-matter,2 was also borrowed from
Hobbes. Pufendorf rejected Grotius' definition of natural
law as only leading around in an inconclusive circle.3 He
defined it himself as that universal and perpetual law which
is deliberately ordained by the will of God, is " so exactly
congruous with the rational and social nature of man that
human kind can not maintain an honest and peaceful society
without it," and is capable of being discovered by unperverted human reason. 4
The state of nature was the starting-point for an important part of Pufendorf's theory. He used the notion in two
senses; the first analytical, indicating "such a state as we
may conceive man to be placed in by his bare nativity, when
abstraction is made of all the rules and institutions, either of
human invention, or of the suggestion and revelation of
Heaven "; 6 the second historical, as describing an actual
p. 43. It is sometimes said that Pufendorf was to Grotius what the systematizer
is to the inventor, what, for illustration, Wolff was to Leibnitz in the domain of
international law. See Franck, Rtformateurs, p. 336; Phillipson, in Macdonell
and Manson, Great Jurists, p. 315. The comparison seems misleading, however, in
view of the fundamental difference between their theories of international relations
and the law of ne.tions. See Wildman, Institutes, I, n-29.
2 I, 6, 18.
1 I, 2, 6; I, 6, 1-4; I, 6, 14.
1 II, 31 4. Barbeyrac thought the difference between their definitions one of
words only, and that both traced natural law ultimately to the will of God. See
his notes to this section in his translation of Pufendorf.
• I, 6, 13 and 18; II, 31 where the definition is developed in great detail.
• II, 2, I.
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condition which had prevailed at some time among each of

the various races of men.1 In either case, he understood by

the state of nature a condition characterized by the absence

of common political organization, a certain community of

goods, and a perfect equality of natural rights.2 Of equality

in the natural state he said:

And in this respect likewise, the state we are treating of has ob-

tained the name of natural liberty; inasmuch as, antecedent to all

human pact and deed, every man is conceived to be perfectly in his

condition which had prevailed at some time among each of
the various races of men.1 In either case, he understood by
the state of nature a condition characterized by the absence
of common political organization, a certain community of
goods, and a perfect equality of natural rights.2 Of equality
in the natural state he said:

own power and disposal, and not to be controlled by the pleasure or

authority of any other. On which account, too, every man may be

thus acknowledged equal to every man, since all subjection and all

command are equally banished on both sides.3

No man could presume to give sentence in his own contro-

versy rt because of that equality which is essential to the state

of nature."4 Contrary to Hobbes' opinion, Pufendorf held

that the state of nature was normally one of peace, since men

were rational beings from the beginning, and since the dic-

tates of reason guided them before as well as after the for-

And in this respect likewise, the state we are treating of has obtained the name of natural liberty; inasmuch as, antecedent to all
human pact and deed, every man is conceived to be perfectly in his
own power and disposal, and not to be controlled by the pleasure or
authority of any other. On which account, too, every man may be
thus acknowledged equal to every man, since all subjection and all
command are equally banished on both sides.3
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mation of political societies.6 So he could argue that the law

of nature prevailed in the natural state, operating to make

men keep their covenants and observe the rights of others.

Aristotle's dogma of inequality was refuted by Pufendorf,

who asserted the natural equality of men 6 in no uncertain

terms:

Since then human nature agrees equally to all persons, and since no

one can live a sociable life with another, who does not own and re-

spect him as a man; it follows as a command of the law of nature,

1 I, 1, 7; n, 2, 4; VII, 1, 7; VII, 2, 2x.

» I, 1, 7 and 16; n, 2; IV, 4, S; V, 13, 2. m

'II, 2, 3 (Kennett's transl. somewhat revised).

* V, 13, 2. "Nam si vel maxime cupiat, idque vel juratus protestetur, se

pronunciaturum, quod sibi justum fuerit visum: cum tamen alter pari dignatione

suam sententiam aestimare queat, ubi eas contingat discrepare, propter aequali-

tatem, status naturalis comitem, nihil age tux."

* n, 2,9; vii, 6,2. • in, 2.

No man could presume to give sentence in his own controversy'' because of that equality which is essential to the state
of nature." 4 Contrary to Hobbes' opinion, Pufendorf held
that the state of nature was normally one of peace, since men
were rational beings from the beginning, and since the dictates of reason guided them before as well as after the formation of political societies. 6 So he could argue that the law
of nature prevailed in the natural state, operating to make
men keep their covenants and observe the rights of others.
Aristotle's dogma of inequality was refuted by Pufendorf,
who asserted the natural equality of men 6 in no uncertain
terms:
Since then human nature agrees equally to all persons, and since no
one can live a sociable life with another, who does not own and respect him as a man; it follows as a command of the law of nature,
1

I,

1,

7; II,

2,

4; VII,

I,

7; VII,

2, 21.

2 I, 1, 7 and 16; II, 2; IV, 4, 5; V, 13, 2.
3 II, 2, 3 (Kennett's transl. somewhat revised).
• V, 13, 2. "Nam si vel maxime cupiat, idque vel juratus protestetur, se
pronunciaturum, quod sibi justum fuerit visum: cum tamen alter pari dignatione
suam sententiam restimare queat, ubi eas contingat discrepare, propter requalitatem, status naturalis comitem, nihil agetur."
6 II, 2 1 9; VII, 6, 2.
1 III, 2.
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that every man should esteem and treat another as one who is natu-

rally his equal, or who is a man as well as he. . . .

... For as in well-order'd commonwealths, one subject may exceed

another in riches, or in honour, but all are equal sharers in the com-

mon liberty; so under this regulation of nature, how much soever a

man may surpass his neighbors, as to bodily or intellectual endow-

ments, he is still obliged to pay all natural duties, as readily and as fully

as he expects to receive them; nor do those advantages give him the

least power or privilege to oppress his fellows. Nor, on the other side,

does the bare unkindness of nature, or of fortune, set a man in a worse

condition than others, as to the enjoyment of common rights. . . .

And this equality we may call an equality of right; the principle

from which it springs is this, that the obligation to a social life equally

binds all men, inasmuch as it is the inseparable companion of human

nature, considered simply as such.1

Hobbes' anthropomorphic description of the state reap-

peared in Pufendorf;2 and the notion which it represented

had an important influence on the latter's theory of the law

of nations. His definition of the state was obviously due to
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the influence of Hobbes:

It is a compound moral person, whose will, united and tied together

that every man should esteem and treat another as one who is naturally his equal, or who is a man as well as he....
. . . For as in well-order'd commonwealths, one subject may exceed
another in riches, or in honour, but all are equal sharers in the common liberty; so under this regulation of nature, how much soever a
man may surpass his neighbors, as to bodily or intellectual endowments, he is still obliged to pay all natural duties, as readily and as fully
as he expects to receive them; nor do those advantages give him the
least power or privilege to oppress his fellows. Nor, on the other side,
does the bare unkindness of nature, or of fortune, set a man in a worse
condition than others, as to the enjoyment of common rights....
And this equality we may call an equality of right; the principle
from which it springs is this, that the obligation to a social life equally
binds all men, inasmuch as it is the inseparable companion of human
nature, considered simply as such. 1

by those covenants which before passed among the multitude, is

deemed the will of all; to the end, that it may use and apply the

strength and riches of private persons towards maintaining the com-

mon peace and security.3

On the other hand, he took his theory of sovereignty from

Grotius.4 This circumstance seems to have been overlooked

by those who have attributed the origin of the principle of

state equality to the idea of unlimited sovereignty developed

by Bodin and Hobbes. Limitation was entirely compatible

Hobbes' anthropomorphic description of the state reappeared in Pufendorf; 2 and the notion which it represented
had an important influence on the latter's theory of the law
of nations. His definition of the state was obviously due to
the influence of Hobbes:

with Pufendorf's understanding of sovereignty. His sover-

1 Extracts from III, 2,1-2 (Kennett's transl.).

* VII, 2,13.

* VII, 2,13 (Kennett's transl.). Cf. Hobbes, Dominion, V, 9, in English Works,

H, 69.

* VII, 2-9.

It is a compound moral person, whose will, united and tied together
by those covenants which before passed among the multitude, is
deemed the will of all; to the end, that it may use and apply the
strength and riches of private persons towards maintaining the common peace and security.3

On the other hand, he took his theory of sovereignty from
Grotius. 4 This circumstance seems to have been overlooked
by those who have attributed the origin of the principle of
state equality to the idea of unlimited sovereignty developed
by Bodin and Hobbes. Limitation was entirely compatible
with Pufendorf's understanding of sovereignty. His soverExtracts from III, 2, 1-2 (Kennett's transl.).
' VII, 2, 13.
• VII, 2, 13 (Kennett's transl.). Cf. Hobbes, Domini<m, V, 9, in English Works,
1

11, 6<).
4 VII, 2-iJ.
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eign was supreme but not absolute; he followed Grotius in

recognizing that external sovereignty might be diminished

by compact, or as a result of conquest, without being ex-

tinguished.1 He derived the idea that states are equal from

other sources.

Thus Pufendorf accepted and developed in greater detail

certain of the most important, so far as the law of nations

was concerned, of the Hobbesian premises. The principle of

state equality was the inevitable conclusion. He defined

the state as "a compound moral person," and asserted an

absolute parity between the state as an artificial person and

the natural man.2 Thus he was enabled to assimilate the

rights and obligations of states to those of natural persons,

a point of vast importance to a philosopher who cared more

about systematic perfection than about the realities of inter-

national relationships. The opinion of Hobbes that the law

of nature and the law of nations were the same thing was ac-

cepted without qualification:

This opinion we, for our part, readily subscribe to: nor do we con-

ceive that there is any other voluntary or positive law of nations,
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properly invested with a true and legal force, and obliging as the ordi-

nance of a superior power.3

Pufendorf subscribed just as readily to the further opinion

of Hobbes that separate states, having no common political

superior, stood to each other in the same mutual relation as

men in the state of nature.4

1 viii, 9,4.

1 II, 3, 23. Cf. Mackintosh, Discourse, p. 44; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. 4;

Westlake, Colltckd Papers, p. 65.

* II, 3, 23 (Kennett's transl.).

* II, 2, 1; II, 2, 4; II, 2, 11; VII, 1, 8; VIII, 4, 17-18; VIII, 6, 1; VIII, 10,

2. See Ward, Law of Nations, I, 4 ff.; Westlake, Collected Papers, p. 11. Of the

theory of a state of nature, and its application to international relations, Ward

remarks: "This Theory, though often started, and beautifully amplified by the

ancient Poets, seems first to have been thought of as the foundation of a system of

Law, by Bobbs, in his famous Book called the Leviathan, in which there is so much
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Thus of old, when mankind was divided into distinct families, and

now since they are fallen into separate communities, those might have

been then, and may now be said to live mutually in a state of nature,

neither of whom obey the others, and who do not acknowledge any

common master among men. ... So that commonwealths, and the

governors thereof may fairly declare themselves to be in a state of

natural liberty, while they are furnished with sufficient strength to

secure the exercise of that grand privilege.1

Finally, he deduced the conclusion from these premises

that states are naturally equal.2 He could see no virtue in

a league to enforce universal peace:

For by such a league or bond, nothing is superadded to the obliga-

tion of the law of nature;. . . For we suppose both parties to remain

in a natural equality, and consequently not to be held to their cove-

nant by any other tie, than that of reverence towards God Almighty,

and fear of such evil as may fall on them, if they break the agree-

Thus of old, when mankind was divided into distinct families, and
now since they are fallen into separate communities, those might havebeen then, and may now be said to live mutually in a state of nature,
neither of whom obey the others, and who do not acknowledge any
common master among men. . . . So that commonwealths, and the
governors thereof may fairly declare themselves to be in a state of
natural liberty, while they are furnished with sufficient strength to
secure the exercise of that grand privilege.1

Finally, he deduced the conclusion from these premises
that states are naturally equal. 2 He could see no virtue in
a league to enforce universal peace:

ment.3

It was evident enough to Pufendorf that states qua invicem

in statu naturali vivunt must have equal rights. He rejected
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as specious the common stock of arguments in favor of pre-

cedence, such as antiquity, the extent, riches and power of

dominion, the quality of the sovereign power, the magnifi-

cence of titles, and the like. Antiquity could not produce a

perfect right for " all kingdoms are by their own nature free

and independent."4 Neither could unlimited sovereign

For by such a league or bond, nothing is superadded to the obligation of the law of nature; ... For we suppose both parties to remain
in a natural equality, and consequently not to be held to their covenant by any other tie, than that of reverence towards God Almighty,
and fear of such evil as may fall on them, if they break the agreement.3

power have such an effect, because sovereign princes

must look upon another prince's absolute power, as it relates to them,

to be no more than liberty of nature, which in itself gives no man pre-

eminence to another not subject to him.6

to admire, and so much to condemn. — It was adopted, and considerably en-

larged by Pufendorf, and instantly approved of by writers without number."

1 II, 2, 4 (Kennett's transl. somewhat revised).

» n, 2, 4; n, 2, iij v, 13,7; vni, 4, 1S-18; vm, 4,22; vin, 6,10 and i4.

* II, 2, 11 (Kennett's transl.). The words quoted applied to natural persons,

but Pufendorf held the same doctrine applicable to separate states.

* VIII, 4, 17.

* Vm, 4, 19 (Kennett's transl.).

It was evident enough to Pufendorf that states qufE invicem
in statu naturali vivunt must have equal rights. He rejected
as specious the common stock of arguments in favor of precedence, such as antiquity, the extent, riches and power of
dominion, the quality of the sovereign power, the magnificence of titles, and the like. Antiquity could not produce a
perfect right for " all kingdoms are by their own nature free
and independent." 4 Neither could unlimited sovereign
power have such an effect, because sovereign princes
must look upon another prince's absolute power, as it relates to them,
to be no more than liberty of nature, which in itself gives no man preeminence to another not subject to him. 6
to admire, and so much to condemn. - It was adopted, and considerably enlarged by Pufendorf, and instantly approved of by writers without number."
1 II, 2, 4 (Kennett's transl. somewhat revised).
2 II, 2, 4; II, 2, n; V, 13, 7; VIII, 4, 15-18; VIII, 4, 22; VIII, 6, 10 and 14.
1 II, 2, II (Kennett's transl.). The words quoted applied to natural persons,
but Pu£endorf held the same doctrine applicable to separate states.
' VIII, 4, 17.
1 VIII, 4, 19 (Kennett's transl.).
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Claims to precedence based upon superiority in wealth or

power were also rejected:

For where liberty is equal, a disproportion in wealth can make no

difference. And therefore, if one prince's territories be six hundred

miles in extent, and another's but one hundred, yet the difference in

the kingdoms makes none between the sovereigns; for their power is

of the same nature in the greater and in the less; and the one may

answer the ends of government as well as the other.1

Pufendorf suggested that in order to solve the problem of

precedence inter plures cequales, members might take then-

places in a common assembly in the order in which they were

admitted.2

Claims to precedence based upon superiority in wealth or
power were also rejected:
For where liberty is equal, a disproportion in wealth can make no
difference. And therefore, if one prince's territories be six hundred
miles in extent, and another's but one hundred, yet the difference in
the kingdoms makes none between the sovereigns; for their power is
of the same nature in the greater and in the less; and the one may
answer the ends of government as well as the other. 1

Thus for the first time the principle of state equality was

expressly derived from the application of familiar theories of

natural law, the state of nature, and natural equality to sepa-

rate states, and was stated with some approach to precision.

The writings of Pufendorf enjoyed an immense success. For

nearly a century a majority of the continental writers on

the law of nature and of nations acknowledged his leader-
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ship. Through the influence of Pufendorf and his successors

among the naturalists the natural equality of states became

an established principle of international law.

Pufendorf lived to see his theory of the law of nations

accepted and proclaimed by a group of distinguished teachers

and jurists, among whom no one was more illustrious than

the great German jurist and philosopher, Christian Thoma-

sius.3 According to Thomasius, the law of nations was simply

1 VIII, 4, 18 (Kennett's transl.). "Libertas quippe in aequo posita est, quae

magnitudine opum hautquidquam distinguitur. Pateat igitur unius imperium per

sexcenta milliaria, alterius per centum duntaxat. Idem tamen imperium hie in

modica sua, quam alter in laxiore ditione obtinet: neque hie minus, quam alter

finem dvitatum institutarum assequitur."

» VIII, 4, 22.

1 Thomasius lived 1655-1728. His InstUutionum jurisprudents divines libri

ires, in quibus fundamenta juris naturalis secundum hypotheses illustris Pufendorffii

perspicue demonstrantur, etc., was first published in Latin in 1688, while Thomasius

was still professor of natural law at Leipzig. References are to the third Latin

Pufendorf suggested that in order to solve the problem of
precedence inter plures requales, members might take their
places in a common assembly in the order in which they were
admitted. 2
Thus for the first time the principle of state equality was
expressly derived from the application of familiar theories of
natural law, the state of nature, and natural equality to separate states, and was stated with some approach to precision.
The writings of Pufendorf enjoyed an immense success. For
nearly a century a majority of the continental writers on
the law of nature and of nations acknowledged his leadership. Through the influence of Pufendorf and his successors
among the naturalists the natural equality of states became
an established principle of international law.
Pufendorf lived to see his theory of the law of nations
accepted and proclaimed by a group of distinguished teachers
and jurists, among whom no one was more illustrious than
the great German jurist and philosopher, Christian Thomasius.3 According to Thomasius, the law of nations was simply
1 VIII, 4, 18 (Kennett's transl.). "Libertas quippe in requo posita est, qure
magnitudine opum hautquidquam distinguitur. Pateat igitur unius imperiwn per
sexcenta milliaria, alterius per centum duntaxat. Idem tamen imperium hie in
modica sua, quam alter in laxiore ditione obtinet: neque hie minus, quam alter
finem civitatum institutarum assequitur."
2 VIII, 4, 22.
1 Thomasius lived 1655-1728. His Inslituti-onum jurispriuJcntia divin<e libri

Ires, in quibus f1mdame11ta jl4ris naluralis secund"m hypotheses illustris Pufendorffii.
perspicue demcnstranl1lr, etc., was first published in Latin in 1688, while Thomasius

was still professor of natural law at Leipzig. References are to the third Latin
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the natural law applied to separate states in a condition of

natural equality with reference to one another.1 He con-

ceived of the societas inter gentes as a state of nature,2 and

denied the possibility of a positive law of nations among

equals:

If you will notice, you may answer easily those who, with Grotius,

regard Jus Gentium as a kind of voluntary and indeed of human

law. . . .

In brief, this is the answer: nations are equal among themselves;

neither do they recognize a superior among men. Therefore, they

cannot be bound by human law.3

Early in the eighteenth century the De Jure Naturce et

Gentium of Pufendorf and the De Jure Belli ac Paris of Gro-

tius were done into French with copious notes and a multi-

tude of cross-references by Jean Barbeyrac.4 The notes of

edition of 1702. See Franck, Rtformateurs, pp. 344-354; White, Seven Great

Statesmen, pp. 113-161.

1 "Potent lex Naturalis non incommode dividi intuitu societatum humanarum

naturalium. Nam alia praecepta ejus dirigunt societatem communem omnium
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hominum viventium inter se in statu naturali, seu ut supra diximus, in statu

sequalitatis, que hodii introductis rebuspublicis dicitur societas Gentium, alia diri-

gunt officia hominum viventium in civitate & societatibus sub civitate comprehensis,

puta domesticis.

"Illud comuniter appellari solet Jus Gentium. Posses aded hoc distinctionis

gratia nominare Jus Naturale stride dictum." I, 2, 101-102.

* III, 1, 49. "Neque convenienter locutos esse opinamur, qui hanc gentium

societatem nomine universalis Reip. omnium hominum insigniverunt. Non est

Resp. sine imperio, at Societas Gentium imperio caret humano, & sola inter natu-

rales in statu post lapsum tequalis est." HI, i, 52.

* "Facile autem patet, in controversia: Utrum jus Gentium sit species Juris

divini, an humani? ultimum significatum attendi debere. Quod si observaveris,

facile poteris respondere iig, qui cum Grotio Jus Gentium speciem juris voluntarii &

quidem humani fadunt. Illi enim vel mores Gentium, vel jus pro attributo per-

sonae sumtum inculcant.

"Summa ed redit: Gentes inter se pares sunt, nec inter homines superiorem

agnoscunt. Ergo lege humana obligari nequeunt." I, 2, 104-105.

4 Barbeyrac lived 1674-1744. His translation of Pufendorf appeared in 1706-

1708 while he was professor of belles-lettres at the French school of Berlin, and of

Grotius in 1719, after he became professor of public law at Groningen. References

to the two translations are in each case to editions published at Leyden in 1759.

Although he wrote no treatise on the law of nations, the salient features of his

system may be constructed from the notes to the above translations.

the natural law applied to separate states in a condition of
natural equality with reference to one another. 1 He conceived of the societas inter genies as a state of nature,2 and
denied the possibility of a positive law of nations among
equals:
If you will notice, you may answer easily those who, with Grotius,
regard Jus Gentium as a kind of voluntary and indeed of human

law. . . .
In brief, this is the answer: nations are equal among themselves;
neither do they recognize a superior among men. Therefore, they
cannot be bound by human law.3

Early in the eighteenth century the De Jure Natur~ et
Gentium of Pufendorf and the De Jure Belli ac Pacis of Grotius were done into French with copious notes and a multitude of cross-references by Jean Barbeyrac.4 The notes of
edition of 1702.
See Franck, Rtformalcurs, pp. 344-354; White, Seve.n Great
Statesmen, pp. 113-16r.
1 " Poterit kx N aturalis non incommode dividi intuitu societatum humanarum
naturalium. Nam alia praecepta ejus dirigunt societatem ctmtm1mem omnium
hominum viventium inter se in statu naturali, seu ut supra diximus, in statu
1equalitatis, quie hodie introductis rebuspublicis dicitur societas Gentium, alia dirigunt officia hominum viventium in civitate & societatibus sub civitate comprehensis,
puta domesticis.
"Illud comuniter appellari solet Jus Gentillm. Posses adeo hoc distinctionis
gratia norninare Jus Na111rale stricte dictum." I, 2, 101-102.
1 III, 1, 49. " Neque convenienter locutos esse opinamur, qui hanc gentium
societatem nomine uniflersalis Reip. omnium hominum insigniverunt. Non est
Resp. sine imperio, at Societas Gentium imperio caret humano, & sola inter naturales in statu post lapsum o:qualis est." III, 1, 52.
i "Facile autem patet, in controversiA:
Utrum j11s Genti11m sit species Juris
di11ini, an humani 'I ultimum significatum attendi debere. Quod si observaveris,
facile poteris respondere iis, qui cum Grotio Jus Gentium specum j1tris 11oluntarii &
quidem humani faciunt. Illi enim vel mores Gentium, vel jus pro attributo personae sumtum inculcant.
"Summa e0 redit: Gentes inter se pares sunt, nee inter homines superiorem
agnoscunt. Ergo lege human! obligari nequeunt." I, 2, 104-105.
4 Barbeyrac lived 1674-1744. His translation of Pufendorf appeared in 17o617o8 while he was professor of belles-lettres at the French school of Berlin, and of
Grotius in 1719, after he became professor of public law at Groningen. References
to the two translations are in each case to editions published at Leyden in 1759.
Although he wrote no treatise on the law of nations, the salient features of his
system may be constructed from the notes to the above translations.

THE F.QUALITY OF STATES
84

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

Barbeyrac were soon rendered into English and appended

to contemporary English editions of the two great classics.

His translations were widely read, and it not infrequently

happened that the reader was influenced full as much by the

editor's notes as by the text itself. Now Barbeyrac was a

thoroughgoing naturalist, as might be inferred from his

frankly expressed preference for Pufendorf.1 His translations

with the notes undoubtedly did much to discredit tempora-

rily certain of the leading principles of Grotius and to spread

the theories of Hobbes and Pufendorf.

Barbeyrac rejected Grotius' definition of law as " a rule of

moral acts obliging to what is right " because it seemed to

insinuate " that the law obliges by itself, and merely as it is

a law, whereas all laws derive their power of obliging from a

superior who makes them."2 Accordingly, in true Hobbesian

fashion, he denied all binding force to the law of nature inde-

pendent of the will of God.3 He held the common naturalist

doctrines with reference to the state of nature 4 and natural

equality,6 and assumed that these theories were as applicable
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to states as to individuals.6

Applying the naturalist philosophy to international rela-

tions, Barbeyrac denounced Grotius' distinction between the

law of nations and the law of nature as une pure chimere.1

1 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prfif., § 31. 1 Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 9, note 3.

* Ibid., I, 1, 10, note 4.

* Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 2, notes; IV, 4, 1, note 2; Barbeyrac's Grotius,

II, 2, 2, notes.

* Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, III, 2, notes; Barbeyrac's Grotius, Proleg. 8, note 1.

* Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, III, 2, 9, note 1; VIII, 4, 1, note 1; Barbeyrac's Gro-

tius, I, 1, 14, note 3; III, 2, 2, note 1. It is significant, as showing the true origin

of the idea of state equality, that Barbeyrac's conception of sovereignty was similar

to that of Grotius and Pufendorf.

7 Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3. See also Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, prfif.,

§ 31, quoted supra, p. 44, note 5. Barbeyrac anticipated Wolff in pointing out a

difference in the mode of applying natural law to natural persons and to states.

Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3. He contended that jus naturale and jus

gentium with the Romans were practically identical. Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II,

Barbeyrac were soon rendered into English and appended
to contemporary English editions of the two great classics.
His translations were widely read, and it not infrequently
happened that the reader was influenced full as much by the
editor's notes as by the text itself. Now Barbeyrac was a
thoroughgoing naturalist, as might be inferred from his
frankly expressed preference for Pufendorf.1 His translations
with the notes undoubtedly did much to discredit temporarily certain of the leading principles of Grotius and to spread
the theories of Hobbes and Pufendorf.
Barbeyrac rejected Grotius' definition of law as " a rule of
moral acts obliging to what is right " because it seemed to
insinuate " that the law obliges by itself, and merely as it is
a law, whereas all laws derive their power of obliging from a
superior who makes them.'' 2 Accordingly, in true Hobbesian
fashion, he denied all binding force to the law of nature independent of the will of God.3 He held the common naturalist
doctrines with reference to the state of nature 4 and natural
equality, 5 and assumed that these theories were as applicable
to states as to individuals. 6
Applying the naturalist philosophy to international relations, Barbeyrac denounced Grotius' distinction between the
law of nations and the law of nature as une pure chimere. 1

3, 23, note 3; Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, 1, notes 1 and 4.

2 Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 9, note 3.
Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, pref.,§ 31.
Ibid., I, l, lo, note 4.
4 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 2, notes; IV, 4, l, note 2; Barbeyrac's Grotius,
II, 2, 2, notes.
6 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, III, 2, notes; Barbeyrac's Grotius, Proleg. 8, note 1.
8 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, III, 2, 9, note I; VIII, 4, 1, note 1; Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, l, 14, note 3; Ill, 2, 2, note 1. It is significant, as showing the true origin
of the idea of state equality, that Barbeyrac's conception of sovereignty was similar
to that of Grotius and Pufendorf.
7 Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 24, note 3. See also Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, pr~f.,
§ 31, quoted supra, p. 44, note 5. Barbeyrac anticipated Wolff in pointing out a
difference in the mode of applying natural law to natural persons and to states.
Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3. He contended that jus naturale and jus
genlium with the Romans were practically identical. Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II,
3, 23, note 3; Barbeyrac's Grotius, II, 8, 1, notes 1 and 4.
l
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He argued that custom simply created a presumption that it

would be followed unless notice were given to the contrary.1

Custom could not create true law among equals.2 Since na-

tions were in a state of nature with reference to one another,

they must be in a state of natural equality:

Nations are obliged the more to respect one another as equals be-

cause they are always in a state of natural liberty, and consequently

in a perfect equality of right toward one another.*

He argued that custom simply created a presumption that it
would be followed unless notice were given to the contrary. 1
Custom could not create true law among equals. 2 Since nations were in a state of nature with reference to one another,
they must be in a state of natural equality:

The natural equality of states found expression in Eng-

land later in the century in the Institutes of Natural Law of

Thomas Rutherforth, a professor of divinity at Cambridge

University.4 The Institutes purported to represent the sub-

stance of a course of lectures on the De Jure Belli ac Paris

Nations are obliged the more to respect one another as equals because they are always in a state of natural liberty, and consequently
in a perfect equality of right toward one another.3

of Grotius. However, Rutherforth denied the existence of

such a positive law of nations as that of which Grotius had

conceived. He justified the classification of international

law as positive law only on the ground that an element of

consent giving it a positive character could be found in the

universal agreement of all nations to recognize the state-
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1 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, note 2; Barbeyrac's Grotius, 1,1,14, note 3;

II, 18, 1, note 1; III, 4, 15, note 1; III, 7, 1, note 2. Thus a sovereign on receiv-

ing an embassy might be presumed to submit to established customs unless he ex-

pressly declared to the contrary. Similarly, at the outbreak of war a belligerent

was presumed to abide by the custom which forbade killing enemies by poison,

unless it reserved its liberty and left the other belligerent free to use like means of

destruction. The argument was carried to an absurd extreme where he contended,

with regard to the custom of enslaving prisoners of war, that the prisoner might

declare that he would not be enslaved, thus saving his right and forfeiting his life.

1 " Mais les Peuples fitant tous naturellement egaux les uns aux autres, quand

meme ils s'accorderoient tous, exceptfi un seul, a eiablir certaines Regies, celui-ci,

quoiqu' unique, pourroit refuser de s'y soumettre." Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3,

The natural equality of states found expression in England later in the century in the Institutes of Natura/, Law of
Thomas Rutherforth, a professor of divinity at Cambridge
University.4 The Institutes purported to represent the substance of a course of lectures on the De Jure Belli ac Pacis
of Grotius. However, Rutherforth denied the existence of
such a positive law of nations as that of which Grotius had
conceived. He justified the classification of international
law as positive law only on the ground that an element of
consent giving it a positive character could be found in the
universal agreement of all nations to recognize the state-

23, note 2.

* "Les Peuples (auxquels on doit aussi appliquer les principes fitablis dans ce

Chapitre) sont d'autant plus obliges i se regarder les uns les autres comme egaux,

qu'ils sont toujours dans l'fitat de la Libertfi Naturelle, & par consequent dans une

parfaite egalitfi de droit les uns par rapport aux autres." Barbeyrac's Pufendorf,

III, 2, 9, note 1. The chapter referred to is Pufendorf's chapter on the natural

equality of men. See ibid., VIII, 4, 1, note x.

* Rutherforth lived 1712-1771. His Institutes was published in 1754-1756.

1 Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3, 23, note 2; Barbeyrac's Grotius, I, 1, 14, note 3;
II, 18, 1, note 1; III, 4, 15, note 1; III, 7, 1, note 2. Thus a sovereign on receiving an embassy might be presumed to submit to established customs unless he expressly declared to the contrary. Similarly, at the outbreak of war a belligerent
was presumed to abide by the custom which forbade killing enemies by poison,
unless it reserved its liberty and left the other belligerent free to use like means of
destruction. The argument was carried to an absurd extreme where he contended,
with regard to the custom of enslaving prisoners of war, that the prisoner might
declare that he would not be enslaved, thus saving his right and forfeiting his life.
2 " Mais les Peuples Ctant tous naturellement egaux !es uns aux autres, quand
meme ils s'accorderoient tous, exccpte un seul, a etablir certaines Regles, celui-ci,
quoiqu' unique, pourroit refuser de s'y soumettre." Barbeyrac's Pufendorf, II, 3,
23, note 2.
a " Les Peuples (auxquels on doit aussi appliquer les principcs etablis clans ce
Chapitre) sont d'autant plus obliges a se regarder lcs uns les autres comme egaux,
qu'ils sont toujours clans l'etat de la Liberte Naturelle, & par consequent dans une
parfaite egalite de droit Jes uns par rapport aux autres." Ilarbeyrac's Pufendorf,
III, 2, 9, note I. The chapter referred to is Pufendorf's chapter on the natural
equality of men. See ibid., VUI, 4 1 1, note I.
4 Rutherforth lived 1712-1771. His Institutes was published in 1754-1756.
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personality of each.1 This general agreement of mankind to

recognize states as collective moral persons was regarded as

the sole foundation for any distinction between the law of

nature and the law of nations. Rutherforth recognized

neither usage nor treaties as a source of positive international

law.2 The law of nations was positive only in the manner of

applying it. It was entirely natural in its subject matter:

But the law of nations is positive only in the manner of applying it,

and is natural as to its matter: it is the law of nature applied by posi-

tive consent, to the artificial persons of civil societies; and, conse-

quently, the dictates of it are only the dictates of right reason, and

personality of each.1 This general agreement of mankind to
recognize states as collective moral persons was regarded as
the sole foundation for any distinction between the law of
nature and the law of nations. Rutherforth recognized
neither usage nor treaties as a source of positive international
law.2 The law of nations was positive only in the manner of
applying it. It was entirely natural in its subject matter:

may be collected by arguing from the nature of things, and from the

condition and circumstances of mankind, when they are considered

as formed into such societies.3

The conclusion that states are naturally equal followed as a

matter of course. Indeed, said Rutherforth, if one under-

stands

what the law of nature is, when it is applied to individual persons in a

state of equality, he will seldom be at a loss to judge what it is, when
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he is to apply it to nations considered as collective persons in a like

state of equality.4

But the law of nations is positive only in the manner of applying it,
and is natural as to its matter: it is the law of nature applied by positive consent, to the artificial persons of civil societies; and, consequently, the dictates of it are only the dictates of right reason, and
may be collected by arguing from the nature of things, and from the
condition and circumstances of mankind, when they are considered
as formed into such societies.3

This process of reasoning, by which the principle of state

equality was derived from the application to separate states

1 H, 9, 1. 1 II, 9,2-4.

* II, 9, 5. Cf. the definition of Erskine in his Principles of the Law of Scotland.

I, 1, 3, also published for the first time in 1754: "The Law of Nations is also the

result of reason, and has God for its Author; but it supposes mankind formed into

several bodies politic or states; and it comprises all the duties which one state owes

to another. These must of necessity be similar to the duties arising between in-

dividuals, since both are dictated by reason, so that what is the law of nature when

applied to men, considered simply as such, is indeed the law of nations when ap-

plied to kingdoms or states." See also, Taylor, Summary of Roman Law, p. 53,

an abridgment of his Elements of Civil Law, first published in 175S; and Blackstone,

The conclusion that states are naturally equal followed as a
matter of course. Indeed, said Rutherforth, if one understands
what the law of nature is, when it is applied to individual persons in a
state of equality, he will seldom be at a loss to judge what it is, when
he is to apply it to nations considered as collective persons in a like
state of equality.•

Commentaries, Introd., pp. 30-43.

* II, 9, 5. "But since the law of nations is only the law of nature applied to the

collective persons of civil societies, and these collective persons are, in respect of

one another, in a state of natural equality; if we know what the law of nature

would determine in any case between individuals, the law of nations will, in like

circumstances, determine in the same manner between civil societies." II, 9, 7.

This process of reasoning, by which the principle of state
equality was derived from the application to separate states
II, 9, I.
I II, 9,2-4.
• II, 9, 5. Cf. the definition of Erskine in his Principles of the Law of Scotland.
I, 1, 3, also published for the first time in 1754: " The Law of Nations is also the
result of reason, and has God for its Author; but it supposes mankind formed into
several bodies politic or states; and it comprises all the duties which one state owes
to another. These must of necessity be similar to the duties arising between individuals, since both are dictated by reason, so that what is the law of nature when
applied to men, considered simply as such, is indeed the law of nations when applied to kingdoms or states." See also, Taylor, Summary of Roman Law, p. 53,
an abridgment of his Elements of Civil Law, first published in 1755; and Blackstone,
Commeniaries, Introd., pp. 3</43·
' II, 91 5. "But since the law of nations is only the law of nature applied to the
collective persons of civil societies, and these collective persons are, in respect of
one another, in a state of natural equality; if we know what the law of nature
would determine in any case between individuals, the law of nations will, in like
circumstances, determine in the same manner between civil societies." II, 9, 7.
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of the theories of natural law, the state of nature, and natural

equality, on an assumed analogy between states and natural

persons, was presented in a very lucid statement by Burla-

maqui, a celebrated Swiss publicist and teacher, who became

one of the most widely influential representatives of the

naturalist school in the eighteenth century.1 His statement

may be taken as an excellent summary of the whole case for

the naturalists' derivation of the natural equality of states:

Simple human society is of itself and with regard to those who com-

pose it a society of equality and independence. It is subject only to

God; no one has a natural and primitive right to command; but each

person may dispose of himself and of what he possesses as he thinks

proper, under the sole restriction that he keep within the bounds of

the natural law and do no wrong to others. ...

Every society is formed by the concurrence or union of the wills of

several persons with a view of acquiring some advantage. Hence it

is that societies are considered as bodies and that we give them the

name of moral persons, because these bodies are animated in effect by

a single will which regulates all their movements. This agrees par-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

ticularly with the body politic or state. The sovereign is the chief or

head, and the subjects the members; all their actions that have any

relation to the society are directed by the will of the chief. Where-1

fore as soon as states are formed they acquire in some manner personal

qualities, and we may consequently attribute to them in proportion

whatever agrees in particular with men, such as certain actions which

are suited to them, certain rights which pertain to them, certain duties

which they are bound to fulfil, etc. . . .

This being granted, the establishment of states introduces a kind ^

of society among them, similar to that which exists naturally among

men, and the same reasons which induce men to maintain union among

themselves ought also to persuade nations or their sovereigns to live

on good terms with one another.

It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some law among

nations to serve as a rule for mutual intercourse. Now this law can

be nothing else but the natural law itself, which is then called the right

or law of nations (droit des gens ouloides nations). Natural law, says

1 Burlamaqui lived 1694-1748. His Principes du droit naturel was published at

Geneva in 1747.

of the theories of natural law, the state of nature, and natural
equality, on an assumed analogy between states and natural
persons, was presented in a very lucid statement by Burlamaqui, a celebrated Swiss publicist and teacher, who became
one of the most widely influential representatives of the
naturalist school in the eighteenth century. 1 His statement
may be taken as an excellent summary of the whole case for
the naturalists' derivation of the natural equality of states:
Simple human society is of itself and with regard to those who compose it a society of equality and independence. It is subject only to
God; no one has a natural and primitive right to command; but each
person may dispose of himself and of what he possesses as he thinks
proper, under the sole restriction that he keep within the bounds of
the natural law and do no wrong to others....
Every society is formed by the concurrence or union of the wills of
several persons with a view of acquiring some advantage. Hence it
is that societies are considered as bodies and that we give them the
name of moral persons, because these bodies are animated in effect by
a single will which regulates all their movements. This agrees particularly with the body politic or state. The sovereign is the chief or
head, and the subjects the members; all their actions that have any
relation to the society are directed by the will of the chief. Where-I
fore as soon as states are formed they acquire in some manner personal
qualities, and we may consequently attribute to them in proportion
whatever agrees in particular with men, such as certain actions which
are suited to them, certain rights which pertain to them, certain duties
which they are bound to fulfil, etc. . . .
This being granted, the establishment of states introduces a kind \
of society among them, similar to that which exists naturally among
men, and the same reasons which induce men to maintain union among
themselves ought also to persuade nations or their sovereigns to live
on good terms with one another.
It is necessary, therefore, that there should be some law among
nations to serve as a rule for mutual intercourse. Now this law can
be nothing else but the natural law itself, which is then called the right
or law of nations (droit des gens ou loi des nations). Natural law, says
1 Burlamaqui lived 1694-1748. His Principes du droit naltirel was published at
Geneva in 1747·
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Hobbes very properly, is divided into the natural law of man and the

natural law of states, and the latter is what we call the law of nations.

Thus the natural law and the law of nations are in reality one and the

same thing,1 and differ only by an external denomination. It should

be said, therefore, that the law of nations, properly so called and con-

sidered as a law emanating from a superior, is nothing else than the

natural law itself applied, not to men regarded simply as such, but to

peoples or nations, to states or their chiefs, in the relations they have

together and in the interests they have to manage among themselves.

. . . But in order to say something more particular on this subject,

let us observe that the natural state of nations with regard to one an-

other is a state of social life and peace. This society is also one of

Hobbes very properly, is divided into the natural law of man and the
natural law of states, and the latter is what we call the law of nations.
Thus the natural law and the law of nations are in reality one and the
same thing, 1 and differ only by an external denomination. It should
be said, therefore, that the law of nations, properly so called and considered as a law emanating from a superior, is nothing else than the
natural law itself applied, not to men regarded simply as such, but to
peoples or nations, to states or their chiefs, in the relations they have
together and in the interests they have to manage among themselves .

equality and independence, which establishes an equality of right

among them, and pledges them to have the same regard and respect

for one another. Hence the general principle of the law of nations is

nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations

having intercourse with one another to the practice of the same duties

as those to which individuals are naturally subject.2 . . .

When Professor Felice published a new edition of Burla-
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maqui's works twenty years later, he revised the chapter on

equality and added some phrases of his own and others from

Vattel, presenting a concise statement of the principle in

language very much like that which was to pass from pub-

licist to publicist during the succeeding century:

Natural equality being the basis of all the duties of sociability, we

start from this very principle in order to expound them. Hence, this

. . . But in order to say something more particular on this subject,
let us observe that the natural state of nations with regard to one another is a state of social life and peace. This society is also one of
equality and independence, which establishes an equality of right
among them, and pledges them to have the same regard and respect
for one another. Hence the general principle of the law of nations is
nothing more than the general law of sociability, which obliges nations
having intercourse with one another to the practice of the same duties
as those to which individuals are naturally subject.2 • • •

same principle should guide us also in the exposition of the reciprocal

duties and rights of nations. Indeed, as men are naturally equal, and

as nations are composed only of men, and are considered as being moral

persons who enjoy perfect liberty, it follows that they ought to regard

one another as naturally equal. The strength or weakness of any one

of them does not make any difference in this respect; just as a dwarf

is as much a man as a giant, so a small republic is no less a sovereign

state than the most powerful kingdom; and, consequently, all the

1 Burlamaqui followed Barbeyrac in assuming that the Roman jus noiurale and

jus gentium were the same. Principes, p. 226, note 1.

When Professor Felice published a new edition of Burlamaqui's works twenty years later, he revised the chapter on
equality and added some phrases of his own and others from
Vattel, presenting a concise statement of the principle in
language very much like that which was to pass from publicist to publicist during the succeeding century:

* The above extracts are from Pt. II, ch. 6, §§ 1, 4, 5, 7, pp. 218 ff.

Natural equality being the basis of all the duties of sociability, we
start from this very principle in order to expound them. Hence, this
same principle should guide us also in the exposition of the reciprocal
duties and rights of nations. Indeed, as men are naturally equal, and
as nations are composed only of men, and are considered as being moral
persons who enjoy perfect liberty, it follows that they ought to regard
one another as naturally equal. The strength or weakness of any one
of them does not make any difference in this respect; just as a dwarf
is as much a man as a giant, so a small republic is no less a sovereign
state than the most powerful kingdom; and, consequently, all the
1

Burlamaqui followed Barbeyrac in assuming that the Roman jus naturale and

jus gentium were the same. Principes, p. 226, note
1

1.

The above extracts are from Pt. II, ch. 6, §§ 1, 4, 5, 7, pp. :n8 ff.
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rights assumed by the great kingdoms, such as France or Spain, belong

also to the republics of Lucca and of San Marino, and all the duties

which these republics are obliged to perform are no less obligatory on

the kingdoms of France and of Spain.1

At the end of the seventeenth century the followers of

rights assumed by the great kingdoms, such as France or Spain, belong
also to the republics of Lucca and of San Marino, and all the duties
which these republics are obliged to perform are no less obligatory on
the kingdoms of France and of Spain.1

Pufendorf were the predominant school on the continent of

Europe. During the eighteenth century many of their doc-

trines were taken over by other schools and so passed into

the common stock of speculation on the law of nations. This

was the case with the principle of state equality and with a

good deal of the theory that was associated with it.2

The Tendency toward Positivism

The positivists held a different conception of the law of

nations, viewing it as preeminently a law of human institu-

tion derived from custom, treaties, and the common under-

standing of nations. While they did not always ignore the

law of nature, they usually appealed to it in the guise of rea-

At the end of the seventeenth century the followers of
Pufendorf were the predominant school on the continent of
Europe. During the eighteenth century many of their doctrines were taken over by other schools and so passed into
the common stock of speculation on the law of nations. This
was the case with the principle of state equality and with a
good deal of the theory that was associated with it. 2

son, or as modified by usage, or as an additional sanction

for the positive law of nations. There was relatively little

THE TENDENCY TOWARD POSITIVISM
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of the abstract and the a priori in their treatises.

The positivist tendency was foreshadowed in the work of

Gentilis. The first manual of the positive law of nations was

the Juris et Judicii Feciales, sive Juris Inter Gentes, etc. of

Richard Zouche, professor of law at Oxford and judge of the

High Court of Adrniralty.3 Zouche recognized the suprem-

1 Burlamaqui, Principes du droit de la nature et des gens, etc., ed. by Felice,

new edition by Dupin, IV, p. 434. See ibid., Sentimens de I'éditeur, IV, p. x.

• Whatever may be the present opinion with reference to the teachings of the

naturalists, it hardly seems wise, in view of their important contributions to the

modern law of nations, to insist on relegating them to that " limbo of forgotten

authors" to which Mr. Abdy consigns Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and

all their kind. Abdy's Kent, p. 35.

* Zouche lived 1500-1660. His manual was first published at Oxford in 1650.

References are to parts, sections, and paragraphs, and the page references are to

J. L. Brierly's translation in Vol. II of the edition published in the Classics of In-

ternational Law. Consult also Ompteda, Litteratur, pp. 252-265; Phillipson, in

The positivists held a different conception of the law of
nations, viewing it as preeminently a law of human institution derived from custom, treaties, and the common understanding of nations. While they did not always ignore the
law of nature, they usually appealed to it in the guise of reason, or as modified by usage, or as an additional sanction
for the positive law of nations. There was relatively little
of the abstract and the a priori in their treatises.
The positivist tendency was foreshadowed in the work of
Gentilis. The first manual of the positive law of nations was
the Juris et J udicii Feciales, sive Juris Inter Gentes, etc. of
Richard Zouche, professor of law at Oxford and judge of the
High Court of Admiralty. 3 Zouche recognized the supremBurlamaqui, Principes du droit de la nature et des gens, etc., ed. by Felice,
new edition by Dupin, IV, p. 434. See ibid., Sentimens de l'tditeur, IV, p. x.
1 Whatever may be the present opinion with reference to the teachings of the
naturalists, it hardly seems wise, in view of their important contributions to the
modem law of nations, to insist on relegating them to that " limbo of forgotten
authors " to which Mr. Abdy consigns Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, Rutherforth, and
all their kind. Abdy's Kent, p. 35.
' Zouche lived 15(}0-1660. His manual was first published at Oxford in 1650.
References are to parts, sections, and paragraphs, and the page references are to
]. L. Brierly's translation in Vol. II of the edition published in the Classics of International Law. Consult also Ompteda, Litteralur, pp. 252-265; Phillipson, in
1
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acy of conventional law over the natural. His law between

nations comprised both an unwritten law founded on custom

and a written law based upon treaties and conventions.1 It

was denned as

the law which is recognized in the community of different princes or

peoples who hold sovereign power — that is to say, the law which has

acy of conventional law over the natural. His law between
nations comprised both an unwritten law founded on custom
and a written law based upon treaties and conventions.1 It
was defined as

been accepted among most nations by customs in harmony with rea-

son, and that upon which single nations agree with one another, and

which is observed by nations at peace and by those at war.1

Zouche made a systematic use of precedents and examples,

including many that were modern. He did not undertake a

scientific development of doctrine or indulge in abstract

generalizations which could not be applied to actual con-

the law which is recognized in the community of different princes or
peoples who hold sovereign power- that is to say, the law which has
been accepted among most nations by customs in harmony with reason, and that upon which single nations agree with one another, and
which is observed by nations at peace and by those at war.2

ditions. So great was his aversion to dogmatic finality that

he made it his plan to analyze precedents, state the issues

raised, and refrain from adding his own opinion one way or

the other.3

There was no place in a manual conceived in such a spirit

for an elaboration of the natural equality of states. Zouche
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did remark that peace was of two kinds — the pax moralis

between superiors and inferiors, as between the head of a

family and its members, and the pax civilis between equals,

as states.4 He also borrowed from Grotius the dictum of

Thucydides that colonists are not sent out to be slaves but

to have equal rights.6 Elsewhere, however, he recognized

inequalities of dignity and precedence6 as well as inequalities

of sovereignty or status. Zouche conceived of sovereignty

as " universal and supreme power of deciding questions con-

cerning the community between nations both in peace and

Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, pp. 220-247; Scelle, in Pillet, Les Fonda-

teurs, pp. 260-330.

1 I, 1, 1, p. 1. * I, 1, 3, p. 2. See also II, 2, 6, p. 65.

* I, 1, 1 (Brierly's transl.). 'II, 2, 8, p. 66.

* To the reader, p. vii.

1 I, 4, 1, pp. "ff-; I, 4, 2, 2, p. 18; I, S, 3, P- 29-

Zouche made a systematic use of precedents and examples,
including many that were modem. He did not undertake a
scientific development of doctrine or indulge in abstract
generalizations which could not be applied to actual conditions. So great was his aversion to dogmatic finality that
he made it his plan to analyze precedents, state the issues
raised, and refrain from adding his own opinion one way or
the other.3
There was no place in a manual conceived in such a spirit
for an elaboration of the natural equality of states. Zouche
did remark that peace was of two kinds - the pax nwralis
between superiors and inferiors, as between the head of a
family and its members, and the pax civil.is between equals,
as states.4 He also borrowed from Grotius the dictum of
Thucydides that colonists are not sent out to be slaves but
to have equal rights.I'> Elsewhere, however, he recognized
inequalities of dignity and precedence 6 as well as inequalities
of sovereignty or status. Zouche conceived of sovereignty
as " universal and supreme power of deciding questions concerning the community between nations both in peace and
Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists, pp. 220-247; Scelle, in Pillet, Les Fonda-

teurs, pp. 2f>9-330.
1 I, I I I, p. I.
I, 1, l (Brierly's transl.).
• To the reader, p. vii.
• I, 4, 1 1 pp. 12 ff.; I, 4, 2 1

' I, 1 1 3 1 p. 2. See also II, 2, 6, p. 65.
6 II, 2, 8, p. 66.

1

21

p.

18;

I, 5, 3, p.

29.
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in war," 1 but it was not so supreme that it could not be

qualified without being destroyed.2 Thus sovereign states

might be in subjection by right of clientship or dependency

and yet remain sovereign:

Free peoples are in subjection by right of clientship or dependency,

who have bound themselves to loyalty and homage for the sake of

in war," 1 but it was not so supreme that it could not be
qualified without being destroyed. 2 Thus sovereign states
might be in subjection by right of clientship or dependency
and yet remain sovereign:

protection....

. . . Clients differ from vassals in this respect, that vassals are under

the dominion and sovereignty of a supreme lord, whereas princes and

peoples who are clients of others, are not under their sovereignty.

Thus the jurist Proculus says: "We regard our clients as free, al-

though neither in authority, nor dignity, nor in any of their rights are

they our equals."*

In brief, Zouche recognized the legal significance of actual

inequalities. In sections on the law of status among those

at peace and at war, although he limited himself to rudi-

mentary distinctions, he at least suggested that the law of

status might constitute an important part of the law of

nations.4 As a positivist Zouche did not dilate upon that

Free peoples are in subjection by right of clientship or dependency,
who have bound themselves to loyalty and homage for the sake of
protection ....
. . . Clients differ from vassals in this respect, that vassals are under
the dominion and sovereignty of a supreme lord, whereas princes and
peoples who are clients of others, are not under their sovereignty.
Thus the jurist Proculus says: "We regard our clients as free, although neither in authority, nor dignity, nor in any of their rights are
they our equals." 3
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equality of natural right which prevails in a state of nature.

Searching for the principles that actually deteimined the

conduct of separate states, this disciple of Gentilis and Gro-

tius discovered inequalities of legal capacity which he recog-

nized as having the force of law.

Later in the seventeenth century there appeared in Ger-

many a vigorous protest against the school of natural law.

Rachel6 and Textor 6 denounced the naturalist doctrines.7

.11,1,2, p. 2. • 1,4,4, P. 25; 1,7,2, p. 35.

• I, 8, 6, p. 43 (Brierly's transl.); II, 2, 4, p. 64.

4 II, 2, pp. 61 ff.

• Rachel lived 1628-1691. His De jure natures el gentium was published in

1676. References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page

references are to J. P. Bate's translation in Vol. II. See Nys, Le droit int., I, 259.

* Textor lived 1637-1701. His Synopsis juris gentium was published in 1670.

References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page refer-

ences are to J. P. Bate's translation in Vol. H.

7 Rachel, I, 3a, 7a; Textor, I, 3a.

In brief, Zouche recognized the legal significance of actual
inequalities. In sections on the law of status among those
at peace and at war, although he limited himself to rudimentary distinctions, he at least suggested that the law of
status might constitute an important part of the law of
nations.4 As a positivist Zouche did not dilate upon that
equality of natural right which prevails in a state of nature.
Searching for the principles that actually determined the
conduct of separate states, this disciple of Gentilis and Grotius discovered inequalities of legal capacity which he recognized as having the force of law.
Later in the seventeenth century there appeared in Germany a vigorous protest against the school of natural law.
Rachel 5 and Textor 6 denounced the naturalist doctrines. 7
2 I, 4, 4, p. 25; I, 7, 2, p. 35.
I, l, 2, p. 2.
I, 8, 6, p. 43 (Brierly's transl.); II, 2, 4, p. 64.
4 II, 2, pp. 61 ff.
' Rachel lived 1628--r&)r. His De jure natzme et genlium was published in
1676. References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page
references are to J.P. Bate's translation in Vol. II. See Nys, Le drait int., I, 259.
1 Textor lived 1637-1701. His Synopsis juris genlium was published in i670.
References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page references are to J.P. Bate's translation in Vol. II.
7 Rachel, I, 3a, 7a; Textor, I, 3a.
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Their law of nations was founded upon the law of nature as

modified by custom and by express compact.1 Thus Rachel,

in the course of his refutation of the naturalists, declared

that even if

one free Nation is not the superior of another, and one can not lay

Their law of nations was founded upon the law of nature as
modified by custom and by express compact. 1 Thus Rachel,
in the course of his refutation of the naturalists, declared
that even if

down Law specially so called for another, yet if they choose to bind

themselves by pacts, they are reciprocally bound just as if by true

Law; so that, should one of them break faith, it by that very fact

makes the other or others its superior so far as that they can compel

it to keep faith.2

Rachel accordingly defined the law of nations as

a law developed by the consent or agreement, either expressly or tacitly

given, of many free nations, whereby for the sake of utility they are

mutually bound to one another.3

one free Nation is not the superior of another, and one can not lay
down Law specially so called for another, yet if they choose to bind
themselves by pacts, they are reciprocally bound just as if by true
Law; so that, should one of them break faith, it by that very fact
makes the other or others its superior so far as that they can compel
it to keep faith.2

This law of nations was purely arbitrary and might be quite

at variance with the law of nature.4 Indeed, it might es-

tablish as legally just things which would be absolutely con-

Rachel accordingly defined the law of nations as

demned in the forum of conscience. Neither Rachel nor

Textor developed the principle of state equality. They ap-
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parently regarded separate states as equal so far as the natu-

ral law was concerned,6 but took it for granted that natural

equality could be modified by the positive law of nations

a. law developed by the consent or agreement, either expressly or tacitly
given, of many free nations, whereby for the sake of utility they are
mutually bound to one another.3

founded on consent.6

Bynkershoek7 in the next century derived the law of na-

tions from reason and usage. Notwithstanding his assertion

1 See Rachel, De jure nature, § 20, p. 11; §33, p. 20; § 58, p. 37; De jure

gentium, § 4, p. 158; § 5, p. 159; § 10, P- 163; § i6» P- and Textor, ch. 2,

pp. 8-12.

1 Dejure gentium, § 91, p. 208 (Bate's transl.).

■ Ibid., § 16, p. 170 (Bate's transl.).

* Ibid., § 5, p. 159; § 56, p. 190.

s Rachel, Dejure natures, § 135, p. 94.

• Rachel, Dejure gentium, §§ 2-3, p. 157. Textor recognized degrees of status

Among princes or peoples in what he called " quasi-possession of sovereign power."

See ch. 14, pp. 134-150; ch. 16, pp. 159-166; ch. 20, pp. 216-231.

'Bynkershoek lived 1673-1743. His De foro kgatorum appeared in 1702, De

dominio maris in 1721, and Qutesttimes juris publici in 1737.

This law of nations was purely arbitrary and might be quite
at variance with the law of nature.4 Indeed, it might establish as legally just things which would be absolutely condemned in the forum of conscience. Neither Rachel nor
Textor developed the principle of state equality. They apparently regarded separate states as equal so far as the natural law was concerned, 6 but took it for granted that natural
equality could be modified by the positive law of nations
founded on consent. 6
Bynkershoek 7 in the next century derived the law of nations from reason and usage. Notwithstanding his assertion
See Rachel, De jure natur<Z, § 20, p. u; § 33, p. 20; § 581 p. 37; De jure
gentium, § 4, p . 158; § 5, p. 159; § 10, p. 163; § 16, p. 170; and Textor, ch. 2,
pp. 8-12.
1 Dejure gentium, § 91, p. 2o8 (Bate's transl.).
1 Ibid., § 16, p. l 70 (Bate's transl.).
4 Ibid., § 5, p. 159; § 56, p. 190.
' Rachel, De jure natura, § 135, p. 94.
• Rachel, Dejure gentium, §§ 2-3, p. 157· Textor recognized degrees of status
1

.among princes or peoples in what he called" quasi-possession of sovereign power."
See ch. 14, pp. 134-150; ch. 16, pp. 15()-166; ch. 20, pp. 216-231.
7 Byn.kershoek lived 1673-1743. His De foro legatornm appeared in 1702, De
Jominio maris in 1721, and Quasliones juris publici in 1737.
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that ratio ipsa Juris Gentium est anima,1 he relied mainly

upon custom as expressed in treaties or the practice of na-

tions, and thus gave an increased impetus to the positivist

tendency. He wrote no general treatise on the law of na-

tions, nor did he develop the principle of state equality.2

The leading exponents of the positivist tendency in the

eighteenth century were the great German jurists, Moser3

and Georg Friedrich von Martens.4 Moser may be regarded

as the founder of the modern positivist school. He dis-

claimed all intention of writing a treatise on the natural or

philosophical law of nations, confining himself to the expo-

sition of ein wilrckliches Europaisches Vdlkerrecht derived

from custom and treaties.6 Moser based equality upon sov-

ereignty as the factor which determines status. He said

nothing of natural law, the state of nature, or natural equal-

ity. That lack of precision with reference to the notion of

sovereignty which had characterized the treatises of Grotius,

Zouche, Pufendorf, and many others among the earlier

writers was avoided by classifying states into those that were
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sovereign and those that were semi-sovereign.6 The benevo-

lent vagueness of a theory of state equality based upon con-

ceptions of international personality, the state of nature,

and natural right was cleared away by expressly limiting

the application of the principle to fully sovereign states:7

1 Quastiones, I, 2, 10. Read what he says in Ad Uctorum.

* There is some evidence in his work of the influence of naturalist theory, as

where he speaks of war as a contest between independent persons: "Ait definitio,

eorum, qui suae potestatis sunt. Sive nempe Gentium, sive singulorum hominum,

ubi nulla est Civitas: iidem quippe tunc utrique sunt, . . ." Quastiones, I, 1, 2.

• Moser lived 1701-1785. His Versuch ies neuesten europ&ischen VSlker-rechts

in Friedens- und Kriegs-Zeiten was published in 1777-1780. References are to parts,

books, chapters, and sections.

4 G. F. von Martens lived 1756-1821. His Prtcis du droit des gens was pub-

lished in 1788. References are to Charles Vergfi's 2d edition.

5 Vorlauffige Abhandlung, § 1.

'I, 1, 1. Moser was apparently the first to make systematic use of the term

semi-sovereign. See his Beytrage zu dem neuesten europaischen Vdlckerrecht in

Fridens-Zeiten, I, 508. Cf. Textor, supra, p. 92, note 6.

that ratio ipsa Juris Gentium est anima,1 he relied mainly
upon custom as expressed in treaties or the practice of nations, and thus gave an increased impetus to the positivist
tendency. He wrote no general treatise on the law of nations, nor did he develop the principle of state equality.2
The leading exponents of the positivist tendency in the
eighteenth century were the great German jurists, Moser 3
and Georg Friedrich von l\1artens.4 l\1oser may be regarded
as the founder of the modern positivist school. He disclaimed all intention of wTiting a treatise on the natural or
philosophical law of nations, confining himself to the exposition of ein wiirckliclzes Europaisches V olkerrecht derived
from custom and treaties. 5 l\Ioser based equality upon sovereignty as the factor which determines status. He said
nothing of natural law, the state of nature, or natural equality. That lack of precision with reference to the notion of
sovereignty which had characterized the treatises of Grotius,
Zouche, Pufendorf, and many others among the earlier
writers was avoided by classifying states into those that were
sovereign and those that were semi-sovereign. 6 The benevolent vagueness of a theory of state equality based upon conceptions of international personality, the state of nature,
and natural right was cleared away by expressly limiting
the application of the principle to fully sovereign states: 7

» I, 1, 2.

Qutzstioms, I, 2, 10. Read what he says in Ad leclorum.
There is some evidence in his work of the influence of naturalist theory, as
where he speaks of war as a contest between independent persons: "Ait definitio,
eorum, qui suae potestatis sunt. Sive nempe Gentium, sive singulorum hominum,
ubi nulla est Civitas: iidem quippe tune utrique sunt, ..." QUtzstiones, I, 1 1 2.
1 Moser lived 1701-1785. His Versuch des neuesten europlJischen Volker-rechls
in FrWJens- und Kriegs-ZeiJen was published in 1777-178o. References are to parts,
books, chapters, and sections.
' G. F. von Martens lived 1756-1821. His Prlcis du droit des gens was published in 1788. References are to Charles Verge's 2d edition.
1 Vorlauffige Abhandlung, § 1.
• I, 1, 1. Moser was apparently the first to make systematic use of the term
semi-sOPereign. See his Beytriige zu dem neuesten europtJischen Volckerrecht in
Fridens-ZeiJen, I, 5o8. Cf. Textor, rnpra, p. 92, note 6.
1
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A state that is independent, that is, one over which no other state

or ruler has any authority, is called sovereign. . . .

Independence gives equal rights. As regards the rights resulting

from independence all fully sovereign states are equal to one another;

on the other hand, semi-sovereign states are unequal to sovereign.1

Thus the principle of state equality was stated with new pre-

A state that is independent, that is, one over which no other state
or ruler has any authority, is called sovereign....
Independence gives equal rights. As regards the rights resulting
from independence all fully sovereign states are equal to one another;
on the other hand, semi-sovereign states are unequal to sovereign.1

cision and from a new point of view. Moser did not regard

states as equal because they were international persons in a

state of nature and hence endowed with the same natural

rights. He accredited states with an equality of legal ca-

pacity when they enjoyed the same status and not other-

wise; and he undertook to discover how many kinds of legal

status actually existed among international persons. Moser

developed, to be sure, only the most rudimentary distinc-

tions with reference to status; but the notion of semi-

sovereignty was a contribution which at least suggested the

importance of the law of persons in international jurispru-

dence.

Martens' positivism was not quite so uncompromising.
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He recognized a natural law of nations which consisted of

the law of nature modified and applied to states regarded as

persons living in a state of nature.2 According to the natu-

ral law states like individuals enjoyed a perfect equality of

natural rights:

Among nations as among individuals there is a perfect equality of

natural and absolute rights, that is, apart from diversity of territory,

of population, of strength, of religion, of constitution, of the antiquity

of the established government, all have the same right to undertake

whatever is consistent with the independence of others, and in the un-

restricted state no one has a right to coerce others into any positive

act whatever in its favor.'

1 "Ein Staat heisst souverain, welcher unabhangig ist, das ist, dem kein

anderer Staat oder Herr in weltlichen Sachen etwas zu befehlen hat." I, 1, 1, 1.

"Die Unabhangigkeit gibt gleiche Rechte. In Absicht auf die aus der Unab-

hangigkeit herfliesscnde Rechte seind alle ganz souveraine Staaten einander gleich;

die halbsouveraine hingegen ihnen ungleich." I, 1, 2, 2.

» S§ i ff., I, 31 ff. • 5 I2S, I, 337-

Thus the principle of state equality was stated with new precision and from a new point of view. Moser did not regard
states as equal because they were international persons in a
state of nature and hence endowed with the same natural
rights. He accredited states with an equality of legal capacity when they enjoyed the same status and not otherwise; and he undertook to discover how many kinds of legal
status actually existed among international persons. Moser
developed, to be sure, only the most rudimentary distinctions with reference to status; but the notion of semisovereignty was a contribution which at least suggested the
importance of the law of persons in international jurisprudence.
Martens' positivism was not quite so uncompromising.
He recognized a natural law of nations which consisted of
the law of nature modified and applied to states regarded as
persons living in a state of nature. 2 According to the natural law states like individuals enjoyed a perfect equality of
natural rights:
Among nations as among individuals there is a perfect equality of
natural and absolute rights, that is, apart from diversity of territory,
of population, of strength, of religion, of constitution, of the antiquity
of the established government, all have the same right to undertake
whatever is consistent with the independence of others, and in the unrestricted state no one has a right to coerce others into any positive
act whatever in its favor. 3
1 " Ein Staat heisst souverain, welcher unabhangig ist, das ist, dem kein
anderer Staat oder Herr in weltlichen Sachen etwas zu befehlen hat." I, 1, 1, 1.
"Die Unabhangigkeit gibt gleiche Rechte. In Absicht auf die aus der Unabhangigkeit herfliesscnde Rechte seind alle ganz souveraine Staaten einander gleich;
die halbsouveraine hingegen ihnen ungleich." I, 1, 2, 2.
I HI ff., I, 31 ff.
I § 125, I, 337.
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Martens contended, however, that the natural law had been

found insufficient among civilized states, with the result

that a positive law of nations founded upon custom and con-

vention had modified that perfect equality of rights estab-

lished by the law of nature.1 From this point his position

was similar to that of Moser whom he credited with having

revived the study of the positive law of nations.2 Martens'

manual was a summary of positive law. He admitted that

in actual practice weaker states were frequently unable to

exercise that liberty which the natural law attributed to

them,3 and argued for the recognition of at least a few dif-

ferences of status among international persons.4

The Eclectics or Grotians

The difference between the positivists and the eclectics

was not always sharply drawn. G. F. von Martens, for il-

lustration, combined an eclectic theory with the substance

of positivism. In general, the eclectics adopted a twofold

division into the natural or necessary law of nations, which

consisted of the law of nature applied to nations, and the

Martens contended, however, that the natural law had been
found insufficient among civilized states, with the result
that a positive law of nations founded upon custom and convention had modified that perfect equality of rights established by the law of nature. 1 From this point his position
was similar to that of l\rloser whom he credited with having
revived the study of the positive law of nations.2 Martens'
manual was a summary of positive law. He admitted that
in actual practice weaker states were frequently unable to
exercise that liberty which the natural law attributed to
them,3 and argued for the recognition of at least a few differences of status among international persons.4

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:49 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

voluntary or positive law of nations founded on consent.

This in substance was the viewpoint of Leibnitz in the pref-

THE ECLECTICS OR GROTIANS

ace of his Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus.6 The most

illustrious advocate of this point of view was Christian von

Wolff,6 distinguished German jurist and philosopher. Wolff

made two significant contributions to the theory of the law

1 §§ 6 ff., I, 45 ff. '§"9. If 320-

"§13,1,68. 4 §§18ff.,I,9iff.

* Leibnitz lived 1646-1716. His Codex, a collection of treaties and state papers

preceded by a brief preface in which Leibnitz stated his views on the law of nations,

was published in 1693. His Mantissa codicis juris gentium diplomatici, a supple-

ment to the Codex, appeared in 1700. See Macdonell, in Macdonell and Manson,

Great Jurists, pp. 283-304.

• Wolff lived 1670-1754. His Jus naturm was published 1740-48, and his Jus

gentium in 1749. The Institutions, an abridgment of the latter work, appeared

in 1750. See Olive, in Pillet, Les fondateurs, pp. 447-479; Twiss, Law of Nations,

passim; Westlake, Collected Papers, pp. 70-76; Wheaton, History, pp. 176-182.

The difference between the positivists and the eclectics
was not always sharply drawn. G. F. von Martens, for illustration, combined an eclectic theory with the substance
of positivism. In general, the eclectics adopted a twofold
division into the natural or necessary law of nations, which
consisted of the law of nature applied to nations, and the
voluntary or positive law of nations founded on consent.
This in substance was the viewpoint of Leibnitz in the preface of his Codex Juris Gentium Diplomaticus. 6 The most
illustrious advocate of this point of view was Christian von
Wolff, 6 distinguished German jurist and philosopher. Wolff
made two significant contributions to the theory of the law
3 § n9, I, 320.
§§ 6 ff., I, 45 ff.
4 §§ 18 ff., I, 91 ff.
§ 13, I, 68.
' Leibnitz lived 1646-1716. His Codex, a collection of treaties and state papers
preceded by a brief preface in which Leibnitz stated his views on the law of nations,
was published in 1693. His Mamissa codicis juris gentium dipwmatici, a supplement to the Codex, appeared in 1 700. See Macdonell, in Macdonell and Manson,
GreatJurists, pp. 283-304.
• Wolff lived 167~1754. His ]us natura was published 1740-481 and his ]us
gemirlm in 1749· The lnstittdicnes, an abridgment of the latter work, appeared
in 1750. See Olive, in Pillet, Lesfondateurs, pp. 447-479; Twiss, Law of Nations,
passim; Westlake, Collected Papers, pp. 70-76; Wheaton, History, pp. 176-182.
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of nations: first, he pointed out that the law of nature could

not be applied to separate states in the same way that it

applied to natural persons, but must be adapted to the

peculiar character of its subjects; second, he based the volun-

tary law of nations upon the existence of a great common-

wealth or civitas maxima of which all civilized nations were

members.1 From the point of view of the natural or neces-

sary law of nations states were to be regarded as so many

free persons living in a state of nature; from the point of

view of the jus voluntarium they were members of the civitas

maxima. Wolff based the equality of states upon the natural

or necessary law of nations. His explanation of the principle

was practically identical with that of the naturalists:

All nations are equal by nature. They are regarded as free individ-

ual persons living in a state of nature. Wherefore, since all men are

naturally equal, all nations are also naturally equal. . . .

Whereas all nations are equal by nature, and men are equal in a

moral sense whose rights and obligations are the same, so by nature

all nations have the same rights and obligations.2
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No more lucid statement of the naturalist's explanation of

state equality need be desired than that which is to be found

in the work of Wolff. So far as this principle was concerned

there was no real difference between the theories of the natu-

ralists and of the eclectics. Wolff drew a complete parallel

1 Jus gentium, prafatio; Instituiiones, §§ 1088, 1090. Wolff distinguished the

conventional and the customary from the voluntary law of nations. Insttiutiones,

§§ 1001-1092. See Despagnet, Cows, § 32, p. 33.

» Jus Gentium, proleg., §§ 16-17. "C'&ait repfiter l'enseignement des juris-

consultes du temps des Antonins: Omnes homines natura aquales sunt." Nys, Le

droit int., II, 235. An equally lucid statement is to be found in Wolff's Institutions,

of nations: first, he pointed out that the law of nature could
not be applied to separate states in the same way that it
applied to natural persons, but must be adapted to the
peculiar character of its subjects; second, he based the voluntary law of nations upon the existence of a great commonwealth or civitas maxima of which all civilized nations were
members. 1 From the point of view of the natural or necessary law of nations states were to be regarded as so many
free persons living in a state of nature; from the point of
view of the jus voluntarium they were members of the civitas
maxima. Wolff based the equality of states upon the natural
or necessary law of nations. His explanation of the principle
was practically identical with that of the naturalists:
All nations are equal by nature. They are regarded as free individual persons living in a state of nature. Wherefore, since all men are
naturally equal, all nations are also naturally equal. ...
Whereas all nations are equal by nature, and men are equal in a
moral sense whose rights and obligations are the same, so by nature
all nations have the same rights and obligations. 2

§ 1089: "Vi Juris Gentium necessarii gentium omnium eadem est obligatio, eadem

sunt jura ac ideo omnes natura aequales, nulli praerogativa aliqua nec praecedentia

competit. Nulli jus est in actiones alterius singularum est libertas cujus usus non

impediendus a gente alia. Nulla gens alteram latere, seu jus perfectam ipsius

violare debet seu injuriam facere & adversus injuriam intentatam jus defendendi

adversus fact am jus puniendi competit unicuique. Et praeterea singulis quoque

gentibus competit jus alias ad certas prsestationes sibi obligandi, & per consequens

jus perfectum acquirendi auferri nescium ac denique jus belli."

No more lucid statement of the naturalist's explanation of
state equality need be desired than that which is to be found
in the work of Wolff. So far as this principle was concerned
there was no real difference between the theories of the naturalists and of the eclectics. Wolff drew a complete parallel
1 Jus gentium, pnzfatw; Instit11tianes, §§ 1088, 1090. Wolff distinguished the
conventional and the customary from the voluntary law of nations. Institutwnes,
§§ 1091-1092. See Despagnet, Cours, § 32, p. 33.
i Jus Gentium, proleg., §§ 16-17.
"C'etait r~peter l'enseignement des jurisconsultes du temps des Antonins: Omnes hcmines natura aquales mnl." Nys, Le
drr>it int., II, 235. An equally lucid statement is to be found in Wolff's Insliluti-Ones,
§ 1o89: "Vi Juris Gentium necessarii gentium ornnium eadem est obligatio, eadem
sunt jura ac ideo om.nes natura requales, nulli pnerogativa aliqua nee prrecedentia
competit. Nulli jus est in actiones alterius singularum est libertas cujus usus non
impediendus a gente alia. Nulla gens alteram Ired.ere, seu jus perfectam ipsius
violare debet seu injuriam facere & adversus injuriam intentatam jus defendendi
adversus factam jus puniendi competit unicuique. Et pneterea singulis quoque
gentibus competit jus alias ad certas pnestationes sibi obligandi, & per consequens
jus perfectum acquirendi auferri nescium ac denique jus belli."
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between man and the state, each in a state of nature, and

concluded that the same principles in regard to equality

applied in each case.1

Wolff's theories were given wider currency through the

work of his brilliant admirer, Emerich de Vattel.2 Like his

great master, Vattel treated the natural law of nations as a

separate science consisting of a just and rational application

of the law of nature to independent states. This constituted

the necessary and immutable law of nations.3 On other

points, however, Vattel's theory represented a retrograde

movement in the history of the science. He rejected Wolff's

conception of the civitas maxima, and founded the voluntary

law of nations upon the presumed consent of nations living

in the familiar state of natural liberty.4 His conception of

the state was in many respects analogous to that metaphysi-

cal notion of state-being which had dominated the thought

of the naturalists.8 Grotius' distinction between the law of

nature and the law of nations was criticized by Vattel, who

referred to Hobbes as the first to give a distinct though im-
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perfect idea of true international law. It was the glory of

Wolff, in his opinion, to have first indicated the real relation

between the natural law of men and of nations.6 Vattel re-

garded sovereign states as so many free persons living to-

gether in a state of nature,7 and he asserted their perfect

equality in the clearest and most precise of language:

1 Cf. Institutional, Pt. I, ch. 3, and Pt. IV, ch. 1, § 1089.

* Vattel lived 1714-1767. His Le droit des gens, ou principes de la lot naturalle,.

appliques d la conduite 6* aux affaires des nations 6* des souverains was published in

1758. References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page

references are to C. G. Fenwick's translation in Vol. III. See Mallarme, in Pillet,

Les fondateurs, pp. 481-601; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists*

PP- 477-S04.

■ Preface; Introd., fj 6-9, p. 4.

4 Preface; Introd., $ 21, p. 7. The conventional law was based upon express.

consent and the customary law upon tacit consent. Introd., §§ 24-25, p. 8.

5 Ibid., §§ 1-5, p. 3.

• Preface. 'Introd., §§ 4 ff., pp. 3 ff.

between man and the state, each in a state of nature, and
concluded that the same principles in regard to equality
applied in each case.1
Wolff's theories were given wider currency through the
work of his brilliant admirer, Emerich de Vattel. 2 Like his
great master, Vattel treated the natural law of nations as a
separate science consisting of a just and rational application
of the law of nature to independent states. This constituted
the necessary and immutable law of nations. 3 On other
points, however, Vattel's theory represented a retrograde
movement in the history of the science. He rejected Wolff's
conception of the civt'.tas maxima, and founded the voluntary
law of nations upon the presumed consent of nations living
in the familiar state of natural liberty.4 His conception of
the state was in many respects analogous to that metaphysical notion of state-being which had dominated the thought
of the naturalists. 5 Grotius' distinction between the law of
nature and the law of nations was criticized by Vattcl, who
referred to Hobbes as the first to give a distinct though imperfect idea of true international law. It was the glory of
Wolff, in his opinion, to have first indicated the real relation
between the natural law of men and of nations. 6 Vattel regarded sovereign states as so many free persons living together in a state of nature,7 and he asserted their perfect
equalit7 in the clearest and most precise of language:
Cf. Institutionu, Pt. I, ch. 3, and Pt. IV, ch. r, § 1089.
Vattel lived 1714-1767. His Le droit des gens, ou pri11cipes de la loi naturalle,.
applUjuts d la cond11ile &- aux ajfaires des nations &- des souvcrains was published in
1758. References are to the edition in the Classics of International Law, and page
references are to C. G. Fenwick's translation in Vol. III. See Mallanne, in Pillet,
Les fondateurs, pp. 481-601; Phillipson, in Macdonell and Manson, Great Jurists,.
pp. 477-504.
a Preface; Introd., §§ 6-9, p. 4.
• Preface; Introd., § 21, p. 7. The conventional law was based upon express
consent and the customary law upon tacit consent. Introd., §§ 24-25 1 p. 8.
' Ibid., §§ 1-5, p. 3.
7 Introd., §§ 4 ff., pp. 3 ff.
1 Preface.
1
1
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Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obli-

gations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are

composed of men and may be regarded as so many free persons living

together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from na-

ture the same obligations and the same rights. Strength or weakness,

in this case, counts for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant

is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most power-

ful Kingdom.

From this equality it necessarily follows that what is lawful or un-

lawful for one Nation is equally lawful or unlawful for every other

Nation.

A Nation is therefore free to act as it pleases, so far as its acts do

not affect the perfect rights of another Nation, and so far as the Na-

tion is under merely internal obligations without any perfect external

obligation. If it abuse its liberty it acts wrongfully; but other

Nations cannot complain, since they have no right to dictate to it.

Since Nations are free, independent, and equal, and since each has

the right to decide in its conscience what it must do to fulfil its duties,

the effect of this is to produce, before the world at least, a perfect
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equality of rights among Nations in the conduct of their affairs and in

the pursuit of their policies. The intrinsic justice of their conduct is

another matter which it is not for others to pass upon finally; so that

what one may do another may do, and they must be regarded in the

society of mankind as having equal rights.1

With the above quotation from Vattel, probably more

widely quoted than any other statement of the principle, an

account of the origin of state equality and of its early de-

velopment by the publicists may be appropriately concluded.

The equality of states was the logical consequence of Pufen-

dorf's application to international relations of the political

and legal philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. It was a creation

of those publicists who were dominated by the theories of

the naturalist school. It was not developed by the early

Since men are by nature equal, and their individual rights and obligations the same, as coming equally from nature, Nations, which are
composed of men and may be regarded as so many free persons living
together in a state of nature, are by nature equal and hold from nature the same obligations and the same rights. Strength or weakness,
in this case, counts for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant
is; a small Republic is no less a sovereign State than the most powerful Kingdom.
From this equality it necessarily follows that what is lawful or unlawful for one Nation is equally lawful or unlawful for every other
Nation.
A Nation is therefore free to act as it pleases, so far as its acts do
not affect the perfect rights of another Nation, and so far as the Nation is under merely internaJ obligations without any perfect external
-0bligation. If it abuse its liberty it acts wrongfully; but other
Nations cannot complain, since they have no right to dictate to it.
Since Nations are free, independent, and equal, and since each has
the right to decide in its conscience what it must do to fulfil its duties,
the effect of this is to produce, before the world at least, a perfect
equality of rights among Nations in the conduct of their affairs and in
the pursuit of their policies. The intrinsic justice of their conduct is
another matter which it is not for others to pass upon finally; so that
what one may do another may do, and they must be regarded in the
society of mankind as having equal rights. 1

positivists. It was not until the principle had become well

established, for all at least who accepted the naturalist the-

1 Introd., §§ 18-21, p. 7 (Fenwick's transl.). See Pradier-Fodfir£, Traité, § 167,

I, 286.

With the above quotation from Vattel, probably more
widely quoted than any other statement of the principle, an
account of the origin of state equality and of its early development by the publicists may be appropriately concluded.
The equality of states was the logical consequence of Pufendorf's application to international relations of the political
and legal philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. It was a creation
of those publicists who were dominated by the theories of
the naturalist school. It was not developed by the early
positivists. It was not until the principle had become well
established, for all at least who accepted the naturalist theIntrod., §§
I, 286.
1

18-:21 1

p. 7 (Fenwick's transl.). See

Pradier-Focl~re,

Traill,§ 1671
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ones, that the idea of sovereignty was offered as an analyti-

cal explanation. Even then the principle could hardly be

explained apart from naturalist philosophy. Moser, to be

sure, rejected the whole paraphernalia of naturalism; but

Martens recurred to naturalist conceptions as his starting-

point in expounding a positivist system. So far as equality

was concerned there was no essential difference between the

theory of the eclectics, represented by Wolff or Vattel, and

the view of the naturalists. Thus the equality of states

came down to the nineteenth century grounded upon the

natural law, the state of nature, natural equality, and the
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analogy.

ories, that the idea of sovereignty was offered as an analytical explanation. Even then the principle could hardly be
explained apart from naturalist philosophy. Moser, to be
sure, rejected the whole paraphernalia of naturalism; but
Martens recurred to naturalist conceptions as his startingpoin tin expounding a positivist system. So far as equality
was concerned there was no essential difference between the
theory of the eclectics, represented by Wolff or Vattel, and
the view of the naturalists. Thus the equality of states
came down to the nineteenth century grounded upon the
natural law, the state of nature, natural equality, and the
analogy.

CHAPTER IV

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE WRITINGS

OF THE MODERN PUBLICISTS

The Common Statement or the Principle

A majority of the publicists writing in the last century have

accepted the equality of states as an essential principle of

CHAPTER IV

the law of nations.1 The common statement has not been

greatly improved since the days of Burlamaqui, Moser, and

Vattel. In truth, there has been a very obvious tendency

to repeat hackneyed expositions, which have passed, as

Hobbes would say, "like gaping from mouth to mouth."

The result has been an unfortunate ambiguity in both

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE MODERN PUBLICISTS

thought and expression with reference to the whole subject.

THE COMMON STATEMENT OF THE PRINCIPLE

Calvo's Dictionnaire contains a statement, made up of ex-

tracts from various writers, which is perhaps as good a

specimen of the common nineteenth century exposition as

can be found:

Equality is one of the natural and primitive rights of nations. It

is the right by virtue of which every sovereign State may demand that

another State shall not assume more extensive rights, in their mutual

relations, than it enjoys itself, and shall not free itself from any of the
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obligations imposed upon all.

The equality of sovereign states is a generally recognized principle

of public law. It has a twofold consequence in that it attributes to

all States the same rights and imposes upon them reciprocally the

same duties.

Natural relations (rapports) among States being everywhere the

same, and therefore essential, this equality cannot be affected by the

casual qualities or attributes of a State, such as antiquity, population,

extent of territory, military power, form of the constitution, title of

1 See Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, pp. 90, 104, 105; Nys, Mtudes, II, 9-14.
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A majority of the publicists writing in the last century have
accepted the equality of states as an essential principle of
the law of nations.1 The common statement has not been
greatly improved since the days of Burlamaqui, Moser, and
Vattel. In truth, there has been a very obvious tendency
to repeat hackneyed expositions, which have passed, as
Hobbes would say, "like gaping from mouth to mouth."
The result has been an unfortunate ambiguity in both
thought and expression with reference to the whole subject.
Calvo's Dictionnaire contains a statement, made up of extracts from various writers, which is perhaps as good a
specimen of the common nineteenth century exposition as
can be found:
Equality is one of the natural and primitive rights of nations. It
is the right by virtue of which every sovereign State may demand that
another State shall not assume more extensive rights, in their mutual
relations, than it enjoys itself, and shall not free itself from any of the
obligations imposed upon all.
The equality of sovereign states is a generally recognized principle
of public law. It has a twofold consequence in that it attributes to
all States the same rights and imposes upon them reciprocally the
same duties.
Natural relations (rapports) among States being everywhere the
same, and therefore essential, this equality cannot be affected by the
casual qualities or attributes of a State, such as antiquity, population,
extent of territory, military power, form of the constitution, title of
1

See Huber, Du Gleichheil der Staaten, pp. 90, 104, 105; Nys, &udes, II, 9-14.
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its sovereign, state of civilization, respect which it enjoys, etc. No

one of these considerations can justify the least difference or the

slightest distinction between nations considered as moral persons;

from this point of view all participate alike in international law.

Whatever is lawful or unjust for one State is equally so for all

others. Quite apart from diversity of territory, form of government,

or other characteristic differences, all States have the same right to

undertake whatever is consistent with the independence of others;

and, strictly speaking, no State has the right to extort from another

any positive act in its favor. In brief, by the equality of nations it is

to be understood that the rights of each ought to be respected the

same as those of every other, without distinction between nations

which are powerful and those which occupy only a secondary place

in the list of nations. The weaker State has the same right as the

stronger State.

The right of equality of States is the necessary consequence of then-

sovereignty and of their independence. All States enjoy an independ-

ent personality; each may assert all rights which are derived from

that personality; consequently, their rights are equal.1

The Essential Nature of State Equality
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What is the essential nature of this equality of rights?

Is it an attribute of the state, a right of the state, or a prin-

ciple of the law of nations? The publicists have not agreed

on an answer to this question.2 There are a few writers who

treat equality as what Pradier-Foderf i calls une maniere

d'itre, i. e., a fundamental quality or attribute of the state

as an international person. Vattgl regarded states jts^egual

its sovereign, state of civilization, respect which it enjoys, etc. No
one of these considerations can justify the least difference or the
slightest distinction between nations considered as moral persons;
from this point of view all participate alike in international law.
Whatever is lawful or unjust for one State is equally so for all
others. Quite apart from diversity of territory, form of government,
or other characteristic differences, all States have the same right to
undertake whatever is consistent with the independence of others;
and, strictly speaking, no State has the right to extort from another
any positive act in its favor. In brief, by the equality of nations it is
to be understood that the rights of each ought to be respected the
same as those of every other, without distinction between nations
which are powerful and those which occupy only a secondary place
in the list of nations. The weaker State has the same right as the
stronger State.
The right of equality of States is the necessary consequence of their
sovereignty and of their independence. All States enjoy an independent personality; each may assert all rights which are derived from
that personality; consequently, their rights are equal.1

by nature because they were composed of men who were

gqual by nature, andconsequgntly could be considerecLas so

1 I, 286. The rest of the passage is concerned chiefly with rank and ceremonial.

THE

ESSENTIAL NATURE OF STATE EQUALITY

Good discussions along traditional lines are to be found in Calvo, Le droit int.,

§§21 ff., I, 356 ff.; Camazza Amari, TraUato, pp. 276 ff.; Chretien, Principes, §§

160 ff., pp. 162 ff.; Fiore, Trattato, §§ 420 ff., I, 289 ff.; Huber, Die Gleichheit

der Staaten; Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; Pradier-

Foddrf, Traité, §§ 442 ff.; II, 1 ff. See also references cited in the following notes.

'Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 105; Pradier-FoderS, Traits §§ 443-

446, II, 5-8; Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2" sir., II, 13.

What is the essential nature of this equality of rights?
ls it an attribute of the state, a right of the state, or a principle of the law of nations ? The publicists have not agreed
on an answer to this question. 2 There are a few writers who
treat equality as what Pradier-Fodere calls une maniere
d'etre, i. e., a fundamental quality or attribute of the state
as an international person. Vatte) _regarjed _~~tes_ ~~equal
by nature because they _~~re_ composed of men who were
equal by nature_,_ ~ndc.Qns~_g_v.ently could.he. considered as so .
1 I, 286. The rest of the passage is concerned chiefly with rank and ceremonial.
Good discussions along traditional lines are to be found in Calvo, Le droit int.,
§§ 21 ff., I, 356 ff.; Camazza Amari, Trattato, pp. 276 ff.; ChrHien, Prinripes, §§
160 ff., pp. 162 ff.; Fiore, Tratta.to, §§ 420 ff., I, 289 ff.; Huber, Die GJeichheit
der Staaten; Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; PradierFodere, TraiU, §§ 442 ff.; II, 1 ff. See also references cited in the following notes.
' Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 105; Pradier-Fodere, TraiU §§ 443446, II, 5-8; Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2e ser., II, 13.
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many free persons living in a state of nature.1 A modern

version of Vattel's idea appears in several of the leading

authorities of the nineteenth century. F. de Martens in-

cludes equality among les qualitSs internationales of states,

which he defines as follows:

By the international qualities of states we mean the inherent qual-

ities without which they could not figure in the domain of international

relations and on which their mutual rights are based.*

Substantially the same opinion is held by Pomeroy, who

says:

It seems possible to refer all primary international rights to two

sources, existing in the essential characteristics or elements of a state.

many free persons living in a state of nature.1 A modern
version of Vattel's idea appears in several of the leading
authorities of the nineteenth century. F. de Martens includes equality among les quaJ.itis internationales of states,
which he defines as follows:
By the international qualities of states we mean the inherent qualities without which they could not figure in the domain of international
relations and on which their mutual rights are based.1

These characteristics or elements are (ist), the fact that each state is

independent and sovereign, a corporate legal person, a free moral

agent; and (2d), the fact that all states are equal.3

As recent a writer as Oppenheun says:

Substantially the same opinion is held by Pomeroy, who
says:

The equality before International Law of all member-States of the

Family of Nations is an invariable quality derived from their Inter-

national Personality. Whatever inequality may exist between States
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as regards their size, population, power, degree of civilisation, wealth,

and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as International

Persons.4

The description of equality as an essential characteristic or

invariable quality of the state is due to the influence of

It seems possible to refer all primary international rights to two
sources, existing in the essential characteristics or elements of a state.
These characteristics or elements are (1st), the fact that each state is
independent and sovereign, a corporate legal person, a free moral
agent; and (2d), the fact that all states are equal.3

naturalist theories. It is the consequence of conceiving of

the state as a collective person, having attributes analo-

As recent a writer

as~

says:

gous to the attributes of the natural persons of which it is

composed.

The naturalist theory of the law of nations also placed a

great deal of emphasis upon the idea of natural rights. Ac-

1 Introd., 118. * Traité, I, 377, 387 (transl. from French ed.).

• Lectures, p. 82. See also Woolsey, Int. Law, p. 35.

* Int. Law, I, 168. See also Carnazza Amari, Trattato, p. 276; Twiss, Law of

Nations, pp. 11, 14, 145; Wheaton, Elements, pp. $8, 118.

The equality before International Law of all member-States of the
Family of Nations is an invariable quality derived from their International Personality. Whatever inequality may exist between States
as regards their size, population, power, degree of civilisation, wealth,
and other qualities, they are nevertheless equals as International
Persons. 4

The description of equality as an essential characteristic or
invariable quality of the state is due to the influence of
naturalist theories. It is the consequence of conceiving of
the state as a collective person, having attributes analogous to the attributes of the natural persons of which it is
composed.
The naturalist theory of the law of nations also placed a
great deal of emphasis upon the idea of natural rights. Ac1
1

Introd., § 18.
t Traill, I, 377 1 387 (transl. from French ed.).
Lulures, p. 82. See also Woolsey, lnl. Law, p. 35.

• lnl. Law, I, 168. See also Camazza Amari, Traltalo, p. 276; Twiss, Law of
Nations, pp. 11, 14, 145; Wheaton, Elemmls, pp. 58, u8.
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cordingly, many of the modern publicists regard equality as

a natural right, or, what amounts to the same thing, as an

absolute, primordial, or fundamental right. Pradier-Fodere'

objects to the definition of equality as une maniere d'etre,

and concludes that it is a true right.1 Bonfils likewise in-

sists that " this juridical equality is a true right for states." 2

The difference between this view and the one which regards

equality as an attribute or characteristic is not of great

significance. By natural or primordial rights the publicists

mean essential interests. When an interest becomes so

essential that the state cannot endure unless it is safe-

guarded, it is of little moment whether it be called an at-

tribute or a fundamental right.

The tendency among modern publicists is to avoid all

difficulty by describing equality as an essential principle

of the law of nations. Many writers who retain a natural-

ist terminology and classification really treat equality as a

principle, rather than a natural right or an essential attri-

bute. It is presented as a principle by the ablest of modern

publicists, including Bluntschli, Phillimore, Rivier, and
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others.3

The Juridical Significance of State Equality

Whatever the terms with which publicists may attempt

to define equality in the law of nations, it is of supreme im-

1 TraiU, §§ 184,442,1,307, II. S-

'Manuel, §§ 272, 241, pp. 162, 142. See also Calvo, Dictionnaire, I, 286;

Despagnet, Cours, } 165, p. 217; Field, Int. Code, § 16, p. 10; Fiore, Trattato, §

361,1, 245; Hershey, Essentials, p. 155; Klüber, Droit des gens, § 80, p. 132; Nys,

Le droit int., II, 235; Pifidelievre, Precis, § 267,1, 244.

* Bluntschli, VSlkerrecht, § 81, p. 96; Calvo, Le droit int., § 210, I, 356; Car-

nazza Amari, Trattato, p. 276; Cobbett, Cases, I, 50; Chrftien, Principes, §§ 163,

176, pp. 165, 177; Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Heffter, Vblkerrecht, § 26, p. 47;

Holtzendorff, Handbuch, § 3, II, 11; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten; Kebedgy,

in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; Kent, Commentaries, I, 21; Neu-

cordingly, many of the modern publicists regard equality as
a natural right, or, what amounts to the same thing, as an
absolute, primordial, or fundamental right. Pradier-Fodere
objects to the definition of equality as une maniere d'etre,
and concludes that it is a true right. 1 Bonfils likewise insists that " this juridical equality is a true right for states." 2
The difference between this view and the one which regards
equality as an attribute or characteristic is not of great
significance. By natural or primordial rights the publicists
mean essential interests. When an interest becomes so
essential that the state cannot endure unless it is safeguarded, it is of little moment whether it be called an attribute or a fundamental right.
The tendency among modern publicists is to a void all
difficulty by describing equality as an essential principle
of the law of nations. Many writers who retain a naturalist terminology and classification really treat equality as a
principle, rather than a natural right or an essential attribute. It is presented as a principle by the ablest of modern
publicists, including Bluntschli, Phillimore, Rivier, and
others. 3

mann, EUments, § 8, 28; Nys, Etudes, II, 9; Phillimore, Commentaries, I, 216;

Rivier, Principes, I, 124; Walker, Manual, p. 11. Several of the writers cited in

THE

note 2 above really treat equality as a principle.

JURIDICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STATE EQUALITY

Whatever the terms with which publicists may attempt
to define equality in the law of nations, it is of supreme im1

Traitt, §§ 184, 442, I, 307, II, 5.

s Jfanrul, §§ 272, 241, pp. 162, 142.

See also Calvo, Dictionnaire, I, 286;
Despagnet, Cours, § 165, p. 217; Field, Int. Code, § 16, p. to; Fiore, Trattato, §
361, I, 245; Hershey, Essentials, p. 155; Kliiber, Droil des gens,§ SQ, p. 132; Nys,
Le droit int., II, 235; Pi~delievre, Pruis, § 267, I, 244.
1 Bluntschli, Viilkerrechl, § 81, p. 96; Calvo, Le droit int., § 210, I, 356; Carnazza Amari, Trauato, p. 276; Cobbett, Cases, I, 50; Chretien, Principes, §§ 163,
176, pp. 165, 177; Halleck, lnl. Law, p. 97; Heffter, Viilkerrechl, § 26, p. 47;
Holtzendorff, Handbuch, § 3, II, 11; Huber, Die Gleichheil der Staalen; Kebedgy,
in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; Kent, Commentaries, I, 21; Neumann, EMments, § 8, :z8; Nys, P.ludes, II, 9; Phillimore, Commenlari-es, I, 216;
Rivier, Principes, I, 124; Walker, Manual, p. II. Several of the writers cited in
note 2 above really treat equality as a principle.
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portance that there be a common understanding with refer-

ence to its juridical significance, as well as adequate means

of expressing that significance so that it can be understood.

Unfortunately, there is an extraordinary confusion of thought

and of statement on this point in the books. It was sug-

gested at the beginning of the first chapter that equality

among persons subject to law may mean either an equality

of protection in the enjoyment of rights or an ^efluality of

Capacity for rights. In systems of municipal law the former

principle ibTIsuafly described as " equality before the law,"

or as " equal protection of the law," while the latter prin-

ciple is called simply an equality of rights or of capacity.

There seems to be no adequate terminology in the law of

nations whereby these two principles may be defined and

distinguished. "Equality before the law" is a convenient

description of the principle of equal protection, and is com-

mended by its use in this sense in various systems of mu-

nicipal law.1 Unhappily, in the law of nations publicists

and statesmen have used "equality before the law" and

"equality of rights " as though they meant the same thing.2
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1 See the guaranties of equality in the following constitutions: Argentine,

Art. 16; Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,

Art. 2; Belgium, Art. 6; Brazil, Art. 72, § 2; Bulgaria, Art. 57; Chile, Art. 10, § t;

China, Art. 4; Costa Rica, Art. 25; Cuba, Art. 11; Ecuador, Art. 30; Greece, Art.

3; Guatemala, Art. 16; Haiti, Art. 13; Honduras, Arts. 25,57; Italy, Art. 24; Lux-

emburg, Art. 11; Montenegro, Art. 106; Netherlands, Art. 4; Nicaragua, Art. 23; -

Panama, Art. 16; Paraguay, Art. 26; Persia, Suppl. Fundamental Laws of 1907,

Art. 8; Peru, Art. 32; Portugal, Art. 3, § 2; Roumania, Art. 10; Salvador, Arts.

8, 23; Servia, Art. 7; Switzerland, Art. 4; Turkey, Art. 17; Uruguay, Art. 132;

Venezuela, Art. 23, § 5, par. 15. For the dates of constitutions cited, and method

of citation, see infra, p. 192, note 1.

2 See Barbosa, La Deux. Confer., II, 153, transl. in The Independent (1908),

LXIV, 79; Bourgeois, La Confer. Int. Pt. IV, p. 76, and La Deux. Confer., II, 88,

349; Brown, in A. J. I. L. (1915), IX, 326-329; Carvajal, La Deux. Confer., II,

147; Creasy, Int. Law, pp. 114-116; Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 190, 216, 220,

242; Hershey, Essentials, pp. 59. 155; Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 532-534;

Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; Lawrence, Essays, pp.

202, 203, 206, 208, 232; Maine, Int. Law, p. 55; F. de Martens, Traitt, I, 380;

Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 37, 163; de Villa-Urrutia, La Deux. Confer.,

II, 252.

portance that there be a common understanding with reference to its juridical significance, as well as adequate means
of expressing that significance so that it can be understood.
Unfortunately, there is an extraordinary confusion of thought
and of statement on this point in the books. It was suggested at the beginning of the first chapter that equality
among persons subject to law may mean either an equality
of protection in the enjoyment of rights or an ~alit¥- of
~acity for ri~ In systems of municipal law the former
prin~y described as" equality before the law,"
or as "equal protection of the law," while the latter principle is called simply an equality of rights or of capacity.
There seems to be no adequate terminology in the law of
nations whereby these two principles may be defined and
distinguished. "Equality before the law" is a convenient
description of the principle of equal protection, and is commended by its use in this sense in various systems of municipal law.1 Unhappily, in the law of nations publicists
and statesmen have used "equality before the law" and
"equality of rights" as though they meant the same thing. 2
1 See the guaranties of equality in the following constitutions: Argentine,
Art. 16; Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the General Rights of Citizens,
Art. 2; Belgium, Art. 6; Brazil, Art. 72, § 2; Bulgaria, Art. 57; Chile, Art. 10, § 1;
China, Art. 4; Costa Rica, Art. 25; Cuba, Art. II; Ecuador, Art. 30; Greece, Art.
3; Guatemala, Art. 16; Haiti, Art. 13; Honduras, Arts. 25, 57; Italy, Art. 24; Luxemburg, Art. II; Montenegro, Art. 196; Netherlands, Art. 4; Nicaragua, Art. 23;
Panama, Art. 16; Paraguay, Art. 26; Persia, Suppl. Fundamental Laws of 1907,
Art. 8; Peru, Art. 32; Portugal, Art. 3, § 2; Roumania, Art. 10; Salvador, Arts.
8, 23; Servia, Art. 7; Switzerland, Art. 4; Turkey, Art. 17; Uruguay, Art. 132;
Venezuela, Art. 23, § 5, par. 15. For the dates of constitutions cited, and method
of citation, see infra, p. 192, note 1.
2 See Barbosa, La Deux. Confer., II, 153, transl. in Tlte Independent (1908),
LXIV, 79; Bourgeois, La Confer. Int. Pt. IV, p. 76, and La Deux. Conftr., II, 88,
349; Brown, in A. J. I. L. (1915), IX, 326-329; Carvajal, La Deux. Con/&., II,
147; Creasy, Int. Law, pp. 114-II6; Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, pp. 190, 216, 220,
242; Hershey, Essentials, pp. 59, 155; Hicks, in A. J. I . L. (1908), II, 532-534;
Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103; Lawrence, Essays, pp.
202, 203, 2o6, 2o8, 232; Maine, Int. Law, p. 55; F. de Martens, TraiU, I, 380;
Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 37, 163; de Villa-Urrutia, La Deux. Con/&.,

II, 252.
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Both the principles and the means of stating them have

been hopelessly confused.

There are some statements of the rule of equality which,

if taken literally, imply nothing more than the basic prin-

ciple of equal protection in the enjoyment of rights. Kent,

for example, appears to emphasize equal consideration for

rights rather than equality of rights:

Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim

equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative

dimensions or strength, or however greatly they may differ in govern-

ment, religion, or manners. This perfect equality, and entire inde-

pendence of all distinct states, is a fundamental principle of public

Both the principles and the means of stating them have
been hopelessly confused.
There are some statements of the rule of equality which,
if taken literally, imply nothing more than the basic principle of equal protection in the enjoyment of rights. Kent,
for example, appears to emphasize equal consideration for
rights rather than equality of rights:

law.1

This, however, is not what the publicists mean. When they

refer to the equality of states they imply something quite

different from equality of protection. The point has been

stated clearly by Lorimer, who says:

If all that was meant were that all States are equally entitled to

assert such rights as they have, and that they have thus an equal

interest in the vindication of law, the assertion would be true of
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States, as of citizens and individuals. Small States might be more

Nations are equal in respect to each other, and entitled to claim
equal consideration for their rights, whatever may be their relative
dimensions or strength, or however greatly they may differ in government, religion, or manners. This perfect equality, and entire independence of all distinct states, is a fundamental principle of public
law.1

dependent on positive law than great States, but the same may be

said of small men as compared with great men. This, however, is not

the meaning of the doctrine at all. If we look into the authorities we

shall find that what is meant, though of course by no means consist-

ently maintained, is really what is said — viz., that the rights of

States are equal in themselves, and not merely the right of asserting

their rights.2

This, however, is not what the publicists mean. When they
refer to the equality of states they imply something quite
different from equality of protection. The point has been
stated clearly by Lorimer, who says:

The principle of equality is explained by a majority of

the publicists as meaning that states have equal rights and

obligations. Thus, according to Calvo, equality

has a twofold consequence, in that it attributes to all states the same

rights and imposes upon them reciprocally the same duties.3

1 Commentaries, I, 21. * Le droit int., § 210,1, 356.

• Institutes, I, 171.

If all that was meant were that all States are equally entitled to
assert such rights as they have, and that they have thus an equal
interest in the vindication of law, the assertion would be true of
States, as of citizens and individuals. Small States might be more
dependent on positive law than great States, but the same may be
said of small men as compared with great men. This, however, is not
the meaning of the doctrine at all. If we look into the authorities we
shall find that what is meant, though of course by no means consistently maintained, is really what is said - viz., that the r£ghts of
States are equal in themselves, and not merely the right of asserting
their rights. 2

The principle of equality is explained by a majority of
the publicists as meaning that states have equal rights and
obligations. Thus, according to Calvo, equality
has a twofold consequence, in that it attributes to all states the same
rights and imposes upon them reciprocally the same dnties.3
l

t

Commentaries, I, 21.
Institutes, I, 171.

a Le droit int., §

210,

I, 356.
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Taylor defines equality as meaning that "the legal rights

of the greatest and smallest states are identical,"1 while

Hershey insists that all independent states have " the same

legal rights and obligations."2 According to Cobbett,

equality

really means that all States, whether great or small, have equal rights

and duties in matters of international law.s

Of course the publicists do not really mean that states

have identical legal rights and obligations, for that is mani-

Taylor defines equality as meaning that "the legal rights
of the greatest and smallest states are identical," 1 while
Hershey insists that all independent states have "the same
legal rights and obligations." 2 According to Cobbett,
equality

festly inconceivable. What they really mean, although by

no means what they consistently say, is that states have

equal natural rights or interests, and that in the protection

really means that all States, whether great or small, have equal rights
and duties in matters of international law.3

of these interests the law of nations recognizes an equality

of capacity for legal rights among its subjects. The am-

biguity results from attempting to explain naturalist con-

ceptions in terms of modern legal science, without a very

clear understanding of modern legal science. It would

probably have been corrected long since were it not for the

chronic tendency of publicists to repeat uncritically their

predecessors' definitions.
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The meaning of equality as a legal principle is explained

by a few of the modern writers in a way that approaches

scientific precision. Some define it in terms that suggest

equality of rights, and then proceed to explain it as equality

of legal capacity. Thus, Heffter refers to equality of rights

(Gleichheit des Rechtes), but says that equality

means nothing more nor less than that each state may exercise equally

with others all rights that are based upon its existence as a state in the

international society.4

1 Int. Pub. Law, § 69, p. 98. 8 Essentials, p. 155.

* Cases, I, 50. See also Felice's Burlamaqui, Principes, IV, 434; Field, Int.

Code, § 16, p. 10; Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Klflber, Droit des gens, § 89, p. 132;

Lawrence, Int. Law, § 112, p. 268; F. de Martens, Traité, I, 380; Moore, Digest,

I, 62; Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 419; Root, in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 213;

Wheaton, History, p. 636; Woolsey, Int. Law, pp. 36, 59.

* VSlkerrecht, §§ 26-27, PP- 47_48. "Mit dem vSlkerrechtlichen Begriffe eines

Of course the publicists do not really mean that states
have identical legal rights and obligations, for that is manifestly inconceivable. What they really mean, although by
no means what they consistently say, is that states have
equal natural rights or interests, and that in the protection
of these interests the law of nations recognizes an equality
of capacity for legal rights among its subjects. The ambiguity results from attempting to explain naturalist conceptions in terms of modern legal science, without a very
clear understanding of modern legal science. It would
probably have been corrected long since were it not for the
chronic tendency of publicists to repeat uncritically their
predecessors' definitions.
The meaning of equality as a legal principle is explained
by a few of the modern writers in a way that approaches
scientific precision. Some define it in terms that suggest
equality of rights, and then proceed to explain it as equality
of legal capacity. Thus, Heffter refers to equality of rights
(Gleichheit des Rechtes), but says that equality
means nothing more nor less than that each state may exercise equally
with others all rights that are based upon its existence as a state in the
international society.•
/nl. Pub. Law,§ 69, p. 98.

Essentials, p. 155.
Cases, I, 50. See also Felice's Burlamaqui, Principes, IV, 434; Field, fot.
Code, § 16, p. 10; Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Klilber, Droil des gens, § 89, p. 132;
Lawrence, Int. Law,§ 112, p. 268; F. de Martens, Traill, I, 38o; Moore, Digest,
I, 62; Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 419; Root, in A. J. /. L. (1916), X, 213;
Wheaton, History, p. 636; Woolsey, Int. Law, pp. 36, 59.
' Volkerrec/sJ, §§ 26-27, pp. 47-48. "Mit dem volkerrechtlichen Begriffe eines
1
1
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Others avoid even this much of ambiguity, explaining the

principle, with considerable lucidity of statement, as a

matter of legal capacity. According to Pradier-Foderfi, the

equality of states should be understood as meaning

that they all have potentially {mrtuellement) the same rights, that

they have an equal power (pouvoir) of realizing them, and that they

ought to be able to exercise them with the same inviolability.1

Others avoid even this much of ambiguity, explaining the
principle, with considerable lucidity of statement, as a
matter of legal capacity. According to Pradier-Fodere, the
equality of states should be understood as meaning

The clearest and in all respects the most satisfactory dis-

cussion of the meaning of equality in the law of nations is

to be found in the treatises of Carnazza Amari and Fiore.

Carnazza Amari is unequivocal in explaining that states are

equal, not in respect to their rights, but in respect to-

that they all have potentially (virtuellement) the same rights, that
they have an equal power (p(mvoir) of realizing them, and that they
ought to be able to exercise them with the same inviolability. 1

capacity. He says:

This fundamental equality should not be taken to mean that it is

necessary for them to develop their existence and realize their rights

in the same degree; these rights may differ according to the more or

less extensive activity of each state and according to the differences of

situation in which the different peoples may find themselves and the

varied influence of accompanying circumstances. It is necessary to

understand this equality in the sense that all states have potentially
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the same rights, and enjoy, as Romagnosi has well said, the same

inviolability in the exercise and in the realization of their rights. This

The clearest and in all respects the most satisfactory discussion of the meaning of equality in the law of nations is
to be found in the treatises of Carnazza Amari and Fiore.
Carnazza Amari is unequivocal in explaining that states are
equal, not in respect to their rights, but in respect tocapacity. He says:

equality results from the human nature which presents in all states the

same characteristics of type; it is a natural fact which has a real exist-

ence; it is, therefore, based on human nature; and to violate it is to

destroy the very constitution of human kind and of states.

Equality, strictly speaking, is not a right; but it establishes a

general limit imposed on states, which have an equal power of realiz-

ing the same rights, and which ought to exercise them with the same

inviolability when they have become concrete.*

vollkommen souveranen Staates sind an und fttr sich Rechtsungleichheiten unter

mehreren derselben unvereinbar. Auch der kleinste Staat in Hinsicht auf politische

Bedeutung hat demnach das gleiche Recht mit dem grosseren und m&chtigeren in

Anspruch zu nehmen. Darin liegt jedoch nichts mehr oder weniger, als dass jeder

Staat gleich den anderen alle in der staatlichen Existenz und im volkerrechtlichen

Verbande begriindeten Rechte ausüben darf."

1 TraiU, §449, II, u.

* "Questa loro uguaglianza fondamentale non deve essere presa net senso che-

This fundamental equality should not be taken to mean that it is
necessary for them to develop their existence and realize their rights
in the same degree; these rights may differ according to the more or
less extensive activity of each state and according to the differences of
situation in which the different peoples may find themselves and the
varied influence of accompanying circumstances. It is necessary to
understand this equality in the sense that all states have potentially
the same rights, and enjoy, as Romagnosi has well said, the same
inviolability in the exercise and in the realization of their rights. This.
equality results from the human nature which presents in all states the
same characteristics of type; it is a natural fact which has a real existence; it is, therefore, based on human nature; and to violate it is to
destroy the very constitution of human kind and of states.
Equality, strictly speaking, is not a right; but it establishes a
general limit imposed on states, which have an equal power of realizing the same rights, and which ought to exercise them with the same
inviolability when they have become concrcte.2
vollkommen souveranen Staates sind an und fur sich Rechtsungleichheiten untermehreren derselben unvereinbar. Auch der kleinste Staat in Hinsicht auf politische
Bedeutung hat demnach das gleiche Recht mit dem grosscren und machtigeren in
Anspruch zu nehmen. Darin liegt jedoch nichts mehr oder weniger, als dass jeder
Staat gleich den anderen alle in der staatlichen Existenz und im volkerrechtlichen
Verbande begrUndeten Rechte austiben darf."
• TraiU, § 449 1 II, 11.
1 " Questa loro uguaglianza fondamentale non deve essere presa nel senso che-
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Fiore has a very clear and satisfactory statement:

Fiore has a very clear and satisfactory statement:

Every state which possesses political personality has the right to

be considered in the international society as the equal of others in

whatever concerns its juridical capacity, the faculty of exercising its

rights, and the extent of international obligations. Whether states

are great or small, weak or strong, a superiority or limitation not

common to all cannot be lawful.

Consequently, we may formulate the following rules:

(a) Whatever is lawful, just, or equitable for one state, should be

equally lawful, just, and equitable for others.

(b) The greater or less extent of territory, number of population,

and power, can never modify the perfect juridical equality of states

in all that concerns the exercise of their rights and the fulfilment of

their duties.1

Chrétien, who follows Fiore, expresses the idea clearly and

concisely:

debbano mantenere lo stesso grado di sviluppo di loro esistenza, e di effetuazione

dei loro diritti, i quali possono differire secondo la loro maggiore o minore attività

e secondo la differente posizione in cui possono i popoli trovarsi e la varia in-
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fluenza delle circostanze che l'accompagnano, ma nel senso che tutti gli stati hanno

Every state which possesses political personality has the right to
be considered in the international society as the equal of others in
whatever concerns its juridical capacity, the faculty of exercising its
rights, and the extent of international obligations. Whether states
are great or small, weak or strong, a superiority or limitation not
common to all cannot be lawful.
Consequently, we may formulate the following rules:
(a) Whatever is lawful, just, or equitable for one state, should be
equally lawful, just, and equitable for others.
(b) The greater or less extent of territory, number of population,
and power, can never modify the perfect juridical equality of states
in all that concerns the exercise of their rights and the fulfilment of
their duties. 1

gli stessi diritti in potenza e godono, come bene disse il Romagnosi, della uguale

inviolabilità nell'esercizio e nell'attuazione dei loro diritti. Questa uguaglianza

risulta dalla umana natura che presenta in tutti gli stati i medesimi caratteri tipici,

è un fatto naturale che ha realtà di esistenza; quindi non può essere violata senza

Chretien, who follows Fiore, expresses the idea clearly and
concisely:

distruggere la costituzione istessa del genere umano e degli stati, e si fonda sulla

natura umana.

L'uguaglianza, rigorosamente parlando, non è un diritto, ma stabilisce un

limite generale imposto agli stati, i quali hanno l'uguale potenza ad effettuare i

medesimi diritti, ma una volta concretati, devono esercitarli con uguale inviola-

bilità." Trattato, p. 277.

1 "Ciascuno Stato ha il diritto di essere considerato nella società internazionale

alla pari degli altri, per quanto attiene alla sua capacità giuridica, alla facoltà di

esercitare i suoi diritti, all'estensione delle sue obbligazioni intemazionali. Siano

grandi o piccoli gli Stati, deboli o forti, non potrebbe essere legittima una superiorità

o una limitazione che non fosse commune a tutti.

"Stabiliamo quindi le seguenti regole:

(a) Tutto ciò che è lecito, equo, giusto per uno Stato, deve essere parimente

lecito, equo, giusto per gli altri;

(b) La maggiore o minore estensione del territorio, il numero della popolazione,

la potenza, per nulla possono modificare l'uguaglianza giuridica perfetta degli

Stati, in tutto quello che attiene all'esercizio dei loro diritti e all'adempimento dei

loro doveri." Trattato, §§ 420-421,1, 289. See also Int. Lavi Cod., § 393.

debbano mantenere lo stesso grado di sviluppo di loro esistenza, e di effetuazione
dei loro diritti, i quali possono differire secondo la loro maggiore o minore attivitA.
e secondo la differente posizione in cui possono i popoli trovarsi e la varia influenza delle circostanze che l'accompagnano, ma nel senso che tutti gli stati hanno
gli stessi diritti in potenza e godono, come bene disse il Romagnosi, della uguale
inviolabilit.a nell'esercizio e nell'attuazione dei loro diritti. Questa uguaglianza
risulta dalla umana natura che presenta in tutti gli stati i medesimi caratteri tipici,
e un fatto naturale che ha realtA di esistenza; quindi non pu<} essere violata senza
distruggere la costituzione istessa del genere umano e degli stati, e si fonda sulla
natura umana.
L'uguaglianza, rigorosamente parlando, non e un diritto, ma stabilisce un
limite generale imposto agli stati, i quali hanno l'uguale potenza ad effettuare i
medesimi diritti, ma una volta concretati, devono esercitarli con uguale inviolabilitA." Trattato, p. 277.
1 " Ciascuno Stato ha ii diritto di essere considerato nella societA intemazionale
alla pari degli altri, per quanto attiene alla sua capacitA giuridica, alla facolta di
esercitare i suoi diritti, all'estensione delle sue obbligazioni internazionali. Siano
grandi o piccoli gli Stati, deboli o forti, non potrebbe essere legittima una superioritA
o una Iimitazione che non fosse commune a tutti.
" Stabiliamo quindi le seguenti regole:
(a) Tutto ci<} che e lecito, equo, giusto per uno Stato, deve essere parimente
lecito, equo, giusto per gli altri;
(b) La maggiore o minore estensione del territorio, il numero della popolazione,
la potenza, per nulla possono modificare l'uguaglianza giuridica perfetta degli
Stati, in tutto quello che attiene all'esercizio <lei loro diritti e all'adempimento <lei
loro doveri." Traltato, §§ 420-4:zx, I, 28<}. See also Int. Law Cod.,§ 393.
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States are equal in the sense that they all have the same juridical

capacity, that is to say, that whatever their strength and their wealth

may be, they may claim the same rights and are subject to the same

obligations. . . .

Its general effect is to attribute to each state, whether it be the

principality of Monaco or the Empire of the Czars, the aptitude to ex-

ercise the same rights and to assume the same obligations.1

"It results from this equality," according to Twiss, " that

whatever is lawful for one Nation is equally lawful for an-

other, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally

States are equal in the sense that they all have the same juridical
capacity, that is to say, that whatever their strength and their wealth
may be, they may claim the same rights and are subject to the same
obligations. . . .
Its general effect is to attribute to each state, whether it be the
principality of Monaco or the Empire of the Czars, the ap#tude to exercise the same rights and to assume the same obligations. 1

unjustifiable in the other 2 and the same idea is expressed

from another point of view by Wilson, who says that " on

the ground of equality, regardless of extent of territory or

number of population, each state of the family of nations

has a similar status at international law." 3

The Justification of State Equality

Why should international persons have an equal capacity

for rights? For this question also publicists have a variety

of answers. Their answers cannot be systematically classi-

fied; the difference is frequently a matter of emphasis or of
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point of approach. Perhaps the subject would hardly justify

an effort at classification if classification were possible.

Nevertheless their answers are of considerable interest, be-

cause they shed a good deal of light on the real significance

" It results from this equality," according to Twiss, " that
whatever is lawful for one Nation is equally lawful for another, and whatever is unjustifiable in the one is equally
unjustifiable in the other "; 2 and the same idea is expressed
from another point of view by Wilson, who says that "on
the ground of equality, regardless of extent of territory or
number of population, each state of the family of nations
has a similar status at international law." 3

of the principle, and because they constitute in a sense its

justification.

1 "Les Etats sont egaux en ce sens qu'ils ont tous meme capacitfi juridique,

c'est-a-dire qu'ils peuvent, quelles que soient d'ailleurs leur force et leur richesse,

revendiquer les memes droits et sont tenus des mSmes obligations. . . .

"Son effet general est d'attribuer a tout fitat, quel qu'il soit, principautfi de

Monaco ou empire des Czars, I'aptitude d exercer les mtmes droits el d assumer les

mtmes obligations." Principes, §§ 161, 163, pp. 163, 165.

* Law of Nations, p. 12.

* Handbook, p. 74. See also Bonfils, Manuel, § 272, p. 161; F. de Martens,

Traité, I, 309; Pifidelievre, Précis, § 268,1, 245; Pomeroy, Lectures, p. 323; Rivier,

Principes, I, 123; Venez. Arbit. (Counter Case of Great Britain), p. 975.

THE JUSTIFICATION OF STATE EQUALITY

Why should international persons have an equal capacity
for rights ? For this question also publicists have a variety
of answers. Their answers cannot be systematically classified; the difference is frequently a matter of emphasis or of
point of approach. Perhaps the subject would hardly justify
an effort at classification if classification were possible.
Nevertheless their answers are of considerable interest, because they shed a good deal of light on the real significance
of the principle, and because they constitute in a sense its
justification.
1 " Les ttats sont egaux en ce sens qu'ils ont tous meme capacite juridique,
c'est-A-dire qu'ils peuvent, quelles que soient d'ailleurs leur force et leur richesse,
revendiquer !es memes droits et sont tenus des memes obligations....
" Son effet general est d'attribuer A tout ttat, quel qu'il soit, principaute de
Monaco ou empire des Czars, l'aptitude a exercer les mcmes droils el d assumer les
mbnes obligations." Principes, §§ 16r, 163, pp. r63, 165.
2 Law of Natfons, p. 12.
1 Handbook, p. 74.
See also Bonfils, Manuel, § 272, p. 161; F. de Martens,
TraiU, I, 309; Piedelicvre, Pr«is, § 268, I, 245; Pomeroy, Lectures, p. 323; Rivier,
Principes, I, 123; Venez. Arbit. (Counter Case of Great Britain), p. 975.
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THE EQUALITY OF STATES

Many writers of the last century regard equality as a

natural right or as a principle which is based upon natural

right. Thus Wheaton and Phillrmore speak of the "natu-

ral equality of states "; Chretien says that " this juridical

equality of states may be called natural"; and Halleck and

Taylor declare that sovereign states are " endowed with the

same natural rights." 1 Bluntschli rests the principle upon

the same foundation:

Common human nature is the natural bond which binds all peoples

to the unity of human kind. Accordingly, each people has a natural

right to be respected in its human nature by other peoples, and an

obligation to respect this same human nature in them. This is the

Many writers of the last century regard equality as a
natural right or as a principle which is based upon natural
right. Thus Wheaton and Phillimore speak of the "natural equality of states"; Chretien says that " this juridical
equality of states may be ca.lled natural "; and Halleck and
Taylor declare that sovereign states are" endowed with the
same natural rights." 1 Bluntschli rests the principle upon
the same foundation:

human equality of peoples before the law (Rechtsgleichheit). Through-

out all time individual sages have admitted this truth; but it has

found recognition for the first time in the modern law of nations, and

even today numerous prejudices, religious and racial hatreds, and

selfishness stand as obstacles in the way of its general application as a

legal maxim (Rechtssaiz).*

There is also a tendency among the publicists to derive
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the principle of equality from the nature of international

society. F. de Martens declares that "the society which

unites civilized nations requires that they mutually recog-

nize the equality of their rights." 3 Phillimore lays down

two propositions as the basis of international law: (i)

states are recognized as free moral persons; (2) each state

is a member of a universal community. From the second

proposition that each state is a member of a universal com-

Common human nature is the natural bond which binds all peoples
to the unity of human kind. Accordingly, each people has a natural
right to be respected in its human nature by other peoples, and an
obligation to respect this same human nature in them. This is the
human equality of peoples before the law (Rechtsgleichheit). Throughout all time individual sages have admitted this truth; but it has
found recognition for the first time in the modern law of nations, and
even today numerous prejudices, religious and racial hatreds, and
selfishness stand as obstacles in the way of its general application as a
legal maxim (Rechtssalz). 1

munity, he says, "seem to be more especially derived the

Rights incident to Equality." 4 According to Twiss, inde-

pendence and equality constitute the basis of the " Natural

1 See Carnazza Amari, Trottato, p. 276; Chretien, Principes, § 161, p. 163;

Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Klliber, Droit des gens, §§ 37, 89, pp. 68, 132; Maine,

Ancient Law, p. 103; Moore, Digest, I, 62; Phillimore, Commentaries, II, 45;

Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, § 282, p. 322; Twiss, Law of Nations, pp. 145, 179; Whea-

ton, Elements, pp. 118,295.

* VSlkerrecht, § 2, p. 60. * Traité, I, 380. * Commentaries, I, 216.

There is also a tendency among the publicists to derive
the principle of equality from the nature of international
society. F. de Martens declares that "the society which
unites civilized nations requires that they mutually recognize the equality of their rights." 3 Phillimore lays down
two propositions as the basis of international law: (1)
states are recognized as free moral persons; (2) each state
is a member of a universal community. From the second
proposition that each state is a member of a universal community, he says, "seem to be more especially derived the
Rights incident to Equality." 4 According to Twiss, independence and equality constitute the basis of the "Natural
See Cama.zza Amari, Tralkllo, p. 276; Chretien, Principes, § 161, p. 163;
Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; KlUber, Droil des gens, §§ 37 1 8<), pp. 68, 132; Maine,
Ancknt Law, p. 103; Moore, Digest, I, 62; Phillimore, Commentaries, II, 45;
Taylor, Int. Pub. Law,§ 282 1 p. 322; Twiss, Law of Nations, pp. 1451 179; Wheaton, Elements, pp. n8, 295.
1 Traill, I, 38o.
' VolkerruhJ, § 2, p. 6o.
• Commentaries, I, 216.
1
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Society of Nations." 1 Calvo makes it a fundamental prin-

ciple of the international society that

all questions of right arising between nations ought to be settled in a

way that will not derogate from that mutual equality in which they

are all placed with regard to one another.*

Wheaton repeats the eighteenth century dogma that the

great society of nations is only " a state of nature." 3 This

is the substance of the whole proposition. The notion that.

Society of Nations." 1 Calvo makes it a fundamental principle of the international society that
all questions of right arising between nations ought to be settled in a
way that will not derogate from that mutual equality in which they
are all placed with regard to one another.2

equality is derived from the nature of international relation-

ships is simply a modern version of the naturalists' propo-

sition that each state is the equal of every other because it

is une personne morale jouissant de la libertS naturelle.* It is

the theory of natural rights regarded from the point of view

of international society instead of the point of view of the

international person.

A few writers seem to regard equality as a necessary con-

sequence of international personality. They imply that

since states are Rechtspersonen, personnalites morales, or ju-

ristic persons in the law of nations, they must be equal. The

notion is rarely pressed to a conclusion as in itself a justifi-
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cation for the principle. It is almost always associated with

other ideas.6

One of the most common devices for explaining and justi-

fying the equality of states is the analogy between natural

1 Law of Nations, pp. 14, 145.

• Le droit int., § 1860, TV, 2.

1 Elements, p. 118.

4 KlUber, Droit des gens, §§ 37, 89, pp. 68, 132. See also Fiore, Trattato, § 169,

I, 113; Maine, Ancient Law, p. 103; Oppenheim, Int. Law, I, 20, 168; Pillet, in

R. G. D. I. P. (1898), V, 71. Huber's more recent analysis of the principle of

equality seems to have been influenced largely by what was, in essence, the natural-

ists' conception of international relationships. Die Gleichheit der Staaten, pp. 106-

118.

* See Bluntschli, VSlkerrecht, § 81, p. 96; Carnazza Amari, Trattato, pp. 269-

274, 276 ff.; Klüber, Droit des gens, §§ 37, 89, pp. 68, 132; F. de Martens, Traitl,

I, 377, 387; Oppenheim, Int. Law, I, 168; Phillimore, Commentaries, II, 45;

Woolsey, Int. Law, p. 35.

Wheaton repeats the eighteenth century dogma that the
great society of nations is only "a state of nature." 3 This
is the substance of the whole proposition. The notion that .
equality is derived from the nature of international relationships is simply a modern version of the naturalists' proposition that each state is the equal of every other because it
is une personne morale jouissant de la liberte naturelle.4 It is
the theory of natural rights regarded from the point of view
of international society instead of the point of view of the
international person.
A few writers seem to regard equality as a necessary consequence of international personality. They imply that
since states are Rechtspersonen, personnalites morales, or juristic persons in the law of nations, they must be equal. The
notion is rarely pressed to a conclusion as in itself a justification for the principle. It is almost always associated with
other ideas. 6
One of the most common devices for explaining and justifying the equality of states is the analogy between natural
Law of Nations, pp. 14, 145.
Le droit inJ., § 1860, IV, 2.
I E/.emenJs, p. 118.
' Klilber, Droit des gens, H 37, &), pp. 68, 132. See also Fiore, TraltakJ, § 169,
I, 113; Maine, AncienJ Law, p. 103; Oppenheim, Im. Law, I, 20, 168; Pillet, in
R. G.D. I. P. {1&)8), V, 7r. Huber's more recent analysis of the principle of
equality seems to have been influenced largely by what was, in essence, the naturalists' conception of international relationships. DU Gkichheit der Staaten, pp. 1o6118.
1 See Bluntschli, Volkerrecht, § 81, p. 96; Carnazza Amari, Trallato, pp. 269274, 276 ff.; Kluber, Droit des gens,§§ 37, &), pp. 68, 132; F. de Martens, Traill,
I, 377, 387; Oppenheim, Int. Law, I, 168; Phillimore, Commentaries, II, 45;
Woolsey, Int. Law, p. 35.
1
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THE EQUALITY OF STATES

persons and states as international persons. The device is

an old one and has undergone little change since the seven-

teenth century. Pradier-Fodere's use of it, for illustration,

is almost Hobbesian in its simplicity:

The equality which is a right of man is also a right of states, because

we know that as soon as states are formed they in some way acquire

persons and states as international persons. The device is
an old one and has undergone little change since the seventeenth century. Pradier-Fodere's use of it, for illustration,
is almost Hobbesian in its simplicity:

personal properties, they become moral persons, and we may conse-

quently attribute to them, in proportion, whatever agrees with men

in particular, such as certain acts which are suited to them, certain

rights which belong to them, and certain duties which they are bound

to perform.1

Pi&ielievre says much the same thing:

The equality which is a right of man is equally a right of states.

Just as all men, having the same essential faculties, have juridical per-

sonality and consequently are juridically equal, so states, which are

collective personalities, ought to have the same characteristics, deserve

The equality which is a right of man is also a right of states, because
we know that as soon as states are formed they in some way acquire
personal properties, they become moral persons, and we may consequently attribute to them, in proportion, whatever agrees with men
in particular, such as certain acts which are suited to them, certain
rights which belong to them, and certain duties which they are bound
to perform.1

individually the same respect, and enjoy the same juridical equality.*

Despagnet follows a well-beaten path in asserting that

Piedelievre says much the same thing:

This equality is no other than that which reason reveals and con-
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science commands us to recognize among men, from the point of view

of right, in spite of innumerable inequalities of fact, natural or ac-

quired, which exist among them.3

The analogy is vindicated in greatest detail in the treatise

of Carnazza Amari:

All men have the same origin, the same type, are physico-spiritual

beings, since they are composed of an organic and living body and of

The equality which is a right of man is equally a right of states.
Just as all men, having the same essential faculties, have juridical per·
sonality and consequently are juridically equal, so states, which are
collective personalities, ought to have the same characteristics, deserve
individually the same respect, and enjoy the same juridical equality.2

a free and immortal soul; they are endowed with the same faculties,

since they all have intelligence, free will, and the power to act, facul-

Despagnet follows a well-beaten path in asserting that

ties which raise them above all other beings. The different human

races are not distinguished by any essential differences; in fact, they

all reveal the same type, they have the same fundamental character-

istics, and they manifest a mysterious harmony which shows that

they are all of the same species. This unity of species and of type of

human kind is a fact generally recognized by science. Now men, all

This equality is no other than that which reason reveals and conscience commands us to recognize among men, from the point of view
of right, in spite of innumerable inequalities of fact, natural or acquired, which exist among them.3

1 Troitt, § 447, II, 8. 1 Prtcis, § 267,1, 244. » Cours, § 167, 218.

The analogy is vindicated in greatest detail in the treatise
of Carnazza Amari:
All men have the same origin, the same type, are physico-spiritual
beings, since they are composed of an organic and living body and of
a free and immortal soul; they are endowed with the same faculties,
since they all have intelligence, free will, and the power to act, faculties which raise them above all other beings. The different human
races are not distinguished by any essential differences; in fact, they
all reveal the same type, they have the same fundamental characteristics, and they manifest a mysterious harmony which shows that
they are all of the same species. This unity of species and of type of
human kind is a fact generally recognized by science. Now men, all
1

TraiU, § 447, II, 8.

2

Pr«is, § 267, I, 244.

1

Cours, § 167, 218.
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having the same fundamental faculties, are all juridical persons and

consequently are all juridically equal.

States and nations, resulting from the union of a large number of

human beings, have the same characteristics which appear in their

members. Now if men are equal by type and in their rights, states,

which are collective persons composed of men, are likewise juridically

equal beings. Whatever the form of government, the more or less.

extensive area, the degree of power, the varied development of knowl-

edge, arts, and riches, the military strength, the more or less favorable

climate in which they are located, the fertility or aridity of soil, the

difference in the origin of the inhabitants, the different nature of the

territory, whether adjacent to the sea or in the interior, states are al-

ways juridically equal because they are always collective persons who

deserve the same juridical respect. States have the same fundamental

rights and their personality ought to be equally respected, whether it

concerns the vast empire of Russia or the petty republic of San Marinor

civilized France or a barbarous oceanic people; it is thus that the man

of great stature and the dwarf, the rich and the poor, are equal before

the law which governs the actions of individuals. Thus, international

treaties which attribute primitive rights to certain states while denying
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them to others, which accord to the powerful guaranties of which they

despoil the weak, violate equity; for states, whatever may be their

differences of form resulting from the same constituent elements of

their nature, have the same type and are consequently juridically

equal.1

1 Traitato, p. 276. See also Bluntschli, VOlkerrecht, § 81, p. 96; Bonfils, Manuel,

§ 235, p. 150; Felice's Burlamaqui, Principes, IV, 434; Holtzendorff, Handbuch,

$3,II,11; Kebedgy, in Z. 5. R. (1900) Neue Folge,XIX, 89,91,92; KlUber, Droit

des gens, § 37, p. 68; F. de Martens, Traitl, I, 380; Phillimore, Commentaries, II,

45; Pollock's Maine, Ancient Law, Note H, p. 121; Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900)

2" se>., II, 16. See also Barbosa, La Deux. Confer., II, 150, transl. in The Independ-

ent (1008), LXIV, 76; Carajal, La Deux. Confer., II, 147; Declaration of Rights of

Nations, in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 124; Lansing, in A. S. J. S. I. D., Proceedings

(1912), pp. 228-243, 232.

Equality was discussed at a meeting of the American Society of International

having the same fundamental faculties, are all juridical persons and
consequently are all juridically equal.
States and nations, resulting from the union of a large number of
human beings, have the same characteristics which appear in their
members. Now if men are equal by type and in their rights, states,
which are collective persons composed of men, are likewise juridically
equal beings. Whatever the form of government, the more or less.
extensive area, the degree of power, the varied development of knowledge, arts, and riches, the military strength, the more or less favorable
climate in which they are located, the fertility or aridity of soil, the
difference in the origin of the inhabitants, the different nature of the
territory, whether ad1acent to the sea or in the interior, states are always juridically equal because they are always collective persons who
deserve the same juridical respect. States have the same fundamental
rights and their personallty ought to be equally respected, whether it
concerns the vast empire of Russia or the petty republic of San Marinor
civilized France or a barbarous oceanic people; it is thus that the man
of great stature and the dwarf, the rich and the poor, are equal before
the law which governs the actions of individuals. Thus, international
treaties which attribute primitive rights to certain states while denying
them to others, which accord to the powerful guaranties of which they
despoil the weak, violate equity; for states, whatever may be their
differences of form resulting from the same constituent elements of
their nature, have the same type and are consequently juridically
equal.1

Law in 1909. In the course of the discussion, Mr. John W. Foster said: "I am

hardly prepared to say that the equality of states is a legal fiction. I do not think

it is a fiction at all; I think it is a reality. Sir, we might compare it, it occurs to

me, with the rights of men. In all countries, and especially in democratic or re-

publican countries, all men are entitled to equal rights; but they do not exercise

equal influence in the community." A. S. I. L. Proceedings (1909), III, 247. Mr.

F. W. Aymar relied upon the same analogy: "But for all practical purposes states

Trattato, p. 276. See also Bluntschli, V iilkerrechi, § 81, p. 96; Bonfils, Manuel,
§ 235, p. 150; F~lice's Burlamaqui, Principes, IV, 434; Holtzendorff, l!andbuch,
§ 3, II, u; Kebedgy, in Z. S . R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 89, 91, 92; Kluber, Droit
des gens,§ 37, p. 68; F. de Martens, TraiU, I, 380; Phillimore, Commentaries, II,
45; Pollock's Maine, Ancient Law, Note H, p. 121; Streit, in R . D. I. L. C. (1900)
2° ~r., II, 16. See also Barbosa, La Deux. Confh., II, 150, transl. in The Independent (I<)08), LXIV, 76; Carajal, La Deux. Conffr., II, 147; Declaration of Rights of
Nations, in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 124; Lansin~, in A. S. J. S. I. D., Proceedings
(1912), pp. 228-243, 232.
Equality was discussed at a meeting of the American Society of International
Law in 1909. In the course of the discussion, Mr. John W. Foster said: "I am
hardly prepared to say that the equality of states is a legal fiction. I do not think
it is a fiction at all; I think it is a reality. Sir, we might compare it, it occurs to
me, with the rights of men. In all countries, and especially in democratic or republican countries, all men are entitled to equal rights; but they do not exercise
equal infiuence in the community." A. S . I. L. Proceedings (1909), III, 247. Mr.
F. W. Aymar relied upon the same analogy: "But for all practical purposes states
1
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However much they may stress other explanations, a ma-

jority of the modern jurists come back eventually to the

conception of sovereignty as the fundamental justification

for equality. Walker derives his three basic principles of

the law of nations, of which equality is the first, from " the

fundamental conception of Territorial Sovereignty."1 Rivier

says:

The equality of sovereign states is the necessary consequence of

their independence. They are all equally sovereign. They have no

power above them. No one of them is placed above the others.2

However much they may stress other explanations, a majority of the modern jurists come back eventually to the
conception of sovereignty as the fundamental justification
for equality. Walker derives his three basic principles of
the law of nations, of which equality is the first, from " the
fundamental conception of Territorial Sovereignty." 1 Rivier
says:

Heffter insists that "it is inconsistent from the point of

view of the law of nations to consider fully sovereign states

otherwise than as equal in law among themselves ";3 and

Hershey declares that equality is " a necessary consequence

of the fundamental right of sovereignty and independence."4

The equality of sovereign states is the necessary consequence of
their independence. They are all equally sovereign. They have no
power above them. No one of them is placed above the others.2

The statement of Bonfils is a good one:

As far as they are sovereign and independent with respect to each

other, states are on a footing of juridical equality among themselves.

are alike; therefore it does not seem to me that this matter is a fiction. Take, for
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instance, among human beings — we have certain rights which are inherent in us,

as human beings. It does not make any difference whether a man is a small man,

or whether a person is a large man, whether he is strong or whether he is weak;

whether, for instance, he is suffering from disease, or whether he is in perfect phys-

ical health, he still has inherent in him certain natural rights; and it seems to me

that states, as such, possess certain inherent rights, and it does not make any dif-

Heffter insists that " it is inconsistent from the point of
view of the law of nations to consider fully sovereign states
otherwise than as equal in law among themselves "; 3 and
Hershey declares that equality is "a necessary consequence
of the fundamental right of sovereignty and independence." 4
The statement of Bonfils is a good one:

ference what the size of the state is, as far as the inherent rights of the state are

concerned." Ibid., p. 249. The analogy was also emphasized by Mr. A. J. Mon-

tague: "The equality of states is as well established as the equality of men; but

As far as they are sovereign and independent with respect to each
other, states are on a footing of juridical equality among themselves.

the nature of this equality is the precise question involved. Men are not equal in

character, influence, power, talents and culture; but a legal equality must be

accorded every man, or his pursuit of life, liberty and happiness is a futile under-

taking. If we do not recognize this legal equality there is no hope for the develop-

ment of man. So with nations. A legal equality, embracing certain elements of

independence and sovereignty as against all comers, must be accorded, or the

nation is not a nation, is not a state. It is this recognition of the right of equality

or independence which supplies us with the concept of a nation, which enables

nations to treat with one another, and out of which international law grows."

Ibid., p. 254.

1 Manual, p. 11. * VSlkerrechl, § 27, p. 48.

* Principes, I, 124. * Essentials, pp. 155-157.

are alike; therefore it does not seem to me that this matter is a fiction. Take, for
instance, among human beings - we have certain rights which are inherent in us,
as human beings. It does not make any difference whether a man is a small man,
or whether a person is a large man, whether he is strong or whether he is weak;
whether, for instance, he is suffering from disease, or whether he is in perfect physical health, he still has inherent in him certain natural rights; and it seems to me
that states, as such, possess certain inherent rights, and it does not make any difference what the size of the state is, as far as the inherent rights of the state are
concerned." Ibid., p. 249. The analogy was also emphasized by Mr. A. J. Montague: "The equality of states is as well established as the equality of men; but
the nature of this equality is the precise question involved. Men are not equal in
character, influence, power, talents and culture; but a legal equality must be
accorded every man, or his pursuit of life, liberty and happiness is a futile undertaking. If we do not recognize this legal equality there is no hope for the development of man. So with nations. A legal equality, embracing certain elements of
independence and sovereignty as against all comers, must be accorded, or the
nation is not a nation, is not a state. It is this recognition of the right of equality
~r independence which supplies us with the concept of a nation, which enables
nations to treat with one another, and out of which international law grows."
Ibid., p. 254.
1 Manual, p. 11.
1 Volkerrecht, § 27, p. 48.
' Principes, I, 124.
' Essentials, pp. 155-157.
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Each may exercise in their plenitude the rights and faculties which

result from its existence and from its participation in the international

community. The attributes of sovereignty are identical for all.1

Kebedgy also emphasizes the impoitance of sovereignty, of

which juridical equality is an essential corollary:

Each may exercise in their plenitude the rights and faculties which
result from its existence and from its participation in the international
community. The attributes of sovereignty are identical for all. 1

Sovereignty is the fundamental attribute which the juridical con-

science of peoples and the science of international law recognize in the

different moral persons forming the society of nations, the persons

that we call states; it has as a corollary, of course, the juridical equal-

ity and mutual independence of all states. By virtue of their very

definition sovereign states do not recognize any one above them; it

follows, obviously, that they are all equal and independent by the

same right. That is true whatever may be the geographical extent or

the material power or the constitutional form of each state, from the

petty principality of Monaco, for example, to the vast empire of

Russia.*

Juridical Equality and Inequalities of Fact

States are equal in the law of nations. On this point a

majority of the publicists agree. Equality may be pre-

sented as an attribute, a right, or a principle; it may be
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explained as an equality of rights and duties, or more ac-

curately as an equality of legal capacity; it may be justified

by appealing to theories of natural right or natural society,

the analogy, or sovereignty. However defined, explained,

or justified, juridical equality raises a question that has per-

Kebedgy also emphasizes the importance of sovereignty, of
which juridical equality is an essential corollary:
Sovereignty is the fundamental attribute which the juridical conscience of peoples and the science of international law recognize in the
different moral persons forming the society of nations, the persons
that we call states; it has as a corollary, of course, the juridical equality and mutual independence of all states. By virtue of their very
definition sovereign states do not recognize any one above them; it
follows, obviously, that they are all equal and independent by the
same right. That is true whatever may be the geographical extent or
the material power or the constitutional form of each state, from the
petty principality of Monaco, for example, to the vast empire of
Russia. 2

plexed publicists ever since the theory of natural equality

JURIDICAL EQUALITY AND INEQUALITIES OF FACT

was first opposed to the positivist emphasis upon realities.

How may juridical equality be reconciled with patent in-

equalities of fact?

1 Manuel, § 272, p. 161.

* Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84. See also Calvo, Le droit int., § 210,

I, 356; Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 97; Klüber,

Droit des gens, § 89, p. 132; Moore, Digest, I, 62; Pomeroy, Lectures, pp. 264,313;

Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2« ser., II, 14; Taylor, Int. Pub. Law, §§ 69, 117,

pp. 98,158; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. 11; Walker, Science, pp. 112,115; Wheaton,

Elements, p. 58; Woolsey, Int. Law, pp. 35,59. See also Barbosa, La Deux. Confer.,

II, 645, 648; Drago, ibid., II, 249; and Larreta, ibid., II, 15.

States are equal in the law of nations. On this point a
majority of the publicists agree. Equality may be presented as an attribute, a right, or a principle; it may be
explained as an equality of rights and duties, or more accurately as an equality of legal capacity; it may be justified
by appealing to theories of natural right or natural society,
the analogy, or sovereignty. However defined, explained,
or justified, juridical equality raises a question that has perplexed publicists ever since the theory of natural equality
was first opposed to the positivist emphasis upon realities.
How may juridical equality be reconciled with patent mequalities of fact ?
1

Manuel,§ 272, p. 161.

1 Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84. See also Calvo, Le droit int., § 210,
I, 356; Halleck, Int. Law, p. 97; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staalen, p. 97; Kltiber,
Droit des gens,§ Bg, p. 132; Moore, Digest, I, 62; Pomeroy, Lectures, pp. 264, 313;
Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900) :a• ser., II, 14; Taylor, Int. Piw. Law,§§ 6g, 117,
pp. g8, 158; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. 11; Walker, Science, pp. II2, us; Wheaton,
Etemmts, p. 58; Woolsey, Int. Law, pp. 35, 59. See also Barbosa, La Deux. Confb.,
II, 645, 648; Drago, ibid., II, 249; and Larreta, ibid., II, 15.
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THE EQUALITY OF STATF.s

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

All the publicists have to take account of certain obvious

facts with reference to which states are quite unequal, such

as the number of their inhabitants, the extent of their terri-

tory, favorable or unfavorable climate, situation with re-

spect to access to the sea and to trade routes, degree of

civilization, form of government, military power, and the

like. A majority of the writers dispose of these and similar

inequalities by treating them as matters of fact rather than

matters of law. The view is that state personality is unaf-

fected by the varied character of the constituent elements

of state existence. Inequality is always I'inegalite effective;

equality is Vegalite juridique. Thus Pradier-Fodfirf i says:

However, among states as among individuals, natural or juridical

equality does not necessarily correspond to social or real equality.

While each people possesses all rights potentially (virtuellement), it

does not realize them all equally in the same degree as other peoples.

Indeed, all states are naturally and juridically equal from the point

of view of absolute right, but all are not equally powerful, influential

through their ideas, preponderant on account of their civilization, and

All the publicists have to take account of certain obvious
facts with reference to which states are quite unequal, such
as the number of their inhabitants, the extent of their territory, favorable or unfavorable climate, situation with respect to access to the sea and to trade routes, degree of
civilization, form of government, military power, and the
like. A majority of the writers dispose of these and similar
inequalities by treating them as matters of fact rather than
matters of law. The view is that state personality is unaffected by the varied character of the constituent elements
of state existence. Inequality is always l'inegalite effective;
equality is l'egalitejuridique. Thus Pradier-Fodere says:
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formidable because of their material forces. The metaphysicians will

discourse in vain on the absolute equality of states from the point of

view of natural right; they will always be obliged to recognize in the

reality of things an inequality between the Empire of all the Russias,

for example, and Portugal, or some Spanish American republic.1

A few writers go farther than this and assert that actual

inequality among states is not only consistent with juridical

equality, but that it is the natural and desirable consequence

of the principle of legal equality. This is the position taken

by Pieclelievre:

It is unnecessary to hope or to desire that this real inequality dis-

appear, for it is the natural consequence of the personality and liberty

of states and to do away with it would be to do away with their inde-

pendence. It is only the result of the normal progress of nations whose

moral power and material wealth are intimately related to the par-

ticular aptitudes, the characteristics, and the intelligence of their in-

1 TraUt, § 450, H, xi.

However, among states as among individuals, natural or juridical
equality does not necessarily correspond to social or real equality.
While each people possesses all rights potentially (v'irtuellement), it
does not realize them all equally in the same degree as other peoples.
Indeed, all states are naturally and juridically equal from the point
of view of absolute right, but all are not equally powerful, influential
through their ideas, preponderant on account of their civilization, and
formidable because of their material forces. The metaphysicians will
discourse in vain on the absolute equality of states from the point of
view of natural right; they will always be obliged to recognize in the
reality of things an inequality between the Empire of all the Russias,
for example, and Portugal, or some Spanish American republic. 1

A few writers go farther than this and assert that actual
inequality among states is not only consistent with juridical
equality, but that it is the natural and desirable consequence
of the principle of legal equality. This is the position taken
by Piedelievre:
It is unnecessary to hope or to desire that this real inequality dis-

appear, for it is the natural consequence of the personality and liberty
of states and to do away with it would be to do away with their independence. It is only the result of the normal progress of nations whose
moral power and material wealth are intimately related to the particular aptitudes, the characteristics, and the intelligence of their in1 Trait~,

§ 450, II, xx.
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habitants, and to the fertility of soil and the geographical location of

their territory, so that the inequality of fact which separates them

rests on a natural law quite as much as their juridical equality.1

Carnazza Amari objects to the expression "inequalities

of fact." He insists that what is meant is "inequality of

habitants, and to the fertility of soil and the geographical location of
their territory, so that the inequality of fact which separates them
rests on a natural law quite as much as their juridical equality. 1

form" (la disuguaglianza modale), and that inequality of

form is just as rational and juridical as that equality of type

of which equal capacity is the natural consequence. He

says:

However, this equality of states exists only in their condition, in

their fundamental laws, upon which basis concrete inequalities are

instituted, which produce different forms without destroying equality

of type. In fact, although each people possesses potentially all rights,

nevertheless it realizes them only in part. Consequently each state

may have concretely rights not existing in others who have not de-

veloped equally their capacity, have not exercised it on the same

objects, or have not found themselves in like situations. . . .

Equality of type and inequality of form are natural facts; the first

is based on the identity of type and the second on the inequality of

form which may exist among states. It is, therefore, wrong to speak
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of equality of right and inequality of fact, because both are rational

and juridical; they result from a natural necessity; they exist in fact,

and one really meets them in human nature.

Equality of type and inequality of form are in harmony; the one

refers to the identical faculty of states to realize concretely the rights

which may result from the condition of each and from the different

activities which they display, and to the equal inviolability of the

rights acquired; the other refers to the different situations in which

they find themselves and to the unequal activities of which they give

evidence; from the latter the inequality of their concrete rights is

derived.2

In addition to inequalities of fact or form there are certain

actions or practices in international relations, such as the

1 Prtcis, § 267,1, 244.

• Trattato, p. 278. See also Fiore, Int. Law Cod., §§ 397-400; Kebedgy, in

Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 89, 92; Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2* ser.,

II, 16; Walker, Manual, pp. 11-13.

Carnazza Amari objects to the expression " inequalities
of fact." He insists that what is meant is "inequality of
form" (la disuguaglianza modale), and that inequality of
form is just as rational and juridical as that equality of type
of which equal capacity is the natural consequence. He
says:
However, this equality of states exists only in their condition, in
their fundamental laws, upon which basis concrete inequalities are
instituted, which produce different forms without destroying equality
of type. In fact, although each people possesses potentially all rights,
nevertheless it realizes them only in part. Consequently each state
may have concretely rights not existing in others who have not developed equally their capacity, have not exercised it on the same
objects, or have not found themselves in like situations....
Equality of type and inequality of form are natural facts; the first
is based on the identity of type and the second on the inequality of
form which may exist among states. It is, therefore, wrong to speak
of equality of right and inequality of fact, because both are rational
and juridical; they result from a natural necessity; they exist in fact,
and one really meets them in human nature.
Equality of type and inequality of form are in harmony; the one
refers to the identical faculty of states to realize concretely the rights
which may result from the condition of each and from the different
activities which they display, and to the equal inviolability of the
rights acquired; the other refers to the different situations in which
they find themselves and to the unequal activities of which t·hey give
evidence; from the latter the inequality of their concrete rights is
derived.z

In addition to inequalities of fact or form there are certain
actions or practices in international relations, such as the
1 Pr«is, § 267, I, 244.
' TraUato, p. 278. See also Fiore, Int. Law Cod., §§ 397-400; Kebedgy, in
Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 89, 92; Streit, in R. D. I. L. C. {1900) 2• ser.,
II, 16; Walker, Manual, pp. n-13.
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hegemony of the great powers, which are admittedly in con-

flict with the principle of equality as it is usually understood.

This raises a point of great difficulty for the publicists, and

has influenced several writers to doubt or deny the whole

conception of equality in the law of nations. A majority of

the writers, however, reconcile practice and principle, and

they do it in several ways. Occasionally they recur, as does

Nys, to le role de la science, defending equality against the

encroachments of the great powers on premises grounded in

reason.1 The next step is to denounce every violation of

equality as un fait politique rather than un fait juridique.

Finally, it is pointed out that the violation of a juridical

principle does not destroy it. "If their equality is not al-

ways respected in practice that disturbs in no respect the

force of the principle," says F. de Martens.2 Of Bluntschli's

rule to the effect that every European state has a right to

participate in all deliberations of the great powers when

decisions relating to its own affairs are to be made, Streit

remarks:
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It is true that the rule has been neglected occasionally by the great

powers; but these violations do not destroy the principle of inter-

national law any more than infractions of the principles of municipal

law abolish the latter.*

Kebedgy says of the alleged primacy of the great powers:

But these tendencies contrary to right can never establish a right,

any more than the abuse of material force can establish a juridical

1 6tudes, II, 45. "En vfiritfi, e'en serait fait du droit international lui-meme si

de pareils actes pouvaient engendrer de nouvelles notions et de nouvelles regies.

La git de peril. Le droit international est en grande partie un droit coutumier; e'est

dire que les precedents y ont une grand portee et que le fait accompli y est a un

hegemony of the great powers, which are admittedly in conflict with the principle of equality as it is usually understood.
This raises a point of great difficulty for the publicists, and
has influenced several writers to doubt or deny the whole
conception of equality in the law of nations. A majority of
the writers, however, reconcile practice and principle, and
they do it in several ways. Occasionally they recur, as does
N ys, to le role de la science, defending equality against the
encroachments of the great powers on premises grounded in
reason. 1 The next step is to denounce every violation of
equality as un fait politique rather than un fait juridique.
Finally, it is pointed out that the violation of a juridical
principle does not destroy it. " If their equality is not always respected in practice that disturbs in no respect the
force of the principle," says F. de Martens.2 Of Bluntschli's
rule to the effect that every European state has a right to
participate in all deliberations of the great powers when
decisions relating to its own affairs are to be made, Streit
remarks:

haut degre gfinfirateur du droit; mais e'est dire aussi que le rdle de la science y est

preponderant. La science doit se garder d'approuver les procides et les pratiques

qu'essaie d'introduire une politique trop habile; elle doit protester quand des

theories depourvues de base rationnelle et de fondement historique prdnent l'hege-

monie des grandes puissances, montrant en elle une institution destinee a assurer

le regne de la libertfi et de la justice dans la sphere des relations internationales."

It is true that the rule has been neglected occasionally by the great
powers; but these violations do not destroy the principle of international law any more than infractions of the principles of municipal
law abolish the latter.3

See also Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaien.

'Traitt, I, 380. » R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2« ser., II, 17.

Kebedgy says of the alleged primacy of the great powers:
But these tendencies contrary to right can never establish a right,
any more than the abuse of material force can establish a juridical
1 &udes, II, 45. "En verite, e'en serait fait du droit international lui-m~me si
de pareils actes pouvaient engendrer de nouvelles notions et de nouvelles regles.
La gtt de peril. Le droit international est en grande partie un droit coutum.ier; c'est
dire que les precedents y ont une grand portee et que le fait accompli y est a un
haul degre generateur du droit; mais c'est dire aussi que le r6le de la science yest
preponderant. La science doit se garder d'approuver les procedes et les pratiques
qu'essaie d'introduire une politique trop habile; elle doit protester quand des
tMories depourvues de base rationnelle et de fondement historique pr6nent l'hegCmonie des grandes puissances, montrant en elle une institution destinee a assurer
le regne de la liberte et de la justice clans la spMre des relations internationales."
See also Huber, Die Gkichheit der Staaten.
1 R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2• sfr., II, 17.
2 Traill, I, 380.
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rule, any more than the tendency to break conventional obligations

can seriously unsettle the rule with reference to the binding force of

treaties. One does not abolish right by denying it. Still less is it well

founded to consider its violation as capable of establishing a rule of

law. They may tell us to be sure that" quite apart from the equality

of the books public life shows us only inequalities." One sees with-

out difficulty the error in this reasoning which intentionally confuses

fact with right. From the point of view of right the inequalities of fact

necessarily existing among states as among individuals should not be

considered. The inequalities, juridically insignificant, which exist

from the point of view of social situation, influence, wealth, and force,

are not opposed to the existence of the rule of equality for all before

the law.1

A curious doctrine has been suggested by a few jurists.

Although never developed in any detail it seems to imply

that while states are equal in law they may be absolutely

unable to profit equally from their juridical condition. In

other words, they may have equal capacity for rights, but

may be unable to exercise the rights for which they have a

rule, any more than the tendency to break conventional obligations
can seriously unsettle the rule with reference to the binding force of
treaties. One does not abolish right by denying it. Still less is it well
founded to consider its violation as capable of establishing a rule of
law. They may tell us to be sure that" quite apart from the equality
of the books public life shows us only inequalities." One sees without difficulty the error in this reasoning which intentionally confuses
fact with right. From the point of view of right the inequalities of fact
necessarily existing among states as among individuals should not be
considered. The inequalities, juridically insignificant, which exist
from the point of view of social situation, influence, wealth, and force,
are not opposed to the existence of the rule of equality for all before
the law.1

capacity. Fiore at least suggests the doctrine.2 F. de
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Martens says that all states are equal but that " they are

not all equally capable of profiting from their rights." 3 The

same notion seems to be at the root of Twiss' objection to

the term " semi-sovereign." He says:

It is not desirable that this classification of certain States as Semi-

Sovereign States should find a place in a system of law which is con-

cerned only with the external relations which States bear to one

another as independent political communities. The term itself," Semi-

Sovereign," points at once to another system of political law, and

suggests rather a subordination of position analogous to that in which

the Princes and States of the Germanic Empire stood in former days

relatively to the Emperor as their Suzerain or Supreme Lord, than a

modification of the manner in which the foreign relations of an inde-

pendent State, as such, are maintained. The international rights of

1 Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 89. 1 TraUato, § 422,1, 289.

* " Cependant ils ne sont pas tous egalement capables de profiter de leurs

droits." TraiU, I, 381, 309 (Leo's transl.).

A curious doctrine has been suggested by a few jurists.
Although never developed in any detail it seems to imply
that while states are equal in law they may be absolutely
unable to profit equally from their juridical condition. In
other words, they may have equal capacity for rights, but
may be unable to exercise the rights for which they have a
capacity. Fiore at least suggests the doctrine. 2 F. de
Martens says that all states are equal but that " they are
not all equally capable of profiting from their rights." 3 The
same notion seems to be at the root of Twiss' objection to
the term" semi-sovereign." He says:
It is not desirable that this classification of certain States as SemiSovereign States should find a place in a system of law which is concerned only with the external relations which States bear to one
another as independent political communities. The term itself," SemiSovereign," points at once to another system of political law, and
suggests rather a subordination of position analogous to that in which
the Princes and States of the Germanic Empire stood in former days
relatively to the Emperor as their Suzerain or Supreme Lord, than a
modification of the manner in which the foreign relations of an independent State, as such, are maintained. The international rights of
1 Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 89.

2 Trattal<J, § 422, I, 28<}.

I " Cependant ils ne sont pas tous egalement capables de profiter de leurs
droits." Traitt, I, 381, 309 (Leo's transl.).
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the States, which rank in this category, are in substance as complete

as those of any other independent State, and it is only in the mode in

which those rights are exercised that a distinction is found to exist.1

This distinction between having rights and being able to

the States, which rank in this category, are in substance as complete
as those of any other independent State, and it is only in the mode in
which those rights are exercised that a distinction is found to exist.1

exercise them was used at the meeting of the Institute of

International Law in 1888 to meet the objection that pa-

cific blockade violates equality.2 The same doctrine was

urged by American delegates at the Second Hague Peace

Conference in 1907, in defending the principle of rotation in

the composition of a court of arbitral justice.3

The difficulty in reconciling juridical equality with in-

equalities of fact or of form and inequalities of influence

has resulted in a tendency to emphasize the theoretical

importance of equality as opposed to the practical existence

of inequalities. A few publicists say quite frankly that not

only equality, but the whole subject of fundamental rights,

must be considered from the point of view of pure theory.

Carnazza Amari and Pradier-Fodere point out that funda-

mental rights must be proved a priori4 The former jurist

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

adds that positive international law

does not exercise any influence on the determination and classification

of the rights of states because there is no positive international law

which establishes those rights.

The contrast between theory and practice stands out clearly

in Scott's discussion of equality of voting strength and in-

1 Law of Nations, p. 25. Cf. Mighell f. Sultan of Johore, L. R. ([1894]) iQ.B.

149. iS3. 162.

* The following report of Perels' reply to Geffcken is from the minutes of the

Institute: "Quant a 1'egaliU du droit entre les £tats, il faut distinguer entre le

droit et la possibilitfi d'exercer un droit. Le droit d'exercer le blocus existe contre

tous les £tats, bien qu'il ne soit possible que contre les faibles." A.I.D. I. (1888),

LX, 296.

This distinction between having rights and being able to
exercise them was used at the meeting of the Institute of
International Law in 1888 to meet the objection that pacific blockade violates equality. 2 The same doctrine was
urged by American delegates at the Second Hague Peace
Conference in 1907, in defending the principle of rotation in
the composition of a court of arbitral justice.3
The difficulty in reconciling juridical equality with inequalities of fact or of form and inequalities of influence
has resulted in a tendency to emphasize the theoretical
importance of equality as opposed to the practical existence
of inequalities. A few publicists say quite frankly that not
only equality, but the whole subject of fundamental rights,
must be considered from the point of view of pure theory.
Carnazza Amari and Pradier-Fodere point out that fundamental rights must be proved a priori.4 The former jurist
adds that positive international law

* La Deux. Confer., II, 606, 608, 689; Scott, Am. Addresses, pp. 99, 103. The

argument was effectively refuted by the advocates of equality. La Deux. Confer.,

II, 619, 626.

* TraUato, pp. 269-274; Traité, §§ 181-183,1, 306.

does not exercise any influence on the determination and classification
of the rights of states because there is no positive international law
which establishes those rights.

The contrast between theory and practice stands out clearly
in Scott's discussion of equality of voting strength and inLaw of Nations, p. 25. Cf. Mighell 11. Sultan of Johore, L. R . ([18<)4]) 1 Q. B.
149, 153, 162.
1 The following report of Perels' reply to Geffcken is from the minutes of the
Institute: "Quant a l'egalite du droit entre les f:tats, il faut distinguer entre le
droit et la possibilite d'exercer un droit. Le droit d'exercer le blocus existe contre
tous Jes f:tats, bien qu'il ne soit possible que contre les faibles." A. I . D. I. (1888),
IX, 296.
1 La Deux. Confir., II, 6o6, 6o8, 68<); Scott, Am. Addresses, pp. 99, 103. The
argument was effectively refuted by the advocates of equality. La Dcux. Conftr.,
1

II, 619, 626.
' Trattat-0, pp. 269-274; TraiU, §§ 181-183, I, 3o6.
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equality of influence in an international conference. He

says:

It follows, therefore, that while all States are legally equal, still in

equality of influence in an international conference.
says:

He

this practical world of ours we must not, or at least we can not, ignore

the historic fact that nations exercise an influence upon the world's

affairs commensurate with their traditions, their industry, their com-

merce, and their present ability to safeguard their rights. It follows

from this that though equal in theory, their influence is often unequal

in practice.1

Those who are inclined to doubt or deny the principle of

equality readily depreciate it as " a theory or alleged prin-

ciple," un mot sans portee, or an "excessive legal theory

which is largely a fiction." 2

It is possible, of course, to take equality of legal capacity

It follows, therefore, that while all States are legally equal, still in
this practical world of ours we must not, or at least we can not, ignore
the historic fact that nations exercise an influence upon the world's
affairs commensurate with their traditions, their industry, their commerce, and their present ability to safeguard their rights. It follows
from this that though equal in theory, their influence is often unequal
in practice.1

for an ideal, while recognizing that in actual practice the

ideal can only be imperfectly attained. There is a tendency,

reluctantly manifested, to approach the problem from this

point of view. Fiore admits that states may be so situated

that real equality in some respects can never be attained.

After discussing the right of an inland state to have a mari-
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time flag, he concludes:

Although in the abstract all states have equal rights, the enjoy-

ment of some of them, presuming a group of circumstances of fact,

may be denied to those to whom the circumstances necessary to the

enjoyment and exercise of such rights are completely lacking.3

Heffter refers to " positive modifications " of the principle,4

while Rivier says that "equality is presumed, inequality

1 Hague Peace Conferences, I, 164.

2 Brown, in A. J. I. L. (1915), EC, 326-329; Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Precis,

pp. 46-47; Olney, in 4. /. I. L. (1907), 1,419; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences,!,

169, 503.

* "Quantunque in astratto tutti gli Stati abbiano diritti uguali, il godimento

di alcuni di questi, supponendo un complesso di circostanze di fatto, pud essere

negato a colore ai quali manchino completamente tali circostanze necessarie al

godimento e all'esercizio di tali diritti." Tratlato, §§ 423-424,1, 290.

4 "Als Grundprincip fur alle souveranen Staaten ergiebt sich Gleichheit des

Rechtes, welches daher auch mit seinen positiven Modificationen jenen Special-

Those who are inclined to doubt or deny the principle of
equality readily depreciate it as " a theory or alleged principle," un mot sans portee, or an " excessive legal theory
which is largely a fiction." 2
It is possible, of course, to take equality of legal capacity
for an ideal, while recognizing that in actual practice the
ideal can only be imperfectly attained. There is a tendency,
reluctantly manifested, to approach the problem from this
point of view. Fiore admits that states may be so situated
that real equality in some respects can never be attained.
After discussing the right of an inland state to have a maritime flag, he concludes:
Although in the abstract all states have equal rights, the enjoyment of some of them, presuming a group of circumstances of fact,
may be denied to those to whom the circumstances necessary to the
enjoyment and exercise of such rights are completely lacking. 3

Heffter refers to " positive modifications " of the principle,4
while Rivier says that "equality is presumed, inequality
Hague Peace Conferences, I, 164.
Brown, in A. J. I. L. (1915), IX, 326-329; Funck-Brentano et Sorel, Prtcis,
pp. 46-47; Olney, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 419; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I,
1

2

169, 503.

' " Quantunque in astratto tutti gli Stati abbiano diritti uguali, ii godimento
di alcuni di questi, supponendo un complesso di circostanze di fatto, pu~ essere
negato a coloro ai quali manchino completamente tali circostanze necessarie al
godimento e all'esercizio di tali diritti." Trattato, §§ 423-424, I, 290.
4 " Als Grundprincip fur alle souveranen Staaten ergiebt sich Gleichheit des
Rechtes, welches daher auch mit seinen positiven Modificationen jenen Special-
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should be demonstrated."1 Sir Frederick Pollock has

stated this view clearly, in a note to his edition of Maine's

Ancient Law:

The theoretical equality of independent States naturally follows from

their recognition as analogous to free persons, who must have full

and equal rights in the absence of any definite reason for inequality.

This indeed is all that the maxim of men's equality before the law

of nature declares or involves according to its classical meaning.2

There is a terse expression of the same opinion in Antoine's

notes to his translation of Fiore, where he says:

It seems that in order to be quite accurate one should say that each

should be demonstrated." 1 Sir Frederick Pollock has
stated this view clearly, in a note to his edition of Maine's
Ancient Law:
The theoretical equality of independent States naturally follows from
their recognition as analogous to free persons, who must have full
and equal rights in the absence of any definite reason for inequality.
This indeed is all that the maxim of men's equality before the law
of nature declares or involves according to its classical meaning.2

state ought to have the right to be the equal of others, quite apart from

its importance and its force. It is a long way between the virtuous

desire expressed with reason by the publicists and the reality.3

There are not many publicists who admit, in statements as

There is a terse expression of the same opinion in Antoine's
notes to his translation of Fiore, where he says:

unguarded as those quoted above, that equality in the law of

nations is only an ideal. A good deal of evidence might be col-

lected to illustrate such a tendency, but, in general, writers

seem to feel that they are on the defensive. They distinguish
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juridical equality from inequalities of fact, form, influence,

or policy, with many refinements of reasoning, rather than

It seems that in order to be quite accurate one should say that each
state ought to hafJe the right to be the equal of others, quite apart from
its importance and its force. It is a long way between the virtuous
desire expressed with reason by the publicists and the reality.a

admit that the true distinction is between the ideal and the

actual.

rechten voranzustellen ist." VSlkerrecht, § 26, p. 47. Levi says: "All sovereign

states, great or small, are equal in the eyes of international law, such equality

being subject to modification by compact and usage." Int. Law, p. i11. The

usages referred to are those which authorize consular courts, spheres of influence,

pacific blockades, and benevolent interventions.

1 "L'egalite, principe de droit, n'est point incompatible avec diverses inegalites

effectives. Entre 1es fitats comme entre les hommes, il existe en fait et necessaire-

ment des inegalites de situation, d'influence, de force, de richesse. L'accord expres

ou tacit des nations les admit et les sanctionne. Ce sont des exceptions, qui doivent

s'interpreter de facon limitative, tandis que la regie est d'interpretation extensive.

L'egalite se presume, l'inegalite doit etre demontree." Principes, I, 125.

* Note H, p. i2i.

* " I1 nous semble que pour etre completement exact, ou devrait dire que chaque

There are not many publicists who admit, in statements as
unguarded as those quoted above, that equality in the law of
nations is only an ideal. A good deal of evidence might be collected to illustrate such a tendency, but, in general, writers
seem to feel that they are on the defensive. They distinguish
juridical equality from inequalities of fact, form, influence,
or policy, with many refinements of reasoning, rather than
admit that the true distinction is between the ideal and the
actual.

fitat devrait avoir le droit d'etre 1'egal des autres, independamment de son impor-

tance et de sa force. I1 y a loin entre ce desir vertueux exprime avec raison par les

rechten voranzustellen ist." Volkerrecht, § 26, p. 47. Levi says: "All sovereign
states, great or small, are equal in the eyes of international law, such equality
being subject to modification by compact and usage." Int. Law, p. 111. The
usages referred to are those which authorize consular courts, spheres of influence,
pacific blockades, and benevolent interventions.
1 "L'egalite, principe de droit, n'est point incompatible avec diverses inegalites
effectives. Entre !es £tats comme entre !es hommes, il existe en fait et necessairement des inegalites de situation, d'influence, de force, de richesse. L'accord expres
ou tacit des nations !es admit et les sanctionne. Ce sont des exceptions, qui doivent
s'interpreter de facon limitative, tandis que la regle est d'interpretation extensive.
L'egalite se presume, l'inegalite doit Hre demontree." Principes, I, 125.
' Note H, p. 121.
1 " II nous semble que pour ~tre completement exact, ou devrait dire que chaque
ttat devrait avoir le droit d'Hre l'egal des autres, independamment de son importance et de sa force. II y a loin entre ce desir vertueux exprime avec raison par les
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The Practical Application of State Equality

The practical application of the principle of equality in

THE PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF STATE EQUALITY

the positive law of nations has not been much considered.

Discussion in the books is usually confined to questions of

precedence, ceremonial, and diplomatic etiquette,1 the es-

sence of which is inequality, albeit, according to most au-

thorities, a social rather than a juridical inequality.

Phillimore and Pomeroy expressly derive from the prin-

ciple of equality the state's right to protect its citizens at

home and abroad, including the question of debts due to

citizens from the government of another state, the right to

have its government recognized, the right of external marks

of honor and respect, and the right to make treaties, to which

Pomeroy adds the right of diplomatic and consular repre-

sentation.2 Most publicists, however, simply take equality

for a general principle underlying all rules of international

intercourse, and give little attention to its concrete appli-

cation in relation to special topics.

The two most important subdivisions of the law of nations

in which the application of the principle of state equality
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has special significance, viz., (i) the law of international

persons, and (2) the law of supernational organization, have

received scant attention from the publicists. Perhaps, in

view of the rudimentary development of the positive law of

publicistes et la rfialitfi." Fiore, Nouveau droit int. pub., § 428, note 1,1, 374. See-

also § 436, note 1, and § 439, note 2,1, 379, 381. Cf. Funck-Brentano et Sorel,

Prtcis, p. 46; Pifidelievre, Prtcis, §§ 282 ff., I, 25S ft.

1 Bluntschli, VSlkerrecht, §§ 81-94, pp. 96-101; Bonfils, Manuel, §§ 272-278,

pp. 161-165; Calvo, Le Droit int., §§ 210-259,1, 356-381; Carnazza Amari, Traité,

I, 384-406; Chretien, Principes, §§ 165-174, pp. 167-175; Despagnet, Cours, §§

167-171, pp. 218-224; Fiore, Nouveau droit int. pub., §§ 439-451,1,381-389; Hal-

leck, Int. Law, pp. 97-118; Heffter, VSlkerrechl, § 28, p. 49; KlOber, Droit des gens,

§§ 89-122, pp. 132-172; F. de Martens, Traité, I, 380-387; Oppenheim, Int. Law,

§§ 117-122, I, 171-177; Pifidelievre, Prtcis, §§ 272-278, I, 248-253; Pomeroy^

Lectures, pp. 313-322; Pradier-Fodere, Traité, §§ 442-594, II, 5-117; Rivier, Prin-

cipes, I, 123-131; Ullmann, VSlkerrecht, § 37, p. 138.

* Phillimore, Commentaries, II, 1; Pomeroy, Lectures, p. 83.

The practical application of the principle of equality in
the positive law of nations has not been much considered.
Discussion in the books is usually confined to questions of
precedence, ceremonial, and diplomatic etiquette,1 the essence of which is inequality, albeit, according to most authorities, a social rather than a juridical inequality.
Phillimore and Pomeroy expressly derive from the principle of equality the state's right to protect its citizens at
home and abroad, including the question of debts due to
citizens from the government of another state, the right to
have its government recognized, the right of external marks
of honor and respect, and the right to make treaties, to which
Pomeroy adds the right of diplomatic and consular representation. 2 11ost publicists, however, simply take equality
for a general principle underlying all rules of international
intercourse, and give little attention to its concrete application in relation to special topics.
The two most important subdivisions of the law of nations
in which the application of the principle of state equality
has special significance, viz., (1) the law of international
persons, and (2) the law of supernational organization, have
received scant attention from the publicists. Perhaps, in
view of the rudimentary development of the positive law of
publicistes et la rfalite." Fiore, N oui·eau droit int. pub., § 428, note 1, I, 374. Seealso§ 436, note 1, and § 439, note 2, I, 379, 381. Cf. Funck-Brentano et Sorel,
Pruis, p. 46; Piedelit!vre, Prtcis, §§ 282 ff., I, 255 ff.
1 Bluntschli, Volkerrec/11, §§ 81--i)4, pp. 96-101; Bonfils, .Manuel,§§ 272-278,
pp. 161-165; Calvo, Le Droit int.,§§ 210--259, I, 356-381; Carnazza Amari, Traitt,
I, 384-4o6; Chretien, Principes, §§ 165-174, pp. 167-175; Despagnet, Cours, §§
167-171, pp. 218-224; Fiore, Nouveau droil int. pub.,§§ 439- 451, I, 381-389; Halleck, Int. Law, pp. 97-118; Heffter, Volkerrecht, § 28, p. 49; Klllber, Droit des gens,
H 8<r122, pp. 132-172; F. de Martens, Traill, I, 380--387; Oppenheim, Int. Law,
H n7-122, I, 171-177; Piedeli~vre, Precis, §§ 272-278, I, 248-253; Pomeroy,
Lectures, pp. 313-3:12; Pradier-Fodfre, Traitt, §§ 442-594, II, 5-u7; Rivier, Principes, I, 123-131; Ullmann, Volkerrecht, § 37, p. 138.
1 Phillimore, Commentaries, II, l; Pomeroy, Lectures, p. 83.
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nations in relation to these subjects, they have received as

much attention as could be expected; yet one cannot help

feeling that adequate consideration of both subjects has been

considerably retarded by the influence of naturalist theories.

The law of international persons has been treated in a

rudimentary fashion by the writers, with the result that

several categories of international persons of qualified status

have been recognized.1 The completely sovereign state has

been taken as the normal type, and all qualifications have

been admitted grudgingly. The remark of Lawrence that

"the classificatory skill of jurists toils far behind the con-

structive ingenuity of statesmen" deserves to be repeated

with a broader application.2 Nevertheless, the books take

account in one way or another of personal unions, confedera-

tions, neutralized states, guaranteed states, protectorates,

states under suzerainty, partially civilized states, civilized

belligerent communities, and civilized insurgent communi-

ities. Almost all writers recognize that the principle of

equality of capacity can only apply among international
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persons of the same status.3 Thus a number of difficulties

involved in the application of the principle are avoided,

while the foundations are laid for separate consideration of

the law of persons.

1 Bonfils, Manuel, §§ 165-194, pp. 91-119; Calvo, Le droit int., §} 39-77,1,168-

225; Carnazza Amari, Traité, I, 259-321; Cobbett, Cases, I, 41-68; Despagnet,

Cours, §§ 75-78, pp. 94_I03; Fiore, Nouveau droit int. pub., §§ 332-347,I, 290-304;

Fontenay, Des droits el des devoirs des ttats entre eux, pp. 15-27; Halleck, Int. Law,

pp. 63-72; Hershey, Essentials, pp. 99-114; HoltzendorfE, Handbuch, §§ 24-27, II,

98-117; Liszt, VSlkerrecht, § 6, pp. 50-60; F. de Martens, Traiit, I, 311-356; Op-

penheim, Int. Law, §§ 63-111, I, 107-164; Phillimore, Commentaries, I, 94-155;

Pfedelievre, Precis, §§ 71-114, I, 61-95; Pomeroy, Lectures, pp. 45-78; Pradier-

Foderfi, Traité, §§ 86-123, I, 158-215; Rivier, Principes, I, 79-123; Ullmann,

V Slkerrecht, §§ 19-27, pp. 86-118; Wilson, Handbook, §§ 6-19, pp. 21-52.

* The remark was made with reference to composite states only. Int. Law,

§ 37, P- S9-

* See Bonfils, Manuel, $ 273, p. 162; Cobbett, Cases, I, 50; Chretien, Principes,

nations in relation to these subjects, they have received as
much attention as could be expected; yet one cannot help
feeling that adequate consideration of both subjects has been
considerably retarded by the influence of naturalist theories.
The law of international persons has been treated in a
rudimentary fashion by the writers, with the result that
several categories of international persons of qualified status
have been recognized. 1 The completely sovereign state has
been taken as the normal type, and all qualifications have
been admitted grudgingly. The remark of Lawrence that
" the classificatory skill of jurists toils far behind the constructive ingenuity of statesmen " deserves to be repeated
with a broader application. 2 Nevertheless, the books take
account in one way or another of personal unions, confederations, neutralized states, guaranteed states, protectorates,
states under suzerainty, partially civilized states, civilized
belligerent communities, and civilized insurgent communiiti~s.
Almost all writers recognize that the principle of
equality of capacity can only apply among international
persons of the same status.3 Thus a number of difficulties
involved in the application of the principle are avoided,
while the foundations are laid for separate consideration of
the law of persons.

§ 175, P- 176; Fiore, Nouveau droit int. pub., §§ 433-435, !, 376-379; Kebedgy, in

Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 88-90; Piedelievre, Précis, §§ 282 ff., I, 255 ff.

1 Bonfils, Manud, §§ 165-194, pp. 91-119; Calvo, Le droit inl., §§ 3cr-77, I , 168225; Carnazza Amari, Traill, I , 25cr-321; Cobbett, Cases, I, 41--68; Despagnet,
Cours, §§ 75-78, pp. 94-103; Fiore, Nouveau droit int. pub.,§§ 332-347, I, 290-304;
Fontenay, Des droils et des devoirs des ttats entre eux, pp. 15-27; Halleck, Int. Law,
pp. 63-72; Hershey, &senliaJs, pp. 9<JII4; Holtzendorff, Handbuch, §§ 24-27, II,
98-117; Liszt, ViJlkerredu, § 6, pp. 5o--6o; F. de Martens, Traitt, I, 311-356; Oppenheim, Int. Law, §§ 63-111, I, 107-164; Phillimore, Commentaries, I, 94-155;
Piedelievre, Prtcis, §§ 71-114, I, 614}5; Pomeroy, Lectures, pp. 45-78; PradierFodere, Traitt, §§ 86-123, I, 158-215; Rivier, Principes, I, 7cr-123; Ullmann,
Volkerrecht, §§ 19-27, pp. 86-118; Wilson, Handbook , §§ 6-19, pp. 21-52.
1 The remark was made with reference to composite states only. Int. Law,
§ 37, p. 59·
• See Bonfils, Manuel, § 273 , p. 162; Cobbett, Cases, I, 50; Chretien, Principes,
§ 175, p. r76; Fiore, Nouveau droit int. p-ub., §§ 433-435, I, 376-379; Kebedgy, in
Z . S. R. {ICp>) Neue Folge, XIX, 884}0; Piedelievre, Prtcis, §§ 282 ff., I, 255 ff.
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It can hardly be said that foundations have been laid so

far as the law of supernational organization is concerned;

yet a number of jurists have pointed out the importance of

the subject, and have suggested the difficulties involved in

applying the principle of equality to this subdivision of the

positive law of nations as it develops. Huber has discussed

the question at some length. He is one of the few writers

to appreciate the necessity of distinguishing the law of or-

ganization from the rest of international law, and for this

his essay deserves a wider reading, whatever one may think

of his conclusions. He says:

This equality may be manifested on the one hand in relation to abstract

legal principles of a more material and more formal nature, and on the

other hand in relation to concrete rules, i. e., in relation to international

organizations. Equality is recognized with regard to the first category

of legal principles by those who deny it in relation to the second cate-

gory. The problem centers upon the importance or unimportance of

equality within international organizations, in which are compre-

It can hardly be said that foundations have been laid so
far as the law of supernational organization is concerned;
yet a number of jurists have pointed out the importance of
the subject, and have suggested the difficulties involved in
applying the principle of equality to this subdivision of the
positive law of nations as it develops. Huber has discussed
the question at some length. He is one of the few writers
to appreciate the necessity of distinguishing the law of organization from the rest of international law, and for this
his essay deserves a wider reading, whatever one may think
of his conclusions. He says:

hended not only such permanent organizations as the unions for law,

justice, and administration, but also such occasional or periodical or-
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ganizations as congresses and conferences, particularly the Peace

Conferences.1

The relation of equality to the evolution of supernational

organization has been principally concerned with three

questions: (1) representation, voting, and contributions in

1 Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 106. "Eine differentielle Behandlung der

Staaten ist an sich in allen Beziehungen denkbar, doch ist sie wohl nie in Frage

gekommen bei materiellen Rechtsnormen, weil die materielle Norm ein abstraktes

Verhältnis zu regeln pflegt, welches ebensowohl zwischen Grossstaaten wie zwi-

schen Kleinstaaten, wie endlich zwischen Staaten von ungleicher politischer Bedeu-

tung vorkommen kann. Anders verhält es sich mit formellen organisatorischen

Rechtssätzen, durch welche ein konkretes, gleichzeitig verschiedene Staaten um-

fassendes Rechtsverhältnis begründet wird. Solange internationale Organisationen,

wie es bisher üblich war, den teilnehmenden Staaten angepasst werden, ist eine

This equality may be manifested on the one hand in relation to abstract
legal principles of a more material and more formal nature, and on the
other hand in relation to concrete rules, i.e., in relation to international
organizations. Equality is recognized with regard to the first category
of legal principles by those who deny it in relation to the second category. The problem centers upon the importance or unimportance of
equality within international organizations, in which are comprehended not only such permanent organizations as the unions for law,
justice, and administration, but also such occasional or periodical or·
ganizations as congresses and conferences, particularly the Peace
Conferences. 1

gleichmässige Berücksichtigung aller ohne weiteres möglich. Anders aber, wenn

zunächst für die Organisation feste Grundsätze aufgestellt werden und erst hernach

geprüft wird, in welcher Weise den beteiligten Staaten eine Stellung in dieser

angewiesen werden könne." Ibid., p. 90.

The relation of equality to the evolution of supernational
organization has been principally concerned with three
questions: (1) representation, voting, and contributions in
Die Gleichheit der Staalen, p. 106. " Eine differentielle Behandlung der
Staaten ist an sich in alien Beziehungen denkbar, doch ist sie wohl nie in Frage
gekommen bei materiellen Rechtsnormen, weil die materielle Norm ein abstraktes
Verhaltnis zu regeln pflegt, welches ebensowohl zwiscben Grossstaaten wie zwischen Kleinstaaten, wie endlich zwischen Staaten von ungleicher politiscber Bedeutung vorkommen kann. Anders verhii.lt es sich mit formellen organisatorischen
Rechtssatzen, <lurch welche ein konkretes, gleichzeitig verschiedene Staaten umfassendes Rechtsverhii.ltnis begrtindet wird. Solange internationale Organisationen,
wie es bisher tiblich war, den teilnehmenden Staaten angepasst werden, ist eine
gleicbmassige Beri.icksicbtigung aller ohne weiteres moglich. Anders aber, wenn
zuniichst filr die Organisation feste Grundsatze aufgestellt werden und erst hernach
gepri.ift wird, in welcher Weise den beteiligten Staaten eine Stellung in dieser
angewiesen werden konne." Ibid., p. 90.
1
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international congresses, conferences, and unions; (2) the

composition of permanent international tribunals; and (3)

the position of the great powers in the society of nations.

The first question has received relatively little consideration

from the publicists. So far as it has been considered it has

been generally assumed that complete equality must be the

rule. Chretien says:

From the idea of equality is to be deduced especially the impossi-

bility of discovering, either in an isolated power, or in the union and

alliance of many powers, the germ of any authority whatever relative

to others. Conferences or congresses are in principle destitute of all

international congresses, conferences, and unions; (2) the
composition of permanent international tribunals; and (3)
the position of the great powers in the society of nations.
The first question has received relatively little consideration
from the publicists. So far as it has been considered it has
been generally assumed that complete equality must be the
rule. Chretien says:

coactive authority relative to the states which have not been called

to the assembly or have not taken part; the meeting of all states but

one will never have with regard to that one either legislative or judi-

cial power.1

The second question has scarcely been considered at all,

having come within the domain of practical politics only in

recent years.2

About the third question there has been a great deal of
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controversy. It has divided the writers more sharply than

any other question arising from the application of the prin-

ciple of equality to international relations. A majority of

the jurists appear to hold the opinion that the hegemony

From the idea of equality is to be deduced especially the impossibility of discovering, either in an isolated power, or in the union and
alliance of many powers, the germ of any authority whatever relative
to others. Conferences or congresses are in principle destitute of all
coactive authority relative to the states which have not been called
to the assembly or have not taken part; the meeting of all states but
one will never have with regard to that one either legislative or judicial power.1

of the great powers is not an impairment of the juridical

equality of states. Some hold that the two are entirely

compatible, the equality of states being a legal principle,

while the hegemony of the great powers is purely political.

This appears to be the opinion of Oppenheim, who says:

1 Principes, § 164, p. 166. Huber discusses the question at greater length and

reaches a similar conclusion. Op. cit., pp. 106-118. Cf. Bluntschli, VSlkerrecht,

§§ 165-106.

* The discussion of plans for permanent international tribunals in the Second

Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907 has given the question a degree of practical

importance. The question is certain to receive more attention in treatises of the

future. See Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 530-561; Huber, Die Gleichheti der

Staaien.

The second question has scarcely been considered at all,
having come within the domain of practical politics only in
recent years. 2
About the third question there has been a great deal of
controversy. It has divided the writers more sharply than
any other question arising from the application of the principle of equality to international relations. A majority of
the jurists appear to hold the opinion that the hegemony
of the great powers is not an impairment of the juridical
equality of states. Some hold that the two are entirely
compatible, the equality of states being a legal principle,
while the hegemony of the great powers is purely political.
This appears to be the opinion of Oppenheim, who says:
1 Prindpcs, § 164, p. 166. Huber discusses the question at greater length and
reaches a similar conclusion. Op. cit., pp. 106-n8. Cf. Bluntschli, Volkcrrecht,
§§ 105-1o6.
2 The discussion of plans for permanent international tribunals in the Second
Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907 bas given the question a degree of practical
importance. The question is certain to receive more attention in treatises of the
future. See Hicks, in A. J. I. L. (19o8), II, 530-561; Huber, Die Gleichheit der

SlaaUn.
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Legal equality must not be confounded with political equality....

Politically, States are in no manner equals, as there is a difference be-

tween the Great Powers and others. . . .

But, however important the position and the influence of the Great

Powers may be, they are by no means derived from a legal basis or

rule.1

Of the contention that the position of the great powers is

legally superior to that of the smaller states, Oppenheim

remarks:

Legal equality must not be confounded with political equality....
Politically, States are in no manner equals, as there is a difference between the Great Powers and others ....
But, however important the position and the influence of the Great
Powers may be, they are by no means derived from a legal basis or
rule. 1

This doctrine, which professedly seeks to abolish the universally recog-

nized rule of the equality of States, has no sound basis, and confounds

political with legal inequality.*

Rivier makes a similar distinction:

Always, by the very nature of things, strong states have exercised

Of the contention that the position of the great powers is
legally superior to that of the smaller states, Oppenheim
remarks:

a preponderant influence; the political equilibrium was created to

oppose the abuse of force. Since 1815, the great powers have ruled

Europe. This hegemony, admitted, and useful as long as it is confined

within the limits of justice, is un fait politique and has to do only with

policy. It is in no respect un principe juridique; questions of right

This doctrine, which professedly seeks to abolish the universally recognized rule of the equality of States, has no sound basis, and confounds
political with legal inequality. 2

are not affected by it; it never detracts by itself from the principle of
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equality. When resolutions are adopted in a congress a great power

has no more voice than a small one.3

Huber stresses the importance of the fact

that practice and doctrine are in accord, that a legal differentiation of

states and a legal hegemony of the great powers do not exist. A num-

ber of authors, to be sure, emphasize the extraordinary importance of

the great powers that appear in the form of the so-called European

Concert, and think that to some extent they are able to perceive

therein the germ of a future world organization. For all that, how-

ever, there are involved only actual, political differences, which may

become legally important in the future, but are not legally important

at present.4

1 Int. Law, { 116, I, 170. » Ibid., I, 171, note.

• Principes, 1,125. See also Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 88-

90; Walker, Manual, pp. 11-13.

Rivier makes a similar distinction:
Always, hy the very nature of things, strong states have exercised
a preponderant influence; the political equilibrium was created to
oppose the abuse of force. Since 1815, the great powers have ruled
Europe. This hegemony, admitted, and useful as long as it is confined
within the limits of justice, is 1m f ait politique and has to do only with
policy. It is in no respect un p1incipe juridique; questions of right
are not affected by it; it never detracts by itself from the principle of
equality. When resolutions are adopted in a congress a great power
has no more voice than a small one.3

* Die Gleichheit der Stouten, p. 105.

Huber stresses the importance of the fact
that practice and doctrine are in accord, that a legal differentiation of
states and a legal hegemony of the great powers do not exist. A number of authors, to be sure, emphasize the extraordinary importance of
the great powers that appear in the form of the so-called European
Concert, and think that to some extent they are able to perceive
therein the germ of a future world organization. For all that, however, there are involved only actual, political differences, which may
become legally important in the future, but are not legally important
at present.4
1 ll>id., I, 171, note.
Int. Law,§ u6, I, 170.
a Principes, I, 1:25. See also Kebedgy, in Z . S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 8890; Walker, Manual, pp. u-13.
4 Die Gleichheit der StaaJen, p. 105.
1
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Some writers seem to go even further, and deny, not only

the legal nature of the position of the great powers, but

also the future possibility of that position becoming the

nucleus of a supernational organization. Thus Streit, while

professing to take the positivist viewpoint, refutes both the

suggestion of Bluntschli and Westlake that the hegemony of

the great powers may be an incipient supernational organi-

zation and the contention of Holtzendorff that unanimity

among the great powers creates a presumption that a general

interest exists. He concludes:

International science is somewhat reserved with regard to all pro-

posals for an organization of the society of states. In fact, any such

organization seems to be impracticable; it presupposes the territorial

stability of all states on the basis of mutual concessions to which it is

difficult, not to say impossible, to hope that states will consent; and

further, in our opinion, it would be in conflict with the very nature of

Some writers seem to go even further, and deny, not only
the legal nature of the position of the great powers, but
also the future possibility of that position becoming the
nucleus of a supemational organization. Thus Streit, while
professing to take the positivist viewpoint, refutes both the
suggestion of Bluntschli and Westlake that the hegemony of
the great powers may be an incipient supemational organization and the contention of Holtzendorff that unanimity
among the great powers creates a presumption that a general
interest exists. He concludes:

international society, of which it is characteristic that it is composed

of independent and sovereign persons. . . .

It follows from what has been said that the juridical hegemony of
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the great powers appears neither to indicate nor to be possible as the

beginning of an organization of international society.

The superiority, either of all the great powers united or of any one

of them, has been at all times a social superiority, which has formed

an essential element of the policy of all centuries but which vanishes

before the law. It is to be expected that it will always be thus. Jurid-

ical equality among states is a principle of the law of nations without

which the law of nations could not exist, and consequently it is to the

advantage of all states. What individual liberty is for municipal

public law, the equality of states is in international law.1

Other writers, while opposing just as vigorously the sug-

gestion that the position of the great powers is legally su-

perior to that of other states, admit frankly that it is in

conflict with equality and that it represents a tendency

which, unless checked, may place important limitations

1 R. D. I. L. C. (1900) 2* sfir., II, 5-45, 22, 24. Cf. Huber, Die Glekhheit der

Staaten, pp. 89, 90, 106-118.

International science is somewhat reserved with regard to all proposals for an organization of the society of states. In fact, any such
organization seems to be impracticable; it presupposes the territorial
stability of all states on the basis of mutual concessions to which it is
difficult, not to say impossible, to hope that states will consent; and
further, in our opinion, it would be in conflict with the very nature of
international society, of which it is characteristic that it is composed
of independent and sovereign persons. . . .
It follows from what has been said that the juridical hegemony of
the great powers appears neither to indicate nor to be possible as the
beginning of an organization of international society.
The superiority, either of all the great powers united or of any one
of them, has been at all times a social superiority, which has formed
an essential element of the policy of all centuries but which vanishes
before the law. It is to be expected that it will always be thus. Juridical equality among states is a principle of the law of nations without
which the law of nations could not exist, and consequently it is to the
advantage of all states. What individual liberty is for municipal
public law, the equality of states is in international law. 1

Other writers, while opposing just as vigorously the suggestion that the position of the great powers is legally superior to that of other states, admit frankly that it is in
conflict with equality and that it represents a tendency
which, unless checked, may place important limitations
1 R. D. I. L . C. (1<)00) 2• ser., II, 5-25, 22 1 24. Cf. Huber, Die Gkich/reit der
Staaten, pp. 89, 901 1o6-118.
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upon the principle's application. Fiore declares that the

pretension of the great powers to control the liberty of

smaller states is a violation of equality as that principle is

generally understood.1 In an essay on the European Conr

cert and its relation to international law, Nys contends that

the idea of hegemony is in conflict with the principle of

equality. He saves the principle by condemning the hegem-

ony of the great powers as an institution of policy:

Within this European Concert, within this European political system,

there has been constituted a directing body which includes only the

"great powers." In fact, in positive contradiction with the idea of

society which involves the notion of equality among the members

composing society, the more powerful states of Europe presume to con-

trol the destinies of all Europe and to exercise an irresistible influence

on the other continents. It is true that the opposition of the United

States has defeated the plan outlined by the great powers with refer-

ence to America, but it exists for Asia and for Africa. The situation is

somewhat novel on the European continent. The hegemony of the

great powers is indisputable as a political fact: the whole history of

Europe in the nineteenth century bears witness to it. But this hegem-
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ony does not and can not constitute a juridical principle.*

Nys recognizes the danger that the practice of inequality

may impair the principle of equality, and he urges accord-

ingly that the Concert as an institution be condemned:

The pretension can not stand for an instant before the fundamental

principles of the law of nations; the diplomatic transactions by which

it attempts to support itself do not emanate from the consent of all the

members of the society of states, but only from the will of the so-called

great powers. . . .

In truth, it may become international law if such transactions can

produce new ideas and new rules. There lies the danger. Interna-

tional law is in large part customary law, that is, precedents have a

upon the principle's application. Fiore declares that the
pretension of the great powers to control the liberty of
smaller states is a violation of equality as that principle is
generally understood. 1 In an essay on the European Concert and its relation to international law, Nys contends that
the idea of hegemony is in conflict with the principle of
equality. He saves the principle by condemning the hegemony of the great powers as an institution of policy:
Within this European Concert, within this European political system,.
there has been constituted a directing body which includes only the
"great powers." In fact, in positive contradiction with the idea of
society which involves the notion of equality among the members
composing society, the more powerf\11 states of Europe presume to control the destinies of all Europe and to exercise an irresistible influence
on the other continents. It is true that the opposition of the United
States has defeated the plan outlined by the great powers with reference to America, but it exists for Asia and for Africa. The situation is
somewhat novel on the European continent. The hegemony of the
great powers is indisputable as a political fact: the whole history of
Europe in the nineteenth century bears witness to it. But this hegemony does not and can not constitute a juridical principle.2

great influence and le fail accompli is to an important extent the gen-

erator of law; but it is also true that le rdle de la science is preponder-

ant. Science ought to guard against the sanctioning of proceedings

1 Trattaio, § 429, I, 293; Int. Lava Cod., § 396. » tiudes, II, 3.

Nys recognizes the danger that the practice of inequality
may impair the principle of equality, and he urges accordingly that the Concert as an institution be condemned:
The pretension can not stand for an instant before the fundamental
principles of the law of nations; the diplomatic transactions by which
it attempts to support itself do not emanate from the consent of all the
members of the society of states, but only from the will of the so-called
great powers ....
In truth, it may become international law if such transactions can
produce new ideas and new rules. There lies the danger. International law is in large part customary law, that is, precedents have a
great influence and le fait accompl1: is to an important extent the generator of law; but it is also true that le r6le de la science is preponderant. Science ought to guard against the sanctioning of proceedings.
1

Traltato, § 4291 I, 293; Int. Law Cod.,§ 396.

2

l.Judes, II, 3.
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and practices which try to introduce too subtle a policy; it ought to

protest when theories without rational basis or historical foundation

extol the hegemony of the great powers as an institution destined to

assure the reign of liberty and justice in the sphere of international

relations.

The European Concert, taking the term in the sense of government

by the great European powers, ought to be rejected and condemned.

It is by no means a tribunal; no more does it constitute in any respect

the executive power of an international organization in process of de-

velopment. It is the product of policy, and on the whole it has so far

served particularly as an instrument of oppression.1

In his general treatise, a later and larger work, Nys repeats

the same warning:

The principle of equality has seen the pretensions of the great

powers rise up against it, first with regard to Europe and then with

and practices which try to introduce too subtle a policy; it ought to
protest when theories without rational basis or historical foundation
extol the hegemony of the great powers as an institution destined to
assure the reign of liberty and justice in the sphere of international
relations.
The European Concert, taking the term in the sense of government
by the great European powers, ought to be rejected and condemned.
It is by no means a tribunal; no more does it constitute in any respect
the executive power of an international organization in process of development. It is the product of policy, and on the whole it has so far
served particularly as an instrument of oppression. 1

regard to the whole world, and the pretensions of the United States

with regard to the American continent. These pretensions are un-

founded in international law; but they have prevailed on more than

one occasion in the domain of facts, and there is a great danger in this

In his general treatise, a later and larger work, Nys repeats
the same warning:
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because international law is in part customary law, a thing done has

an important bearing, and, aided by the dissertations of skillful

writers, an erroneous doctrine may grow up and impose itself upon

us. It is necessary to combat it: the great powers are neither the

tribunal nor the executive power of an international organization;

their" concert," their " accord," is a product of policy.2

Chretien is equally explicit in denouncing the activities of

the great powers as a violation of the equality of states.

There is a derogation from the principle of equality much more

important than that made necessary by political or diplomatic cere-

monial; it is the division of European powers into great powers and

secondary powers. Included today in the first category are Germany,

England, Austria, France, Italy, and Russia. This division, under-

stood as modern international policy understands it, tends to destroy,

to the detriment of secondary powers, the fundamental principle of

the equality of states. The great powers manifest more and more a

tendency to constitute themselves an international tribunal before

The principle of equality has seen the pretensions of the great
powers rise up against it, first with regard to Europe and then with
regard to the whole world, and the pretensions of the United States
with regard to the American continent. These pretensions are unfounded in international law; but they have prevailed on more than
one occasion in the domain of facts, and there is a great danger in this
because international law is in part customary law, a thing done has
an important bearing, and, aided by the dissertations of skillful
writers, an erroneous doctrine may grow up and impose itself upon
us. It is necessary to combat it: the great powers are neither the
tribunal nor the executive power of an international organization;
their" concert,'' their" accord," is a product of policy.2

1 Etudes, II, 44-46. * Le droit int., II, 240.

Chretien is equally explicit in denouncing the activities of
the great powers as a violation of the equality of states.
There is a derogation from the principle of equality much more
important than that made necessary by political or diplomatic ceremonial; it is the division of European powers into great powers and
secondary powers. Included today in the first category are Germany,
England, Austria, France, Italy, and Russia. This division, understood as modem international policy understands it, tends to destroy,
to the detriment of secondary powers, the fundamental principle of
the equality of states. The great powers manifest more and more a
tendency to constitute themselves an international tribunal before
t

Le droil inl., II, 240.
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which states of less importance will be henceforth justiciable. They

grant permissions or refuse them, ratify acts of sovereignty or annul

them, superintend others by virtue of I know not what superior right

which they attribute to themselves, setting themselves up as the au-

thorized directors of the international society. They tend, finally, to

transform into an authority of right the authority of fact which can-

not fail to be the consequence of the superiority of their military forces

and of their wealth. It is precisely in doing this that they manifestly

violate the principle of the juridical equality of states. We are a long

way it is evident from questions of precedence and ceremonial. It is

the very liberty of weak states which is threatened; it is the existence

of their rights which is attacked. The divergence of views and the

latent sources of conflict which, at the present moment [1893], exist

between two of the great powers and the other four, will constitute,

while they continue, a safeguard and a guaranty for the small states.

But on the day when enmities are appeased, when conformity of

interests and of views comes to be established, the juridical equality

of all states incurs, at least in Europe, a great risk of being no more

than a vain word.1

Jurists are by no means unanimous on this point however.
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A large, apparently an increasing, number regard the hegem-

ony of the great powers as the incipient manifestation of

supernational institutional development, and they accord-

ingly admit important limitations upon the principle of

equality in the law of supernational organization. Rep-

resentatives of this view may be considered most conven-

which states of less importance will be henceforth justiciable. They
grant permissions or refuse them, ratify acts of sovereignty or annul
them, superintend others by virtue of I know not what superior right
which they attribute to themselves, setting themselves up as the authorized directors of the international society. They tend, finally, to
transform into an authority of right the authority of fact which cannot fail to be the consequence of the superiority of their military forces
and of their wealth. It is precisely in doing this that they manifestly
violate the principle of the juridical equality of states. We are a long
way it is evident from questions of precedence and ceremonial. It is
the very liberty of weak states which is threatened; it is the existence
of their rights which is attacked. The divergence of views and the
latent sources of conflict which, at the present moment [1893], exist
between two of the great powers and the other four, will constitute,
while they continue, a safeguard and a guaranty for the small states.
But on the day when enmities are appeased, when conformity of
interests and of views comes to be established, the juridical equality
of all states incurs, at least in Europe, a great risk of being no more
than a vain word. 1

iently with those jurists who doubt or deny the principle of

equality.

Publicists Who Doubt or Deny State Equality

From regarding equality as merely an ideal it is a short

step to doubting or denying it altogether. The divergence

between the opinions of those who accept the principle and

the opinions of those who doubt or deny it is not so great

as one might assume at first instance. All jurists recognize

1 Principcs, $ 174, p. 174.

Jurists are by no means unanimous on this point however.
A large, apparently an increasing, number regard the hegemony of the great powers as the incipient manifestation of
supemational institutional development, and they accordingly admit important limitations upon the principle of
equality in the law of supemational organization. Representatives of this view may be considered most conveniently with those jurists who doubt or deny the principle of
equality.
PUBucrsrs WHo DmrnT OR

DENY

STATE EQUALITY

From regarding equality as merely an ideal it is a short
step to doubting or denying it altogether. The divergence
between the opinions of those who accept the principle and
the opinions of those who doubt or deny it is not so great
. as one might assume at first instance. All jurists recognize
1

Principes, § 174, p. 174.
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the fundamental principle of equality of protection in the

enjoyment of rights. Almost all modern jurists admit some

differences of status among international persons. Those

who accept the principle of equality regard equal capacity

for rights as the normal and the ideal, and inequality as ab-

normal and something to be discouraged. Those who doubt

or deny the principle are more impressed with the extensive

prevalence of inequality in the practice of nations, and the

unreal and impractical character of equality even as an ideal.

Positivist tendencies in the study of the law of nations have

brought an increasing number of jurists to the latter opinion.1

Funck-Brentano and Sorel distinguish the real from the

theoretical law of nations, defining the former as those rules

founded on custom and convention which actually deter-

mine the conduct of independent states, and the latter as

the speculations of writers as to what ought to determine

the conduct of independent states. Vattel is described as

one of the best known of the theorists, while their own

manual is devoted to real or positive law. The notion that
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international society is a state of nature is emphatically re-

jected. The principle of state equality is represented as

having little practical significance:

All established States are sovereign, but in their mutual relations

they do not all possess the same rights of sovereignty. They are equal,

therefore, only in theory, particularly as one considers the principle

of their sovereignty without taking account of the conditions in

which that sovereignty is exercised. All sovereign States are equal

as sovereign States: in reality, these identical terms, these words

"sovereign State," that we apply to them indiscriminately, designate

States of very diverse constitution, sovereignties of a very different

nature, and consequently sovereign States perfectly unequal in rights

and strength. It is correct to say that when sovereign states enter

1 A few writers omit equality or treat it under another name. Hall develops

much the same idea under the name of independence (Int. Law, pp: 17 ff., 47),

while Westlake asserts that " the equality of sovereign states is merely their in-

dependence under a different name." Int. Law, I, 321.

the fundamental principle of equality of protection in the
enjoyment of rights. Almost all modern jurists admit some
differences of status among international persons. Those
who accept the principle of equality regard equal capacity
for rights as the normal and the ideal, and inequality as abnormal and something to be discouraged. Those who doubt
or deny the principle are more impressed with the extensive
prevalence of inequality in the practice of nations, and the
unreal and impractical character of equality even as an ideal.
Positivist tendencies in the study of the law of nations have
brought an increasing number of jurists to the latter opinion.1
Funck-Brentano and Sorel distinguish the real from the
theoretical law of nations, defining the former as those rules
founded on custom and convention which actually determine the conduct of independent states, and the latter as
the speculations of writers as to what ought to determine
the conduct of independent states. Vattel is described as
one of the best known of the theorists, while their own
manual is devoted to real or positive law. The notion that
international society is a state of nature is emphatically rejected. The principle of state equality is represented as
having little practical significance:
All established States are sovereign, but in their mutual relations
they do not all possess the same rights of sovereignty. They are equal,
therefore, only in theory, particularly as one considers the principle
of their sovereignty without taking account of the conditions in
which that sovereignty is exercised. All sovereign States are equal
as sovereign States: in reality, these identical terms, these words
" sovereign State," that we apply to them indiscriminately, designate
States of very diverse constitution, sovereignties of a very different
nature, and consequently sovereign States perfectly unequal in rights
and strength. It is correct to say that when sovereign states enter
A few writers omit equality or treat it under another name. Hall develops
much the same idea under the name of independence (Int. Law, pp. 17 ff., 47),
while Westlake asserts that "the equality of sovereign states is merely their independence under a different name." Int. Law, I, 321.
1
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into mutual obligations they employ in the agreement the same ab-

stract right of contracting; but if we examine the very nature of the

agreement, the events which have caused it, and the consequences

which result from it, we see that this agreement, while resulting from

an abstract equality, almost always demonstrates the real inequality

of the contracting parties. This inequality is the consequence not

only of the disproportion which exists between the extent, wealth, and

military power of states; it results also from the political relations

which the nations that form states maintain with one another; it

results especially from the internal constitution of these nations, from

their public and private morals, and from the degree of their intellec-

tual culture. Apart from the application which is made of it the

equality of states is a word without significance. This equality exists

only as far as it is respected, and states only respect it or enforce re-

spect for it as they understand it. Civil and political equality among

the subjects of a single state may become a reality because the laws

of the state may be conceived in a way to establish equality and guar-

antee its practice; but among states there is no public authority (il

n'y a point de lois communes); equality has no other foundation and

no other guaranty than the customs (meeurs) of nations; differences
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in national character, intellectual culture, moral progress, political

traditions, productivity, and, finally, of geographical situation destroy

all real equality among states. If, in spite of so many causes of diver-

sity, so many sources of contradiction, so many reasons for irregular-

ity, general rules of conduct have been established and considered as

equally applicable to all states, these rules acquire a positive impor-

tance only as they take account of the conditions in which states are

placed in their relations with one another.1

The question of equality in its relation to the theory of

fundamental rights has been considered by Pillet, who con-

cludes that it is futile, as well as a logical mistake, to treat

equality as a fundamental right. Inequality must prevail

between civilized and partially civilized states, between

sovereign and partially sovereign states, between the guar-

antors and guaranteed states, between states that are neu-

tralized and states that are not, and, in some respects at

1 Prtcis, p. 46.

into mutual obligations they employ in the agreement the same abstract right of contracting; but if we examine the very nature of the
agreement, the events which have caused it, and the consequences
which result from it, we see that this agreement, while resulting from
an abstract equality, almost always demonstrates the real inequality
of the contracting parties. This inequality is the consequence not
only of the disproportion which exists between the extent, wealth, and
military power of states; it results also from the political relations
which the nations that form states maintain with one another; it
results especially from the internal constitution of these nations, from
their public and private morals, and from the degree of their intellectual culture. Apart from the application which is made of it the
equality of states is a word without significance. This equality exists
only as far as it is respected, and states only respect it or enforce respect for it as they understand it. Civil and political equality among
the subjects of a single state may become a reality because the laws
of the state may be conceived in a way to establish equality and guarantee its practice; but among states there is no public authority (il
n'y a point de lois communes); equality has no other foundation and
no other guaranty than the customs (mamrs) of nations; differences
in national character, intellectual culture, moral progress, political
traditions, productivity, and, finally, of geographical situation destroy
all real equality among states. If, in spite of so many causes of diversity, so many sources of contradiction, so many reasons for irregularity, general rules of conduct have been established and considered as
equally applicable to all states, these rules acquire a positive importance only as they take account of the conditions in which states are
placed in their relations with one another. 1

The question of equality in its relation to the theory of
fundamental rights has been considered by Pillet, who concludes that it is futile, as well as a logical mistake, to treat
equality as a fundamental right. Inequality must prevail
between civilized and partially civilized states, between
sovereign and partially sovereign states, between the guarantors and guaranteed states, between states that are neutralized and states that are not, and, in some respects at
1

Prlcis, p. 46.
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least, between states that are great and states that are small.

The assertion that Russia and Geneva have equal rights,

says Pillet,

has a primary and a very great defect; it is not just. States are not

least, between states that are great and states that are small.
The assertion that Russia and Geneva have equal rights,
says Pillet,

equal from the point of view of their rights any more than from that

of their wealth and their power.

Bien eloignee de I'egaliti des livres, la vie publique ne nous

montre qu'inegalites, and that is reason enough why we

should not speak of equality as a fundamental and absolute

has a primary and a very great defect; it is not just. States are not
equal from the point of view of their rights any more than from that
of their wealth and their power.

right of states.1

A briefer study of the theory of independence and equal-

ity leads Mr. Philip M. Brown to the conclusion that

"the perfect equality of nations " is very far from being" universally

acknowledged " in the intercourse of states. Statesmen conscious of

their high responsibility cannot honestly face the facts of international

life and say that Great Britain and Liberia are equal. . . .

It would not be just, of course, to infer that a theory or alleged prin-

ciple is unsound because it may not generally be accepted in practice.

But statesmen are unable to acknowledge the truth of the theory of the

Bien efoignee de l'egalite des livres, la vie publique ne nous
montre qu'inegalites, and that is reason enough why we

should not speak of equality as a fundamental and absolute
right of states. 1
A briefer study of the theory of independence and equality leads Mr. Philip M. Brown to the conclusion that

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

equality of states simply because that theory is in patent antagonism

with the actual facts of international life. From their point of view,

and, it would seem, from the point of view of all reasoning men, it is

unpardonable folly to assume that things which are unequal in almost

every important respect are nevertheless equal to each other.'

This opinion has received the support of at least one

statesman and man of affairs. In an address before the

American Society of International Law in 1907, Richard

Olney, formerly United States Secretary of State, said of

the equality of states:

It is a principle which is simple in statement and easy to under-

stand — which prima facie seems to be founded in right reason and

calculated to be just and equitable in its working. Yet, while all this

1 R. G. D. I. P. (1898), V, 70-71. Pillet's conclusions are combated by Ke-

bedgy, in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103.

» A.J.I. L. (1915), DC, 326-3*9.

the perfect equality of nations " is very far from being 11 universally
acknowledged" in the intercourse of states. Statesmen conscious of
their high responsibility cannot honestly face the facts of international
life and say that Great Britain and Liberia are equal. ...
It would not be just, of course, to infer that a theory or alleged principle is unsound because it may not generally be accepted in practice.
But statesmen are unable to acknowledge the truth of the theory of the
equality of states simply because that theory is in patent antagonism
with the actual facts of international life. From their point of view,
and, it would seem, from the point of view of all reasoning men, it is
unpardonable folly to assume that things which are unequal in almost
every important respect are nevertheless equal to each other.2

11

This opinion has received the support of at least one
statesman and man of affairs. In an address before the
American Society of International Law in 1907, Richard
Olney, formerly United States Secretary of State, said of
the equality of states:
It is a principle which is simple in statement and easy to understand - which prima f acie seems to be founded in right reason and
calculated to be just and equitable in its working. Yet, while all this
1 R. G. D. I. P. (1898}, V, 7o-'/I. Pillet's conclusions are combated by Kebedgy, in Z. S. R. (uJoo) Neue Folge, XIX, 84-103.
I A. J. I. L. (1915), IX, 326-329.
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may be theoretically true of the principle of state equality, so much

irreconcilable with it has been done within the last hundred years that

its continued assertion seems to be an anachronism and a mistake.

A crowd of international incidents goes to prove the principle to be

one almost more active and better known in its breach than in its

observance. . . .

International law will hardly make much progress in the way of

scientific development so long as there is doubt as respects one of its

basic principles — so long as it continues to lay down a rule, which,

however plausible in theory, conflicts with the practice of the most

civilized and enlightened states, and, if obeyed, would have inhibited

and prevented numerous important international transactions which

are universally acknowledged to have been wise in conception and

beneficent in operation. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether

there must not be a material modification of the supposed hard and

fast rule that every state is the equal of every other and is without a

superior entitled to interfere with its absolute freedom of action.1

The same point of view was presented by Mr. F. C. Hicks

before the American Society of International Law in 1909.

Mr. Hicks said:

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

If the principle is intrinsically incapable of application to an actual

state of affairs, it is well to realize the fact at once and begin anew.

That the latter is the case may well be argued from two assertions of

recent years. First, that the doctrine has ceased to operate for the

may be theoretically true of the principle of state equality, so much
irreconcilable with it has been done within the last hundred years that
its continued assertion seems to be an anachronism and a mistake.
A crowd of international incidents goes to prove the principle to be
one almost more active and better known in its breach than in its
observance. . . .
International law will hardly make much progress in the way of
scientific development so long as there is doubt as respects one of its
basic principles - so long as it continues to lay down a rule, which,
however plausible in theory, conflicts with the practice of the most
civilized and enlightened states, and, if obeyed, would have inhibited
and prevented numerous important international transactions which
are universally acknowledged to have been wise in conception and
beneficent in operation. It is necessary, therefore, to consider whether
there must not be a material modification of the supposed hard and
fa.st rule that every state is the equal of every other and is without a
superior entitled to interfere with its absolute freedom of action.1

benefit of those states which most need it; and, second, that if al-

lowed to become operative it would give to minor states undue power

in international affairs.

More results have been expected to flow from the fiction than it is

capable of producing. Admitting for a moment the legal basis of the

fiction, in any given case, practical considerations immediately out-

The same point of view was presented by Mr. F. C. Hicks
before the American Society of International Law in 1909.
Mr. Hicks said:

weigh any respect for it. The doctrine really exists only in an academic

sense and has no inherent virtue or strength. It is invoked only when

it happens to fit in with the desires of a state confronted with a prob-

lem. At all other times it is ignored except as a reason for ceremonial

rules, all of which could be justified on common grounds of courtesy.

1 A.J.I.L. (1907),1,419-420. Cf. former Secretary Root's address before the

same Society, April 27, 1916, printed in ibid. (1916), X, 211-221.

If the principle is intrinsically incapable of application to an actual
state of affairs, it is well to realize the fact at once and begin anew.
That the latter is the case may well be argued from two assertions of
recent years. First, that the doctrine has ceased to operate for the
benefit of those states which most need it; and, second, that if allowed to become operative it would give to minor states undue power
in international affairs.
More results have been expected to flow from the fiction than it is
capable of producing. Admitting for a moment the legal basis of the
fiction, in any given case, practical considerations immediately outweigh any respect for it. The doctrine really exists only in an academic
sense and has no inherent virtue or strength. It is invoked only when
it happens to fit in with the desires of a state confronted with a problem. At all other times it is ignored except as a reason for ceremonial
rules, all of which could be justified on common grounds of courtesy.
l A. J. I. L. (1907),I, 41~420. Cf. former Secretary Root's address before the
same Society, April 27 1 1916, printed in ibid. (1916), X, ::111-221.
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It is not a practical doctrine because it connotes conceptions which

now require restatement.1

It is not a practical doctrine because it connotes conceptions which
now require restatement. 1

The most uncompromising attack on the whole concep-

tion of state equality comes from the great Scotch jurist,

James Lorimer. Lorimer is sometimes described as a belated

naturalist and associated with the school of Pufendorf.2 It

is true that he seeks to establish the law of nations upon the

basis of thoroughgoing rationalism, even denning it as the

law of nature realized in the relations of separate nations or

political communities; but his leading deductions are so

diametrically opposed to those of Pufendorf and his school

that it seems misleading to associate the two. Lorimer re-

jects absolutely the notion of state equality. There has

been no want of theories, he says, by which men have sought

to evade the inevitable problem involved in the classification

of states. The theory of universal monarchy and the theory

of control by an oligarchy of great powers have both had

their champions.

Last, and most baseless of all, we have the prevalent theory of the
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equality of all powers, a theory which seeks to get rid of the question

by denying its existence. Of these three theories it is the last alone

which has never been found capable of any practical realization at

all; and yet it is the theory which at the present day you will find

1 A. S. I. L., Proceedings (1909), III, 241. In the discussion of Mr. Hicks'

address, Mr. L. B. Evans said: "It seems to me that we have no clearer instance

of legal fiction than this doctrine of the equality of states. I doubt if there has

been a single moment since Grotius first promulgated that doctrine when it has

actually conformed to the facts in the case. There has never been a time when

nations were allowed to act upon the principle that they were equal, that they were

possessed of equal rights which they were free to use in accordance with their own

conception of what their best interests demanded. ... It seems to me that if the

rules of international law are, as so many writers say, based upon international

usage, then it must be said that the doctrine of equality is not now and never has

been a part of international law." Ibid., p. 248. Mr. E. C. Stowell said: "I

should like to say that I agree with the first speaker in considering the equality of

states a fiction and one which has never been very consistently observed." Ibid.,

The most uncompromising attack on the whole conception of state equality comes from the great Scotch jurist,
James Lorimer. Lorimer is sometimes described as a belated
naturalist and associated with the school of Pufendorf. 2 It
is true that he seeks to establish the law of nations upon the
basis of thoroughgoing rationalism, even defining it as the
law of nature realized in the relations of separate nations or
political communities; but his leading deductions are so
diametrically opposed to those of Pufendorf and his school
that it seems misleading to associate the two. Lorimer rejects absolutely the notion of state equality. There has
been no want of theories, he says, by which men have sought
to evade the inevitable problem involved in the classification
of states. The theory of universal monarchy and the theory
of control by an oligarchy of great powers have both had
their champions.
Last, and most baseless of all, we have the prevalent theory of the
equality of all powers, a theory which seeks to get rid of the question
by denying its existence. Of these three theories it is the last alone
which has never been found capable of any practical realization at
all; and yet it is the theory which at the present day you will find

p. 252. But compare the remarks of others, quoted supra, p. 113, note 1.

1 See Fenwick in A. J. I. L. (1914), VIII, 39; Hershey, in ibid. (1912), VI, 34,

note 10.

1 A. S. I. L., Proceedings (1909), III, 24r. In the discussion of Mr. Hicks'
address, Mr. L. B. Evans said: "It seems to me that we have no clearer instance
of legal fiction than this doctrine of the equality of states. I doubt if there has
been a single moment since Grotius first promulgated that doctrine when it has
actually conformed to the facts in the case. There has never been a time when
nations were allowed to act upon the principle that they were equal, that they were
possessed of equal rights which they were free to use in accordance with their own
conception of what their best interests demanded .... It seems to me that if the
rules of international law are, as so many writers say, based upon international
usage, then it must be said that the doctrine of equality is not now and never bas
been a part of international law." Ibid., p. 248. Mr. E. C. Stowell said: "I
should like to say that I agree with the first speaker in considering the equality of
states a fiction and one which has never been very consistently observed." Ibid.,
p. 252. But compare the remarks of others, quoted supra, p. n3, note 1.
1 See Fenwick in A. J. I. L. (1914), VIII, 39; Hershey, in ibid. (1912), VI, 34,
note 10.

IN THE WRITINGS OF MODERN PUBLICISTS 137

IN THE WRITINGS OF MODERN PUBLICISTS

137

set forth in all the books as that which alone is in accordance with

nature, and to which practice must, of course, strive to accommodate

itself. Now the equality of all States, the moment they are acknowl-

edged to be States at all, is, if possible, a more transparent fiction than

the equality of all individuals who are admitted to be jural persons or

jural citizens; because in the case of individuals or citizens there are

limits to possible size and power, and consequently to inequality, which

do not exist in the case of States. A State may be almost of any size

or power, both absolutely and relatively; and unless we are to adopt

the theory of absolute centralization and recognize annihilation of

nationality as the Nirvana of international existence, it is of the last

importance that the rights of the smaller and weaker States, such as

they are, should be carefully preserved. But this will never be effected

by placing them in a false position and inducing them to advance

claims which they cannot maintain. To assert that, without any

superiority in other respects, a State with ten thousand inhabitants

is equal to a State with ten million inhabitants, or that a State half

the size of an English County is equal to a State that covers half a

Continent, is just as false as to assert that a thousand is equal to a

million, or that the Canton of Geneva is equal to the Continent of
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Europe.1

Lorimer urges that the law of nations must take account of

the relative value of states, and he suggests that the size,

quality, and form of the state, and the form of government,

are factors which contribute to determine relative value.

A steadily increasing number of writers and jurists reject

the principle of equality in so far as its application to super-

national organization is concerned. Analytically considered,

this should constitute a problem quite distinct from the

question of equality of capacity for rights among inter-

set forth in all the books as that which alone is in accordance with
nature, and to which practice must, of course, strive to accommodate
itself. Now the equality of all States, the moment they are acknowledged to be States at all, is, if possible, a more transparent fiction than
the equality of all individuals who are admitted to be jural persons or
jural citizens; because in the case of individuals or citizens there are
limits to possible size and power, and consequently to inequality, which
do not exist in the case of States. A State may be almost of any size
or power, both absolutely and relatively; and unless we are to adopt
the theory of absolute centralization and recognize annihilation of
nationality as the NirvAna of international existence, it is of the last
importance that the rights of the smaller and weaker States, such as
they are, should be carefully preserved. But this will never be effected
by placing them in a false position and inducing them to advance
claims which they cannot maintain. To assert that, without any
superiority in other respects, a State with ten thousand inhabitants
is equal to a State with ten million inhabitants, or that a State half
the size of an English County is equal to a State that covers half a
Continent, is just as false as to assert that a thousand is equal to a
million, or that the Canton of Geneva is equal to the Continent of
Europe. 1

national persons. The general principle of classification

has been stated well enough by Amos, who says:

In every body of Law Systematically arranged, Laws affecting

Special Classes of Persons, often called " Laws regulating Status,"

1 Institutes, I, 170-171. Westlake says that "the equality of states cannot

usefully or even intelligibly be presented as a deduction unless the deduction also

furnishes a test showing to what states it applies." Collected Papers, pp. 86-87.

Lorimer urges that the law of nations must take account of
the relative value of states, and he suggests that the size,
quality, and form of the state, and the form of government,
are factors which contribute to determine relative value.
A steadily increasing number of writers and jurists reject
the principle of equality in so far as its application to supernational organization is concerned. Analytically considered,
this should constitute a problem quite distinct from the
question of equality of capacity for rights among international persons. The general principle of classification
has been stated well enough by Amos, who says:
In every body of Law Systematically arranged, Laws affecting
Special Classes of Persons, often called " Laws regulating Status,"
i InstituJes, I, 170--171.
Westlake says that "the equality of states cannot
usefully or even intelligibly be presented as a deduction unless the deduction also
furnishes a test showing to what states it applies." Colleckd Papers, pp. 86-87.
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ought to be distinctly separated from Laws directly relating to the

Constitution and Administration of the State, and may usefully be

also separated, in order to prevent repetition and to facilitate refer-

ence, from the rest of the body of Laws.1

Writers on the law of nations, however, generally refuse to

make any such separation. Principles and rules applicable

ought to be distinctly separated from Laws directly relating to the
Constitution and Administration of the State, and may usefully be
also separated, in order to prevent repetition and to facilitate reference, from the rest of the body of Laws. 1

to the relations between international persons are assumed

to be equally applicable to supernational organization. The

reason for this is found in the reluctance of publicists to

recognize the existence or even the possibility of super-

national institutions. So long as international society is a

state of nature, sovereignty unlimited, and states naturally

equal, such institutional development is manifestly im-

possible and law on the subject is nonexistent. This has

been the prevailing view of the last century, but there is a

significant tendency away from it. The tendency has been

much controverted. The controversy has turned chiefly

upon the legal position of the great powers.

Even those who defend equality are constrained to admit

that something is taking place which threatens to limit the
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principle's application more definitely than heretofore.

Bonfils says:

These powers (the great powers) frequently manifest a tendency to

assume, as the Pentarchy from 1815 to 1840, with regard to the other

powers, a superior right, a quasi-legislative authority, in taking a

position as the directors of the international community.*

Chretien and Nys recognize quite frankly the same tend-

ency.3

A great many eminent publicists have gone farther and

have recognized, expressly or by implication, the position

1 Science of Jurisprudence, p. 235. This distinction is not observed in primitive

law. It is characteristic of primitive society that no distinction should be made

between legal and political rights.

> Manuel, § 278, p. 165.

• Supra, pp. 129-131.

Writers on the law of nations, however, generally refuse to
make any such separation. Principles and rules applicable
to the relations between international persons are assumed
to be equally applicable to supernational organization. The
reason for this is found in the reluctance of publicists to
recognize the existence or even the possibility of supernational institutions. So long as international society is a
state of nature, sovereignty unlimited, and states naturally
equal, such institutional development is manifestly impossible and law on the subject is nonexistent. This has
been the prevailing view of the last century, but there is a
significant tendency away from it. The tendency has been
much controverted. The controversy has turned chiefly
upon the legal position of the great powers.
Even those who defend equality are constrained to admit
that something is taking place which threatens to limit the
principle's application more definitely than heretofore.
Bonfils says:
These powers {the great powers) frequently manifest a tendency to
assume, as the Pentarchy from 1815 to 1840, with regard to the other
powers, a superior right, a quasi-legislative authority, in taking a
position as the directors of the international community.2

ChrHien and Nys recognize quite frankly the same tendency.3
A great many eminent publicists have gone farther and
have recognized, expressly or by implication, the position
a Science of Jurisprudence, p. 235. This distinction is not observed in primitive

law. It is characteristic of primitive society that no distinction should be made
between legal and political rights.
1 Manud, ~ 278, p. 165.
• Supra, pp. I2Q-IJI.
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of the great powers as a rudimentary stage in the evolution

of supernational organization. Thus Bluntschli says:

The so-called pentarchy may be regarded as the beginning of a Eu-

ropean organization, but it cannot be regarded as its completion.1

Holtzendorff is not wholly unfavorable to the tendency:

It is natural that the smaller states should be less able to resist the

collective political action of the great powers. But their voluntary

of the great powers as a rudimentary stage in the evolution
of supernational organization. Thus Bluntschli says:
The so-called pentarchy may be regarded as the beginning of a European organization, but it cannot be regarded as its completion.1

submission to the unanimous counsel of the great powers, through

which there is attained at least a strong presumption of the existence

of a collective international interest, is more beneficial to their juridi-

cal position than that submissiveness to the threats of individual

neighboring states of superior power which formerly prevailed.*

Brusa thinks that the concert of the great powers has a right

to restrain the small states, by coercion if necessary, in order

to prevent them from making war.3 Even Geffcken, while

protesting against the opinion represented by Brusa, con-

cedes to the great powers a real superiority in the govern-

ment of Europe.4 Antoine insists that

In fact, it is beyond doubt that the great powers exercise an indis-

putable preponderance and regulate at their pleasure the collective

Holtzendorff is not wholly unfavorable to the tendency:
It is natural that the smaller states should be less able to resist the
collective political action of the great powers. But their voluntary
submission to the unanimous counsel of the great powers, through
which there is attained at least a strong presumption of the existence
of a collective international interest, is more beneficial to their juridical position than that submissiveness to the threats of individual
neighboring states of superior power which formerly prevailed.2
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interests of the other states.6

Pillet notes the same development:

The chief among them, those that are called the great powers, have

in fact monopolized the management of important common interests.

1 "Die sogenannte Pentarchie mag als Anfang einer Organisation Europas,

aber sie kann nicht als ihre Vollendung betrachtet werden." VSlkerrecht, § 103,

p. 106.

'"Dass sich kleinere Staaten einer politischen Gesammtaction der Grossm&chte

am wenigsten entziehen kSnnen, ist natUrlkh. Aber ihre (freiwillige) Unterord-

nung unter einstimmige Rathschlage der Grossmachte, durch welche mindestens

Brusa thinks that the concert of the great powers has a right
to restrain the small states, by coercion if necessary, in order
to prevent them from making war. 3 Even Geffcken, while
protesting against the opinion represented by Brusa, concedes to the great powers a real superiority in the government of Europe. 4 Antoine insists that

eine starke Prasumtion fur das Vorhandensein eines internationalen Gesammtin-

teresses erreicht wird, ist für ihren Rechtsbestand forderlicher, als die ehemalige

erzwungene Nachgiebigkeit gegen die Drohungen einzelner ubermfich tiger Nach-

barstaaten." Handbuch, { 4, II, 16.

» A. I. D. I. (1888), DC, 398. 4 Ibid., p. »93, note 1.

In fact, it is beyond doubt that the great powers exercise an indisputable preponderance and regulate at their pleasure the collective
interests of the other states. 6

'Flore, Nouveau droit int. pub., § 428, note 1,1, 374.

Pillet notes the same development:
The chief among them, those that are called the great powers, have
in fact monopolized the management of important common interests.
1 " Die sogenannte Pentarchie mag als Anfang einer Organisation Europas,
aber sie kann nicht als ihre Vollendung betrachtet werden." VolkerruhJ, § 103,
p. 1o6.
t
" Dass sich kleinere Staaten einer politischen Gesammtaction der Grossmic:hte
am wenigsten entziehen konnen, ist nattirlich. Aber ihre (freiwillige) Unterordnung unter einstimmige RathschUi.ge der GrossmJlchte, durch welche mindestens
cine starke Prasumtion fUr das Vorhandensein eines internationalen Gesammtinteresses erreicht wird, ist fill' ihren Rechtsbestand fOrderlicher, als die ehemalige
erzwungene Nachgiebigkeit gegen die Drohungen einzelner Ubennichtiger Nachbarstaaten." Handbuds, § 41 II, 16.
4 Ibid., p. 293 1 note 1.
1 A. I. D. I. (1888) 1 IX, 298.
1 Fiore, Nouveau droil i"'. tu/J., § 428, note 1, I, 374.
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They are the ones who determine the progress of positive interna-

tional law, who regulate affairs representing a general interest, and

who undertake to avoid the most pressing of the common dangers.

Therefore, there is for them an obvious superiority of fact which tends

to be transformed into a superiority of right by the increasing respect

which their decisions command among interested powers, who, not

having been consulted, would have the strict right to refuse to recog-

nize them.1

This opinion of the position of the great powers, with

its consequent limitation upon the principle of equality, is

widely held among British and American writers. Cobbett

They are the ones who determine the progress of positive international law, who regulate affairs representing a general interest, and
who undertake to a void the most pressing of the common dangers.
Therefore, there is for them an obvious superiority of fact which tends
to be transformed into a superiority of right hy the increasing respect
which their decisions command among interested powers, who, not
having been consulted, would have the strict right to refuse to recognize them.1

says that the equality of states is subject to some important

qualifications. The first relates to status, the second to the

primacy of the great powers:

In the second place, the recognized primacy of the six Great Powers

of Europe in relation to matters of European concern, and that of the

United States on the continent of America, although primarily politi-

cal, would seem also to involve an ultimate control over territorial

arrangements, and a consequent restriction on the territorial suprem-
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acy of other States, which are scarcely in keeping with the theory

even of legal equality.*

This opinion of the position of the great powers, with
its consequent limitation upon the principle of equality, is
widely held among British and American writers. Cobbett
says that the equality of states is subject to some important
qualifications. The first relates to status, the second to the
primacy of the great powers:

According to Taylor equality has

always been enjoyed sub modo, — that is, subject to the irresistible

power vested by the conventional or higher law in a committee com-

posed of the representatives of a few of the greater states acting in

behalf of the whole. That primacy or overlordship, gradually de-

veloped outside of the written treaty law since the Peace of West-

phalia, represents the common superior who actually succeeded to the

place made vacant by the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire as

international director.3

In his Essays, written more than thirty years ago, Law-

rence reached the conclusion that the principle of equality

In the second place, the recognized primacy of the six Great Powers
Qf Europe in relation to matters of European concern, and that of the
United States on the continent of America, although primarily political, would seem also to involve an ultimate control over territorial
arrangements, and a consequent restriction on the territorial supremacy of other States, which are scarcely in keeping with the theory
even of legal equality.1

was obsolete:

1 R. G. D. I. P. (1898), V, 71. » Int. Pub. Law, § 69, p. 98.

According to Taylor equality has

* Cases, I, 50.

always been enjoyed sub modo, - that is, subject to the irresistible
power vested by the conventional or higher law in a committee composed of the representatives of a few of the greater states acting in
behalf of the whole. That primacy or overlordship, gradually developed outside of the written treaty law since the Peace of Westphalia, represents the common superior who actually succeeded to the
place made vacant by the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire as
international director.3

In his Essays, written more than thirty years ago, Lawrence reached the conclusion that the principle of equality
was obsolete:
1
1

R. G. D. I. P. (18g8), V, 71.
Cases, I, 50.

1

Int. Pub. Law, § 691 p. 98.
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If, then, the principles and rules of the law of nations are really to

be deduced from the practice of nations whenever that practice is

consistent and uniform, it is time, I think, to give up the doctrine of

equality in deference to the stern logic of established facts. For many

years Europe has been working round again to the old notion of a

common superior, not indeed a Pope or an Emperor, but a Committee,

a body of representatives of her leading states.. . .

It seems to me that, in the face of such facts as these, it is impossible

to hold any longer the old doctrine of the absolute equality of all inde-

pendent states before the law. It is dead; and we ought to put in its

place the new doctrine that the Great Powers have by modern Inter-

national Law a primacy among their fellows, which bids fair to de-

velop into a central authority for the settlement of all disputes between

the nations of Europe.1

In late editions of his Principles of International Law, Law-

rence takes the slightly more conservative view that the

principle is in process of becoming obsolete. After review-

ing the manifold activities of the great powers, he says:

We must be cautious in drawing inferences from the facts just re-

cited. Attempts are made to reconcile them with the doctrine of the

If, then, the principles and rules of the law of nations are really to
be deduced from the practice of nations whenever that practice is
consistent and uniform, it is time, I think, to give up the doctrine of
equality in deference to the stern logic of established facts. For many
years Europe has been working round again to the old notion of a
common superior, not indeed a Pope or an Emperor, but a Committee,
a body of representatives of her leading states ....
It seems to me that, in the face of such facts as these, it is impossible
to hold any longer the old doctrine of the absolute equality of all independent states before the law. It is dead; and we ought to put in its
place the new doctrine that the Great Powers have by modern International Law a primacy among their fellows, which bids fair to develop into a central authority for the settlement of all disputes between
the nations of Europe. 1
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equality of all sovereign states by pointing out that what they es-

tablish is a political inequality, whereas what the old theory asserted

was a legal equality. It is a grave question whether the legal and the

political aspects of the problem can be parted and kept separate in

this way. . . . But in a system of rules depending, like International

Law, for their validity on general consent, what is political is legal also,

if it is generally accepted and acted on. In the society of nations con-

In late editions of his Principles of International, Law, Lawrence takes the slightly more conservative view that the
principle is in process of becoming obsolete. After reviewing the manifold activities of the great powers, he says:

sent has the force of law, and general consent is shown not only by ex-

press agreement, but still more by continuous custom. If, therefore,

the authority of the Great Powers has been acknowledged so constantly

for the greater part of a century that it has become a part of the public

order of Europe, and is accepted and even invoked by the smaller

states of Europe, any description of it which refuses to recognize its

legality seems inadequate, if not inaccurate.2

1 Extracts from pp. 209, 232.

* § 114, p. 275. Mr. A. H. Snow asserts that as a matter of fact " the super-

national law of the world is made principally through the persuasive hegemony of

the group of nations which we call' the great Powers.'" A.J. I. L. (1012), VI, 897.

We must be cautious in drawing inferences from the facts just recited. Attempts are made to reconcile them with the doctrine of the
equality of all sovereign states by pointing out that what they establish is a political inequality, whereas what the old theory asserted
was a legal equality. It is a grave question whether the legal and the
political aspects of the problem can be parted and kept separate in
this way. . . . But in a system of rules depending, like International
Law,for their validity on general consent, what is political is legal also,
if it is generally accepted and acted on. In the society of nations consent has the force of law, and general consent is shown not only by express agreement, but still more by continuous custom. If, therefore,
the authority of the Great Powers has been acknowledged so constantly
for the greater part of a century that it has become a part of the public
order of Europe, and is accepted and even invoked by the smaller
states of Europe, any description of it which refuses to recognize its
legality seems inadequate, if not inaccurate.2
Extracts from pp. 209, 232.
§ 114, p. 275. Mr. A. H. Snow asserts that as a matter of fact "the supernational law of the world is made principally through the persuasive hegemony of
the group of nations which we call' the great Powers.'" A . J. I. L. ( 1912), VI, 897.
1
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He finds it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile current ten-

dencies with an international society founded on equality.

Prediction would be folly. All we can venture to say is that the

old order founded on the doctrine of the equality of all independent

states seems breaking up before our eyes, as three hundred years ago

the mediaeval order crumbled beneath the gaze of the men of the

Renaissance and the Reformation. ... May not international society

be organizing itself to-day on lines inconsistent with that absolute

equality in all things which still seems to some statesmen and pub-

licists almost a sacred dogma? That states must remain equal be-

fore the law in such matters as jurisdiction, proprietary rights, and

diplomatic privileges is evident. But it seems almost as evident that

they cannot remain equal in what we may term political rights and

social standing, now that the society of nations has become self-

conscious, and is preparing itself for the performance of legislative,

administrative, and judicial functions.1

The juridical significance of this development in the con-

stitution of international society, and its relation to equal-

ity, was pointed out by Mr. Joseph H. Beale in 1904, in an
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address before the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis.

He said:

The most striking development of the law of nations during the

He finds it difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile current tendencies with an international society founded on equality.
Prediction would be folly. All we can venture to say is that the
old order founded on the doctrine of the equality of all independent
states seems breaking up before our eyes, as three hundred years ago
the medireval order crumbled beneath the gaze of the men of the
Renaissance and the Reformation. . . . May not international society
be organizing itself to-day on lines inconsistent with that absolute
equality in all things which still seems to some statesmen and publicists almost a sacred dogma? That states must remain equal before the law in such matters as jurisdiction: proprietary rights, and
diplomatic privileges is evident. But it seems almost as evident that
they cannot remain equal in what we may term political rights and
social standing, now that the society of nations has become selfconscious, and is preparing itself for the performance of legislative,
administrative, and judicial functions. 1

last century has been in the direction of international constitutional

law, if I may so call it, rather than of the substantive private law of

nations. At the beginning of the period the fundamental doctrine of

international law was the equality of all states great or small, and

this idea, as one might expect, was fully recognized and insisted on

during the first fifty years of the century. There was little develop-

ment in the law otherwise. Each nation adopted and enforced its

own idea of national rights, and was powerless to force its ideas upon

other nations. . . .

The juridical significance of this development in the constitution of international society, and its relation to equality, was pointed out by Mr. Joseph H. Beale in 1904, in an
address before the Congress of Arts and Sciences at St. Louis.
He said:

In the last half of the century, however, there has been an enormous

development of combinations, both to affect and to enforce law; and

resulting therefrom a development of the substance of the law itself.

The associations of civilized nations to suppress the slave trade both

1 § 116, p. 288. Huber's assertion that Lawrence stands almost alone among

the writers in explaining the privileged position of the great powers as a right based

upon practice needs to be qualified considerably.

The most striking development of the law of nations during the
last century has been in the direction of international constitutional
law, if I may so call it, rather than of the substantive private law of
nations. At the beginning of the period the fundamental doctrine of
international law was the equality of all states great or small, and
this idea, as one might expect, was fully recognized and insisted on
during the first fifty years of the century. There was little development in the law otherwise. Each nation adopted and enforced its
own idea of national rights, and was powerless to force its ideas upon
other nations. . . .
In the last half of the century, however, there has been an enormous
development of combinations, both to affect and to enforce law; and
resulting therefrom a development of the substance of the law itself.
The associations of civilized nations to suppress the slave trade both
§ 116, p. 288. Huber's assertion that Lawrence stands almost alone among
the writers in explaining the privileged position of the great powers as a right based
upon practice needs to be qualified considerably.
1
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made and enforced a new law. The concert on the Eastern question,

the Congress of Paris, the joint action of the Powers in the case of

Greece and Crete, and in the settlement of the questions raised by

the Russo-Turkish and Japanese wars, the Geneva and Hague con-

ventions, are all proofs of the increasing readiness of the Great Powers

to make, declare, and enforce doctrines of law; and they have not

hesitated, in case of need, to make their action binding upon weaker

states, disregarding, for the good of the world, the technical theory of

the equality of all states. While all independent states are still free,

they are not now regarded as free to become a nuisance to the world.1

Few publicists have stated the significance of the position

of the great powers from the point of view of the nineteenth

century any better than Westlake, who says that

if each of their proceedings be considered separately, the ratification

subsequently conceded to it by the states affected saves it from being

made and enforced a new law. The concert on the Eastern question,
the Congress of Paris, the joint action of the Powers in the case of
Greece and Crete, and in the settlement of the questions raised by
the Russo-Turkish and Japanese wars, the Geneva and Hague conventions, are all proofs of the increasing readiness of the Great Powers
to make, declare, and enforce doctrines of law; and they have not
hesitated, in case of need, to make their action binding upon weaker
states, disregarding, for the good of the world, the technical theory of
the equality of all states. While all independent states are still free,
they are not now regarded as free to become a nuisance to the world. 1

a substantial breach of their equality and independence, leaving it

open only to the charge of a want of courtesy in manner. It stands

as an example of political action, not to be condemned if just. But

when such proceedings are habitual they present another character.

They then carry the connotation of right which by virtue of human
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nature accretes to settled custom, and the acquiescence of the smaller

powers in them loses the last semblance of independent ratification.

We are in presence of the first stages of a process which in the course

of ages may lead to organized government among states, as the indis-

pensable condition of their peace, just as organized national govern-

ment has been the indispensable condition of peace between private

individuals. The world in which the largest intercourse of civilized

men has been from time to time carried on has not always been dis-

tributed into equal and independent states, and we are reminded by

what we see that it may not always continue to be so distributed*

1 H. L. R. (1905), XVIII, »74-275-

* Int. Law, I, 322. In the preface to his Problems of International Practice and

Diplomacy, Sir Thomas Barclay says: "To talk seriously of a League of Peace is

not' mere optimism,' as some short-sighted writers, who dub all progress impracti-

cal, have characterized it. Its foundations already exist in the Concert of Europe."

In his latest edition of Halleck, Baker appends the following to Halleck's remarks

on equality: "Nevertheless, the Great Powers of Europe have obtained such a

position of authority that they are able to exercise predominance over other States.

This position is now well recognized." Baker's Halleck, Int. Law, I, 126.

Few publicists have stated the significance of the position
of the great powers from the point of view of the nineteenth
century any better than Westlake, who says that
if each of their proceedings be considered separately, the ratification
subsequently conceded to it by the states affected saves it from being
a substantial breach of their equality and independence, leaving it
open only to the charge of a want of courtesy in manner. It stands
as an example of political action, not to be condemned if just. But
when such proceedings are habitual they present another character.
They then carry the connotation of right which by virtue of human
nature accretes to settled custom, and the acquiescence of the smaller
powers in them loses the last semblance of independent ratification.
We are in presence of the first stages of a process which in the course
of ages may lead to organized government among states, as the indispensable condition of their peace, just as organized national government has been the indispensable condition of peace between private
individuals. The world in which the largest intercourse of civilized
men has been from time to time carried on has not always been distributed into equal and independent states, and we are reminded by
what we see that it may not always continue to be so distributed.2
1

H. L. R. (1905), XVIII, 274-275.

Int. Law, I, 322. In the preface to his Problems of International Praclice and
Diplomacy, Sir Thomas Barclay says: "To talk seriously of a League of Peace is
not ' mere optimism,' as some short-sighted writers, who dub all progress impractical, have characterized it. Its foundations already exist in the Concert of Europe."
In his latest edition of Halleck, Baker appends the following to Halleck's remarks
on equality: " Nevertheless, the Great Powers of Europe have obtained such a
position of authority that they are able to exercise predominance over other States.
This position is now well recognized." Baker's Halleck, Int. Law, I, 126.
1
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THE EQUALITY OF STATES

The hegemony of the great powers was denied, at the

beginning of the twentieth century, in the constitution and

procedure of the international peace conferences at The

Hague. This circumstance has been regarded in many

quarters as a triumphal demonstration of equality as a

practical principle. Others have concluded from the ex-

perience of those conferences that equality must undergo

some practical limitations, at least in relation to the de-

velopment of supernational organization. Thus, Renault,

speaking of equality in its relation to the constitution and

procedure of the Hague Peace Conferences, has remarked:

Now the juridical equality of states, taken literally, leads to absurd

conclusions. This we must have the courage to say.

I will take an example which I trust will offend no one, even if

there should be in this hall persons belonging to the small nations I

am about to mention. Can it be admitted that in a question of mari-

time law the vote of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg or even of Mon-

The hegemony of the great powers was denied, at the
beginning of the twentieth century, in the constitution and
procedure of the international peace conferences at The
Hague. This circumstance has been regarded in many
quarters as a triumphal demonstration of equality as a
practical principle. Others have concluded from the experience of those conferences that equality must undergo
some practical limitations, at least in relation to the development of supernational organization. Thus, Renault,
speaking of equality in its relation to the constitution and
procedure of the Hague Peace Conferences, has remarked:

tenegro should have the same weight as that of Great Britain? Could

these small countries, pleading the principle of unanimity, block re-
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forms on which the great maritime powers are agreed? 1

Hicks concludes from a study of the same question that

the doctrine of equality was untrue in its origin, was preserved in

international law by a verbal consent which is not followed by per-

formance, and was bolstered up by false analogies growing out of a

confusion in thought between international and positive law.2

Renewed interest in world organization in the twentieth

century has brought with it a widespread conviction that

the principle of equality, as hitherto understood, is irrecon-

cilable with the development of adequate supernational in-

stitutions, and that the principle must be limited in the

Now the juridical equality of states, taken literally, leads to absurd
conclusions. This we must have the courage to say.
I will take an example which I trust will offend no one, even if
there should be in this hall persons belonging to the small nations I
am about to mention. Can it be admitted that in a question of maritime law the vote of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg or even of Montenegro should have the same weight as that of Great Britain? Could
these small countries, pleading the principle of unanimity, block reforms on which the great maritime powers are agreed? 1

interest of a better international order. This opinion is

1 Annales its sciences politiques (1908), XXIII, 444. Cf. the dictum of Sir

Samuel Evans in the case of The Mowe, L. R. [1915] Prob. Div., 1,12-13; and the

Hicks concludes from a study of the same question that

case of The Fenix, reported in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 909-915, 910, 912.

• A.J.I. L. (1908), II, 535. Cf. Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten.

the doctrine of equality was untrue in its origin, was preserved in
international law by a verbal consent which is not followed by performance, and was bolstered up by false analogies growing out of a
confusion in thought between international and positive law.2

Renewed interest in world organization in the twentieth
century has brought with it a widespread conviction that
the principle of equality, as hitherto understood, is irreconcilable with the development of adequate supernational institutions, and that the principle must be limited in the
interest of a better international order. This opinion is
1 Annales des sciences politiques (1908), XXIII, 444. Cf. the dictum of Sir
Samuel Evans in the case of The l\fowe, L. R. [1915) Prob. Div., 1, 12-13; and the
case of The Fenix, reported in A. J. l. L. (1916), X, 909-<]15, 910, 912.
' A. J. l. L. (19o8), II, 535. Cf. Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten.
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finding frequent expression in popular writing. The two

following illustrations may be taken as somewhat typical.

If nations are not equal in moral, intellectual, or even material in-

fluence; if they have not an equal concern in the adjustment of in-

ternational interests; if they have not an equal voice in the creation,

the interpretation, and the enforcement of law; if, in fact, the claim

to equality stands squarely in the way of world organization itself;

then it is folly to insist on the concept of equality as a basic principle

of the law of nations.1

If, then, the world is ever to organize itself for the peaceful regu-

lation of international affairs, that organization must provide for the

essential inequality of States. If such inequality is not reflected in

the pacific machinery, it will make itself felt in war, while the ma-

chinery will be left to rust unused.2

Whether the opinion that is finding so much popular ex-

pression is to be reflected in the publicists is for the future

to declare. The event is at present in the hands of those

who make the law of nations rather than of those who in-

terpret it.

Suggested Alternative Principles
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While the opinion which doubts or denies the principle

finding frequent expression in popular writing. The two
following illustrations may be taken as somewhat typical.
If nations are not equal in moral, intellectual, or even material influence; if they have not an equal concern in the adjustment of international interests; if they have not an equal voice in the creation,
the interpretation, and the enforcement of law; if, in fact, the claim
to equality stands squarely in the way of world organization itself~
then it is folly to insist on the concept of equality as a basic principle
of the law of nations. 1
If, then, the world is ever to organize itself for the peaceful regulation of international affairs, that organization must provide for the
essential inequality of States. If such inequality is not reflected in
the pacific machinery, it will make itself felt in war, while the machinery will be left to rust unused. 2

of equality has gained adherents among the publicists, few

have made any serious effort, either to analyze systemati-

cally the inequalities which are characteristic of the society

of nations, or to discover another principle upon which the

law of nations may be assumed to rest. Two problems are

1 Brown, International Realities, pp. 15, 68-72.

* Woolf, International Government, p. 120. In concluding his recent study of

international administration, Mr. Sayre says: "Power to influence the future

course of nations springs rather from inherent native capacities than from rights;

Whether the opinion that is finding so much popular expression is to be reflected in the publicists is for the future
to declare. The event is at present in the hands of those
who make the law of nations rather than of those who interpret it.

and if an international organ is to accord truly to the world of facts, the member

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE PRINCIPLES

states which compose it will be given voting power more or less according to their

actual world influence. To give to states which are unequal in wealth, in area, in

population, in native capabilities, in influence, and in military power, exactly the

same voting power in a duly constituted executive organ would be to depart far from

justice; and no institution founded on injustice can permanently endure." Experi-

ments in International Administration, p. 160.

While the opinion which doubts or denies the principle
of equality has gained adherents among the publicists, few
have made any serious effort, either to analyze systematically the inequalities which are characteristic of the society
of nations, or to discover another principle upon which the
law of nations may be assumed to rest. Two problems are
Brown, International Realities, pp. 15, 68-72.
Woolf, International Government, p. 120. In concluding his recent study of
international administration, :Mr. Sayre says: "Power to influence the future
course of nations springs rather from inherent native capacities than from rights;
and if an international organ is to accord truly to the world of facts, the member
states which compose it will be given voting power more or less according to their
actual world influence. To give to states which are unequal in wealth, in area, in
population, in native capabilities, in influence, and in military power, exactly the
same voting power in a duly constituted executive organ would be to depart far from
justice; and no institution founded on injustice can permanently endure." Experiments in InternationaJ Administration, p. 16o.
1
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involved. The first has to do with the capacity of inter-

national persons in their ordinary legal relations with one

another, or, to put the matter in another way, with their

capacity for legal rights. The second is concerned with the

capacity of international persons as regards participation

in the privileges and responsibilities of supernational insti-

tutional development, in other words, with their capacity

for political rights. In so far as they have considered these

problems at all, writers have generally regarded them as two

aspects of the same question.

Systematic attempts to discover an alternative principle

have been made by Lorimer and Pillet. The former devotes

some attention to the means of ascertaining the relative

value of states, and concludes that there are four factors

which must be taken into account, viz., the extent or size

of the state or the quantity of materials of which it is com-

posed, the content or quality of the state or of its materials,

the form of the state or the manner in which its materials

are combined, and the government of the state or the man-
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ner in which its forces are brought into action.1 Lorimer's

study is an effort to get at the facts of international life and

to formulate principles in relation to those facts.

Pillet's study, as he himself admits, is purely theoretical.

His theory is founded upon two basic facts: (1) each state

is sovereign, and (2) each state lives in intercourse with

other states. There are accordingly two groups of state

rights, those resulting from internal sovereignty, and those

resulting from international intercourse. Conflicts between

states are always conflicts between sovereignties. Sover-

eignty is either territorial or personal. Therefore conflicts

between states may be divided into three categories: (1)

conflicts between two external sovereignties, e. g., on the

high seas, in unclaimed territory, or conflicts involving

1 Institutes, 1,162-215.

involved. The first has to do with the capacity of international persons in their ordinary legal relations with one
another, or, to put the matter in another way, with their
capacity for legal rights. The second is concerned with the
capacity of international persons as regards participation
in the privileges and responsibilities of supernational institutional development, in other words, with their capacity
for political rights. In so far as they have considered these
problems at all, writers have generally regarded them as two
aspects of the same question.
Systematic attempts to discover an alternative principle
have been made by Lorimer and Pillet. The former devotes
some attention to the means of ascertaining the relative
value of states, and concludes that there are four factors
which must be taken into account, viz., the extent or size
of the state or the quantity of materials of which it is composed, the content or quality of the state or of its materials,
the form of the state or the manner in which its materials
are combined, and the government of the state or the manner in which its forces are brought into action. 1 Lorimer's
study is an effort to get at the facts of international life and
to formulate principles in relation to those facts.
Pillet's study, as he himself admits, is purely theoretical.
His theory is founded upon two basic facts: ( 1) each state
is sovereign, and (2) each state lives in intercourse with
-other states. There are accordingly two groups of state
rights, those resulting from internal sovereignty, and those
resulting from international intercourse. Conflicts between
states are always conflicts between sovereignties. Sovereignty is either territorial or personal. Therefore conflicts
between states may be divided into three categories: (1)
.conflicts between two external sovereignties, e. g., on the
high seas, in unclaimed territory, or conflicts involving
1

Institutes, I,

182-215.
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nationals in a third state; (2) conflicts between two internal

sovereignties, e. g., in leased, jointly administered, or dis-

puted territory; (3) conflicts between the external sover-

eignty of one state and the internal sovereignty of another.

The controversies of greatest difficulty fall in the third cate-

gory, which includes most of the really delicate questions of

international relations. For the settlement of these con-

troversies Pillet evolves what he calls, for want of a better

name, la loi du moindre sacrifice, based upon two propo-

sitions: (1) all states are equally interested in the exercise

of the functions of sovereignty; (2) the different functions

of sovereignty may be classified in an order of importance.

His law is formulated in the following terms:

States should be guaranteed in the exercise of their sovereignty in

their mutual relations; and, in case of conflict, they are rationally

bound to give preference to the public interest which is the more

seriously endangered by the dispute.1

For the practical application of his law, Pillet suggests

briefly how the different attributes of sovereignty may be

classified, in the order of their importance, in relation to
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the different public interests which they represent.2

nationals in a third state; (2) conflicts between two internal
sovereignties, e.g., in leased, jointly administered, or disputed territory; (3) conflicts between the external sovereignty of one state and the internal sovereignty of another.
The controversies of greatest difficulty fall in the third category, which includes most of the really delicate questions of
international relations. For the settlement of these controversies Pillet evolves what he calls, for want of a better
name, la loi du moindre sacrifice, based upon two propositions: ( 1) all states are equally interested in the exercise
of the functions of sovereignty; (2) the different functions
of sovereignty may be classified in an order of importance.
His law is formulated in the following terms:

The publicists have given scant attention to the principles

underlying the development of supernational institutions,

viewed as a separate problem, nor is this to be wondered at

in view of the rudimentary character of all development of

1 "Telle est done, a nos yeux, la loi qui doit servir de fondement a une doctrine

rationnelle du droit des gens. S'il fallait lui donner un nom, nous l'appellerions la

loi du moindre sacrifice; nous la formulons ainsi: les fitats doivent se garantir

States should be guaranteed in the exercise of their sovereignty in
their mutual relations; and, in case of conflict, they are rationally
bound to give preference to the public interest which is the more
seriously endangered by the dispute. 1

l'exercise de leur souverainete dans leurs rapports reciproques, et, en cas de conflit,

sont rationnellement obliges de donner la preference i Finteret public le plus fort

compromis dans le litige. De la aussi la notion du droit primordial de tout fitat

qui est d'obtenir des autres le respect le plus grand possible de sa souverainete."

R. G. D. I. P. (1898), V, 244-245.

* For the constructive part of Fillet's study, see ibid. (1898), V, 236-264, and

(1899), VI, 503-532. Cf. Kebedgy's criticism in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX,

84-103.

For the practical application of his law, Pillet suggests
briefly how the different attributes of sovereignty may be
classified, in the order of their importance, in relation to
the different public interests which they represent. 2
The publicists have given scant attention to the principles
underlying the development of supernational institutions,
viewed as a separate problem, nor is this to be wondered at
in view of the rudimentary character of all development of
1 " Telle est done, a nos yeux, la loi qui doit servir de fondement a une doctrine
rationnelle du droit des gens. S'il fallait lui donner un nom, nous l'appellerions la
loi du moindre sacrifice; nous la formulons ainsi: les ttats doivent se garantir
l'exercise de leur souverainete dans leurs rapports reciproques, et, en cas de conflit,
sont rationnellement obliges de donner la preference a l'interH public le plus fort
compromis dans le litige. De la aussi la notion du droit primordial de tout ttat
qui est d'obtenir des autres le respect le plus grand possible de sa souverainete."
R. G. D. I. P. (18<)8), V, 244-245.
' For the constructive part of Pillet's study, see ibid. (18<)8), V, 236-264, and
(18<)9), VI, 503-532. Cf. Kebedgy's criticism in Z. S. R. (1900) Neue Folge, XIX,

84-103.
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that kind.1 Lorimer worked out a detailed scheme of world

organization based upon relative value rather than equal-

ity,2 and for this was severely criticized, not to say ridiculed,

by his contemporaries. Most of those who doubt or deny

equality do no more than to suggest the importance of

bringing the principles of the law of nations into closer har-

mony with the facts of international life.3

Summary

There is much that is unsatisfactory about the common

exposition of equality which one finds in a majority of the

books. Very few publicists distinguish equal protection of

that kind. 1 Lorimer worked out a detailed scheme of world
organization based upon relative value rather than equality ,2 and for this was severely criticized, not to say ridiculed,
by his contemporaries. Most of those who doubt or deny
equality do no more than to suggest the importance of
bringing the principles of the law of nations into closer harmony with the facts of international life. 3

the law and equal capacity for rights. Legal and political

rights are almost always confounded. The whole subject is

SUMMARY

confused by intermixing the ideas and the language of natu-

ralist theory with other ideas and expressions borrowed

somewhat mdiscrirninately from modern legal science.

Equality is variously described as an attribute, a right,

or a principle. The first is unsatisfactory because it ap-

proaches the subject from the wrong angle, predetermines
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the issue, and confines discussion to pure abstractions.

While equality may conceivably be an essential attribute of

the theoretically perfect state, the really important con-

sideration is the way in which the law of nations regards

1 The problem is considered in some detail in Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten.

There is, of course, an extensive literature devoted to the idea and to plans of

international organization; but this literature has grown up quite apart from

treatises on the law of nations. See Meulen, Der Gedanke der internationalen

Organisation.

* Institutes, I, 270-287.

1 In his study of equality and the Hague Conferences, Hicks says: "We have

seen that the equality theory is far from perfect, and that the theory of the primacy

of the powers is open to very serious objections in that it does not recognize any

influence at all as existing in minor powers. Neither of the theories are true to the

facts. It seems to us that the true problem is to find the facts of international life,

and to devise a scheme for the adequate representation of all elements in their true

proportions." A. J. I. L. (1908), II, 550.

There is much that is unsatisfactory about the common
exposition of equality which one finds in a majority of the
boolfs. Very few publicists distinguish equal protection of
the law and equal capacity for rights. Legal and political
rights are almost always confounded. The whole subject is
confused by intermixing the ideas and the language of naturalist theory with other ideas and expressions borrowed
somewhat indiscriminately from modern legal science.
Equality is variously described as an attribute, a right,
or a principle. The first is unsatisfactory because it approaches the subject from the wrong angle, predetermines
the issue, and confines discussion to pure abstractions.
While equality may conceivably be an essential attribute of
the theoretically perfect state, the really important consideration is the way in which the law of nations regards
1 The problem is considered in some detail in Huber, Die Gkichheit der Staaten .
There is, of course, an extensive literature devoted to the idea and to plans of
international organization; but this literature has grown up quite apart from
treatises on the law of nations. See Meulen, Der Gcdanke der inlernalionalen
Organisation.
2 Institutes, I, 279-287.
3 In his study of equality and the Hague Conferences, Hicks says: "We have
seen that the equality theory is far from perfect, and that the theory of the primacy
of the powers is open to very serious objections in that it does not recognize any
influence at all as existing in minor powers. Neither of the theories are true to the
facts. It seems to us that the true problem is lo find the facts of inlernalional life,
and to devise a scheme for the adequate representation of all elements in their true
proportions." A. J. I. L. (1go8), II, 550.
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actually existing states. The description of equality as a

right is a survival of naturalist theories and is quite inade-

quate. It leads to the confusion of natural rights or essen-

tial interests with legal rights, induces unsound classifica-

tion, and raises the whole question of fundamental rights.

Among a majority of the publicists equality is coming to be

regarded as a principle, or foundational rule, which con-

tributes to determine the content of the mass of substantive

rules of which the law of nations is composed. This descrip-

tion is adequate, and is free from the objections which may

be made to the definition of equality as a right or an attribute.

While some of the more conservative publicists define

equality in terms that imply no more than equal protection

of the law, or what Lorimer calls an equal interest in the

vindication of the law, almost without exception they mean

something quite different. Most of them say that they

mean an equality of rights, or an equality of rights and obli-

gations. It is unnecessary to add duties or obligations, for

duties or obligations are correlative to rights. It is inviting

no end of difficulty to speak of equality of rights, as though
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persons could have identical rights in a world of realities.

What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights,

a conception that has been explained most satisfactorily by

Carnazza Amari, Fiore, Pradier-Foderfi, and Chretien.

The traditional justification for the principle of equality

was grounded upon natural right, the state of nature, and

the analogy. The conceptions of natural right and the in-

ternational state of nature, while of great historical interest,

can hardly justify equality as a principle of true legal signifi-

cance in a system that is becoming increasingly positive.

Even assuming that the state as an aggregate of human

beings may be regarded as endowed with the natural rights

of human beings, it remains true that natural rights are not

legal rights, and that they have no legal significance until

actually existing states. The description of equality as a
right is a survival of naturalist theories and is quite inadequate. It leads to the confusion of natural rights or essential interests with legal rights, induces unsound classification, and raises the whole question of fundamental rights.
Among a majority of the publicists equality is coming to be
regarded as a principle, or foundational rule, which contributes to determine the content of the mass of substantive
rules of which the law of nations is composed. This description is adequate, and is free from the objections which may
be made to the definition of equality as a right or an attribute.
While some of the more conservative publicists define
equality in terms that imply no more than equal protection
of the law, or what Lorimer calls an equal interest in the
vindication of the law, almost without exception they mean
something quite different. Most of them say that they
mean an equality of rights, or an equality of rights and obligations. It is unnecessary to add duties or obligations, for
duties or obligations are correlative to rights. It is inviting
no end of difficulty to speak of equality of rights, as though
persons could have identical rights in a world of realities.
What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights,
a conception that has been explained most satisfactorily by
Carnazza Amari, Fiore, Pradier-Fodere, and Chretien.
The traditional justification for the principle of equality
was grounded upon natural right, the state of nature, and
the analogy. The conceptions of natural right and the international state of nature, while of great historical interest,
can hardly justify equality as a principle of true legal significance in a system that is becoming increasingly positive.
Even assuming that the state as an aggregate of human
beings may be regarded as endowed with the natural rights
of human beings, it remains true that natural rights are not
legal rights, and that they have no legal significance until
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they are secured by positive custom or superior authority.

There are serious defects in the analogy. If pressed too far

it upsets the whole foundation upon which state equality

rests. Equality of capacity in municipal law prevails only

among persons of the same juristic condition or status,

while the tendency in the law of nations, at least in its

theory, has been to deny the possibility of status. Witness

the cursory and dogmatic way in which most publicists dis-

miss the whole subject of persons.1 About the only real

similarity between natural and international persons consists

in the circumstance that each has legal personality. The

de facto basis for de jure personality is entirely different in

the two cases,2 so different, in truth, that it hardly seems

necessary to suggest that a broad analogy introduces an

element of unreality into a system of law that is already too

much beclouded in nebulous speculation. The suggestion

that equality is the necessary consequence of international

personality is no justification at all. It is about as signifi-

cant to say that persons are equal because they are persons

as it would be to say that persons are equal because they are
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equal.

The nearest approach to a scientific explanation for the

equality of states is found in the modern tendency to justify

the principle as a corollary of sovereignty. From one point

of view this is simply offering one abstraction in explanation

of another. From another point of view, however, it does

suggest a criterion by which the application of the principle

may conceivably be determined. Only fully sovereign

states are equal, that is to say, only states of a common

status have equal capacity. This was Moser's position,3

and in theory it is sound enough. However, the persistent

1 Supra, p. 124.

'The author has discussed this question in somewhat greater detail in Y. L. J.

(10i7),XXVI, 581-591.

* Vcrsuch, I, 1, 2.

they are secured by positive custom or superior authority.
There are serious defects in the analogy. If pressed too far
it upsets the whole foundation upon which state equality
rests. Equality of capacity in municipal law prevails only
among persons of the same juristic condition or status,
while the tendency in the law of nations, at least in its
theory, has been to deny the possibility of status. Witness
the cursory and dogmatic way in which most publicists dismiss the whole subject of persons. 1 About the only real
similarity between natural and international persons consists
in the circumstance that each has legal personality. The
de facto basis for de jure personality is entirely different in
the two cases,2 so different, in truth, that it hardly seems
necessary to suggest that a broad analogy introduces an
element of unreality into a system of law that is already too
much beclouded in nebulous speculation. The suggestion
that equality is the necessary consequence of international
personality is no justification at all. It is about as significant to say that persons are equal because they are persons
as it would be to say that persons are equal because they are
equal.
The nearest approach to a scientific explanation for the
equality of states is found in the modern tendency to justify
the principle as a corollary of sovereignty. From one point
of view this is simply offering one abstraction in explanation
of another. From another point of view, however, it does
suggest a criterion by which the application of the principle
may conceivably be determined. On1y fully sovereign
states are equal, that is to say, only states of a common
status have equal capacity. This was Moser's position,3
and in theory it is sound enough. However, the persistent
1
1

Supra, p. I 24.
The author bas discussed this question in somewhat greater detail in Y. L. J.

(1917) 1 XXVI, 581-591.
1

Ver such, I,

1 1 2.
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reluctance of publicists either to admit degrees of sover-

eignty or to look into the de facto justification for various

claims to sovereignty has greatly retarded any satisfactory

solution of the problem. The law of international persons

has made no great advance, so far as the books are concerned,

since the days of Moser and G. F. von Martens. The net

result of regarding equality as an essential corollary of

sovereignty has been to shift the question of rights and

capacity for rights from one range of speculation to another.

A great deal that is uncertain and unsatisfactory in the

books may be traced to the difficulty involved in reconciling

juridical equality with de facto inequalities. There is some-

thing inadequate about saying arbitrarily that all inequal-

ities are matters of fact or form while equality is a matter of

law, and yet this is the usual method of approach. A dis-

tinction of this sort, if carried too far, will divorce the law

from all reality and seriously impair its usefulness. The

problem becomes still more acute when de facto inequalities

are manifested in action, as in the controlling authority

asserted by the great powers. Here the publicists fall back
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on reason, a distinction between law and policy, or a dis-

tinction between law and violation of law. Reason, of

course, in the last analysis, is only the publicists' opinion as

to what the law ought to be. The distinction between law

and policy, or legal equality and political inequality, is use-

ful within reasonable limitations, but it may easily be

pressed too far by those who seek to inteipret a system of

law that grows chiefly through custom. The same may be

said of the distinction between law and violations of law.

A body of law that is largely customary may grow through

violations practised uniformly and consistently throughout

a considerable period of time. It seems futile to try to get

around the difficulty by distinguishing capacity for rights

and the capacity to exercise rights. It seems equally futile

reluctance of publicists either to admit degrees of sovereignty or to look into the de facto justification for various
claims to sovereignty has greatly retarded any satisfactory
solution of the problem. The law of international persons
has made no great advance, so far as the books are concerned,
since the days of Moser and G. F. von Martens. The net
result of regarding equality as an essential corollary of
sovereignty has been to shift the question of rights and
capacity for rights from one range of speculation to another.
A great deal that is uncertain and unsatisfactory in the
books may be traced to the difficulty involved in reconciling
juridical equality with de facto inequalities. There is something inadequate about saying arbitrarily that all inequalities are matters of fact or form while equality is a matter of
law, and yet this is the usual method of approach. A distinction of this sort, if carried too far, will divorce the law
from all reality and seriously impair its usefulness. The
problem becomes still more acute when de facto inequalities
are manifested in action, as in the controlling authority
asserted by the great powers. Here the publicists fall back
on reason, a distinction between law and policy, or a distinction between law and violation of law. Reason, of
course, in the last analysis, is only the publicists' opinion as
to what the law ought to be. The distinction between law
and policy, or legal equality and political inequality, is useful within reasonable limitations, but it may easily be
pressed too far by those who seek to interpret a system of
law that grows chiefly through custom. The same may be
said of the distinction between law and violations of law.
A body of law that is largely customary may grow through
violations practised uniformly and consistently throughout
a considerable period of time. It seems futile to try to get
around the difficulty by distinguishing capacity for rights
and the capacity to exercise rights. It seems equally futile
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to separate theory from practice, for unless the theory bears

some relation to the practice it becomes superfluous. It is

submitted that the most satisfactory approach to the ques-

tion is that which regards equality of legal capacity as the

ideal toward which the practical rules of the law of nations

can only approximate. This is the significance of equality

of legal capacity in municipal law. Much would be gained

for clearness and logical precision if a similar view could be

taken in the law of nations. It should be pointed out, how-

ever, that, while it has been suggested by a few and implied

by others, this point of view has no general acceptance among

the publicists.

In so far as the practical application of equality is con-

cerned, publicists have placed the greatest emphasis upon

matters of etiquette and ceremonial, matters which are only

of secondary importance. The law of international persons

has been treated in a somewhat cursory fashion. The law

of organization has hardly been treated at all. There are

indications, however, that these subjects are to receive more

attention in the future. Those who have doubted or denied
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the equality of states have directed attention to both sub-

jects, while the progress of international events gives them

larger importance and a more commanding interest.

to separate theory from practice, for unless the theory bears
some relation to the practice it becomes superfluous. It is
submitted that the most satisfactory approach to the question is that which regards equality of legal capacity as the
ideal toward which the practical rules of the law of nations
can only approximate. This is the significance of equality
of legal capacity in municipal law. Much would be gained
for clearness and logical precision if a similar view could be
taken in the law of nations. It should be pointed out, however, that, while it has been suggested by a few and implied
by others, this point of view has no general acceptance among
the publicists.
In so far as the practical application of equality is concerned, publicists have placed the greatest emphasis upon.
matters of etiquette and ceremonial, matters which are only
of secondary importance. The law of international persons
has been treated in a somewhat cursory fashion. The law
of organization has hardly been treated at all. There are
indications, however, that these subjects are to receive more
attention in the future. Those who have doubted or denied
the equality of states have directed attention to both subjects, while the progress of international events gives them
larger importance and a more commanding interest.

CHAPTER V

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE DOCUMENTARY

SOURCES OF THE PAST CENTURY

There has been much less said about the equality of nations

outside the treatises of the publicists than one might rea-

sonably expect. This is perhaps due to the nature of the

principle, rather than to any lack of interest on the part of

CHAPTER V

judges, arbitrators, statesmen, or diplomats. The principle

has been proclaimed occasionally in the formal resolutions

of assemblies representing organized propaganda or other

interests. It has been discussed in a few opinions by national

courts, in a few international arbitrations, and somewhat

THE PRINCIPLE OF STATE EQUALITY IN THE DOCUMENTARY
SOURCES OF THE PAST CENTURY

more frequently in diplomatic papers and the utterances of

statesmen. The leading declarations and precedents have

been brought together in the following pages. Together

with the opinions of the writers, they constitute the au-

thority, so far as printed sources are concerned, for state

equality in the modern law of nations.

The Equality of States in Unofficial Declarations

The Universal Peace Congress at Antwerp in 1894 formu-

lated a statement of three leading principles of international

ciples:
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law. The equality of states was the first of the three prin-

Every sovereign state, whether small or great, weak or strong,

should be considered as the equal of all others, with a right to the

same juridical and natural respect as that which the greatest and

strongest of other nations require, both with regard to its individu-

ality and to its privileges in free and organized society.1

1 R. G. D. J. P. (1894), I, 458. Cf. the Victory Program of the League to En-

force Peace, adopted as the League's official platform November 23,1018, in which

THERE has been much less said about the equality of nations
outside the treatises of the publicists than one might reasonably expect. This is perhaps due to the nature of the
principle, rather than to any lack of interest on the part of
judges, arbitrators, statesmen, or diplomats. The principle
has been proclaimed occasionally in the formal resolutions
of assemblies representing organized propaganda or other
interests. It has been discussed in a few opinions by national
courts, in a few international arbitrations, and somewhat
more frequently in diplomatic papers and the utterances of
statesmen. The leading declarations and precedents have
been brought together in the following pages. Together
with the opinions of the writers, they constitute the authority, so far as printed sources are concerned, for state
equality in the modem law of nations.
THE

EQUALITY OF STATES JN UNOFFICIAL DECLARATIONS

The Universal Peace Congress at Antwerp in 1894 formulated a statement of three leading principles of international
law. The equality of states was the first of the three principles:
Every sovereign state, whether small or great, weak or strong,
should be considered as the equal of all others, with a right to the
same juridical and natural respect as that which the greatest and
strongest of other nations require, both with regard to its individuality and to its privileges in free and organized society. 1
1 R. G.D. I. P. {1&)4), I, 458. Cf. the Victory Program of the League to Enforce Peace, adopted as the League's official platform November 23, 1918, in which
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The principle has rarely been stated more explicitly, not

to say dogmatically, than in the Declaration of the Rights of

Nations adopted by the American Institute of International

Law on January 6,1916, in order to inform its members with

regard to the Institute's point of view and the principles

which are to determine its conduct. This Declaration is of

particular importance because it expresses opinions which

prevail, not only among publicists of Central and South

America, but also among the official spokesmen of American

republics. There is a whole theory of international law in

its preamble, which is in part as follows:

WHEREAS the municipal law of civilized nations recognizes and

protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit

of happiness, as added by the Declaration of Independence of the

United States of America, the right to legal equality, the right to

property, and the right to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; and

WHEREAS these fundamental rights, thus universally recognized,

The p~nciple has rarely been stated more explicitly, not
to say dogmatically, than in the Declaration of the Rights of
Nations adopted by the American Institute of International
Law on January 6, 1916, in order to inform its members with
regard to the Jnstitute's point of view and the principles
which are to determine its conduct. This Declaration is of
particular importance because it expresses opinions which
prevail, not only among publicists of Central and South
America, but also among the official spokesmen of American
republics. There is a whole theory of international law in
its preamble, which is in part as follows:

create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations to observe

them; and . . .
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WHEREAS the nation is a moral or juristic person, the creature

of law, and subordinated to law as is the natural person in political

society; and

WHEREAS we deem that these fundamental rights can be stated

in terms of international law and applied to the relations of the mem-

bers of the society of nations, one with another, just as they have

been applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the states

forming the Society of Nations; and

WHEREAS these fundamental rights of national jurisprudence,

namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit

of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to prop-

erty, and the right to the observance thereof are, when stated in terms

of international law, the right of the nation to exist and to protect and

to conserve its existence; the right of independence and the freedom to

develop itself without interference or control from other nations; the

it is stipulated that " The representation of the different nations in the organs of

the League should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they

assume. The rules of international law should not be defeated for lack of unanimity."

WHEREAS the municipal law of civilized nations recognizes and
protects the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit
of happiness, as added by the Declaration of Independence of the
United States of America, the right to legal equality, the right to
property, and the right to the enjoyment of the aforesaid rights; and
WHEREAS these fundamental rights, thus universally recognized,
create a duty on the part of the peoples of all nations to observe
them; and . . .
WHEREAS the nation is a moral or juristic person, the creature
of law, and subordinated to law as is the natural person in political
society; and
WHEREAS we deem that these fundamental rights can be stated
in terms of international law and applied to the relations of the members of the society of nations, one with another, just as they have
been applied in the relations of the citizens or subjects of the states
forming the Society of Nations; and
WHEREAS these fundamental rights of national jurisprudence,
namely, the right to life, the right to liberty, the right to the pursuit
of happiness, the right to equality before the law, the right to property, and the right to the observance thereof are, when stated in terms
of international law, the right of the nation to exist and to protect and
to conserve its existence; the right of independence and the freedom to
develop itself without interference or control from other nations; the
it is stipulated that " The representation of the different nations in the organs of
the League should be in proportion to the responsibilities and obligations they
assume. The rules of international Jaw should not be defeated for lack of unanimity."
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right of equality in law and before law; the right to territory within

defined boundaries and to exclusive jurisdiction therein; and the right

to the observance of these fundamental rights; . . .

In reliance upon these basic principles it is declared, inter

alia, that

right of equality in law and before law; the right to territory within
defined boundaries and to exclusive jurisdiction therein; and the right
to the observance of these fundamental rights; . . .

Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation

belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to

claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United

States," to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and

In reliance upon these basic principles it is declared, inter
alia, that

equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle

them." 1

The official commentary adopted at the same time explains

that the right of equality is to be understood in the sense

in which it was defined by Sir William Scott in the case of

Le Louis, and in which it was stated and illustrated by

Chief Justice Marshall in the case of The Antelope and by

Secretary Root in his address before the Third Pan-American

Conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1906.2

Every nation is in law and before law the equal of every other nation
belonging to the society of nations, and all nations have the right to
claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United
States," to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and
equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle
them." 1

The Equality of States in the Decisions of

National Courts
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The principle of equality does not admit of exact defini-

tion in the decisions of a national court. Its application to

a particular set of facts may be judicially determined, but

broad definitions are of necessity obiter dicta. There are a

few cases in which the principle may be said to have been

applied to a definite set of facts, although in no case was its

1 The text of the Declaration is printed in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 124; and the

text and official commentary in Scott, The American Institute of International Law:

Its Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations, pp. 87-101. See Root, in A. J. I. L.

(1916) , X, 211-221; and Scott, in ibid. (1917). XI, 406. The Declaration is criti-

The official commentary adopted at the same time explains
that the right of equality is to be understood in the sense
in which it was defined by Sir William Scott in the case of
Le Louis, and in which it was stated and illustrated by
Chief Justice Marshall in the case of The Antelope and by
Secretary Root in his address before the Third Pan-American
Conference at Rio de Janeiro in 1906.2

cized by the author in a short essay in The New Republic (1916), VI, 91; and by

Reeves, in an address on the occasion of the One Hundred and Fourth Convocation

of the University of Chicago, August 31, 1917, printed in The University Record

(1917) , III, 249-265, at pp. 260-263.

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN THE DECISIONS OF
NATIONAL COURTS

1 See infra, pp. 159, 161, 178.

The principle of equality does not admit of exact definition in the decisions of a national court. Its application to
a particular set of facts may be judicially determined, but
broad definitions are of necessity obiter dicta. There are a
few cases in which the principle may be said to have been
applied to a definite set of facts, although in no case was its
1 The text of the Declaration is printed in A.J. I. L. (1916), X, 124; and the
text and official commentary in Scott, The American I nslituU of I nlernational Law:
Its Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations, pp. 87- 101. See Root, in A. J. I. L.
(1916), X, 211-221; and Scott, in ibid. (1917) . XI, 4o6. The Declaration is criticized by the author in a short essay in The New Republic (1916) , VI, 91; and by
Reeves, in an address on the occasion of the One Hundred and Fourth Convocation
of the University of Chicago, August 31, 1917, printed in The University Record
(1917), III, 249-265, at pp. 260-263.
3 See infra, pp. 159, 161, 178.

THE F,QUALITY OF STATES

156 THE EQUALITY OF STATES

application really necessary to the decision of the point at

issue. There are a few well known dicta by famous judges,

in which the principle is stated generally and much after the

manner of the classical publicists.

In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and Others1 an

American-owned vessel was seized by the French, under the

orders and decrees of Napoleon, was converted into a French

man-of-war, and in that capacity entered the port of Phila-

delphia two years later, where it was libelled by its former

owners. The libel was dismissed by the district court on the

ground that a public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign, in

amity with the United States, is not subject to the judicial

tribunals of the United States so far as the sovereign's title

to the vessel is concerned. This decision was reversed in

the circuit court, but affirmed on appeal by the Supreme

Court of the United States. In the course of his opinion

Chief Justice Marshall said:

The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing

equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted

by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good
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offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns

have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain pe-

culiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within

their respective territories which sovereignty confers. . . .

This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and

this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an

interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class

of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise

application really necessary to the decision of the point at
issue. There are a few well known dicta by famous judges,
in which the principle is stated generally and much after the
manner of the classical publicists.
In The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon and Others 1 an
American-owned vessel was seized by the French, under the
orders and decrees of Napoleon, was converted into a French
man-of-war, and in that capacity entered the port of Philadelphia two years later, where it was libeJled by its former
owners. The libel was dismissed by the district court on the
ground that a public armed vessel of a foreign sovereign, in
amity with the United States, is not subject to the judicial
tribunals of the United States so far as the sovereign's title
to the vessel is concerned. This decision was reversed in
the circuit court, but affirmed on appeal by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In the course of his opinion
Chief Justice Marshall said:

of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has

been stated to be the attribute of every nation.*

It was the decision of the court that a public armed vessel

entering the port of a friendly state, under circumstances

such as those in controversy, belonged to the class of cases

mentioned in Chief Justice Marshall's remarks quoted above.

1 7 Cranch, 116 (1812). * 7 Cranch, 136,137 (1812).

The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, possessing
equal rights and equal independence, whose mutual benefit is promoted
by intercourse with each other, and by an interchange of those good
offices which humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns
have consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete jurisdiction within
their respective territories which sovereignty confers....
This perfect equality and absolute independence of sovereigns, and
this common interest impelling them to mutual intercourse, and an
interchange of good offices with each other, have given rise to a class
of cases in which every sovereign is understood to waive the exercise
of a part of that complete exclusive territorial jurisdiction, which has
been stated to be the attribute of every nation.2

It was the decision of the court that a public armed vessel
entering the port of a friendly state, under circumstances
such as those in controversy, belonged to the class of cases
mentioned in Chief Justice Marshall's remarks quoted above.
1

7 Cranch, u6 (1812).

1 7 Cranch, 1361 137 (1812).
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The same principle was applied by the Admiralty Division

of the British High Court of Justice in 1880, in the case of

The Parlement Beige.1 Proceedings in rem were instituted

against an unarmed mail packet belonging to the Govern-

ment of Belgium, officered by commissioned officers of the

Belgian navy, and running between Ostend and Dover, to

secure redress for loss incurred in consequence of a collision.

It was held that the vessel came within the rule which ex-

tends immunity from jurisdiction to the public vessels of a

foreign state. The court recurred to Chief Justice Mar-

shall's opinion in the case of The Schooner Exchange v.

M'Faddon and Others, quoting the passages relating to the

equality and independence of sovereigns, and rested the

rule of immunity upon that comity among nations which

induces every sovereign state to respect the independence

and equality of every other sovereign state.2 In rejecting

the contention that immunity was lost because the vessel

had been used for trading purposes, the court said:

it has been frequently stated that an independent sovereign cannot

be personally sued, although he has carried on a private trading ad-
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venture. It has been held that an ambassador cannot be personally

sued, although he has traded; and in both cases because such a suit

would be inconsistent with the independence and equality of the

state which he represents. If the remedy sought by an action in rem

against public property is, as we think it is, an indirect mode of exer-

cising the authority of the Court against the owner of the property,

1 L. R. S Prob. Div. 197 (1880).

* The passages from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion are quoted on p. 206 of

the report. Referring to an argument by the Admiralty advocate in the case of The

Prins Frederik (2 Dods. 451,466, 468) the court said: "The point and force of this

The same principle was applied by the Admiralty Division
of the British High Court of Justice in 1880, in the case of
The Parlement Belge. 1 Proceedings in rem were instituted
against an unarmed mail packet belonging to the Government of Belgium, officered by commissioned officers of the
Belgian navy, and running between Ostend and Dover, to
secure redress for loss incurred in consequence of a collision.
It was held that the vessel came within the rule which extends immunity from jurisdiction to the public vessels of a
foreign state. The court recurred to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in the case of The Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon and Others, quoting the passages relating to the
equality and independence of sovereigns, and rested the
rule of immunity upon that comity among nations which
induces every sovereign state to respect the independence
and equality of every other sovereign state.2 In rejecting
the contention that immunity was lost because the vessel
had been used for trading purposes, the court said:

argument is that the public property of every state, being destined to public uses,

cannot with reason be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts of such state,

because such jurisdiction, if exercised, must divert the public property from its

destined public uses; and that, by international comity, which acknowledges the

equality of states, if such immunity, grounded on such reasons, exist in each state

with regard to its own public property, the same immunity must be granted by each

state to similar property of all other states." P. 210.

it has been frequently stated that an independent sovereign cannot
be personally sued, although he has carried on a private trading adventure. It has been held that an ambassador cannot be personally
sued, although he has traded; and in both cases because such a suit
would be inconsistent with the independence and equality of the
state which he represents. If the remedy sought by an action in rem
against public property is, as we think it is, an indirect mode of exercising the authority of the Court against the owner of the property,
L. R. 5 Prob. Div. 197 (1880).
The passages from Chief Justice Marshall's opinion are quoted on p. 2o6 of
the report. Referring to an argument by the Admiralty advocate in the case of The
Prins Frederik (2 Dods. 451, 466, 468) the court said: "The point and force of this
argument is that the public property of every state, being destined to public uses,
cannot with reason be submitted to the jurisdiction of the Courts of such state,
because such jurisdiction, if exercised, must divert the public property from its
destined public uses; and that, by international comity, which acknowledges the
equality of states, if such immunity, grounded on such reasons, exist in each state
with regard to its own public property, the same immunity must be granted by each
state to similar property of all other states." P. 210.
1
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then the attempt to exercise such an authority is an attempt incon-

sistent with the independence and equality of the state which is repre-

sented by such owner.1

The equality of states has been argued more recently in

then the attempt to exercise such an authority is an attempt inconsistent with the independence and equality of the state which is represented by such owner.1

the Brazilian Coffee Case. In order to prevent demoraliza-

tion of the coffee market by the abnormal crop of 1906, the

state of Sao Paulo, with the approval and support of the

government of Brazil, organized a valorization scheme

whereby the state took over the surplus crop and placed it

under the control of a committee. The United States De-

partment of Justice brought suit against the committee's

representative in New York, alleging that the scheme vio-

lated the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and asking to have it

declared unlawful, the defendant restrained from withhold-

ing the coffee from the market, a preliminary injunction

granted, and a receiver appointed with power to sell. On

demurrer, the defendant's brief set forth, inter alia, that the

court had no jurisdiction because the property of a foreign

state was involved:
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Sovereign states stand on a basis of absolute equality, and all dif-

ferences between them must be adjusted through the ordinary chan-

nels of diplomacy, by the executive departments of the governments.

One sovereign will not subject another to the indignity of requiring

him to answer for his acts in the courts; and it makes no difference

whether the question involved concerns the person or property of the

sovereign.*

1 P. 220. In Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, L. R. [1894] 1 Q. B. 149, the defendant

in a suit for breach of promise to many claimed immunity from jurisdiction as Sul-

tan of Johore, a British protectorate. It was held that a certificate from the foreign

or colonial office was conclusive as to the status of such a sovereign and that the

court was without jurisdiction. Of the immunity of sovereigns from suit, Lord

The equality of states has been argued more recently in
the Brazilian Coffee Case. In order to prevent demoralization of the coffee market by the abnormal crop of 1906, the
state of Sao Paulo, with the approval and support of the
government of Brazil, organized a valorization scheme
whereby the state took over the surplus crop and placed it
under the control of a committee. The United States Department of Justice brought suit against the committee's
representative in New York, alleging that the scheme violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, and asking to have it
declared unlawful, the defendant restrained from withholding the coffee from the market, a preliminary injunction
granted, and a receiver appointed with power to sell. On
demurrer, the defendant's brief set forth, inter alia, that the
court had no jurisdiction because the property of a foreign
state was involved:

Esher remarked: "For this purpose all sovereigns are equal. The independent

sovereign of the smallest state stands on the same footing as the monarch of the

greatest." P. 158. See The Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 13 L. J.

Ch. 107 (1844); De Haber «,. Queen of Portugal, 20 L. J. Q. B. 488 (1851);

Vavasseur v. Krupp, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 351 (1878).

* Quoted in Stowell and Munro, International Cases, I, 161.

Sovereign states stand on a basis of absolute equality, and all differences between them must be adjusted through the ordinary channels of diplomacy, by the executive departments of the governments.
One sovereign will not subject another to the indignity of requiring
him to answer for his acts in the courts; and it makes no difference
whether the question involved concerns the person or property of the
sovereign.2
1 P. 220. In Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, L. R. (1894) l Q. B. 149, the defendant
in a suit for breach of promise to marry claimed immunity from jurisdiction as Sultan of Johore, a British protectorate. It was held that a certificate from the foreign
or colonial office was conclusive as to the status of such a sovereign and that the
court was without jurisdiction. Of the immunity of sovereigns from suit, Lord
Esher remarked: "For this purpose all sovereigns are equal. The independent
sovereign of the smallest state stands on the same footing as the monarch of the
greatest." P. 158. See The Duke of Brunswick v. The King of Hanover, 13 L. J.
Ch. 107 (1844); De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 20 L. ]. Q. B. 488 (1851) ;
Vavasseur v. Krupp, L. R. 9 Ch. Div. 351 (1878).
2 Quoted in Stowell and Munro, International Cases, I, 161.
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The case never came to a decision. Negotiations were opened

between the United States and Brazil with the result that

the " valorized" coffee was placed on the market and the

proceedings discontinued.

The leading cases in which the equality of nations has

been discussed have involved the right of visitation and

search on the high seas in the suppression of the slave trade.

England had almost stopped this traffic during the last

years of the Napoleonic wars by exercising the belligerent's

right of search. The trade revived, however, with the re-

turn of peace, and an effort was made to suppress it by con-

tinuing the practice of visit and search in time of peace. A

French vessel, Le Louis,1 was overtaken on a slaving voyage

by an English vessel, was captured after forcibly resisting

search, and was condemned by the Vice Admiralty Court

at Sierra Leone for being engaged in the slave trade and for

forcibly resisting the search of the king's cruisers. The case

was appealed to the High Court of Admiralty in England,

where Sir William Scott reversed the decision, laying down

the broad principle that the right of visitation and search on
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the high seas does not exist in time of peace, except in case

of piracy, and that the slave trade is not piracy. In deny-

ing the right of search in time of peace, Sir William de-

livered himself of what is no doubt the most famous judicial

dictum, in regard to the equality of nations, in the recorded

decisions of national tribunals:

Upon the first question, whether the right of search exists in time

of peace, I have to observe, that two principles of public law are

generally recognized as fundamental. One is the perfect equality and

entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude creates

no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or

casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor; * and

1 2 Dodson, 210 (1817). Cf. United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,

U. S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409 (1822).

* Cf. Sir William Scott's dicla in The Hurtige Hane, 3 C. Rob. 324, 325 (1801);

The case never came to a decision. Negotiations were opened
between the United States and Brazil with the result that
the " valorized " coffee was placed on the market and the
proceedings discontinued.
The leading cases in which the equality of nations has
been discussed have involved the right of visitation and
search on the high seas in the suppression of the slave trade.
England had almost stopped this traffic during the last
years of the Napoleonic wars by exercising the belligerent's
right of search. The trade revived, however, with the return of peace, and an effort was made to suppress it by continuing the practice of visit and search in time of peace. A
French vessel, Le Louis,1 was overtaken on a slaving voyage
by an English vessel, was captured after forcibly resisting
search, and was condemned by the Vice Admiralty Court
at Sierra Leone for being engaged in the slave trade and for
forcibly resisting the search of the king's cruisers. The case
was appealed to the High Court of Admiralty in England,
where Sir William Scott reversed the decision, laying down
the broad principle that the right of visitation and search on
the high seas does not exist in time of peace, except in case
of piracy, and that the slave trade is not piracy. In denying the right of search in time of peace, Sir William delivered himself of what is no doubt the most famous judicial
dictum, in regard to the equality of nations, in the recorded
decisions of national tribunals:
Upon the first question, whether the right of search exists in time
of peace, I have to observe, that two principles of public law are
generally recognized as fundamental. One is the perfect equality and
entire independence of all distinct states. Relative magnitude creates
no distinction of right; relative imbecility, whether permanent or
casual, gives no additional right to the more powerful neighbor; 2 and
1 2 Dodson, 210 (1817). Cf. United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,
U. S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409 (1822).
2 Cf. Sir William Scott's dicta in The Hurtige Hane, 3 C. Rob. 324, 325 (18o1);
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any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is

the great foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the

peace of mankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to pre-

serve inviolate. The second is, that all nations being equal, all have

an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts

of the ocean for their navigation.1 In places where no local authority

exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire

equality and independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has

a right to assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another.

I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the

navigation of states in amity upon the high seas, excepting that

which the rights of war give to both belligerents against neutrals*

In the United States, an act of Congress of May 15, 1820,

declared the slave trade piracy. The scope of the act was

considered by Chief Justice Marshall five years later in the

case of The Antelope? A privateer called The Columbia,

any advantage seized upon that ground is mere usurpation. This is
the great foundation of public law, which it mainly concerns the
peace of mankind, both in their politic and private capacities, to preserve inviolate. The second is, that all nations being equal, all have
an equal right to the uninterrupted use of the unappropriated parts
of the ocean for their navigation. 1 In places where no local authority
exists, where the subjects of all states meet upon a footing of entire
equality and independence, no one state, or any of its subjects, has
a right to assume or exercise authority over the subjects of another.
I can find no authority that gives the right of interruption to the
navigation of states in amity upon the high seas, excepting that
which the rights of war give to both belligerents against neutrals.2

sailing under a Venezuelan commission, entered Baltimore

in 1819, clandestinely shipped a crew of thirty or forty men,

proceeded to sea, hoisted the Artegan flag, assumed the
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name The Arraganta, and sailed for Africa. Her officers

and most of her crew were citizens of the United States. Off

the African coast The Arraganta captured an American

vessel, several Portuguese vessels, and a Spanish vessel

called The Antelope, and plundered them all of the slaves

which they had on board. A prize crew was placed on The

Antelope and the two vessels sailed for Brazil. The Arraganta

was wrecked on the Brazilian coast, the captain and most of

The Helena, 4 C. Rob. 3, 6 (1801); and The Madonna Del Burso, 4 C. Rob. 169,

172 (1802).

1 In the case of The Marianna Flora, 1 1 Wheaton, 1,42 (1826), in the Supreme

Court of the United States, Justice Story said: "Upon the ocean, then, in time of

peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated

to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive pre-

rogative there."

* 2 Dodson, 210, 243 (1817).

» 10 Wheaton, 66 (1825). Cf. United States r. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,

U. S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409 (1822).

In the United States, an act of Congress of May 15, 1820,
declared the slave trade piracy. The scope of the act was
considered by Chief Justice Marshall five years later in the
case of The Antelope.3 A privateer called The Columbia,
sailing under a Venezuelan commission, entered Baltimore
in 1819, clandestinely shipped a crew of thirty or forty men,
proceeded to sea, hoisted the Artegan flag, assumed the
name The Arraganta, and sailed for Africa. Her officers
and most of her crew were citizens of the United States. Off
the African coast The Arraganta captured an American
vessel, several Portuguese vessels, and a Spanish vessel
called Tlze Antelope, and plundered them all of the slaves
which they had on board. A prize crew was placed on The
Antelope and the two vessels sailed for Brazil. The Arraganta
was wrecked on the Brazilian coast, the captain and most of
The Helena, 4 C. Rob. 3, 6 (1801); and The Madonna Del Burso, 4 C. Rob. 169,
172 (18o2).
1 In the case of The Marianna Flora, II Wheaton, l, 42 (1826), in the Supreme
Court of the United States, Justice Story said: "Upon the ocean, then, in time: of
peace, all possess an entire equality. It is the common highway of all, appropriated
to the use of all; and no one can vindicate to himself a superior or exclusive prerogative there."
' 2 Dodson, 210, 243 {1817).
• 10 Wheaton, 66 (1825). Cf. United States 11. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,
U. S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409 (1822).
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the crew being lost or made prisoners. The survivors

boarded The Antelope, changed her name to General Rami-

rez, and sailed for Florida. While hovering off the coast of

Florida the vessel was taken by a United States revenue

cutter and brought in for adjudication, on suspicion that

she was either a pirate or engaged in smuggling slaves into

the United States. The Spanish and Portuguese Vice Con-

suls libelled the vessel, each claiming that portion of the

slaves conjectured to belong to the subjects of their respec-

tive sovereigns. Their claims were opposed by the United

States on behalf of the slaves. In a discussion of the general

principles involved, preliminary to examining the circum-

stances of the case, Chief Justice Marshall declared that the

legality of the slave trade was well established by the law

of nations and that no one nation could make it illegal for

others. His observations on the equality of nations have

been more widely quoted than those of any other judge ex-

cept the dictum of Sir William Scott quoted above. He said:

In this commerce, thus sanctioned by universal assent, every na-

tion had an equal right to engage. How is this right to be lost? Each
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may renounce it for its own people; but can this renunciation affect

others?

No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than

the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights.

It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule

on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate

on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all by the consent of

all, can be devested only by consent; and this trade, in which all have

participated, must remain lawful to those who cannot be induced to

the crew being lost or made prisoners. The survivors
boarded The Antelope, changed her name to Genera/. Ramirez, and sailed for Florida. \Vhile hovering off the coast of
Florida the vessel was taken by a United States revenue
cutter and brought in for adjudication, on suspicion that
she was either a pirate or engaged in smuggling slaves into
the United States. The Spanish and Portuguese Vice Consuls libelled the vessel, each claiming that portion of the
slaves conjectured to belong to the subjects of their respective sovereigns. Their claims were opposed by the United
States on behalf of the slaves. In a discussion of the general
principles involved, preliminary to examining the circumstances of the case, Chief Justice Marshall declared that the
legality of the slave trade was well established by the law
of nations and that no one nation could make it illegal for
others. His observations on the equality of nations have
been more widely quoted than those of any other judge except the dictum of Sir William Scott quoted above. He said:

relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can

make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose

governments have not forbidden it.

If it is consistent with the law of nations, it cannot in itself be

piracy. It can be made so only by statute; and the obligation of the

statute cannot transcend the legislative power of the state which may

enact it.

In this commerce, thus sanctioned by universal assent, every nation had an equal right to engage. How is this right to be lost? Each
may renounce it for its own people; but can this renunciation affect
others?
No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than
the perfect equality of nations. Russia and Geneva have equal rights.
It results from this equality, that no one can rightfully impose a rule
on another. Each legislates for itself, but its legislation can operate
on itself alone. A right, then, which is vested in all by the consent of
all, can be devested only by consent; and this trade, in which all have
participated, must remain lawful to those who cannot be induced to
relinquish it. As no nation can prescribe a rule for others, none can
make a law of nations; and this traffic remains lawful to those whose
governments have not forbidden it.
If it is consistent with the law of nations, it cannot in itself be
piracy. It can be made so only by statute; and the obligation of the
statute cannot transcend the legislative power of the state which may
enact it.
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If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is

almost superfluous to say in this Court, that the right of bringing in

for adjudication in time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a

nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot exist. The Courts of

no country execute the penal laws of another; and the course of the

American government on the subject of visitation and search, would

decide any case in which that right had been exercised by an Ameri-

can cruiser, on the vessel of a foreign nation, not violating our munic-

ipal laws, against the captors.

It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade,

captured on the high seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and

brought in for adjudication, would be restored.1

After examining the facts of the case before the court it was

decided that restitution should be made to the Spanish

claimant, but not to the Portuguese claimant because no

satisfactory proof of individual proprietary interest had

If it be neither repugnant to the law of nations, nor piracy, it is
almost superfluous to say in this Court, that the right of bringing in
for adjudication in time of peace, even where the vessel belongs to a
nation which has prohibited the trade, cannot exist. The Courts of
no country execute the penal laws of another; and the course of the
American government on the subject of visitation and search, would
decide any case in which that right had been exercised by an American cruiser, on the vessel of a foreign nation, not violating our municipal laws, against the captors.
It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the African slave trade,
captured on the high seas in time of peace, by an American cruiser, and
brought in for adjudication, would be restored. 1

been made.

The equality of states has never been expressly doubted

or denied, so far as the author is aware, in any formal judicial
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utterance in a national court. There are a few dicta, how-

ever, in which its denial in certain instances is necessarily

1 10 Wheaton, 66,122 (1825). In an earlier case involving the seizure of a foreign

vessel engaged in the slave trade, United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,

U. S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409,452 (1822), Justice Stoiy said: "No nation has a

right to infringe the law of nations, so as thereby to produce an injury to any other

nation. But if it does, this is understood to be an injury, not against all nations,

which all are bound or permitted to redress; but which concerns alone the nation

injured. The independence of nations guarantees to each the right of guarding its

own honour, and the morals and interests of its own subjects. No one has a right

to sit in judgment generally upon the actions of another; at least to the extent of

compelling its adherence to all the principles of justice and humanity in its do-

mestic concerns. If a nation were to violate as to its own subjects in its domestic

regulation the clearest principles of public law, I do not know, that that law has

ever held them amenable to the tribunals of other nations for such conduct. It

would be inconsistent with the equality and sovereignty of nations, which admit

no common superior. No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum

of the whole world; and though abstractedly a particular regulation may violate

the law of nations, it may sometimes, in the case of nations, be a wrong without a

remedy." See Pollard v. Bell, 8 Term Rep. 434 (1800); The Scotia, 14 Wallace,

170 (1871); United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 Fed. Cas. 292,

297-298 (1862).

After examining the facts of the case before the court it was
decided that restitution should be made to the Spanish
claimant, but not to the Portuguese claimant because no
satisfactory proof of individual proprietary interest had
been made.
The equality of states has never been expressly doubted
or denied, so far as the author is aware, in any formal judicial
utterance in a national court. There are a few dicta, how~
ever, in which its denial in certain instances is necessarily
1 10 \Vheaton, 66, 122 (1825) . In an earlier case involving the seizure of a foreign
vessel engaged in the slave trade, United States v. The Schooner La Jeune Eugenie,
U.S. Circuit Court, 2 Mason, 409, 452 (1822), Justice Story said: "No nation has a
right to infringe the law of nations, so as thereby to produce an injury to any other
nation. But if it does, this is understood to be an injury, not against all nations,
which all are bound or permitted to redress; but which concerns alone the nation
injured. The independence of nations guarantees to each the right of guarding its
own honour, and the morals and interests of its own subjects. No one has a right
to sit in judgment generally upon the actions of another; at least to the extent of
compelling its adherence to all the principles of justice and humanity in its domestic concerns. If a nation were to violate as to its own subjects in its domestic
regulation the clearest principles of public law, I do not know, that that law has
ever held them amenable to the tribunals of other nations for such conduct. It
would be inconsistent with the equality and sovereignty of nations, which admit
no common superior. No nation has ever yet pretended to be the cuslos morum
of the whole world; and though abstractedly a particular regulation may violate
the law of nations, it may sometimes, in the case of nations, be a wrong without a
remedy." See Pollard v. Bell, 8 Term Rep. 434 (18oo); The Scotia, 14 Wallace,
170 (1871); United States v. One Hundred Barrels of Cement, 27 Fed. Cas. 292,

297-298 (1862).
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implied. In several opinions Sir William Scott pointed out

that the less civilized states of the Barbary coast and the

Levant were not considered subject to the full rigor of the

European law of nations. In the case of The Madonna Del

Burso, referring to the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, he

said:

Independent of such engagements [treaties], it is well known that this

court is in the habit of showing something of a peculiar indulgence

to persons of that part of the world. The inhabitants of those

countries are not professors of exactly the same law of nations with

implied. In several opinions Sir William Scott pointed out
that the less civilized states of the Barbary coast and the
Levant were not considered subject to the full rigor of the
European law of nations. In the case of The Madonna Del
Burso, referring to the subjects of the Ottoman Empire, he
said:

ourselves. In consideration of the peculiarities of their situation and

character, the court has repeatedly expressed a disposition not to

hold them bound to the utmost rigour of the system of public laws on

which European states have so long acted in their intercourse with

one another.1

A much more interesting dictum is that of Sir Samuel Evans

in the recent case of The Mowe. Discussing the binding

character of Hague Conventions which had not been ratified

by all the belligerents, he said:

Of the belligerents, Montenegro has no navy, and, so far as I know,
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no mercantile marine — it has a coast line, but only of about thirty

miles; and Serbia is a purely inland State, having no seaboard at all.

It would scarcely seem desirable that the non-ratification by these

Independent of such engagements [treaties], it is well known that this
court is in the habit of showing something of a peculiar indulgence
to persons of that part of the world. The inhabitants of those
countries are not professors of exactly the same law of nations with
ourselves. In consideration of the peculiarities of their situation and
character, the court has repeatedly expressed a disposition not to
hold them bound to the utmost rigour of the system of public laws on
which European states have so long acted in their intercourse with
one another.1

Powers should prevent the application of the maritime Conventions;

and it may be that the counsellors who have the responsibility of ad-

vising the Crown may deem it fit to advise that by proclamation or

otherwise this country should declare that it will give effect to the

Conventions, whether by the literal terms thereof they are strictly

binding or not.2

1 4 C. Rob. 160, 172 (1802). See also The Hurtige Hane, 3 C. Rob. 324, 325

(1801). "Although their notions of justice, to be observed between nations, differ

A much more interesting dictum is that of Sir Samuel Evans
in the recent case of The Mowe. Discussing the binding
character of Hague Conventions which had not been ratified
by all the belligerents, he said:

from those which we entertain, we do not, on that account, venture to call in ques-

tion their public acts." The Helena, 4 C. Rob. 3, 6 (1801).

1 L. R. [1915] Prob. Div. 1, 13. A similar view was taken by the Imperial

Supreme Prize Court in Berlin, in the case of The Fenix, December 17, 1914. See

A.J.I. L. (1916), X, 900-915. 910, 912.

Of the belligerents, Montenegro has no navy, and, so far as I know,
no mercantile marine - it has a coast line, but only of about thirty
miles; and Serbia is a purely inland State, having no seaboard at all.
It would scarcely seem desirable that the non-ratification by these
Powers should prevent the application of the maritime Conventions;
and it may be that the counsellors who have the responsibility of advising the Crown may deem it fit to advise that by proclamation or
otherwise this country should declare that it will give effect to the
Conventions, whether by the literal terms thereof they are strictly
binding or not.2
4 C. Rob. r&), 172 (18o2). See also The Hurtige Hane, 3 C. Rob. 324, 325
(18o1). "Although their notions of justice, to be observed between nations, differ
1

from those which we entertain, we do not, on that account, venture to call in question their public acts." The Helena, 4 C. Rob. 3, 6 (1801).
2 L. R. (1915) Prob. Div. 1, 13. A similar view was taken by the Imperial
Supreme Prize Court in Berlin, in the case of The Fenix, December 171 1914. See
A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 909-915, 910, 912.
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The Equality of States in International Awards

Express reference to the equality of nations has been al-

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL AWARDS

most as uncommon before international tribunals as before

the courts of national jurisdiction. Aside from an occasional

passing reference in the course of an argument or opinion,

it has been considered in only two important international

arbitrations, the Venezuelan Arbitration before the Hague

Tribunal in 1003, and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries

Arbitration before the same tribunal in 1010.

The Venezuelan Arbitration of 1903 had its origin in a

controversy over claims held by citizens of the United

States and of several European powers against the Republic

of Venezuela. Prolonged diplomatic negotiations having

failed to bring an adjustment the governments of Great

Britain, Germany, and Italy resorted to joint coercive meas-

ures, including a blockade of Venezuelan ports, the seizure

of customhouses, and other expedients. As a consequence

of these measures Venezuela was constrained to recognize in

principle the justice of claims held by subjects of the block-
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ading powers, to pay certain of their claims at once and

refer others to a mixed commission, and to assign thirty

per cent of the customs receipts at La Guaira and Puerto

Cabello as security. Were the subjects of non-blockading

powers, having claims against Venezuela, to share equally

in the customs receipts assigned as security? The blockad-

ing powers claimed preferential treatment for their subjects.

Venezuela and the non-blockading powers contended that

all should participate equally. An agreement could not be

reached and the point was accordingly referred to arbitra-

tion.

In the course of the proceedings at The Hague it was

argued for Venezuela and the pacific powers that the prin-

ciple of equality among nations created a presumption in

Express reference to the equality of nations has been almost as uncommon before international tribunals as before
the courts of national jurisdiction. Aside from an occasional
passing reference in the course of an argument or opinion,
it has been considered in only two important international
arbitrations, the Venezuelan Arbitration before the Hague
Tribunal in 1<)03, and the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries
Arbitration before the same tribunal in 1910.
The Venezuelan Arbitration of 1<)03 had its origin in a
controversy over claims held by citizens of the United
States and of several European powers against the Republic
of Venezuela. Prolonged diplomatic negotiations having
failed to bring an adjustment the governments of Great
Britain, Germany, and Italy resorted to joint coercive measures, including a blockade of Venezuelan ports, the seizure
of customhouses, and other expedients. As a consequence
of these measures Venezuela was constrained to recognize in
principle the justice of claims held by subjects of the blockading powers, to pay certain of their claims at once and
refer others to a mixed commission, and to assign thirty
per cent of the customs receipts at La Guaira and Puerto
Cabello as security. Were the subjects of non-blockading
powers, having claims against Venezuela, to share equally
in the customs receipts assigned as security ? The blockading powers claimed preferential treatment for their subjects.
Venezuela and the non-blockading powers contended that
all should participate equally. An agreement could not be
reached and the point was accordingly referred to arbitration.
In the course of the proceedings at The Hague it was
argued for Venezuela and the pacific powers that the principle of equality among nations created a presumption in
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favor of equal participation, indeed that preferential treat-

ment for the blockading powers would violate the equality

of sovereign states. This argument may be illustrated from

the Venezuelan Case:

Such further preferential treatment is objected to because equality

is equity, and as all nations are equal in the forum of international

law, they should be accorded equal treatment by this tribunal unless

favor of equal participation, indeed that preferential treatment for the blockading powers would violate the equality
of sovereign states. This argument may be illustrated from
the Venezuelan Case:

some valid and conclusive reason can be adduced for denying them

such equality.1

The same contention was developed further in the Case of

the United States. A closely reasoned passage from the

printed argument of Penfield was based upon the premise

of equality, stated in the following terms:

While each State is sovereign within its own domain, elsewhere —

Such further preferential treatment is objected to because equality
is equity, and as all nations are equal in the forum of international
law, they should be accorded equal treatment by this tribunal unless
some valid and conclusive reason can be adduced for denying them
such equality.1

on the high seas and everywhere within the domain of the general

community — all States are equal, having equal rights and duties of

respect, of representation, and of justice. Each may demand justice

for its nationals domiciled in another State, but not to the exclusion

of the same right of the nationals of other States. The pretension to

such exclusive right assails the sovereignty of a debtor State. It also
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assails that of other States having claims equally just; and if insisted

on it would necessarily provoke resentments and lead to inevitable

conflicts.'

The same principle was emphasized in the Case of France:

What is the general principle applicable in this matter? . . .

According to the law of nations, sovereign states are equal among

themselves, whatever may be the differences of fact which separate

them. This theoretical equality is often disregarded in fact on account

of political considerations, but it is proper not to forget that very

fortunately we stand here on the ground of right. We have what is so

often asked for in vain — forum et jus.

Therefore, according to the general principle the different creditor

states of Venezuela have an equal right to that part of her resources

which their common debtor has intended to assign to them equally.3

1 Venez. Arbit., p. 240. See also M'Veagh's argument for Venezuela, p. 1136.

"Ibid., p. 430. * Ibid., pp. 898, 899, 880.

The same contention was developed further in the Case of
the United States. A closely reasoned passage from the
printed argument of Penfield was based upon the premise
of equality, stated in the following terms:
While each State is sovereign within its own domain, elsewhere on the high seas and everywhere within the domain of the general
community - all States are equal, having equal rights and duties of
respect, of representation, and of justice. Each may demand justice
for its nationals domiciled in another State, but not to the exclusion
of the same right of the nationals of other States. The pretension to
such exclusive right assails the sovereignty of a debtor State. It also
assails that of other States having claims equally just; and if insisted
on it would necessarily provoke resentments and lead to inevitable
conflicts.2

The same principle was emphasized in the Case of France:
What is the general principle applicabl~ in this matter ? . . .
According to the law of nations, sovereign states are equal among
themselves, whatever may be the differences of fact which separate
them. This theoretical equality is often disregarded in fact on account
of political considerations, but it is proper not to forget that very
fortunately we stand here on the ground of right. We have what is so
often asked for in vain - forum et jus.
Therefore, according to the general principle the different creditor
states of Venezuela have an equal right to that part of her resources
which their common debtor has intended to assign to them equally.3
1

1

Venez. Arbit., p. :z40. See also M'Veagh's argument for Venezuela, p. 1136.
3 Ibid., pp. 898, 899, 88o.
Ibid., p. 430.
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The argument based upon the principle of equality consti-

tuted the first point in the Case of Spain:

The first of these maxims of the law of nations is the existence of a

complete and natural equality among the States which constitute the

international society of civilized peoples; the second, that the rights

of a third party can neither be altered nor curtailed by acts or agree-

ments in which it has had no part. . . .

... Can acts of war, such as the events of December to February last,

alter this natural, complete, and unchangeable equality, which is one

of the keystones of the whole fabric of international law? Have those

acts, perchance, reduced Venezuela internationally to a situation of

dependence with regard to the powers which have exercised hostile

acts within her territory so far as to create for those powers and their

subjects a right of preference over every other State and its subjects

in all concerning the Venezuelan Republic ? 1

The argument from the premise of equality was met veiy

effectively by the blockading powers, however, by pointing

out that the application of the principle does not require

equality of treatment unless there is equality of position

between the contending parties, and that in fact there was
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not an equality of position among the parties to the present

arbitration. Their refutation brings out a point already

The argument based upon the principle of equality constituted the first point in the Case of Spain:
The first of these maxims of the law of nations is the existence of a
complete and natural equality among the States which constitute the
international society of civilized peoples; the second, that the rights
of a third party can neither be altered nor curtailed by acts or agreements in which it has had no part ....
. . . Can acts of war, such as the events of December to February lastJ
alter this natural, complete, and unchangeable equality, which is one
of the keystones of the whole fabric of international law? Have those
acts, perchance, reduced Venezuela internationally to a situation of
dependence with regard to the powers which have exercised hostile
acts within her territory so far as to create for those powers and their
subjects a right of preference over every other State and its subjects
in all concerning the Venezuelan Republic? 1

made in connection with the writings of the publicists, viz.,

that whatever equality may be called it means an equality

of capacity and not of rights. The Counter Case of Great

Britain made the distinction very clear:

The main proposition of law on which the other creditor powers

rely is that all nations are entitled to equality of treatment, or, as it

is otherwise stated, that " equality is equity." It is perfectly true

that all nations, great or small, are to be regarded as on a footing of

equality inter se, but this proposition can not possibly be stretched

to the extent of meaning that all nations are to have equal rights in

all circumstances, or that equality is always equity irrespective of

the question whether the parties concerned are in an equal position

or not. There is nothing to prevent one nation from agreeing to con-

1 Venez. Arbit., p. 914.

The argument from the premise of equality was met very
effectively by the blockading powers, however, by pointing
out that the application of the principle does not require
equality of treatment unless there is equality of position
between the contending parties, and that in fact there was
not an equality of position among the parties to the present
arbitration. Their refutation brings out a point already
made in connection with the writings of the publicists, viz.,
that whatever equality may be called it means an equality
of capacity and not of rights. The Counter Case of Great
Britain made the distinction very clear:
The main proposition of law on which the other creditor powers
rely is that all nations are entitled to equality of treatment, or, as it
is otherwise stated, that " equality is equity." It is perfectly true
that all nations, great or small, are to be regarded as on a footing of
equality inter se, but this proposition can not possibly be stretched
to the extent of meaning that all nations are to have equal rights in
all circumstances, or that equality is always equity irrespective of
the question whether the parties concerned are in an equal position
or not. There is nothing to prevent one nation from agreeing to con1

V cnez. Arbit., p. 914.
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fer special privileges on another nation, even though that agreement

be prejudicial to the interests of a third nation, provided that no

vested rights are affected. One nation, for instance, may obtain a

preferential tariff from another nation by treaty or by force, but that

gives no right in law to any third nation to insist on equal treatment.

It is equally certain that the doctrine of equality can have no appli-

cation in cases in which the nations concerned are not in a position of

equality. A neutral, for instance, cannot claim the privileges of a

belligerent. A nation which has nothing to offer in exchange for a

concession is not in the same position as a nation which can confer

signal advantages in return. A creditor Who has taken no steps to

enforce the payment of his debt is not in the same position as a creditor

who has taken successful proceedings against the debtor.

It is obvious, therefore, for reasons which will hereafter more fully

appear, that the maxim has no application to the present case.1

Replying to the Spanish argument from the principle of

state equality, M. Buenz said:

We cheerfully admit all that, contending at the same time that

those principles do not in any way apply to the case at issue.

The blockading powers do not in the least contest the complete
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and natural equality among the States as States, nor did they ever

pretend to have a right to curtail the rights of a third party. On the

fer special privileges on another nation, even though that agreement
be prejudicial to the interests of a third nation, provided that no
vested rights are affected. One nation, for instance, may obtain a
preferential tariff from another nation by treaty or by force, but that
gives no right in law to any third nation to insist on equal treatment.
It is equally certain that the doctrine of equality can have no application in cases in which the nations concerned are not in a position of
equality. A neutral, for instance, cannot claim the privileges of a
belligerent. A nation which has nothing to offer in exchange for a
concession is not in the same position as a nation which can confer
signal advantages in return. A creditor who has taken no steps to
enforce the payment of his debt is not in the same position as a creditor
who has taken successful proceedings against the debtor.
It is obvious, therefore, for reasons which ""'ill hereafter more fully
appear, that the maxim has no application to the present case. 1

contrary they added to those rights and improved the status of the

third party. But how about the reverse of the medal? Can a third

party acquire rights by acts in which it had no part? It was owing

to the military operations of the blockading powers that security was

Replying to the Spanish argument from the principle of
state equality, M. Buenz said:

promised and her customs pledged to them by Venezuela for their

claims. By what title do the other creditor powers demand admission

to that right acquired by acts in which they had no part ?2

The award recognized the soundness of the argument ad-

vanced by the blockading powers and granted preferential

treatment. It stands as a precedent neither for nor against

the equality of states. It is authority for no other propo-

sition than that in a case like the one under consideration

1 Venez. Arbit., p. 975. See also Counter Case of Italy, p. 1028.

3 Ibid., p. 1190. See also the argument of Sir Robert Finlay, p. 1199.

We cheerfully admit all that, contending at the same time that
those principles do not in any way apply to the case at issue.
The blockading powers do not in the least contest the complete
and natural equality among the States as States, nor did they ever
pretend to have a right to curtail the rights of a third party. On the
contrary they added to those rights and improved the status of the
third party. But how about the reverse of the medal? Can a third
party acquire rights by acts in which it had no part ? It was owing
to the military operations of the blockading powers that security was
promised and her customs pledged to them by Venezuela for their
claims. By what title do the other creditor powers demand admission
to that right acquired by acts in which they had no part ? 2

The award recognized the soundness of the argument advanced by the blockading powers and granted preferential
treatment. It stands as a precedent neither for nor against
the equality of states. It is authority for no other proposition than that in a case like the one under consideration
1
2

Vena. Arbit., p. 975. See also Counter Case of Italy, p. 1028.
Ibid., p. u90. See also the argument of Sir Robert Finlay, p. u99.
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coercive action may give a privileged position which carries

with it the right to preferential treatment.

In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration of iqio

the equality of nations was not made an issue in so many

words, but it would seem to have been involved in the de-

cision of the first of the seven questions submitted to the

tribunal.1 The treaty of 1818 between the United States

and Great Britain conceded to the inhabitants of the United

States the liberty to take fish in certain British territorial

waters on the North Atlantic coast. After nearly a century

of controversy with reference to the scope and meaning of

the treaty the two countries agreed in 1909 to have recourse

to arbitration.

The very nature of the right defined by the treaty was

placed in issue by the first question. Could Great Britain

or the colonies enact reasonable regulations for the fisheries

without the consent of the United States? Counsel for the

United States denied that such regulations could be applied

to the common fisheries,
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Unless their appropriateness, necessity, reasonableness, and fairness

be determined by the United States and Great Britain by common

accord and the United States concurs in their enforcement*

It was argued that the fishing rights constituted an inter-

national servitude over the territory of Great Britain, re-

stricting sovereignty, and depriving Great Britain of its

independent right of regulation. It was argued further that

if sovereignty itself was not limited then Great Britain was

at least restricted in the exercise of its sovereignty in the

treaty waters.

The tribunal resolved the question into two contentions:

coercive action may give a privileged position which carries
with it the right to preferential treatment.
In the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration of r9ro
the equality of nations was not made an issue in so many
words, but it would seem to have been involved in the decision of the first of the seven questions submitted to the
tribunal.1 The treaty of r818 between the United States
and Great Britain conceded to the inhabitants of the United
States the liberty to take fish in certain British territorial
waters on the North Atlantic coast. After nearly a century
of controversy with reference to the scope and meaning of
the treaty the two countries agreed in 1909 to have recourse
to arbitration.
The very nature of the right defined by the treaty was
placed in issue by the first question. Could Great Britain
or the colonies enact reasonable regulations for the fisheries
without the consent of the United States? Counsel for the
United States denied that such regulations could be applied
to the common fisheries,

1 N.A.C.F. Proceedings, I, 66 ff.; Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases,

pp. 154 ff. The page references toN.A.C.F.Proceedings, I, refer to the first part

of the volume, and not to the Case of the United States which is paged separately.

* N.A.C.F. Proceedings, I, 67.

Unless their appropriateness, necessity, reasonableness, and fairness
be determined by the United States and Great Britain by common
accord and the United States concurs in their enforcement.1

It was argued that the fishing rights constituted an international servitude over the territory of Great Britain, restricting sovereignty, and depriving Great Britain of its
independent right of regulation. It was argued further that
if sovereignty itself was not limited then Great Britain was
at least restricted in the exercise of its sovereignty in the
treaty waters.
The tribunal resolved the question into two contentions:
1 N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, 66 ff.; Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases,
pp. 154 ff. The page references to N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, refer to the first part
of the volume, and not to the Case of the United States which is paged separately.
• N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, 67.
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1st. Whether the right of regulating reasonably the liberties con-

ferred by the Treaty of 1818 resides in Great Britain;

2d. And, if such right does so exist, whether such reasonable exer-

cise of the right is permitted to Great Britain without the accord and

concurrence of the United States.1

Both contentions were decided against the United States.

The tribunal denied that the fishing liberty constituted a

1st. \\'hether the right of regulating reasonably the liberties conferred by the Treaty of 1818 resides in Great Britain;
2d. And, if such right does so exist, whether such reasonable exercise of the right is permitted to Great Britain without the accord and
concurrence of the United States.1

servitude in derogation of sovereignty because, among other

reasons, there was no satisfactory evidence that either

British or American statesmen were familiar with the doc-

trine in 1818; because a servitude predicates an express

grant of a sovereign right, whereas the treaty granted a

liberty to fish, which was purely an economic right; and be-

cause the notion of international servitudes originated

among the quasi-sovereign ties of the Holy Roman Empire,

whereas

in contradistinction to this quasi-sovereignty with its incoherent at-

tributes acquired at various times, by various means, and not im-

paired in its character by being incomplete in any one respect or by

being limited in favour of another territory and its possessor, the
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modern State, and particularly Great Britain, has never admitted

partition of sovereignty, owing to the constitution of a modern State

requiring essential sovereignty and independence.*

The tribunal regarded the doctrine of international servi-

tudes as being

little suited to the principle of sovereignty which prevails in States

Both contentions were decided against the United States.
The tribunal denied that the fishing liberty constituted a
servitude in derogation of sovereignty because, among other
reasons, there was no satisfactory evidence that either
British or American statesmen were familiar with the doctrine in i818; because a servitude predicates an express
grant of a sovereign right, whereas the treaty granted a
liberty to fish, which was purely an economic right; and because the notion of international servitudes originated
among the quasi-sovereignties of the Holy Roman Empire,
whereas

under a system of constitutional government such as Great Britain

and the United States and to the present international relations of

sovereign States.

In the general interest of the community of nations and of

the parties to the treaty, it was declared, such a principle

could be affirmed " only on the express evidence of an inter-

national contract."

1 N.A.C.F. Proceedings, I, 74.

'Ibid., I, 76.

in contradistinction to this quasi-sovereignty with its incoherent attributes acquired at various times, by various means, and not impaired in its character by being incomplete in any one respect or by
being limited in favour of another territory and its possessor, the
modem State , and particularly Great Britain, has never admitted
partition of sovereignty, owing to the constitution of a modem State
requiring essential sovereignty and independence.'

The tribunal regarded the doctrine of international servitudes as being
little su!ted to the principle of sovereignty which prevails in States
under a system of constitutional government such as Great Britain
and the United States and to the present international relations of
wvereign States.

In the general interest of the community of nations and of
the parties to the treaty, it was declared, such a principle
could be affirmed " only on the express evidence of an international contract."
1

N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, 74.

1

Ibid., I, 76.
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The contention that reasonable exercise of Great Britain's

right of regulation required the accord and concurrence of

the United States was also rejected. It was the tribunal's

opinion that such a concurrent right would impair the

sovereignty and independence of Great Britain.

Finally, to hold that the United States, the grantee of the fishing

right, has a voice in the preparation of fishery legislation involves the

The contention that reasonable exercise of Great Britain's
right of regulation required the accord and concurrence of
the l:nited States was also rejected. It was the tribunal's
opinion that such a concurrent right would impair the
sovereignty and independence of Great Britain.

recognition of a right in that country to participate in the internal

legislation of Great Britain and her colonies, and to that extent

would reduce these countries to a state of dependence.1

Every suggestion of a limitation on the independence or

sovereignty of Great Britain was repudiated.

In its award, however, the tribunal recognized the ex-

istence of a permanent limitation upon the capacity of

Great Britain to regulate its fisheries, a limitation of which

Finally, to hold that the l:nited States, the grantee of the fishing
right, has a voice in the preparation of fishery legislation involves the
recognition of a right in that country to participate in the internal
legislation of Great Britain and her colonies, and to that extent
would reduce these countries to a state of dependence. 1

Great Britain cannot divest itself by its own act, and one

which in a sense affects its capacity in relation to the entire

society of nations. The reasons for this limitation were

stated as follows:
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While therefore unable to concede the claim of the United States

as based on the treaty, this Tribunal considers that such claim has

been and is to some extent, conceded in the relations now existing

between the two Parties. Whatever may have been the situation

under the treaty of 1818 standing alone, the exercise of the right of

regulation inherent in Great Britain has been, and is, limited by the

repeated recognition of the obligations already referred to, by the

limitations and liabilities accepted in the special agreement, by the un-

equivocal position assumed by Great Britain in the presentation of

its case before this Tribunal, and by the consequent view of this

Tribunal that it would be consistent with all the circumstances, as

Every suggestion of a limitation on the independence or
sovereignty of Great Britain was repudiated.
In its award, however, the tribunal recognized the existence of a permanent limitation upon the capacity of
Great Britain to regulate its fisheries, a limitation of which
Great Britain cannot divest itself by its own act, and one
which in a sense affects its capacity in relation to the entire
society of nations. The reasons for this limitation were
stated as follows:

revealed by this record, as to the duty of Great Britain, that she

should submit the reasonableness of any future regulation to such an

impartial arbitral test, affording full opportunity therefor, as is here-

after recommended under the authority of Article IV of the special

agreement, whenever the reasonableness of any regulation is objected

1 N.A.C.F. Proceedings, I, 84.

While therefore unable to concede the claim of the Vnited States
as based on the treaty, this Tribunal considers that such claim has
been and is to some extent, conceded in the relations now existing
between the two Parties. Whatever may have been the situation
under the treaty of 1818 standing alone, the exercise of the right of
regulation inherent in Great Britain has heen, and is, limited by the
repeated recognition of the obligations already referred to, by the
limitations and liabilities accepter! in the special agreement, by the unequivocal position assumed by Great Britain in the presentation of
its case before this Tribunal, and by the consequent view of this
Tribunal that it would be consistent with all the circumstances, as
revealed by this record, as to the duty of Great Britain, that she
should submit the reasonableness of any future regulation to such an
impartial arbitral test, affording full opportunity therefor, as is hereafter recommended under the authority of Article IV of the special
agreement, whenever the reasonableness of any regulation is objected
1

N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, 84.
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to or challenged by the United States in the manner, and within the

time hereinafter specified in the said recommendation.1

It was decided, therefore, that while the right to regulate

to or challenged by the United States in the manner, and within the
time hereinafter specified in the said recommendation. 1

without the consent of the United States was inherent in

the sovereignty of Great Britain, the exercise of that right

must be in good faith and in accord with the treaty; and if

the reasonableness of any regulation should be contested by

the United States the point must be decided by an impartial

authority. The effect of the decision is well summarized in

the report of the agent of the United States:

It is evident, therefore, that as result of the award no regulations

limiting the time, manner and implements of fishing can hereafter be

imposed upon American fishermen exercising their treaty liberties in

Newfoundland and Canadian waters if any objection has been raised

to them by the United States, unless their reasonableness, necessity

and fairness has been approved by an impartial commission or tri-

bunal. . . .

It was decided, therefore, that while the right to regulate
without the consent of the United States was inherent in
the sovereignty of Great Britain, the exercise of that right
must be in good faith and in accord with the treaty; and if
the reasonableness of any regulation should be contested by
the United States the point must be decided by an impartial
authority. The effect of the decision is well summarized in
the report of the agent of the United States:

Although British sovereign rights over the fisheries in British

waters are affirmed in the decision, nevertheless the exercise of such

rights is effectively limited by the award to the extent above indi-
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cated.2

As a distinguished Briton is said to have remarked, Great

Britain saved her sovereignty but lost the right to exercise

it. Stated in terms of equality instead of terms of sov-

ereignty and independence, the somewhat anomalous award

on question one amounts to this: it is always to be pre-

sumed that a state retains an unrestricted capacity for rights

equal to that enjoyed by any other state; but by treaty,

usage, special agreement, and formal admission one state

may become subject to a permanent limitation upon its

capacity to exercise certain rights without becoming subject

to an international servitude, in the sense of a limitation on

sovereignty.

It is evident, therefore, that as result of the award no regulations
limiting the time, manner and implements of fishing can hereafter be
imposed upon American fishermen exercising their treaty liberties in
Newfoundland and Canadian waters if any objection has been raised
to them by the United States, unless their reasonableness, necessity
and fairness has been approved by an impartial commission or tribunal. . . .
Although British sovereign rights over the fisheries in British
waters are affirmed in the decision, nevertheless the exercise of such
rights is effectively limited by the award to the extent above indicated.2

1 N.A.C.F. Proceedings, I, 84.

• Ibid., I, 16.

As a distinguished Briton is said to have remarked, Great
Britain saved her sovereignty but lost the right to exercise
it. Stated in terms of equality instead of terms of sovereignty and independence, the somewhat anomalous award
on question one amounts to this: it is always to be presumed that a state retains an unrestricted capacity for rights
equal to that enjoyed by any other state; but by treaty,
usage, special agreement, and formal admission one state
may become subject to a permanent limitation upon its
capacity to exercise certain rights without becoming subject
to an international servitude, in the sense of a limitation on
sovereignty.
1

N. A. C. F. Proceedings, I, 84.

I

Ibid., I, 16.
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There is one international case in which the broad general

principle of the equality of nations was placed definitely in

issue and judicially affirmed as essential to the right decision

of the controversy. That case is the recent one of Salvador

v. Nicaragua,1 decided by the Central American Court of

Justice in 1917. As a precedent the case can hardly be

said to have international significance; but technically, at

least, it is an international case and therefore may be con-

sidered here. Salvador filed a complaint with the court

against Nicaragua's concession of a naval base to the United

States under the terms of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. It

was contended that the concession constituted a menace to

Salvador's national security, violated her rights of co-

ownership in the Gulf of Fonseca, and impaired her legiti-

mate hopes for the future as a Central American nation.

The Court was petitioned to enjoin Nicaragua from per-

forming its part of the treaty. The Agadir incident was

invoked to show that in similar circumstances, when Ger-

many threatened to seize a port for a naval base on the
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Moroccan coast, Great Britain and France protested that

such a base would be a menace to their national security

and succeeded in preventing its establishment. Nicaragua

denied that there was any parallel between the Agadir inci-

dent and the proposed concession in the Gulf of Fonseca.

The Court held the concession a menace to Salvador's se-

curity, remarking of the Agadir incident:

In the opinion of the Court, the Agadir case is perfectly applicable

to the argument maintained by the high party complainant. It

matters not that in that case the parties who claimed that their

rights were " menaced" were great military Powers. The propo-

sition was there adopted as a fundamental principle of public law that

all states are naturally equal and that they are under the same obli-

gations and enjoy the same rights. "The relative magnitude," says

Sir William Scott, referring to sovereign states, " creates no distinc-

1 A.J.I. L. (i917),XI, 674-730

There is one international case in which the broad general
principle of the equality of nations was placed definitely in
issue and judicially affirmed as essential to the right decision
of the controversy. That case is the recent one of Salvador
v. Nicaragua,1 decided by the Central American Court of
Justice in 1917. As a precedent the case can hardly be
said to have international significance; but technically, at
least, it is an international case and therefore may be considered here. Salvador filed a complaint with the court
against Nicaragua's concession of a naval base to the United
States under the terms of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty. It
was contended that the concession constituted a menace to
Salvador's national security, violated her rights of coownership in the Gulf of Fonseca, and impaired her legitimate hopes for the future as a Central American nation.
The Court was petitioned to enjoin Nicaragua from performing its part of the treaty. The Agadir incident was
invoked to show that in similar circumstances, when Germany threatened to seize a port for a naval base on the
Moroccan coast, Great Britain and France protested that
such a base would be a menace to their national security
and succeeded in preventing its establishment. Nicaragua
denied that there was any parallel b~tween the Agadir incident and the proposed concession in the Gulf of Fonseca.
The Court held the concession a menace to Salvador's security, remarking of the Agadir incident:
In the opinion of the Court, the Agadir case is perfectly applicable
to the argument maintained by the high party complainant. It
matters not that in that case the parties who claimed that their
rights were " menaced" were great military Powers. The proposition was there adopted as a fundamental principle of public law that
all states are naturally equal and that they are under the same obligations and enjoy the same rights. " The relative magnitude," says
Sir William Scott, referring to sovereign states, " creates no distinc1

A. J.I.L. (1917), XI, 674-730
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tion of right, and any difference that may be claimed in respect to

that basis must be considered as a usurpation." 1

It was further held that Nicaragua was under an obligation

tion of right, and any difference that may be claimed in respect to
that basis must be considered as a usurpation." 1

to reestablish and maintain the legal status which had existed

prior to the conclusion of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty; but

the Court piudently declined to enjoin Nicaragua from ful-

filling the treaty or to grant other relief.

Equality in the Protests of Small or Weak Nations

The equality of nations has been invoked much more fre-

quently in the literature of diplomacy. It has been the

theme of protests of the smaller and weaker nations from

the apology of William the Silent1 to the present day.

It was further held that Nicaragua was under an obligation
to reestablish and maintain the legal status which had existed
prior to the conclusion of the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty; but
the Court prudently declined to enjoin Nicaragua from fulfilling the treaty or to grant other relief.

Wurtemberg protested formally in 1823 against being ex-

cluded from the Congress of Verona:

Whatever confidence may be due by reason of the wisdom and the

EQUALITY IN THE PROTESTS OF SMALL OR WEAK NATIONS

impartiality of the powers who have inherited the influence which

was assumed in Europe by Napoleon, it is nevertheless difficult not

to fear for the independence of the smaller states, if ever that pro-

tection should be exercised by less devoted or less generous sovereigns.*

It was declared that the way in which the great powers were
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attempting to supervise the common interests of Europe

threatened to introduce " more or less alarming principles"

into public law, and justified une reserve expresse les droits

inalienable de tout £tat independant.

When the great powers met in concert in 1869 to adjust

the controversy then raging in the near East, Greece refused

The equality of nations has been invoked much more frequently in the literature of diplomacy. It has been the
theme of protests of the smaller and weaker nations from
the apology of William the Silent 2 to the present day.
Wilrtemberg protested formally in 1823 against being excluded from the Congress of Verona:

to participate in the conferences except on terms of equality.

The deliberations accordingly proceeded without the assist-

ance of Greece.4

1 A. J. I. L. (1917), XI, 719. * Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, p. 242.

« B. F. S. P., X, 895, 896. See Metternich's reply, ibid., p. 898.

4 Ibid., LDC, 814, 818, 826. Greece might have quoted from the French

protest against the suppression of the Republic of Cracow, Paris, December 3,

Whatever confidence may be due by reason of the wisdom and the
impartiality of the powers who have inherited the influence which
was assumed in Europe by Napoleon, it is nevertheless difficult not
to fear for the independence of the smaller states, if ever that protection should be exercised by less devoted or less generous sovereigns.3

It was declared that the way in which the great powers were
attempting to supervise the common interests of Europe
threatened to introduce " more or less alarming principles "
into public law, and justified une reserve expresse les droits
inalienable de tout Etat itulependant.
When the great powers met in concert in 1869 to adjust
the controversy then raging in the near East, Greece refused
to participate in the conferences except on terms of equality.
The deliberations accordingly proceeded without the assistance of Greece.•
1 Figgis, Gerson tc Grotius, p. 242.
A. J.1. L. (1917), XI, 719.
B. F. S. P., X, 895, 896. See Metternich's reply, ibid., p. 898.
• Ibid., LIX, 8141 818, 826. Greece might have quoted from the French
protest against the suppression of the Republic of Cracow, Paris, December 3,
1

1
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Again, when the Conference of London was called by the

great powers in 1883 to consider the execution of articles

54 and 55 of the Treaty of Berlin with reference to the

navigation of the Danube, Roumania asserted its right to

participate on the basis of complete equality and justified

its claim by citing its interest in the navigation of the Dan-

ube, its representation on the Danube commission, the

principles of international law, and the express terms of

the protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Rou-

manian representative at London declared:

The participation of Roumania in the work of the Conference sur le

pied de la plus parfaite tgalitt with the other powers is indicated by the

very nature of things.1

The powers declined to admit Roumania on a footing of

equality, and Roumania consequently refused to participate

at all.2

More recently, in the litigation to which reference has

already been made, Salvador protested against the Bryan-

Chamorro Treaty because

It must be patent to everyone that the establishment, by a powerful
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state, of a naval base in the immediate vicinity of the Republic of El
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.

Again, when the Conference of London was called by the
great powers in 1883 to consider the execution of articles
54 and 55 of the Treaty of Berlin with reference to the
navigation of the Danube, Roumania asserted its right to
participate on the basis of complete equality and justified
its claim by citing its interest in the navigation of the Danube, its representation on the Danube commission, the
principles of international law, and the express terms of
the protocol of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Roumanian representative at London declared:
The participation of Roumania in the work of the Conference sur le
pied de la plus parfaite egalite with the other powers is indicated by the
very nature of things.1

Salvador would constitute a serious menace — not merely imaginary,

but real and apparent — to the freedom of life and the autonomy of

that republic.3

More recently still, China has declared, with reference to

the Lansing-Ishii agreement, that

The principle adopted by the Chinese government toward the

friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality. . . .

Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principles

1846: "Independent Powers who negotiate on a footing of perfect equality, and

deliberate on common interests, are never called upon to register decisions and acts

adopted without their participation." Hertslet, II, 1075.

The powers declined to admit Roumania on a footing of
equality, and Roumania consequently refused to participate
at all. 2
More recently, in the litigation to which reference has
already been made, Salvador protested against the BryanChamorro Treaty because

1 Jon Ghica to Granville, London, February 1, 1883, B. P. S. P., LXXTV, 1241.

* Same to same, London, February 12, 1883, ibid., p. 1250.

• A.J.I.L. (1917), XI, 67S.

It must be patent to everyone that the establishment, by a powerful
state, of a naval base in the immediate vicinity of the Republic of El
Salvador would constitute a serious menace - not merely imaginary,
but real and apparent - to the freedom of life and the autonomy of
that republic.1

More recently still, China has declared, with reference to
the Lansing-Ishii agreement, that
The principle adopted by the Chinese government toward the
friendly nations has always been one of justice and equality....
Hereafter the Chinese Government will still adhere to the principles
1846: "Independent Powers who negotiate on a footing of perfect equality, and
deliberate on common interests, are never called upon to register decisions and acts
adopted without their participation." Hertslet, II, 1075.
1 Jon Ghica to Granville, London, February 1, 1883, B. F. S. P., LXXIV, u41.
' Same to same, London, February 12, 1883, ibid., p. 1250.
1 A. J.1. L. (1917), XI, 675.
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hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese

Government will not allow itself to be bound by any agreement en-

tered into by other nations.1

Throughout Latin America the principle of state equality

is regarded as the essential premise of an international

hitherto adopted, and hereby it is again declared that the Chinese
Government will not allow itself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations. 1

Magna Charta. Drago's declaration, in his famous dispatch

to the minister of the Argentine Republic at Washington,

December 29,1902, that

Among the fundamental principles of public international law

which humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that

which decrees that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal,

are entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually en-

titled by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect,2

was received with universal approval in the capitals of Cen-

tral and South America. Secretary Root's address 3 before

the Third Conference of the American Republics at Rio de

Janeiro in 1906 evoked a similar enthusiasm. At the Second

Hague Peace Conference in 1907 the South American dele-

gates were the most outspoken champions of complete equal-

ity.4 The Declaration of the Rights of Nations,6 recently
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issued by the American Institute of International Law, is

Throughout Latin America the principle of state equality
is regarded as the essential premise of an international
Magna Charta. Drago's declaration, in his famous dispatch
to the minister of the Argentine Republic at Washington,
December 29, lCJ02, that
Among the fundamental principles of public international law
which humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that
which decrees that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal,
are entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually entitled by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect,2

an accurate epitome of the view that prevails throughout

the republics of Central and South America.

Equality in the Foreign Policy of the

United States

Throughout its history the United States has professed

to stand for the same principle, a position which has been

1 New York Times, November 14, 1917. A press despatch from Paris, dated

October 17, 1918, reports that a mass meeting of Jews held at Vienna on October 14,

1918, passed a resolution asking that the Jewish people be admitted into the league

of nations with rights equal to those of other nationalities.

» U. S. For. Rel. (1903), p. 2.

* Root, Latin America and the United States, p. 6.

4 La Deux. Confer., 1,333-334, 593; H, 20,147,148-155. 158,180,182,618-622,

624-627, 643-650, 838.

• Supra, p. 154.

was received with universal approval in the capitals of Central and South America. Secretary Root's address 3 before
the Third Conference of the American Republics at Rio de
Janeiro in 1906 evoked a similar enthusiasm. At the Second
Hague Peace Conference in 1907 the South American delegates were the most outspoken champions of complete equality.4 The Declaration of the Rights of Nations, 5 recently
issued by the American Institute of International Law, is
an accurate epitome of the view that prevails throughout
the republics of Central and South America.
EQUALITY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES

Throughout its history the United States has professed
to stand for the same principle, a position which has been
1 New York Times, November 14, 1917. A press despatch from Paris, dated
October 17, 1918, reports that a mass meeting of Jews held at Vienna on October 14,
1918, passed a resolution asking that the Jewish people be admitted into the league
of nations with rights equal to those of other nationalities.
1 U.S. For. Rel. (1903), p. 2.
1 Root, Latin America and the United Stales, p. 6.
' La Deux. Conftr., I, 333-334, 593; II, 20, 147, 148-155, 158, 180, 182, 618-6n,
624-627, 643-650, 838.
6 Supra, p. 154·
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frequently affirmed by its official spokesmen. The first

formal and official statement of the principle in America is

the opening sentence of the Declaration of Independence:

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one

frequently affirmed by its official spokesmen. The first
formal and official statement of the principle in America is
the opening sentence of the Declaration of Independence:

people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with

another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate

and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God

entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires

that they should declare the causes which impel them to the sepa-

ration.

In the negotiations for peace in 1782, Jay did not consider

that independence required any aid or validity from British

acts, " provided that nation treated us as she treated other

nations, viz., on a footing of equality." 1

In 1796, the United States minister to England wrote to

When in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one
people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with
another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate
and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God
entitle them, a decent respect for the opinions of mankind requires
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

Secretary Pickering, suggesting that open letters might be

obtained from the French and British ministers in order to

insure an uninterrupted passage. Secretary Pickering re-

plied:
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If a public minister going to his place of destination must pass

through the territories of the belligerent powers, passports for him

through a neutral would be expedient; but the ocean being the high-

way of all nations, it would seem to me to derogate from our equal

rights as a sovereign power, to seek protection there under any pass-

port but our own.'

1 Jay to Livingston, Paris, November 17, 1782, Wharton, Rewl. Diplom. Cor-

ns}. of the U. S., VI. 17.

* Pickering to King, June 17, 1796, Moore, Digest, IV, 559. Referring to the

basic piinciples of foreign policy established during Washington's administration,

Johnson says: "The first of these cardinal doctrines was that of impregnable in-

In the negotiations for peace in 1782, Jay did not consider
that independence required any aid or validity from British
acts, " provided that nation treated us as she treated other
nations, viz., on a footing of equality." 1
In 1796, the United States minister to England wrote to
Secretary Pickering, suggesting that open letters might be
obtained from the French and British ministers in order to
insure an uninterrupted passage. Secretary Pickering replied:

dependence, and the equal sovereignty of the United States with any and all other

nations of the world. F1ance more than any other had striven to deny and to pre-

vent this, and to make us a mere dependency upon her. But we had wisely and

indeed necessitous!}' insisted upon fulfilment of the Declaration of Independence.

We were no }«<wt-state, no dwarf or cripple, no mere probationer on sufferance.

We were a full-fledged, full-grown nation, possessed of all the functions, powers,

and rights of national sovereignty, the peer in legal standing of any other nation

in the world; inalienably endowed with full powers, in Jefferson's pithy phrase,

If a public minister going to his place of destination must pass

through the territories of the belligerent powers, passports for him
through a neutral would be expedient; but the ocean being the highway of all nations, it would seem to me to derogate from our equal
rights as a sovereign power, to seek protection there under any passport but our own.2
1 Jay to Livingston, Paris, November 17, 1782, Wharton, Revol. Diplom. Corresp. of the U.S., VI. 17.
1 Pickering to King, June 17, 1796, Moore, Digest, IV, 559. Referring to the
basic principles of foreign policy established during Washington's administration,
Johnson says : " The first of these cardinal doctrines was that of impregnable independence, and the equal sovereignty of the United States with any and all other
nations of the world. France more than any other had striven to deny and to prevent this, and to make us a mere dependency upon her. But we had wisely and
indeed necessitously insisted upon fulfilment of the Declaration of Independence.
We were no quasi-state, no dwarf or cripple, no mere probationer on sufferance.
We were a full-fledged, full-grown nation, possessed of all the functions, powers,
and rights of national sovereignty, the peer in legal standing of any other nation
in the world; inalienably endowed with full po\vers, in Jefferson's pithy phrase,

IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PAST CENTURY 177

IN THE DOCUMENTS OF THE PAST CENTURY

177

After the United States became strong enough to assert

without question its own "equal rights as a sovereign

power," the obligation to accord similar rights of equality

to other and weaker nations was not infrequently invoked

against it by its own statesmen. When President Grant's

administration employed the United States navy in support

of negotiations for the acquisition of a part of San Domingo,

in 1871, Senator Sumner secured the insertion of the follow-

ing resolutions of protest in the records of Congress:

Resolved, That since the equality of all nations, without regard to

population, size, or power, is an axiom of International Law, as the

equality of all men is an axiom of our Declaration of Independence,

nothing can be done to a small or weak nation that would not be done

to a large or powerful nation, or. that we would not allow to be done

to ourselves; and therefore any treatment of the republic of Hayti

After the United States became strong enough to assert
without question its own " equal rights as a sovereign
power," the obligation to accord similar rights of equality
to other and weaker nations was not infrequently invoked
against it by its own statesmen. \Vhen President Grant's
administration employed the United States navy in support
of negotiations for the acquisition of a part of San Domingo,
in 1871, Senator Sumner secured the insertion of the following resolutions of protest in the records of Congress:

by the Navy of the United States inconsistent with this principle is

an infraction of international law in one of its great safeguards, and

should be disavowed by the Government of the United States.

Resolved, That since certain naval officers of the United States,

with large war-vessels, including the monitor called the Dictator and
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the frigate Severn, with powerful armaments, acting under instruc-

tions from the Executive and without the authority of an act of

Congress, have entered one or more ports of the republic of Hayti, a

friendly nation, and under the menace of open and instant war have

coerced and restrained that republic in its sovereignty and independ-

ence under International Law; therefore, in justice to the republic

of Hayti, also in recognition of its equal rights in the family of nations,

and in deference to the fundamental principles of our institutions,

these hostile acts should be disavowed by the Government of the

United States.1

Secretary Bayard gave official expression to the same

principle fifteen years later in his report on Pelletier's case:

'to do all acts and things which independent States may of right do.'" America's

Foreign Relations, I, 201. There is a flavor of vaingloriousness about the statement,

but it gives a pretty accurate description of the spirit of American statecraft at

the end of the eighteenth century.

1 March 23, 1871, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st session (1871), Pt. I, p. 235.

Resolved, That since the equality of all nations, without regard tu
population, size, or power, is an axiom of International Law, as the
equality of all men is an axiom of our Declaration of Independence,
nothing can be done to a small or weak nation that would not be done
to a large or powerful nation, or_ that we would not allow to be done
to ourselves; and therefore any treatment of the republic of Hayti
by the Navy of the United States inconsistent with this principle is
an infraction of international law in one of its great safeguards, and
should be disavowed by the Government of the United States.
Resolved, That since certain naval officers of the United States,
with large war-vessels, including the monitor called the Dictator and
the frigate Severn, with powerful armaments, acting under instructions from the Executive and without the authority of an act of
Congress, have entered one or more ports of the republic of Hayti, a
friendly nation, and under the menace of open and instant war have
coerced and restrained that republic in its sovereignty and independ·
ence under International Law; therefore, in justice to the republic
of Hayti, also in recognition of its equal rights in the family of nations,
and in deference to the fundamental principles of our institutions,
these hostile acts should be disavowed by the Government of the
United States. 1

Secretary Bayard gave official expression to the same
principle fifteen years later in his report on Pelletier's case:
' to do all acts and things which independent States may of right do.'" America's
Foreign Relations, I, 2or. There is a flavor of vaingloriousness about the statement,
but it gives a pretty accurate description of the spirit of American statecraft at
the end of the eighteenth century.
1 March 23, 1871, Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st session (1871), Pt. I, p. ::135.
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By the law of nations, it must be remembered, all sovereign states

are to be treated as equals. There is no distinction between strong

states and weak; the weak are to have assigned to them the same

territorial sanctities as the strong enjoy. There is a good reason for

this. Were it not so, weak states would be the objects of rapine,

which would not only disgrace civilization, but would destroy the

security of the seas, by breeding hordes of marauders and buccaneers,

who would find their spoil in communities which have no adequate

power of self-defense.1

Discussing the question of diplomatic intervention in behalf

of disappointed litigants, Secretary Gresham declared in

1893 that " complete reciprocal international equality" ex-

By the law of nations, it must be remembered, all sovereign states
are to be treated as equals. There is no distinction between strong
states and weak; the weak are to have assigned to them the same
territorial sanctities as the strong enjoy. There is a good reason for
this. Were it not so, weak states would be the objects of rapine,
which would not only disgrace civilization, but would destroy the
security of the seas, by breeding hordes of marauders and buccaneers,
who would find their spoil in communities which have no adequate
power of self-defense.1

isted between the United States and Mexico.2

Such casual assertions of the principle, however, were not

enough to prevent the growth of the idea, in many parts of

South America, that the Monroe Doctrine "implied or

carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right

to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to

whose territory that doctrine applies." One of the purposes
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of Secretary Root's mission to South America in 1906 was

"to dispel this unfounded impression."3 In an address be-

fore the Third Conference of The American Republics at

Rio de Janeiro on July 31, 1906, he said:

We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except

our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves. We

deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest

member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those

of the greatest empire; and we deem the observance of that respect

the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong.

We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that

we do not freely concede to every American republic. We wish to

increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in

1 Sen. Ex. Doc., 49th Cong., 2d sess. (1886-87), I, No. 64, 14.

1 Gresham to Ryan, April 26, 1893, Moore, Digest, VI, 270.

* President Roosevelt's message to Congress, December 3, 1906, House Docs.,

59th Cong., 2d sess. (1906-07), I, Pt. I, p. xlviii.

Discussing the question of diplomatic intervention in behalf
of disappointed litigants, Secretary Gresham declared in
1893 that " complete reciprocal international equality " existed between the United States and Mexico.2
Such casual assertions of the principle, however, were not
enough to prevent the growth of the idea, in many parts of
South America, that the Monroe Doctrine " implied or
carried with it, an assumption of superiority, and of a right
to exercise some kind of protectorate over the countries to
whose territory that doctrine applies." One of the purposes
of Secretary Root's mission to South America in 1906 was
" to dispel this unfounded impression." 3 In an address before the Third Conference of The American Republics at
Rio de Janeiro on July 31, 1906, he said:
We wish for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except
our own; for no sovereignty except sovereignty over ourselves. We
deem the independence and equal rights of the smallest and weakest
member of the family of nations entitled to as much respect as those
of the greatest empire; and we deem the observance of that respect
the chief guaranty of the weak against the oppression of the strong.
We neither claim nor desire any rights or privileges or powers that
we do not freely concede to every American republic. We wish to
increase our prosperity, to expand our trade, to grow in wealth, in
Sen. Ex. Doc., 49th Cong., 2d sess. (1886-87), I, No. 64, 14.
a Gresham to Ryan, April 26, 18<)3, Moore, Digesl, VI, 270.
1 President Roosevelt's message to Congress, December 3, 19o6, House Docs.,
59th Cong., 2d sess. (19o6-o7) 1 I, Pt. I, p. xlviii.
1
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wisdom, and in spirit; but our conception of the true way to accom-

plish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to

help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that

we may all become greater and stronger together.1

Secretary Root's declaration was publicly approved by

wisdom, and in spirit; but our conception of the true way to accom·
plish this is not to pull down others and profit by their ruin, but to
help all friends to a common prosperity and a common growth, that
we may all become greater and stronger together. 1

President Roosevelt in his message to Congress of December

3, 1906. After quoting the passage from Secretary Root's

address, printed above, the President continued:

These words appear to have been received with acclaim in every

part of South America. They have my hearty approval, as I am sure

they will have yours, and I can not be wrong in the conviction that

they correctly represent the sentiments of the whole American people.2

America's belief in the equality of nations was reaffirmed

by former Secretary Root in his welcome to Latin American

publicists taking part in the Second Pan-American Scientific

Congress at Washington, December 30, 1915. He said:

It is now nearly ten years ago when your people, gentlemen, and the

other peoples of South America, were good enough to give serious and

respectful consideration to a message that it was my fortune to take

Secretary Root's declaration was publicly approved by
President Roosevelt in his message to Congress of December
3, I<)06. After quoting the passage from Secretary Root's
address, printed above, the President continued:
These words appear to have been received with acclaim in every
part of South America. They have my hearty approval, as I am sure
they will have yours, and I can not be wrong in the conviction that
they correctly represent the sentiments of the whole American people.2

from this great and powerful republic of North America to the other
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American nations. I wish to say to you, gentlemen, and to all my

Latin American friends here in this congress, that everything that I

said in behalf of the Government of the United States at Rio de

Janeiro in 1906 is true now as it was true then. There has been no de-

parture from the standard of feeling and of policy which was declared

then in behalf of the American people. On the contrary, there is

throughout the people of this country a fuller realization of the duty

and the morality and the high policy of that standard.

... The great body of the people of these United States love justice,

not merely as they demand it for themselves, but in being willing to

render it to others. We believe in the independence and the dignity

of nations, and while we are great, we estimate our greatness as one

of the least of our possessions, and we hold the smallest state, be it

upon an island of the Caribbean or anywhere in Central or South Amer-

1 Latin America and the United States, p. 10. Cf. " Ethics of the Panama Ques-

tion," in Addresses on International Subjects, p. 175.

! Supra, p. 178, note 3.

America's belief in the equality of nations was reaffirmed
by former Secretary Root in his welcome to Latin American
publicists taking part in the Second Pan-American Scientific
Congress at Washington, December 30, 1915. He said:
It is now nearly ten years ago when your people, gentlemen, and the
other peoples of South America, were good enough to give serious and
respectful consideration to a message that it was my fortune to take
from this great and powerful republic of North America to the other
American nations. I wish to say to you, gentlemen, and t4> all my
Latin American friends here in this congress, that everything that I
said in behalf of the Government of the United States at Rio de
Janeiro in 1906 is true now as it was true then. There has been no departure from the standard of feeling and of policy which was declared
then in behalf of the American people. On the contrary, there is
throughout the people of this country a fuller realization of the duty
and the morality and the high policy of that standard.
. . . The great body of the people of these United States love justice,
not merely as they demand it for themselves, but in being willing to
render it to others. We believe in the independence and the dignity
of nations, and while we are great, we estimate our greatness as one
of the least of our possessions, and we hold the smallest state, be it
upon an island of the Caribbean or anywhere in Central or South Amer1 Lalin America and the United States, p. 10. Cf." Ethics of the Panama Question," in Addresses on International Subjects, p. 175.
z Supra, p. 178, note 3.
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ica, as our equal in dignity, in the right to respect and in the right to

the treatment of an equal. We believe that nobility of spirit, that

high ideals, that capacity for sacrifice are nobler than material wealth.

We know that these can be found in the little state as well as in the

big one. In our respect for you who are small, and for you who are

great, there can be no element of condescension or patronage, for that

would do violence to our own conception of the dignity of independent

sovereignty. We desire no benefits which are not the benefits ren-

dered by honorable equals to each other. We seek no control that we

are unwilling to concede to others, and so long as the spirit of American

freedom shall continue, it will range us side by side with you, great and

small, in the maintenance of the rights of nations, the rights which exist

as against us and as against all the rest of the world.1

President Wilson has repeatedly and emphatically asserted

in recent diplomatic utterances that respect for the equality

of nations is to be regarded as a cardinal principle of Ameri-

can foreign policy.2

ica, as our equal in dignity, in the right to respect and in the right to
the treatment of an equal. We believe that nobility of spirit, that
high ideals, that capacity for sacrifice are nobler than material wealth.
We know that these can be found in the little state as well as in the
big one. In our respect for you who are small, and for you who are
great, there can be no element of condescension or patronage, for that
would do violence to our own conception of the dignity of independent
sovereignty. We desire no benefits which are not the benefits rendered by honorable equals to each other. We seek no control that we
are unwilling to concede to others, and so long as the spirit of American
freedom shall continue, it will range us side by side with you, great and
small, in the maintenance of the rights of nations, the rights which exist
as against us and as against all the rest of the world. 1

Equality in the Hague Peace Conferences

The meeting of the two Peace Conferences at The Hague
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in 1899 and 1907 gave rise to some new and perplexing ques-

tions with respect to the application of equality as a practi-

cal rule.3 The Conferences themselves were heralded by

many as an affirmation in the domain of practical politics

of the equality of nations.4 Both in respect to composition

and procedure the first Conference was based upon equality.

President Wilson has repeatedly and emphatically asserted
in recent diplomatic utterances that respect for the equality
of nations is to be regarded as a cardinal principle of American foreign policy.2

The same principle was given greater significance in the

second through the representation of the republics of Central

EQUALITY JN THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES

and South America. Speaking of the participation of the

1 Latin America and the United States, p. 292. 1 See infra, pp. 184-185.

* Cf. Hicks, in A.J.I.L (1908), II, 530-561, and Huber, Die Gleichheit der

Staaten.

* In other quarters, on the other hand, they were denounced as conclusive proof

of the impossibility of equality as a practical principle. See The London Times,

September 14, 1907, p. 9c; September s1, 1907, p. 9c; October 19, 1907, p. 9c;

October 21, 1907, p. 3I; and October 24, 1907; The Spectator (1907), XCK, 418,

472.

The meeting of the two Peace Conferences at The Hague
in 1899 and 1907 gave rise to some new and perplexing questions with respect to the application of equality as a practical rule. 3 The Conferences themselves were heralded by
many as an affirmation in the domain of practical politics
of the equality of nations.4 Both in respect to composition
and procedure the first Conference was based upon equality.
The same principle was given greater significance in the
second through the representation of the republics of Central
and South America. Speaking of the participation of the
2 See infra, pp. 184-185.
Lalin America and the United States, p. 292.
Cf. Hicks, in A. J. I. L (19o8), ll, 53~561, and Huber, DU Gleichheit der
Staaten.
• In other quarters, on the other hand, they were denounced as conclusive proof
of the impossibility of equality as a practical principle. See The London Times,
September 14, 1907, p. 9c; September :n, 1907, p. QC; October 19, 1907, p. 9c;
October :n, 1907, p. 3f; and October 24, 1907; The SpectatM (1907), XCIX, 418,
472.
1
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republics of the New World, in the closing session, the first

delegate from the Argentine Republic said:

It signalizes an advantage that is common to us all; it denotes prog-

ress and implies an improvement in public law which, because of its

universal nature, requires the "consensus" of all sovereignties without

distinction between states or continents. We may affirm henceforth

that the political equality of states has ceased to be a fiction and that

it abides, established as an obvious reality.1

The system of arbitration established by the first Con-

ference has been cited frequently as recognizing the es-

sential equality of states.2 A very able address by Leon

Bourgeois in support of the convention by which the system

republics of the New World, in the closing session, the first
delegate from the Argentine Republic said:
It signalizes an advantage that is common to us all; it denotes progress and implies an improvement in public law which, because of its
universal nature, requires the "consensus" of all sovereignties without
distinction between states or continents. We may affirm henceforth
that the political equality of states has ceased to be a fiction and that
it abides, established as an obvious reality.1

was instituted is often quoted. In the course of that address

he declared:

Gentlemen, what is now the rule among individual men will here-

after obtain among nations. Such international Institutions as these

will be the protection of the weak against the powerful. In the con-

flicts of brute force, where fighters of flesh and with steel are in line,

we may speak of great Powers and small, of weak and of mighty.

When swords are thrown in the balance, one side may easily outweigh
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the other. But in the weighing of rights and ideas disparity ceases,

and the rights of the smallest and weakest Powers count as much in

the scales as those of the mightiest.*

The system of arbitration established by the first Conference has been cited frequently' as recognizing the essential equality of states. 2 A very able address by Leon
Bourgeois in support of the convention by which the system
was instituted is often quoted. ln the course of that address
he declared:

At the second Conference an attempt was made to insti-

tute two supernational tribunals, a permanent prize court

and a permanent court of arbitral justice. The composition

of the tribunal became one of the most controverted points

1 La Deux. Confer., I, 593. Huber says that the Second Peace Conference pre-

sented " a representation of all civilized states on the basis of a formal equality of

rights for all the associated states." Die Cleichheit der Stouten, p. 09.

• La Deux. Confer., II, 160, 619, 625, 643. See also Bonfils, Manuel, § 278,

p. 165; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staalen, pp. 89, 91. Of the organization

adopted in 1809 f0r the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Huber says: "Es kann

deshalb gesagt werden, dass die erste Friedenskonferenz dem Grundsatz der Gleich-

heit der Staaten unverkennbaren Ausdruck gegeben hat."

* La Confer. Int., Pt. IV, p. 76 (transl. from Holls, Peace Conference at The Hague,

Gentlemen, what is now the rule among individual men will hereafter obtain among nations. Such international Institutions as these
"'.rill be the protection of the weak against the powerful. In the conflicts of brute force, where fighters of flesh and with steel are in line,
we may speak of great Powers and small, of weak and of mighty.
\Vhen swords are thrown in the balance, one side may easily outweigh
the other. But in the weighing of rights and ideas disparity ceases,
and the rights of the smallest and weakest Powers count as much in
the scales as those of the mightiest.3

p. 274). See also La Deux. Confer., H, 88.

At the second Conference an attempt was made to institute two supernational tribunals, a permanent prize court
and a permanent court of arbitral justice. The composition
of the tribunal became one of the most controverted points
1 La Deux. Conftr., I, 593. Huber says that the Second Peace Conference presented " a representation of all civilized states on the basis of a formal equality of
rights for all the associated states." Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 99.
1 La Deux. Conftr., II, 16o, 619, 625, 643. See also Bonfils, Manuel,§ 278,
p. 165; Huber, Die Gleichheil der Staaten, pp. 89, 91. Of the organization
adopted in 1899 for the Permanent Court of Arbitration, Huber says: "Es kann
deshalb gesagt werden, dass die erste Friedenskonferenz dem Grundsatz der Gleichheit der Staaten unverkennbaren Ausdruck gegeben hat."
1 La Conftr. Int., Pt. IV, p. 76 (transl. from Halls, Pea<:e Conferen<:e al The Hague,
p. 274). See also La Deux. Conftr., II, 88.
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in each instance, the smaller states demanding perfect equal-

ity of representation on the proposed courts, while the great

powers were unwilling that permanent tribunals should be

constituted on that basis. The controversy provoked more

discussion of the principle of equality than had ever taken

place before outside the writings of the publicists.

In the case of the prize court, many of the smaller states

eventually waived their claim to perfect equality of repre-

sentation.1 Others, however, qualified their vote for the

project with reservations as to the court's composition.

Thus, the Haitian delegation made a formal reservation

as regards article 15, which, for the composition of the Court, has not

adopted the principle of absolute equality among all the sovereign

Powers called together in that capacity and represented at the Con-

ference.*

The Venezuelan delegation protested against the plan be-

cause it did not recognize the absolute equality of sovereign

states, and abstained from voting. The delegation declared

in the first committee that

the Second Peace Conference being a universal assembly, its task
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was to establish principles which could be universally admitted and

to create institutions guaranteeing, in absolute equality, the interests

which every state deems essential to its sovereignty.

It would be superfluous, after the prolonged deliberations of the

Committee of Examination, to elucidate again a doctrine which may

in each instance, the smaller states demanding perfect equality of representation on the proposed courts, while the great
powers were unwilling that permanent tribunals should be
constituted on that basis. The controversy provoked more
discussion of the principle of equality than had ever taken
place before outside the \vritings of the publicists.
In the case of the prize court, many of the smaller states
eventually waived their claim to perfect equality of representation.1 Others, however, qualified their vote for the
project with reservations as to the court's composition.
Thus, the Haitian delegation made a formal reservation
as regards article 15, which, for the composition of the Court, has not
adopted the principle of absolute equality among all the sovereign
Powers called together in that capacity and represented at the Conference.2

be considered as consecrated by the juridical conscience of the whole

world and which, moreover, has been expressly admitted at the time

of the calling of the Second Conference, from the moment when it

began its labors.*

The smaller states were so successful in asserting their

claim to equal representation in case of the proposed court

of arbitral justice that no convention could be agreed upon.4

The Venezuelan delegation protested against the plan because it did not recognize the absolute equality of sovereign
states, and abstained from voting. The delegation declared
in the first committee that

1 See La Deux. Confer., I, 165-169; II, 11-33, 797. 832, 849.

* Ibid., 1,168. The final vote, with abstentions and reservations, is given loc. cit.

> Ibid., II, so. 4 Ibid., I, 33^-335; H, 144-160, 177-190, 335, 632, 697.

the Second Peace Conference being a universal assembly, its task
was to establish principles which could be universally admitted and
to create institutions guaranteeing, in absolute equality, the interests
which every state deems essential to its sovereignty.
It would be superfluous, after the prolonged deliberations of the
Committee of Examination, to elucidate again a doctrine which may
be considered as consecrated by the juridical conscience of the whole
world and which, moreover, has been expressly admitted at the time
of the calling of the Second Conference, from the moment when it
began its labors.•

The smaller states were so successful in asserting their
claim to equal representation in case of the proposed court
of arbitral justice that no convention could be agreed upon.4
1

t
I

See La Deu:t. Confb., I, 165-169; II, 11-33, 797, 832, 849.
Ibid., I, 168. The final vote, with abstentions and reservations, is given loc. cit.
Ibid., II, 20.
' Ibid., I, 332-335; II, 144-160, 177-190, 335, 632, 6c)7.
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The delegate from Switzerland was frankly skeptical as to

the possibility of constituting such a court, but took the

keenest satisfaction in observing that throughout the de-

bates

it had been recognized that the primordial principle of the law of

nations, the absolute equality of sovereign states, was perfectly un-

impeachable (parfaitement intangible).1

The Dominican Republic's representative declared that

In spite of material differences of population, territorial extent, wealth,

position and political influence in the world, and even of scientific

culture, existing among the different states that ought to concur in

The delegate from Switzerland was frankly skeptical as to
the possibility of constituting such a court, but took the
keenest satisfaction in observing that throughout the debates
it bad been recognized that the primordial principle of the law of
nations, the absolute equality of sovereign states, was perfectly unimpeachable (parfaitement intangi,ble) .1

the formation of this great international tribunal, it is evident that

there is no adequate reason for sacrificing, in the scheme of compo-

sition, the fundamental principle of the equality of states here where

it exists, as it does for private individuals, before the law.*

The Brazilian delegate, Barbosa, was the most uncompro-

mising and brilliant exponent of the point of view of the

smaller states. His addresses on the subject of equality are

classical expositions of the extreme interpretation of that

principle.3 In an impassioned speech before the first com-
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mittee, he said:

There are, no doubt, between state and state, as between indi-

vidual and individual, differences of culture, of honesty, of wealth, of

physical strength. But is there any difference arising therefrom as

The Dominican Republic's representative declared that
In spite of material differences of population, territorial extent, wealth,
position and political influence in the world, and even of scientific
culture, existing among the different states that ought to concur in
the formation of this great international tribunal, it is evident that
there is no adequate reason for sacrificing, in the scheme of composition, the fundamental principle of the equality of states here where
it exists, as it does for private individuals, before the law.s

to their essential rights? Civil rights are identical for all men. Po-

litical rights are the same for all citizens. Lord Kelvin or Mr. John

Morley have the same voice in the election of the sovereign Parliament

of Great Britain as a workingman mentally famished by the misery

of his labors. And yet, is the normal intelligence of said artisan,

placed at the lower level by his suffering and toil, to be compared with

that of the statesman or of the man of science? Well, then, sover-

1 La Deux. Confir., II, 145- Several of the smaller states denied the neces-

sity and opportuneness of creating a new permanent tribunal. Huber, Die Gleich-

heit der Staaten, p. 93.

The Brazilian delegate, Barbosa, was the most uncompromising and brilliant exponent of the point of view of the
smaller states. His addresses on the subject of equality are
classical expositions of the extreme interpretation of that
principle.3 In an impassioned speech before the first committee, he said:

* La Deux. Confer., II, 147.

• Ibid., II, 148-155, 618-622, 624-627, 643-650.

There are, no doubt, between state and state, as between individual and individual, differences of culture, of honesty, of wealth, of
physical strength. But is there any difference arising therefrom as
to their essential rights ? Civil rights are identical for all men. Political rights are the same for all citizens. Lord Kelvin or Mr. John
Morley have the same voice in the election of the sovereign Parliament
of Great Britain as a workingman mentally famished by the misery
of his labors. And yet, is the normal intelligence of said artisan,
placed at the lower level by his suffering and roil, to be compared with
that of the statesman or of the man of science? Well, then, sover1 La Deux. Conftr., II, 145. Several of the smaller states denied the necessity and opportuneness of creating a new permanent tribunal. Huber, Du Gleichheit der Staalen, p. 93.
1 La Deux. Confer., II, 147.
3 Ibid., II, 148-155, 618-622, 624-627, 643-650.
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eignty is the prime and elemental right of constituted and independent

states. Therefore sovereignty signifies equality. In theory, as in

practice, sovereignty is absolute. It knows no grades. The juridical

aclniinistration of law is a branch of sovereignty. If there must be

among States a common organ of justice, all States must have of

necessity an equivalent representation.1

Equality in the Diplomatic Papers of the

World War

eignty is the prime and elemental right of constituted and independent
states. Therefore sovereignty signifies equality. In theory, as in
practice, sovereignty is absolute. It knows no grades. The juridical
administration of law is a branch of sovereignty. If there must be
among States a common organ of justice, all States must have of
necessity an equivalent representation. 1

The world war has brought new professions of faith in

the equality of nations. The crushing of small states un-

fortunately situated in the path of invasion and the idealism

EQUALITY IN THE DIPLOMATIC PAPERS OF THE

which has been born of the world's suffering have aroused

WORLD WAR

a new interest in the safeguarding of little nations. This

interest is reflected more and more in the utterances of

statesmen. Its common expression is similar to the familiar

language of the books.

The American note of March 30, 1915, protesting against

the British Order in Council restricting neutral trade with

Germany, asserted "the principle of universal equality of

sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and
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nations not engaged in war," subject to certain recognized

exceptions in case of unneutral service, contraband trade,

and blockade.2 President Wilson asserted the universal

application of the principle in his address to the United

States Senate of January 22, 1917, outlining the terms upon

which the United States would be willing to join the other

civilized nations of the earth in guaranteeing the perma-

nence of peace. He said:

Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very prin-

ciple of which is equality and a common participation in a common

benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations,

is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed

questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 150 (Perez' transl.).

1 A.J. I. L. Suppt. (1915), LX, Special Number, 117

The world war has brought new professions of faith in
the equality of nations. The crushing of small states unfortunately situated in the path of invasion and the idealism
which has been born of the world's suffering have aroused
a new interest in the safeguarding of little nations. This
interest is reflected more and more in the utterances of
statesmen. Its common expression is similar to the familiar
language of the books.
The American note of March 30, 1915, protesting against
the British Order in Council restricting neutral trade with
Germany, asserted " the principle of universal equality of
sovereignty on the high seas as between belligerents and
nations not engaged in war," subject to certain recognized
exceptions in case of unneutral service, contraband trade,
and blockade. 2 President Wilson asserted the universal
application of the principle in his address to the United
States Senate of January 22, 1917, outlining the terms upon
which the United States would be willing to join the other
civilized nations of the earth in guaranteeing the permanence of peace. He said:
Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common
benefit. The right state of mind, the right feeling between nations,
is as necessary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed
questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.
La Dcux. Confb., II, 150 (Perez' transl.).
: A . J. [. L. Suppl. (1915), IX, Special Number, 117
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The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it

is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged

must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and

small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak.

Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the indi-

vidual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.

Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor

any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and

legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks

or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is

looking now for freedom for life, not for equipoises of power.1

Again, in his inaugural address of March 5, 1917, the Presi-

dent began his declaration of American piinciples with the

assertion

That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world

and in the political stability of free peoples, and equally responsible

The equality of nations upon which peace must be founded if it
is to last must be an equality of rights; the guarantees exchanged
must neither recognize nor imply a difference between big nations and
small, between those that are powerful and those that are weak.
Right must be based upon the common strength, not upon the individual strength, of the nations upon whose concert peace will depend.
Equality of territory or of resources there of course cannot be; nor
any other sort of equality not gained in the ordinary peaceful and
legitimate development of the peoples themselves. But no one asks
or expects anything more than an equality of rights. Mankind is
looking now for freedom for life, not for equipoises of power.1

for their maintenance.

That the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of na-

tions in all matters of right or privilege.2

A little later, in his war message to Congress, he declared
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that the United States would fight

Again, in his inaugural address of March 5, 1917, the President began his declaration of American principles with the
assertion

for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have

a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small

nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free

peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the

world itself at last free.3

Addressing Congress on December 4, 1917, he reaffirmed his

belief in "justice and equality of rights" as essential to

permanent foundations of world peace.4

That all nations are equally interested in the peace of the world
and in the political stability of free peoples, and equally responsible
for their maintenance.
That the essential principle of peace is the actual equality of nations in all matters of right or privilege.2 ·

1 Cong. Record, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1917), LIV, Pt. 2, p. 1742.

1 Ibid., 65th Cong., special sess. (1917), LV, Pt. i, p. 3.

■ Ibid., 1st sess. (1917), LV, Pt. 1, p. 104.

* Ibid., 2d sess. (1917), LVI, Pt.i.pp. 21, 23. Addressing an audience of loan

workers in New York on September 27, 1918, President Wilson was reported to

have formulated the first of five principles, which he enumerated as the practical

program of America's peace terms, as follows: "First, the impartial justice

meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be

A little later, in his war message to Congress, he declared
that the United States would fight
for democracy, for the right of those who submit to authority to have
a voice in their own governments, for the rights and liberties of small
nations, for a universal dominion of right by such a concert of free
peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all nations and make the
world itself at last free. 3

Addressing Congress on December 4, 1917, he reaffirmed his
belief in "justice and equality of rights" as essential to
permanent foundations of world peace.4
Cong. Record, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1917), LIV, Pt. 2, p. 1742.
Ibid., 65th Cong., special sess. (1917), LV, Pt. 1, p. 3.
1 Ibid., 1st sess. (1917), LV, Pt. 1, p. 104.
' Ibid., :id sess. (1917), LVI, Pt. 1,pp. 21, 23. Addressing an audience of loan
workers in New York on September 27, 1918, President Wilson was reported to
have formulated the first of five principles, which he enumerated as the practical
program of America·s peace terms, as follows: "First, the impartial justice
meted out must involve no discrimination between those to whom we wish to be
1
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These declarations have had their reaction at other

capitals. In the German Government's reply to Pope

Benedict's peace note it was insisted that before the out-

break of war

Germany sought within her national frontiers the free development

of her spiritual and material possessions, and outside the Imperial

territory unhindered competition with nations enjoying equal rights

These declarations have had their reaction at other
capitals. In the German Government's reply to Pope
Benedict's peace note it was insisted that before the outbreak of war

and equal esteem.1

The German Government might have cited the Emperor's

message of March 21, 1871, to the first Reichstag, in which

he declared that

The respect which Germany demands for its own independence will

be accorded freely to the independence of all other states and peoples,

Germany sought within her national frontiers the free development
of her spiritual and material possessions, and outside the Imperial
territory unhindered competition with nations enjoying equal rights
and equal esteem.1

the weak no less than the powerful.*

In outlining to the Reichstag his policies as chancellor on

October 5,1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden was reported to

have declared that Germany was willing to join a general

league of nations based upon the principle of equal rights

for all, both strong and weak.

There is a most explicit affirmation of equality in the
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statement made by Premier Lloyd George to the British

Trade Union Conference on January 5, 1918. Referring to

Count Czernin's statement of December 25, 1917, the Prime

The German Government might have cited the Emperor's
message of March 21, 1871, to the first Reichstag, in which
he declared that
The respect which Germany demands for its own independence will
be accorded freely to the independence of all other states and peoples,
the weak no less than the powerful.2

Minister said:

Does it mean that Belgium, and Serbia, Montenegro and Rou-

mania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies

as the German or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner

of interferences and restrictions, political and economic, incompatible

with the status and dignity of a free and self-respecting people, are to

just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that

plays no favorites, and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples

concerned."

1 A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 219.

'Gareis, Institutional, § 24, p. 92.

In outlining to the Reichstag his policies as chancellor on
October 5, 1918, Prince Maximilian of Baden was reported to
have declared that Germany was willing to join a general
league of nations based upon the principle of equal rights
for all, both strong and weak.
There is a most explicit affirmation of equality in the
statement made by Premier Lloyd George to the British
Trade Union Conference on January 5, 1918. Referring to
Count Czernin's statement of December 25, 1917, the Prime
Minister said:
Does it mean that Belgium, and Serbia, Montenegro and Roumania will be as independent and as free to direct their own destinies
as the German or any other nation? Or does it mean that all manner
of interferences and restrictions, political and economic, incompatible
with the status and dignity of a free and self-respecting people, are to
just and those to whom we do not wish to be just. It must be a justice that
plays no favorites, and knows no standard but the equal rights of the several peoples
concerned."
I A.J. [. L. S11ppl. (1917), XI, :119.
2 Gareis, lnstitutiomn, § 24, p. 92.
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be imposed? If this is the intention then there will be one kind of

independence for a great nation and an inferior kind of independence

for a small nation. We must know what is meant for equality of

right among nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental

issues this country and her Allies are fighting to establish in this war.1

Summary

There is little that need be said by way of summary of

be imposed ? If this is the intention then there will be one kind of
independence for a great nation and an inferior kind of independence
for a smaU nation. We must know what is meant for equality of
right among nations, small as well as great, is one of the fundamental
issues this country and her Allies are fighting to establish in this war. 1

the formal statements in regard to equality which appear in

the documentary literature of the past century. In general,

they simply echo the familiar statements of the text-books

SUMMARY

and treatises. The language of Sir William Scott and Chief

Justice Marshall was the language of Burlamaqui, Vattel,

and their contemporaries, nor did those distinguished judges

add anything to a conception which had already reached a

mature development in the writings of the classical publi-

cists. The same conception comes circuitously from the

publicists in the American Institute's Declaration of the

Rights of Nations. The naturalist idea, indeed the very

language in which it was expounded, reappears in the pro-

tests of smaller nations, before international tribunals, in
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diplomatic papers, and in the Peace Conferences at The

Hague. The application of the principle gives rise to new

problems at The Hague, but the principle itself remains un-

changed. So in the diplomatic utterances provoked by the

recent war the equality of nations is asserted with an under-

standing and in language, if one be permitted to interpolate

"the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," which would

have been understood as readily among statesmen and

publicists of the eighteenth century.

1 British War Aims, authorized version as published by the British Government,

New York, George H. Doran Company, 1918, p. 5. Cf. the statements attributed

to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur J. Balfour, in regard to

equality in a league of nations, in an Associated Press despatch from London, De-

cember 7, 1918.

There is little that need be said by way of summary of
the formal statements in regard to equality which appear in
the documentary literature of the past century. In general,
they simply echo the familiar statements of the text-books
and treatises. The language of Sir William Scott and Chief
Justice Marshall was the language of Burlamaqui, Vattel,
and their contemporaries, nor did those distinguished judges
add anything to a conception which had already reached a
mature development in the writings of the classical publicists. The same conception comes circuitously from the
publicists in the American Institute's Declaration of the
Rights of Nations. The naturalist idea, indeed the very
language in which it was expounded, reappears in the protests of smaller nations, before international tribunals, in
diplomatic papers, and in the Peace Conferences at The
Hague. The application of the principle gives rise to new
problems at The Hague, but the principle itself remains unchanged. So in the diplomatic utterances provoked by the
recent war the equality of nations is asserted with an understanding and in language, if one be permitted to interpolate
"the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God," which would
have been understood as readily among statesmen and
publicists of the eighteenth century.
1 Brilish War Aims, authorized version as published by the British Government,
New York, George H. Doran Company, 1918, p. 5. Cf. the statements attributed
to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Arthur J. Balfour, in regard to
equality in a league of nations, in an Associated Press despatch from London, December 71 1918.
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Those who affirm as well as those who deny the principle

of equality agree that the practice of nations tends to im-

pose limitations upon it. These limitations, their nature,

and significance constitute the subject-matter of succeeding
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chapters.

Those who affirm as well as those who deny the principle
of equality agree that the practice of nations tends to impose limitations upon it. These limitations, their nature,
and significance constitute the subject-matter of succeeding
chapters.

CHAPTER VI

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EQUALITY OF STATES

The Nature of Internal Limitations

It has been pointed out that equality among members of

the society of nations is a matter of capacity. Limitations

upon capacity may be either internal or external; internal

CHAPTER VI

as they are the result of the state's organic constitution,

and external as they are the consequence of relations with

other members of international society.

Internal limitations upon equality are imposed by the

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EQUALITY OF STATES

fundamental organization of the state. Before it can ac-

THE NATURE OF INTERNAL LIMITATIONS

quire personality in the law of nations the state must have

de facto existence. This existence requires a considerable

population, occupying a definite territory, having a separate

political organization or government, and capable of enter-

ing into relations, by means of its government, with mem-

bers of the society of nations. The de facto entity thus

constituted acquires de jure personality through recognition

by members of the international community.

As a juristic person in the society of nations the state can

express itself only through its government, which is defined
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and limited in its organic constitution. As Despagnet says:

The relations of the constitutional law of each country to inter-

national law are easy enough to understand. We know indeed that

by the very necessity of things states can enter into relations among

themselves only by means of an agency which is invested, from this

point of view, with the powers of the state, and which represents the

latter, considered as a moral person, either as it acquires rights or

attempts to enforce rights previously acquired, or as it is obliged to

respond to its obligations.1

1 R.G.D.I.P. (1895), n, 184.

i8g

has been pointed out that equality among members of
the society of nations is a matter of capacity. Limitations
upon capacity may be either internal or external; internal
as they are the result of the state's organic constitution,
and external as they are the consequence of relations with
other members of international society.
Internal limitations upon equality are imposed by the
fundamental organization of the state. Before it can acquire personality in the law of nations the state must have
de facto existence. This existence requires a considerable
population, occupying a definite territory, having a separate
political organization or government, and capable of entering into relations, by means of its government, with members of the society of nations. The de facto entity thus
constituted acquires de jure personality through recognition
by members of the international community.
As a juristic person in the society of nations the state can
express itself only through its government, which is defined
and limited in its organic constitution. As Despagnet says:
IT

The relations of the constitutional law of each country to international law are easy enough to understand. We know indeed that
by the very necessity of things states can enter into relations among
themselves only by means of an agency which is invested, from this
point of view, with the powers of the state, and which represents the
latter, considered as a moral person, either as it acquires rights or
attempts to enforce rights previously acquired, or as it is obliged to
respond to its obligations.1
1

R. G.D. I. P. (1&)5), II, 184.
r8Q
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Publicists frequently assert that the law of nations has no

concern with the constitution of a state. Phillimore says:

Publicists frequently assert that the law of nations has no
concern with the constitution of a state. Phillimore says:

It is a sound general principle, and one to be laid down at the thresh-

old of the science of which we are treating, that International Law

has no concern with the form, character, or power of the constitution

or government of a State, with the religion of its inhabitants, the

extent of its domain, or the importance of its position and influence

in the commonwealth of nations.1

This must be taken to mean that, so far as the law of na-

tions is concerned, the different peoples are free to set up

whatever constitution or government they choose. It can-

It is a sound general principle, and one to be laid down at the threshold of the science of which we are treating, that International Law
has no concern with the form, character, or power of the constitution
or government of a State, with the religion of its inhabitants, the
extent of its domain, or the importance of its position and influence
in the commonwealth of nations.1

not be taken to mean that the law of nations is blind to all

variations in the constitutions and governments of states,

for certain of those variations are the source of important

capacities and incapacities with respect to international re-

lations.

In considering the legal capacity of the state as an inter-

national person it is important to distinguish capacity for

rights and for transactions. A right may be defined as a
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power in the state of exacting a certain act, forbearance, or

benefit, on account of a particular interest, with the aid and

assent of the law of nations. A transaction, on the other

hand, is an act or manifestation of will on the part of the

state, directed to a possible result which is permitted by

the law of nations, and the intent and purpose of which is

to bring about certain legal consequences. Both of these

conceptions are included in the idea of legal capacity. In-

deed, the capacity to enter into certain transactions may

be quite as important to the state as capacity for rights.

If the only agency through which the state can express itself

internationally is incapable, under the organic law, of ac-

1 Commentaries, I, 81. See also Pradier-Foderfi Traité, § 149, I, 256; Walker,

Manual, p. 13; Woolsey, Int. Law, § 39, p. 39. Cf. Despagnet, in R. G. D. I. P.

(1895), II, 184-199; Fiore, Int. Law Cod., § 399; Pillet, in R. G. D. I. P. (1898),

V, 86.

This must be taken to mean that, so far as the law of nations is concerned, the different peoples are free to set up
whatever constitution or government they choose. It cannot be taken to mean that the law of nations is blind to all
variations in the constitutions and governments of states,
for certain of those variations are the source of important
capacities and incapacities with respect to international relations.
In considering the legal capacity of the state as an international person it is important to distinguish capacity for
rights and for transactions. A right may be defined as a
power in the state of exacting a certain act, forbearance, or
b~nefit, on account of a particular interest, with the aid and
assent of the law of nations. A transaction, on the other
hand, is an act or manifestation of will on the part of the
state, directed to a possible result which is permitted by
the law of nations, and the intent and purpose of which is
to bring about certain legal consequences. Both of these
conceptions are included in the idea of legal capacity. Indeed, the capacity to enter into certain transactions may
be quite as important to the state as capacity for rights.
If the only agency through which the state can express itself
internationally is incapable, under the organic law, of ac1 Commentaries, I, 81. See also Pradier-Fodere Trait~,§ 149, I, 256; Walker,
Manual, p. 13; Woolsey, In,, Law,§ 39, p. 39. Cf. Despagnet, in R. G.D. I. P.
(1895), II, 184-199; Fiore, Int. Law Cod., § 399; Pillet, in R. G.D. I. P. (1898),

v, 86.
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quiring certain rights, entering into certain transactions, or

of undertaking other transactions except according to pre-

scribed methods of procedure, then the capacity of the state

itself may be said to be organically limited.1

Internal limitations upon legal capacity must not be con-

fused with the conception of sovereignty. Since they may

be altered or eliminated by amending the constitution, they

do not impair sovereignty as that theory is generally under-

stood. However, important as this consideration may be

from the point of view of the theory of sovereignty, it has

only a potential importance for the law of nations. It is

well known that in most states amendments of the funda-

mental law are made infrequently. Under many constitu-

tions they are made with considerable difficulty. When

consummated they effect a mutation in the legal condition

or capacity of the state concerned. The law of nations is not

presently concerned with potential changes in the legal con-

dition of its subjects. It is concerned immediately with the

existing capacities and incapacities of the members of in-
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ternational society.2 It is obliged to take account of those

internal limitations on equality which the people of each

state, in order to secure certain desired advantages, have

created in perfecting their political organization.

Internal Limitations on the Form of Transactions

The most familiar of internal limitations upon the capac-

ity of international persons are those which affect only the

1 A similar view, in relation to the internal capacity of the state, has been pre-

sented by Gray in his comments on the Austinian theory of sovereignty. He says:

"The truth is that the ideal or fictitious entity, the State, can manifest itself only

through organs, and these organs may be so limited that there are certain acts they

cannot perform, and therefore there may be no one sovereign in Austin's sense,

with complete powers. Such is the case in the Unite d States of America." Nature

and Sources of the Law, § 180, p. 76.

* The same is true of other than constitutional incapacities. Thus an inland

state has no present capacity for certain littoral and maritime rights, although a

very small acquisition of territory would give it access to the sea.

quiring certain rights, entering into certain transactions, or
of undertaking other transactions except according to prescribed methods of procedure, then the capacity of the state
itself may be said to be organically limited.1
Internal limitations upon legal capacity must not be confused with the conception of sovereignty. Since they may
be altered or eliminated by amending the constitution, they
do not impair sovereignty as that theory is generally understood. However, important as this consideration may be
from the point of view of the theory of sovereignty, it has
only a potential importance for the law of nations. It is
well known that in most states amendments of the fundamental law are made infrequently. Under many constitutions they are made with considerable difficulty. When
consummated they effect a mutation in the legal condition
or capacity of the state concerned. The law of nations is not
presently concerned with potential changes in the legal condition of its subjects. It is concerned immediately with the
existing capacities and incapacities of the members of international society.2 It is obliged to take account of those
internal limitations on equality which the people of each
state, in order to secure certain desired advantages, have
created in perfecting their political organization.
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON THE FORM OF TRANSACTIONS

The most familiar of internal limitations upon the capacity of international persons are those which affect only the
1 A similar view, in relation to the internal capacity of the state, has been presented by Gray in his comments on the Austinian theory of sovereignty. He says:
"The truth is that the ideal or fictitious entity, the State, can manifest itself only
through organs, and these organs may be so limited that there are certain acts they
cannot perform, and therefore there may be no one sovereign in Austin's sense,
with complete powers. Such is the case in the United States of America." N alttre
and Sources of the Law, § 180, p. 76.
2 The same is true of other than constitutional incapacities.
Thus an inland
state has no present capacity for certain littoral and maritime rights, although a
very small acquisition of territory would give it access to the sea.
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form of transactions, i. e., those which require a particular

mode of proceeding. Limitations of this kind are exemplified

in constitutional provisions with reference to the exercise

of the treaty power.1 While such limitations do not detract

from the completeness of the power, they are nevertheless

of great international importance because they determine

in large measure the rapidity with which a transaction may

be consummated, the secrecy or publicity of the transaction,

the extent to which it represents an expression of the popu-

lar will on each side, and consequently the good faith with

which its provisions are likely to be observed.

The international importance of such limitations has

been recognized by statesmen of all times and of widely

divergent points of view. Machiavelli observed that leagues

and alliances with republics are more to be trusted than

those with princes:

Taking all things together now, I believe that in such cases which

involve imminent peril there will be found somewhat more of stabil-

1 The most useful comparative studies of the treaty-making power are Crandall,

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Treaties, Their Making and Enforcement; Meier, Uber den Abschluss von Staatsver-

trSgen; and Michon, Les traités internationaux devant les chambres.

Unless otherwise indicated, constitutions of the different states cited in the notes

to the present chapter are the following: Argentine, 1860; Austria, Fundamental

Laws of 1867; Austria-Hungary, Austrian Law Concerning Common Affairs, 1867;

Belgium, 1831; Bolivia, 1880; Brazil, 1891; Bulgaria, 1879, amended 1893 and

1911; Chile, 1833; China, Amended Provisional Constitution, May 1, 1914;

Colombia, 1886; Costa Rica, 1871, with amendments to 1005; Cuba, 1901; Den-

mark, 1849, revised 1866; Dominican Republic, 1908; Ecuador, 1897; France,

Constitutional Laws of 1875; Germany, 1871; Greece, 1864; Guatemala, 1879,

amended 1887; Haiti, 1889; Honduras, 1904; Italy, 1848; Japan, 1889; Luxem-

burg, 1868; Mexico, 1917; Montenegro, 1905; Netherlands, as amended 1887;

Nicaragua, 1911; Norway, 1814; Panama, 1904; Paraguay, 1870; Persia, Funda-

mental Laws of December 30, 1906, and Supplementary Fundamental Laws of

October 8, 1907; Peru, 1860; Portugal, 1911; Roumania, 1866, with amendments,

of 1879 ana 1884; Russia, Fundamental Laws of 1906; Salvador, 1886; Servia

1889, restored in 1903; Spain, 1876; Sweden, 1809; Switzerland 1874; Turkey,

1909; United States, 1789; Uruguay, 1829; Venezuela, 1909.

With a few exceptions, the constitutions indicated above are those which were

in force at the outbreak of the World War in 1914. Subdivisions are cited uniformly

as articles, sections, and paragraphs, in the order named, without regard to varying

practices which prevail in the different countries.
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ity in republics than in princes. For even if the republics were in-

spired by the same feelings and intentions as the princes, yet the fact

of their movements being slower will make them take more time in

forming resolutions, and therefore they will less promptly break their

faith.1

There is a striking passage in President Wilson's address

to Congress of April 2, 1917, in which the same truth re-

ity in republics than in princes. For even if the republics were inspired by the same feelings and intentions as the princes, yet the fact
of their movements being slower will make them take more time in
forming resolutions, and therefore they will less promptly break their
faith. 1

ceives explicit recognition:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a

partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could

be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must

be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat

There is a striking passage in President Wilson's address
to Congress of April 2, 1917, in which the same truth receives explicit recognition:

its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what

they would and render account to no one would be a corruption

seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose

and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of

mankind to any narrow interest of their own.*

The maximum of rapidity, secrecy, and irresponsibility in

treaty making has been attained in some states by provid-
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ing for the definitive conclusion of all treaties by the execu-

tive. Such provisions have a peculiar significance in states

where the real executive is not hampered by any great de-

gree of responsibility to a representative assembly. Before

the Young Turk Revolution treaty making was a preroga-

tive of the Sultan.3 The situation in Russia before the

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a
partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could
be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must
be a league of honour, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat
its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what
they would and render account to no one would be a corruption
seated at its very heart. Only free peoples can hold their purpose
and their honour steady to a common end and prefer the interests of
mankind to any narrow interest of their own.2

Revolution was concisely summarized in three short articles

of the Fundamental Laws:

The Emperor of all the Russias wields the supreme autocratic

power. To obey his authority, not only through fear but for the

sake of conscience, is ordered by God himself.

The Emperor has supreme control of all relations of the Russian

Empire with foreign powers. He likewise determines the course of

the international policy of the Russian Empire.

1 Discourses, I, 59 (Detmold's transl.).

* Cong. Record, 65th Cong., 1st sess. (1917), LV, Pt. 1,104.

* Const. 1876, Art. 7.

The maximum of rapidity, secrecy, and irresponsibility in
treaty making has been attained in some states by providing for the definitive conclusion of all treaties by the executive. Such provisions have a peculiar significance in states
where the real executive is not hampered by any great degree of responsibility to a representative assembly. Before
the Young Turk Revolution treaty making was a prerogative of the Sultan.3 The situation in Russia before the
Revolution was concisely summarized in three short articles
of the Fundamental Laws:
The Emperor of all the Russias wields the supreme autocratic
power. To obey his authority, not only through fear but for the
sake of conscience, is ordered by God himself.
The Emperor has supreme control of all relations of the Russian
Empire with foreign powers. He likewise determines the course of
the international policy of the_Russian Empire.
i

2
1

Discourses, I, 59 (Detmold's transl.).
Cong. Record, 65th Cong., 1st sess. (1917), LV, Pt. 1, 104.
Const. 1876, Art. 7.
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The Emperor declares war and concludes peace, as well as other

treaties with foreign countries.1

The Emperor declares war and concludes peace, as well as other
treaties with foreign countries.1

The Emperor of Japan "declares war, makes peace, and

concludes treaties."2 The King of Sweden must ask the

opinion of certain of his advisers before concluding treaties:

The King shall have power to conclude treaties and alliances with

foreign powers after having, in the manner set forth in the preceding

article, consulted the minister of state, the minister of foreign affairs,

The Emperor of Japan " declares war, makes peace, and
concludes treaties." 2 The King of Sweden must ask the
opinion of certain of his advisers before concluding treaties:

and one other member of the Council of State summoned for this

purpose, or two other members of the Council of State, if the minister

of foreign affairs is also minister of state.8

The constitutions of certain states require legislative ap-

proval before treaties can be concluded, but make an ex-

ception of secret articles which, for reasons of state, are left

to executive discretion. Under the organic law of Norway

the Storthing has power

To have submitted to it the alliances and treaties which the King

The King shall have power to conclude treaties and alliances with
foreign powers after having, in the manner set forth in the preceding
article, consulted the minister of state, the minister of foreign affairs,
and one other member of the Council of State summoned for this
purpose, or two other members of the Council of State, if the minister
of foreign affairs is also minister of state.'

has entered into with foreign powers on behalf of the state, except

secret articles, which shall not, however, conflict with those that are
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public.4

Similarly, the Persian Fundamental Laws of 1906 made an

exception of "treaties which for reasons of State and the

1 Arts. 4, 12, 13 (Dodd's transl.).

* Art. 13. See Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East, Chap. 8.

3 Art. 12 (Dodd's transl.). The preceding article provides in part as follows:

"Ministerial affairs (i.e., all matters which bear upon the relations of the kingdom

with foreign powers) shall be prepared, as the King may think proper, by the min-

ister for foreign affairs, whose duty it shall be to present them to the King in the

presence of the minister of state and of one other member of the Council of State,

or if the minister of foreign affairs is also minister of state, in the presence of two

other members of the Council of State summoned for that purpose. . . . After

having received and entered upon the minutes the advice of these officers, for which

The constitutions of certain states require legislative approval before treaties can be concluded, but make an exception of secret articles which, for reasons of state, are left
to executive discretion. Under the organic law of Norway
the Storthing has power
To have submitted to it the alliances and treaties which the King
has entered into with foreign powers on behalf of the state, except
secret articles, which shall not, however, conflict with those that are
public.'

they are responsible, the King shall make his decision in their presence; the minutes

of such meetings shall be kept by a person specially designated for this purpose.

The King shall inform the Council of State of as much as he may think proper of

Similarly, the Persian Fundamental Laws of 1906 made an
exception of " treaties which for reasons of State and the

such decisions, in order that they may also have some knowledge of this department

of the government." (Dodd's transl.).

4 Art. 75, § g (Dodd's transl.).

Arts. 4, 12, 13 (Dodd's transl.).
Art. 13. See Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far Ea.st, Chap. 8.
a Art. 12 (Dodd's transl.}. The preceding article provides in part as follows:
" Ministerial affairs (i.e., all matters which bear upon the relations of the kingdom
with foreign powers) shall be prepared, as the King may think proper, by the min~
ister for foreign affairs, whose duty it shall be to present them to the King in the
presence of the minister of state and of one other member of the Council of State,
or if the minister of foreign affairs is also minister of state, in the presence of two
other members of the Council of State summoned for that purpose. . . . After
having received and entered upon the minutes the advice of these officers, for which
they are responsible, the King shall make his decision in their presence; the minutes
of such meetings shall be kept by a person specially designated for this purpose.
The King shall inform the Council of State of as much as he may think proper of
such decisions, in order that they may also have some knowledge of this department
of the government." (Dodd's transl.).
' Art. 75, § g (Dodd's transl.).
l
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public advantage, must be kept secret." 1 After the disap-

pearance of the raison de force majeure and as soon as the

interests and safety of the country required it, such treaties

were to be submitted to the legislature with adequate expla-

nations.2 Other executives conclude less formal agreements

without legislative approval.* In at least one constitution this

authority has been defined with some precision.4

In most of the states of Europe treaty-making is regarded

as an executive function, but certain categories of treaties

require legislative approval. The power is theoretically a

prerogative of the Crown in England, but the practice of

parliamentary government has made legislative cooperation

necessary in certain cases. Anson says:

No one but the King can bind the community by treaty, but can

he always do so without the cooperation of Parliament? It would

seem to follow from the general principles of our constitution that a

treaty which lays a pecuniary burden on the people or which alters

the law of the land needs Parliamentary sanction. If it were not so

the King, in virtue of this prerogative, might indirectly tax or legis-
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late without consent of Parliament. . . .

public advantage, must be kept secret." 1 After the disappearance of the raison deforce majeure and as soon as the
interests and safety of the country required it, such treaties
were to be submitted to the legislature with adequate explanations.2 Other executives conclude less formal agreements
without legislative approval. 3 In at least one constitu.tion this
authority has been defined with some precision. 4
In most of the states of Europe treaty-making is regarded
as an executive function, but certain categories of treaties
require legislative approval. The power is theoretically a
prerogative of the Crown in England, but the practice of
parliamentary government has made legislative cooperation
necessary in certain cases. Anson says:

Treaties which thus affect the rights of the King's subjects are

made subject to the approval of Parliament, and are submitted for

its approval before ratification, or ratified under condition.6

There is some controversy as to whether a treaty can impair

private rights or alienate territory without parliamentary

sanction. Constitutional tendencies indicate that these

cases will be brought clearly within the category of treaties

that cannot be made without legislative cooperation.

English practice has been copied on the Continent, direct

legislative participation being substituted for indirect, and

1 Art. 24. 'Suppl. Fundam. Laws of 1907, Art. 52.

'On this authority in the United States, see Crandall, Treaties, §§ 56-61.

4 Colombia, Art. 120, § 10. Cf. Uruguay, Annex No. 3 (1862).

5 Law and Custom of the Constitution, II, Pt. II, 103, 109. See Anson, op. cit.,

II, Pt. I, S3, and Pt. II, 102-110; Crandall, Treaties, §§ 115-125; Dicey, Law of

No one but the King can bind the community by treaty, but can
he always do so without the cooperation of Parliament? It would
seem to follow from the general principles of our constitution that a
treaty which lays a pecuniary burden on the people or which alters
the law of the land needs Parliamentary sanction. If it were not so
the King, in virtue of this prerogative, might indirectly tax or legislate without consent of Parliament. ...
Treaties which thus affect the rights of the King's subjects are
made subject to the approval of Parliament, and are submitted for
its approval before ratification, or ratified under condition. 6

the Constitution, p. 115; Michon, Les traites, pp. 309-340.

There is some controversy as to whether a treaty can impair
private rights or alienate territory without parliamentary
sanction. Constitutional tendencies indicate that these
cases will be brought clearly within the category of treaties
that cannot be made without legislative cooperation.
English practice has been copied on the Continent, direct
legislative participation being substituted for indirect, and
1 Art. 24.

2 Suppl. Fundam. Laws of 1907, Art. 52.
On this authority in the United States, see Crandall, Treati~s, §§ 56-61.
' Colombia, Art. 120, § ro. Cf. Uruguay, Annex No. 3 (1862).
• Law and Custom of the Constitution, II, Pt. II, 103, 109. See Anson, op. cit.,
II, Pt. I, 53, and Pt. II, 102-IIo; Crandall, Treaties, §§ II5-125; Dicey, Law of
the Constitution, p. us; Michon, Les traitts, pp. 309-340.
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the whole subject receiving greater constitutional precision.

The following provisions of the organic law of Belgium have

furnished the prototype for several of the later constitutions:

The King commands the forces both by land and sea, declares war,

makes treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce. He shall give

information to the two Houses of these acts as soon as the interests

and safety of the state permit, adding thereto suitable comments.

Treaties of commerce, and treaties which may burden the state,

or bind Belgians individually, shall take effect only after having re-

ceived the approval of the two Houses.

No cession, exchange, or addition of territory shall take place except

by virtue of a law. In no case shall the secret articles of a treaty be

destructive of those openly expressed.1

Legislative approval is given in the form of a law which

provides that the treaty shall have full effect, and which in

practice is passed before the exchange of ratifications.

Amendments may be offered which are in effect amend-

ments of the treaty. If adopted they require the reopening

the whole subject receiving greater constitutional precision.
The following provisions of the organic law of Belgium have
furnished the prototype for several of the later constitutions:
The King commands the forces both by land and sea, declares war,
makes treaties of peace, of alliance, and of commerce. He shall give
information to the two Houses of these acts as soon as the interests
and safety of the state permit, adding thereto suitable comments.
Treaties of commerce, and treaties which may burden the state,
or bind Belgians individually, shall take effect only after having received the approval of the two Houses.
No cession, exchange, or addition of territory shall take place except
by virtue of a law. In no case shall the secret articles of a treaty be
destructive of those openly expressed.1

of negotiations. "Treaties which may burden the state"
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include only those which impose a direct financial burden.

Political treaties of the greatest importance, such as treaties

of peace and alliance, do not require legislative approval

unless they carry immediate financial obligations, directly

affect private rights, or involve territorial adjustments.

Similar limitations upon the exercise of the treaty power

are embodied in the constitutional law and practice of most

European states.2 Almost without exception legislative ap-

1 Art. 68 (Dodd's transl.). See Crandall, Treaties, § 137; Michon, Les traités,

PP- 346-373-

* Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and

Executive Power, Art. 6, and the Law Concerning Imperial Representation, § 11,

a; Austria-Hungary, § i, a; Bulgaria, Art. 17; Denmark, Art. 18; France, Con-

stitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 8; Germany, Art. 11;

Greece, Arts. 32, 33; Italy, Art. 5; Luxemburg, Art. 37; Montenegro, Art. 7;

Netherlands, Art. 59; Roumania, Art. 93; Servia, Art. 52; Spain, Art. 55. See

also China, Art. 25; Turkey, Art. 7. See Crandall, Treaties, §§ 126-150; Michon,

Les traités, pp. 341-432.

Legislative approval is given in the form of a law which
provides that the treaty shall have full effect, and which in
practice is passed before the exchange of ratifications.
Amendments may be offered which are in effect amendments of the treaty. If adopted they require the reopening
of negotiations. " Treaties which may burden the state "
include only those which impose a direct financial burden.
Political treaties of the greatest importance, such as treaties
of peace and alliance, do not require legislative approval
unless they carry immediate financial obligations, directly
affect private rights, or involve territorial adjustments.
Similar limitations upon the exercise of the treaty power
are embodied in the constitutional law and practice of most
European states.2 Almost without exception legislative apArt. 68 (Dodd's transl.). See Crandall, Trealw, § 137; Michon, Les lraills,
pp. 346-373.
1 Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and
Executive Power, Art. 6, and the Law Concerning Imperial Representation, § 11,
a; Austria-Hungary,§ 1, a; Bulgaria, Art. 17; Denmark, Art. 18; France, Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 8; Germany, Art. 11;
Greece, Arts. 32, 33; Italy, Art. 5; Luxemburg, Art. 37; Montenegro, Art. 7;
Netherlands, Art. 59; Roumania, Art. 93; Servia, Art. 52; Spain, Art. 55. See
also China, Art. 25; Turkey, Art. 7. See Crandall, Treaties,§§ 126-k50; Michon,
Les lraills, pp. 341-432.
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proval is required before territory can be ceded, annexed,

or exchanged; and the same may be said of treaties involv-

ing a direct financial obligation. Treaties of commerce re-

quire legislative assent almost everywhere, either by express

provision, or as a result of well established practice. In

many cases the legislature must approve treaties affecting

private rights. The German Constitution of 1871 provided

for legislative participation in all treaties whose subject-

matter was included within the legislative authority of the

Empire:

So far as treaties with foreign countries relate to matters which,

according to Art. 4, are to be regulated by imperial legislation, the

consent of the Bundesrat shall be required for their conclusion, and

the approval of the Reichstag shall be necessary to render them valid.1

The French law differs only in details from that of Belgium,

quoted above, and adds treaties of peace to the enumerated

proval is required before territory can be ceded, annexed,
or exchanged; and the same may be said of treaties involving a direct financial obligation. Treaties of commerce require legislative assent almost everywhere, either by express
provision, or as a result of well established practice. In
many cases the legislature must approve treaties affecting
private rights. The German Constitution of 1871 provided
for legislative participation in all treaties whose subjectmatter was included within the legislative authority of the
Empire:

categories:

The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties.

He shall give information regarding them to the chambers as soon as

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

the interests and safety of the state permit.

Treaties of peace and of commerce, treaties which involve the

finances of the state, those relating to the person and property of

So far as treaties with foreign countries relate to matters which,
according to Art. 4, are to be regulated by imperial legislation, the
consent of the Bundesrat shall be required for their conclusion, and
the approval of the Reichstag shall be necessary to render them valid.1

French citizens in foreign countries, shall be ratified only after hav-

ing been voted by the two chambers.

No cession, exchange, or annexation of territory shall take place

except by virtue of a law.*

The significant feature of European constitutions is the

extent to which important treaties may be concluded with-

out legislative cooperation. The executive is usually com-

petent to conclude a great many administrative treaties

which may be executed within the limits of executive power.

1 Art. 11 (Dodd's transl.). See Crandall, Treaties, § 141; Michon, Les traites,

pp. 407-420.

* Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 8 (Dodd's

transl.). See Crandall, Treaties, §§ 126-136; Michon, Les traites, pp. 194-308.

The French law differs only in details from that of Belgium,
quoted above, and adds treaties of peace to the enumerated
categories:
The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties.
He shall give information regarding them to the chambers as soon as
the interests and safety of the state permit.
Treaties of peace and of commerce, treaties which involve the
finances of the state, those relating to the person and property of
French citizens in foreign countries, shall be ratified only after having been voted by the two chambers.
No cession, exchange, or annexation of territory shall take place
except by virtue of a law. 2

The significant feature of European constitutions is the
extent to which important treaties may be concluded without legislative cooperation. The executive is usually competent to conclude a great many administrative treaties
which may be executed within the limits of executive power.
1 Art. 11 (Dodd's transl.). See Crandall, TreaJies, § 141; Michon, Les trait&,
pp. 407-420.
1 Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 8 (Dodd's
transl.). See Crandall, Treaties,§§ 126--136; Michon, Les traites, pp. 194-3o8.
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Important political treaties, treaties of alliance, and the like

are left exclusively to executive authority.1 Such transac-

tions are required to be submitted to the legislature as soon

as the interests and security of the state permit, but parlia-

ments have been traditionaUy conservative in demanding

information and explanations in such matters.

There is another type of constitutional provision with

reference to the exercise of the treaty power which requires

the executive to secure the cooperation of one chamber of

the legislature in making all treaties. This is the situation

in the United States, where the President has power,

by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,

provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur.*

The President of Cuba is authorized

To conduct all diplomatic negotiations and conclude treaties with

foreign nations, provided that these treaties be submitted for ap-

proval of the Senate, without which requisite they shall be neither

valid nor binding upon the Republic*

Important political treaties, treaties of alliance, and the like
are left exclusively to executive authority.1 Such transactions are required to be submitted to the legislature as soon
as the interests and security of the state permit, but parliaments have been traditionally conservative in demanding
information and explanations in such matters.
There is another type of constitutional provision with
reference to the exercise of the treaty power which requires
the executive to secure the coc)peration of one chamber of
the legislature in making all treaties. This is the situation
in the United States, where the President has power,

There is a similar provision in the organic law of Mexico.4

Other executives must have the approval of the full legis-
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lative power, including both chambers where the legislature

by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties,
provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur. 2

is bicameral, before they can conclude any treaty. This

type of limitation exists in Switzerland,6 in Portugal,6 and

in all the republics of the New World 7 except the United

1 Art. 55 of the Constitution of Spain includes treaties of offensive alliance

among those which cannot be ratified until authorized by special law. In Portugal,

where the legislature approves all treaties, treaties of alliance are submitted to

Congress for examination in a secret session if two-thirds of the members so request.

Art. 47, § 7.

1 Art. 2, § 2. See Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United States; Crandall,

The President of Cuba is authorized
To conduct all diplomatic negotiations and conclude treaties with
foreign nations, provided that these treaties be submitted for approval of the Senate, without which requisite they shall be neither
valid nor binding upon the Republic.3

Treaties, §§ 8-115; Michon, Les traités, pp. 446-465; Tucker, Limitations on the

Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United States.

* Art. 68, § 7 (Rodriguez' transl.). See also Art. 47, § 6.

* Art. 76,1. x

8 Art. 85, § 5. See Crandall, Treaties, § 148; Michon, Les traités, pp. 435-445.

* Art. 26, § 15; Art. 47, § 7. See Crandall, Treaties, § 147.

7 Argentine, Art. 67, § 19; Bolivia, Art. 52, § 14, Art. 54, § 5, Art. 89, § 1; Brazil,

There is a similar provision in the organic law of Mexico.4
Other executives must have the approval of the full legislative power, including both chambers where the legislature
is bicameral, before they can conclude any treaty. This
type of limitation exists in Switzerland,6 in Portugal,6 and
in all the republics of the New World 7 except the United
1 Art. 55 of the Constitution of Spain includes treaties of offensive alliance
among those which cannot be ratified until authorized by special law. In Portugal,
where the legislature approves all treaties, treaties of alliance are submitted to
Congress for examination in a secret session if two-thirds of the members so request.
Art. 47, § 7.
1 Art. 2, § 2. See Butler, Treaty-Making P<r.rJer of the Unikd Stales; Crandall,
Treaties, §§ 8-u5; Michon, Les traites, pp. 446-465 ; Tucker, Limitations on the
Treaty-J.faking Power Under the Constitution of the United States.
3 Art. 68, § 7 (Rodriguez' transl.). See also Art. 47, § 6.
' Art. 76, I.
' Art. 85, § 5. See Crandall, Treaties, § 148; Michon, Les trait~, pp. 435-445.
8 Art. 26, § 15; Art. 47, § 7. See Crandall, Treatres, § 147.
7 Argentine, Art. 67, § 19; Bolivia, Art. 52, § 14, Art. 54, § 5, Art. 89, § 1; Brazil,
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States, Cuba, and Mexico. The Constitution of Brazil may

be taken as an example. The President of Brazil is au-

thorized

To enter into negotiations with other countries, to conclude agree-

ments, conventions, and treaties, always referring such treaties and

conventions to the Congress.1

The Brazilian Congress has exclusive power "to decide

definitely with regard to treaties and conventions with

foreign nations." Differences of detail among the several

States, Cuba, and Mexico. The Constitution of Brazil may
be taken as an example. The President of Brazil is authorized
To enter into negotiations with other countries, to conclude agreements, conventions, and treaties, always referring such treaties and
conventions to the Congress. 1

American constitutions are not significant. In addition to

the requirement of legislative approval, it is provided in

the fundamental law of Uruguay that the executive shall

initiate treaties with the advice of the Senate, while in

Venezuela the President makes treaties with the consulta-

tive vote of the council of state. Legislative approval in

Bolivia and Haiti is given in a formal joint session of the

two chambers. Colombia makes an exception of interna-

tional agreements in certain cases, while an amendment to

the Uruguayan Constitution stipulates expressly that
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The power given to the General Assembly by clause 7, article 17

of the Constitution, shall be construed as being applicable to all con-

ventions and contracts of whatever nature concluded or entered into

by the Executive power with foreign nations.*

One other type of internal limitation affecting the pro-

cedure of treaty making should be considered. In a few

cases the treaty power is divided between central and local

Art. 34, § 12, Art. 48, § 16; Chile, Art. 73, § 19; Colombia, Art. j6,$ 20, Art. 120,

§ 10; Costa Rica, Art. 72, § 4, Art. io1, § 9; Dominican Republic, Art. 35, § 17,

Art. S3, § 8; Ecuador, Art. 65, § 12, Art. 94, § 6; Guatemala, Art. 54, § 9, Art. 77,

§ 19; Haiti, Art. 60, § 3, Art. 101; Honduras, Art. 73, § 21, Art. 96, § 25; Nicaragua,

Art. 85, § 8, Art. i11, § 10; Panama, Art. 65, §§ 4, 6, Art. 73, § 3; Paraguay, Art.

The Brazilian Congress has exclusive power " to decide
definitely with regard to treaties and conventions with
foreign nations." Differences of detail among the several
American constitutions are not significant. In addition to
the requirement of legislative approval, it is provided in
the fundamental law of Uruguay that the executive shall
initiate treaties with the advice of the Senate, while in
Venezuela the President makes treaties with the consultative vote of the council of state. Legislative approval in
Bolivia and Haiti is given in a formal joint session of the
two chambers. Colombia makes an exception of international agreements in certain cases, while an amendment to
the Uruguayan Constitution stipulates expressly that

72, § 18, Art. 102, § 12; Peru, Art. 59, § 16, Art. 94, § 11; Salvador, Art. 68, § 29,

Art. 91, §§ 6, 7; Uruguay, Art. 17, § 7, Art. 81, Annex No. 3; Venezuela, Art. 57,

§ 13, Art. 81, § 5.

1 Art. 48, § 16 (Dodd's transl.). See also Art. 34, § 12.

* Annex No. 3 (Rodriguez' transl.).

The power given to the General Assembly by clause 7, article 1 7
of the Constitution, shall be construed as being applicable to all conventions and contracts of whatever nature concluded or entered into
by the Executive power with foreign nations.2

One other type of internal limitation affecting the procedure of treaty making should be considered. In a few
cases the treaty power is divided between central and local
Art. 34, § 12, Art. 48, § 16; Chile, Art. 73, § 19; Colombia, Art. 76, § 20, Art. 120,
§ 10; Costa Rica, Art. 12, § 4, Art. 101 1 § 9; Dominican Republic, Art. 35, § r7 1
Art. 53, § 8; Ecuador, Art. 65, § 12, Art. 94, § 6; Guatemala, Art. 54, § 9, Art. 77,
§ 19; Haiti, Art. 60, § 3, Art. 101; Honduras, Art. 73, § 21 1 Art. 96, § 25; Nicaragua,
Art. 85, § 8, Art. III,§ 10; Panama, Art. 65, §§ 4, 6, Art. 73, § 3; Paraguay, Art.
72, § 18, Art. 102, § 12; Peru, Art. 59, § 16, Art. 94, § 1 r; Salvador, Art. 68, § 29 1
Art. 91 1 §§ 6, 7; Uruguay, Art. 17, § 7, Art. 81, Annex No. 3; Venezuela, Art. 57,
§ 13, Art. 81 1 § 5.
1 Art. 48 1 § 16 (Dodd's transl.). See also Art. 34, § 12.
s Annex No. 3 (Rodriguez' transl.).
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governments. It is possible in the United States for a local

state government to enter into agreements or compacts

with a foreign power, provided the consent of the national

Congress can be obtained.1 The Mexican Constitution of

1857 excepted " coalitions between frontier states for offen-

sive or defensive war against savage Indians" from the

general prohibition of all treaties or alliances between states

of the federal republic and foreign powers.2 A more impor-

tant division of authority is contemplated in the Constitution

of Switzerland, which provides:

By exception the cantons preserve the right of concluding treaties

with foreign powers, respecting the administration of public property,

and border and police intercourse; but such treaties shall contain

nothing contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other cantons.

Official intercourse between cantons and foreign governments, or

their representatives, shall take place through the Federal Council.

governments. It is possible in the United States for a local
state government to enter into agreements or compacts
with a foreign power, provided the consent of the national
Congress can be obtained..1 The Mexican Constitution of
1857 excepted " coalitions between frontier states for offensive or defensive war against savage Indians" from the
general prohibition of all treaties or alliances between states
of the federal republic and foreign powers. 2 A more important division of authority is contemplated in the Constitution
of Switzerland, which provides:

Nevertheless, the cantons may correspond directly with the in-

ferior officials and officers of a foreign state, in regard to the subjects

enumerated in the preceding article."
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Treaties made by the cantons are examined and approved

by the Federal Council; if protested by the Federal Council

or another canton, they must be approved by the Federal

Assembly.4

The most important division of this kind is in process of

development within the British Empire. While in theory

the treaty power of the Empire resides exclusively in the

Crown, in practice it is coming to be exercised by the self-

governing dominions whenever their interests are chiefly

concerned.6 The British Government withholds ratification

By exception the cantons preserve the right of concluding treaties
with foreign powers, respecting the administration of public property,
and border and police intercourse; but such treaties shall contain
nothing contrary to the Confederation or to the rights of other cantons.
Official intercourse between cantons and foreign governments, or
their representatives, shall take place through the Federal Council.
Nevertheless, the cantons may correspond directly with the inferior officials and officers of a foreign state, in regard to the subjects
enumerated in the preceding article.1

1 Art. 1, { 10. See Crandall, Treaties, § 68.

* Art. 111, I. This exception has been omitted in the revision of 1917, Art.

117,1.

» Arts. 9, 10 (Dodd's transl.).

« Art. 8S, i 5, Art. 102, J 7.

* Despagnet, in R. G. D. I. P. (1895), n. 19°; Ewart, in A. J. I. L. (1913), VII,

268-284; Keith, in /. C. L. (1919), 3d series, I, I, 7-16, 13; Keith, Responsible

Treaties made by the cantons are examined and approved
by the Federal Council; if protested by the Federal Council
or another canton, they must be approved by the Federal
Assembly.4
The most important division of this kind is in process of
development within the British Empire. While in theory
the treaty power of the Empire resides exclusively in the
Crown, in practice it is coming to be exercised by the selfgoverning dominions whenever their interests are chiefly
concerned.6 The British Government withholds ratification
Art.
Art.
117, I.

t Io.

l

1,

t

III 1

See Crandall, Treaties, t 68.

I. This exception has been omitted in the revision of 1917, Art.

• Arts. 9, IO (Dodd's transl.).
' Art. 85, § 5, Art. 102, t 7.
1 Despagnet, in R. G.D. I. P. (1895), II, 196; Ewart, in A. J. I. L. (1913), VII,
268-284; Keith, in J. C. L. (1919), 3d series, I, I, 7-16, 13; Keith, Responsible
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until the dominion parliament has expressed its approval,

and its part in the transaction is coming to be a mere matter

of form. Canada created a Department of Fxternal Affairs

in 1909. The words of the statute are significant:

The Secretary of State, as head of the department, shall have the

conduct of all official communications between the Government of

until the dominion parliament has expressed its approval,
and its part in the transaction is coming to be a mere matter
of form. Canada created a Department of Fxternal Affairs
in 1909. The words of the statute are significant:

Canada and the Government of any other country in connection

with the external affairs of Canada, and shall be charged with such

other duties as may, from time to time, be assigned to the depart-

ment by order of the Governor in Council in relation to such external

affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or inter-

colonial negotiations so far as they may appertain to the Government

of Canada.1

The first report of the "Under-Secretary of State for

External Affairs " shows that the Dominion has already

negotiated treaties relating to fisheries, boundaries, and com-

merce.2 The self-governing dominions have also been con-

ceded the right to participate independently in important

administrative treaties, such as the conventions providing

The Secretary of State, as head of the department, shall have the
conduct of all official communications between the Government of
Canada and the Government of any other country in connection
with the external affairs of Canada, and shall be charged with such
other duties as may, from time to time, be assigned to the department by order of the Governor in Council in relation to such external
affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or intercolonial negotiations so far as they may appertain to the Government
of Canada.1
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for the Universal Postal Union, the International Institute

of Agriculture, and the International Wireless Telegraph

Union.3

A second category of internal limitations on the form of

international transactions relates to the exercise of the war

power. The society of nations has learned in bitter experi-

ence that "it is a vital international concern where the

power of peace and war is lodged in each nation." Before

the rise of modern representative governments the war

power was usually regarded as an executive function. This

Government in the Dominions, pp. 222-236; Todd, Parliamentary Government in

the British Colonies, pp. 192-218; Tupper, in /. 5. C. L. (1917) N. s., XVII, 5-18.

1 8 & 9 Edw. VII, ch. 13. "Nominally, Canada has no foreign relations, but in

reality she regulates them, very largely, as she wishes." Ewart, in A. J.l.L. (1913)

VII, 269,

» Tupper, in /. 5. C. L. (1917) u. 8., XVH, 16.

'Myers, in A. J.l.L. (1914), VHI, 81-108.

The first report of the " Under-Secretary of State for
External Affairs " shows that the Dominion has already
negotiated treaties relating to fisheries, boundaries, and commerce.2 The self-governing dominions have also been conceded the right to participate independently in important
administrative treaties, such as the conventions providing
for the Universal Postal Union, the International Institute
of Agriculture, and the International Wireless Te]egraph
Union.3
A second category of internal limitations on the form of
international transactions relates to the exercise of the war
power. The society of nations has learned in bitter experience that "it is a vital international concern where the
power of peace and war is lodged in each nation." Before
the rise of modern representative governments the war
power was usually regarded as an executive function. This
Gof/ef'nmenl in lhe Dominions, pp. 222-236; Todd, Parliamentary G01Jernmenl in
the British Colonm, pp. 192- 218; Tupper, in J. S . C. L. (1917) N. s., XVII , 5- 18.
t 8 & 9 Edw. VII, ch. 13. "Nominally, Canada has no foreign relations, but in
reality she regulates them, very largely, as she wishes." Ewart, in A.J. l.L. (1913)
VII, 269,
2 Tupper, in J. S. C. L. (1917) N. s., XVII, 16.
a Myers, in A. J. I. L. (1914), VIII, 81-1o8.
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conception of it has survived in a number of constitutions.1

In some its exercise has been hedged about through the de-

velopment of parliamentary responsibility; in others there

are few or no restrictions on executive decision. Of the

situation in England, Anson says:

The King, acting on the advice of his Ministers, makes war and

peace. The House of Commons may refuse supplies for a war, or

either House may express its disapproval by resolutions condemna-

tory of the ministerial policy, or by address to the Crown, or by

making the position of the ministry in other ways untenable; but

Parliament has no direct means either of bringing about a war or of

bringing a war to an end.2

The King of Sweden makes war or peace after consulting

the Council of State:

If the King wishes to declare war or to conclude peace he shall

convene all the members of the Council of State into extraordinary

council, shall lay before them the causes and circumstances to be

considered, and shall require their opinions concerning the matter;

conception of it has survived in a number of constitutions.1
In some its exercise has been hedged about through the development of parliamentary responsibility; in others there
are few or no restrictions on executive decision. Of the
situation in England, Anson says:
The King, acting on the advice of his Ministers, makes war and
peace. The House of Commons may refuse supplies for a war, or
either House may express its disapproval by resolutions condemnatory of the ministerial policy, or by address to the Crown, or by
making the position of the ministry in other ways untenable; but
Parliament has no direct means either of bringing about a war or of
bringing a war to an end. 2

each of them shall separately enter his opinion in the minutes, under
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the responsibility referred to in Art. 107. The King may then make

and execute such a decision as he considers for the best interests of

the country.3

The King of Sweden makes war or peace after consulting
the Council of State:

Constitutional law and practice in a number of countries

require the executive to inform the chambers, so far as the

interests and security of the state permit, but in some

countries it is not clear that even this much would be re-

quired.

Several executives have been deprived of the authority to

declare offensive war without the consent of one or both of

1 Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and

Executive Power, Art. 5; Belgium, Art. 68; China, Art. 22; Denmark, Art. 18;

Greece, Art. 32; Italy, Art. 5; Japan, Art. 13; Luxemburg, Art. 37; Montenegro,

Art. 7; Netherlands, Art. 58; Persia, Suppl. Fundam. Laws of 1907, Art. 51; Rus-

sia, Art. 13; Servia, Art. 52; Spain, Art. 54, § 4; Turkey, Art. 7.

If the King wishes to declare war or to conclude peace he shall

convene all the members of the Council of State into extraordinary
council, shall lay before them the causes and circumstances to be
considered, and shall require their opinions concerning the matter;
each of them shall separately enter his opinion in the minutes, under
the responsibility referred to in Art. 107. The King may then make
and execute such a decision as he considers for the best interests of
the country.8

* Law and Custom of the Constitution, U, Pt. II, 102.

• Art. 13 (Dodd's transl.).

Constitutional law and practice in a number of countries
require the executive to inform the chambers, so far as the
interests and security of the state permit, but in some
countries it is not clear that even this much would be required.
Several executives have been deprived of the authority to
declare offensive war without the consent of one or both of
1 Austria, Fundamental Law Concerning the Exercise of Administrative and
Executive Power, Art. 5; Belgium, Art. 68; China, Art. 22; Denmark, Art. 18;
Greece, Art. 32; Italy, Art. 5; Japan, Art. 13; Luxemburg, Art. 37; Montenegro,
Art. 7; Netherlands, Art. 58; Persia, Suppl. Fundam. Laws of 1907, Art. 51; Russia, Art. 13; Servia, Art. 52; Spain, Art. 54, § 4; Turkey, Art. 7.
2 Law and Custom of the Constitution, II, Pt. II, 102.
I Art. IJ (Dodd's transl.).
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the legislative chambers, but have been left free to declare

defensive war.1 This is implied in the organic law of Nor-

way, which forbids the use of the troops and fleet in offen-

sive war without the Storthing's consent, and also in the

constitution of Portugal. It was expressly stipulated in the

German Constitution of 1871, which provided:

For a declaration of war in the name of the Empire, the consent

of the Bundesrat is required, unless an attack is made upon the

federal territory or its coasts*

the legislative chambers, but have been left free to declare
defensive war. 1 This is implied in the organic law of Norway, which forbids the use of the troops and fleet in offensive war without the Storthing's consent, and also in the
constitution of Portugal. It was expressly stipulated in the
German Constitution of 1871, which provided:

The executive in Brazil and Colombia may act alone in case

of foreign invasion. In Honduras, under the Constitution

of 1904, the same rule prevailed when circumstances did not

permit the assembling of Congress. Two modern consti-

tutions have associated the upper chamber of the legislature

For a declaration of war in the name of the Empire, the consent
of the Bundesrat is required, unless an attack is made upon the
federal territory or its coasts.2

with the executive in the making of offensive war. In Ger-

many, under the Constitution of 1871, the Emperor was

obliged to secure the consent of the Bundesrat; in Colombia,

the President must be authorized by the Senate.3

France, Portugal, and fifteen of the American republics
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vest the war power in the executive and legislature jointly.4

Constitutional texts suggest a difference between the rule

in France, Argentine, Chile, and several of the smaller re-

publics, where the executive declares war with the consent

of the chambers, and a second group, where the legislature

declares war on the president's recommendation. There is

1 Brazil, Art. 48, § 8; Colombia, Art. 120, § 11; Germany, Art. 11; Honduras,

Art. 96, § 20; Norway, Art. 25; Portugal, Art. 26, § 14.

* Art. 11 (Dodd's transl.). *

* Colombia, Art. 98, § 9; Germany, Art. 11.

* France, Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 9;

Portugal, Art. 26, § 14; Argentine, Art. 67, § 21, Art. 86, § 18; Bolivia, Art. 54, § 7;

Brazil, Art. 34, § 11, Art. 48, §§ 7, 8; Chile, Art. 27, § 2, Art. 73, § 18; Costa Rica,

Art. 72, § 6, Art. 101, § 14; Dominican Republic, Art. 53, § 15; Ecuador, Art. 65,

§ 12, Art. 94, § 11, Art. 110, § 2; Haiti, Art. 58, Art. 60, § 2; Mexico, Art. 73, XII,

Art. 89, Vin; Nicaragua, Art. 85, § 18, Art. 1it, § 25; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 18, Art.

102, § 16; Peru, Art. 59, § 15; Salvador, Art. 68, § 21, Art. 91, § 6; Uruguay,

Art. 17, § 7, Art. 81; Venezuela, Art. 57, § 28, Art. 81, 8 2.

The executive in Brazil and Colombia may act alone in case
of foreign invasion. In Honduras, under the Constitution
of l 904, the same rule prevailed when circumstances did not
permit the assembling of Congress. Two modern constitutions have associated the upper chamber of the legislature
with the executive in the making of offensive war. In Germany, under the Constitution of 1871, the Emperor was
obliged to secure the consent of the Bundesrat; in Colombia,
the President must be authorized by the Senate. 3
France, Portugal, and fifteen of the American republics
vest the war power in the executive and legislature jointly.4
Constitutional texts suggest a difference between the rule
in France, Argentine, Chile, and several of the smaller republics, where the executive declares war with the consent
of the chambers, and a second group, where the legislature
declares war on the president's recommendation. There is
1 Brazil, Art. 48, § 8; Colombia, Art. r 20, § rr; Germany, Art. rr; Honduras,
Art. 96, § 20; Norway, Art. 25; Portugal, Art. 26, § r4.
2 Art. 11 (Dodd's transl.) .
1 Colombia, Art. 98, § 9; Germany, Art. 1 1.
4 France, Constitutional Law on the Relations of the Public Powers, Art. 9;
Portugal, Art. 26, § 14; Argentine, Art. 67, § 21, Art. 86, § 18; Bolivia, Art. 54, § 7;
Brazil, Art. 34, § n, Art. 48, §§ 7, 8; Chile, Art. 27, § 2, Art. 73, § 18; Costa Rica,
Art. 72, § 6, Art. 101, § 14; Dominican Republic, Art. 53, § 15; Ecuador, Art. 65,
§ 12, Art. 94, § 11, Art. uo, § 2; Haiti, Art. 58, Art. 60, § 2; Mexico, Art. 73, XII,
Art. 89, VIII; Nicaragua, Art. 85, § 18, Art. 1n, § 25; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 18, Art.
102, § 16; Peru, Art. 59, § r5; Salvador, Art. 68, § 2r, Art. 91, § 6; Uruguay,
Art. 17, § 7, Art. 81; Venezuela, Art. 57, § 28, Art. 81, 6 2.
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no evidence, however, that the difference is anything more

than a matter of words. In Bolivia and Haiti the chambers

declare war in a formal joint session. In Venezuela a coun-

cil of state is associated with the President in a consultative

capacity.

The declaration of war is a legislative function exclusively

in the United States, Switzerland, and several of the smaller

republics.1 The practical difference between constitutions

of this type and those which vest the power in the executive

and legislature jointly is of no great significance. The ex-

ecutive is everywhere charged with the general conduct of

foreign relations. By virtue of this responsibility it is cer-

tain to have a large influence on the exercise of the war

power.

In a few instances the war power, like the treaty power,

is divided between central and local governments. The

constituent states of the United States may not engage in

war " unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger

as will not admit of delay." 2 A similar exception is embodied
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in the federal Constitution of Mexico, which provides:

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress: . . .

Make war on its own behalf on any foreign power, except in cases

of invasion or of such imminent peril as to admit of no delay. In

such event the State shall give notice immediately to the President

of the Republic.*

The division which exists within the British Empire, although

defined with less exactness, is of greater practical importance.

The self-governing dominions are not only free, by reason

of their constitutional position, to begin a defensive war,

but they are also free to participate or not, as they please,

in the wars of the Empire. As regards Canada's relation

to the war power, Ewart concludes:

no evidence, however, that the difference is anything more
than a matter of words. In Bolivia and Haiti the chambers
declare war in a formal joint session. In Venezuela a council of state is associated with the President in a consultative
capacity.
The declaration of war is a legislative function exclusively
in the United States, Switzerland, and several of the smaller
republics. 1 The practical difference between constitutions
of this type and those which vest the power in the executive
and legislature jointly is of no great significance. The executive is everywhere charged with the general conduct of
foreign relations. By virtue of this responsibility it is certain to have a large influence on the exercise of the war
power.
In a few instances the war power, like the treaty power,
is divided between central and local governments. The
constituent states of the United States may not engage in
war "unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger
as will not admit of delay." 2 A similar exception is embodied
in the federal Constitution of Mexico, which provides:

« United States, Art. i, § 8; Switzerland, Art. 8, Art. 8S, § 6; Cuba, Art. 59,

$ 12; Guatemala, Art. 54, § 15; Honduras, Art. 73, § 30; Panama, Art. 65, § 7.

'Art. I, $ 10. » Art. 1x8 (Branche's transl.).

No State shall, without the consent of the Congress: ...
Make war on its own behalf on any foreign power, except in cases
of invasion or of such imminent peril as to admit of no delay. In
such event the State shall give notice immediately to the President
of the Republic.3

The division which exists within the British Empire, although
defined with less exactness, is of greater practical importance.
The self-governing dominions are not only free, by reason
of their constitutional position, to begin a defensive war,
but they are also free to participate or not, as they please,
in the wars of the Empire. As regards Canada's relation
to the war power, Ewart concludes:
1 United States, Art. 1, § 8; Switzerland, Art. 8, Art. 85 1 § 6; Cuba, Art. 59,
§ 12; Guatemala, Art. 54, § 15; Honduras, Art. 73 1 § 30; Panama, Art. 65, § 7.
1 Art. 118 (Branche's transl.).
a Art. I,§ 10.
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Canada has asserted her liberty of action with reference to British

wars. She has frequently, through her Prime Minister, declared that

she will or will not take part in such wars as she may think proper.

Both political parties in Canada have agreed that there can be no

war-obligation on the part of Canada in the absence of her partici-

pation in the diplomacies which involve war.1

Restrictions upon the exercise of the treaty and war

powers are the most familiar as well as the most important

of internal limitations on the form of international trans-

Canada has asserted her liberty of action with reference to British
wars. She has frequently, through her Prime Minister, declared that
she will or will not take part in such wars as she may think proper.
Both political parties in Canada have agreed that there can be no
war--0bligation on the part of Canada in the absence of her participation in the diplomacies which involve war.1

actions. Other limitations appear, however, in a number

of constitutions. Foreign troops cannot be brought into

the territory of Roumania, Spain, or at least nine of the

American republics without the consent of the legislature.2

Thus, a law is required in Chile

To permit the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of

the Republic, and to determine the time of their stay therein.3

Similar authority is vested in the Senate in Mexico,4 and

also in Colombia, except that in the latter the President

may grant permission during a recess of the Senate, after

consulting the council of state.6 Several American consti-
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tutions also require legislative permission before national

troops can be sent abroad.6 The same limitation is some-

times extended to the stationing of foreign warships in terri-

Restrictions upon the exercise of the treaty and war
powers are the most familiar as well as the most important
of internal limitations on the form of international transactions. Other limitations appear, however, in a number
of constitutions. Foreign troops cannot be brought into
the territory of Roumania, Spain, or at least nine of the
American republics without the consent of the legislature. 2
Thus, a law is required in Chile

torial waters.7 In Mexico, the Senate has exclusive power

1 A.J.I. L. (1913), VII, 284. See Keith, in /. C. L. (1919), 3d series, I, I, 7-16,

iS-

To permit the introduction of foreign troops into the territory of
the Republic, and to determine the time of their stay therein.3

* Roumania, Art. 123; Spain, Art. 55, § 3; Argentine, Art. 67, § 25; Bolivia,

Art. 52, §9; Brazil, Art. 34, § 19; Chile, Art. 28, § 7; Ecuador, Art. 65, § 17;

Nicaragua, Art. 8S, § 20; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 21; Peru, Art. 59, § 14; Uruguay,

Art. 17, § 11. In Nicaragua, this power is vested in the executive during a state

of war.

* Art. 28, § 7 (Dodd's transl.).

* Art. 76, III. * Art. 98, § 7, Art. 120, § 12.

* Argentine, Art. 67, § 25; Bolivia, Art. 52, { 11; Chile, Art. 28, § 9; Nicaragua,

Art. 85, § 20; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 21; Uruguay, Art. 17, § 12. In Nicaragua, this

power is vested in the executive during a state of war.

* Ecuador, Art. 65, § 17.

Similar authority is vested in the Senate in Mexico,4 and
also in Colombia, except that in the latter the President
may grant permission during a recess of the Senate, after
consulting the council of state. 6 Several American constitutions also require legislative permission before national
troops can be sent abroad. 6 The same limitation is sometimes extended to the stationing of foreign warships in territorial waters.7 In Mexico, the Senate has exclusive power
1

A. J. I. L. (1913), VII, 284. See Keith, in J.C. L. (1919), 3d series, I, I, 7-16,

15.
t Roumania, Art. 123; Spain, Art. 55, § 3; Argentine, Art. 67, § 25; Bolivia,
Art. 52, § 9; Brazil, Art. 34, § 19; Chile, Art. 28, § 7; Ecuador, Art. 65, § 17;
Nicaragua, Art. 85, § 20; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 21; Peru, Art. 59, § 14; Uruguay,
Art. 17, § 11. In Nicaragua, this power is vested in the executive during a state
of war.
1 Art. 28, § 7 (Dodd's transl.).
4 Art. 76, III.
• Art. 98, § 7, Art. 120, § 12.
• Argentine, Art. 67, § 2 5; Bolivia, Art. 52, § 11; Chile, Art. 28, § 9; Nicaragua,
Art. 85, § 20; Paraguay, Art. 72, § 21; Uruguay, Art. 17, § 12. In Nicaragua, this
power is vested in the executive during a state of war.
7 Ecuador, Art. 65, § 17.
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To authorize the Executive to allow national troops to go beyond

the limits of the Republic, or to permit foreign troops to pass through

the national territory, and to consent to the presence of fleets of an-

other nation for more than one month in Mexican waters.1

The President of Colombia may permit the stationing of

To authorize the Executive to allow national troops to go beyond
the limits of the Republic, or to permit foreign troops to pass through
the national territory, and to consent to the presence of fleets of another nation for more than one month in Mexican waters. 1

foreign vessels of war within the waters of the nation, after

consulting the council of state.2

Limitations thus far considered affect only the form of

international transactions without going to the substance.

Indirectly, however, they affect capacity to enter into these

transactions. It can hardly be denied that there are practi-

cal inequalities of capacity where states are organically re-

stricted, in undertaking important transactions, to methods

of procedure which differ with respect to the time that they

require, the degree in which secrecy can be preserved, the

possibility of delay or defeat through internal dissension,

and the extent to which they are capable of expressing the

popular will, to mention only more obvious differences. It

may not be practicable or desirable for the law of nations
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to take account of such inequalities. It may be better for

the law to disregard indirect limitations on capacity. How-

ever that may be, they exist, and they are bound to influ-

ence the law in one way or another, whether treated as of

legal significance or regarded merely as matters of fact.

Internal Limitations on Capacity for

Transactions

There are other internal limitations which go to the very

root of an international person's capacity for transactions.

They constitute positive restrictions upon that equality of

legal capacity which is presumed to exist among the mem-

bers of international society. Examples may be given of

1 Art. 76, HI (Blanche's transl.). 'Art. 120, § 13.

The President of Colombia may permit the stationing of
foreign vessels of war within the waters of the nation, after
consulting the council of state. 2
Limitations thus far considered affect only the form of
international transactions without going to the substance.
Indirectly, however, they affect capacity to enter into these
transactions. It can hardly be denied that there are practical inequalities of capacity where states are organically restricted, in undertaking important transactions, to methods
of procedure which differ with respect to the time that they
require, the degree in which secrecy can be preserved, the
possibility of delay or defeat through internal dissension,
and the extent to which they are capable of expressing the
popular will, to mention only more obvious differences. It
may not be practicable or desirable for the law of nations
to take account of such inequalities. It may be better for
the law to disregard indirect limitations on capacity. However that may be, they exist, and they are bound to influence the law in one way or another, whether treated as of
legal significance or regarded merely as matters of fact.
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON CAPACITY FOR
TRANSACTIONS

There are other internal limitations which go to the very
root of an international person's capacity for transactions.
They constitute positive restrictions upon that equality of
legal capacity which is presumed to exist among the members of international society. Examples may be given of
1

Art. 761 III (Branche's transl).

I

Art.

I 20,

§ 13.
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this type of limitation which affect the state's capacity to

make certain treaties, to make war in certain circumstances,

and to extradite certain classes of offenders.

Organic incapacities relating to the treaty power may be

divided for convenience into two groups; first, those de-

signed to protect the essential bases of state existence; and

second, those intended to secure certain interests of a less

fundamental character. Limitations of the first group ap-

pear more frequently in the fundamental laws, and are cre-

ated to protect the territory, independence, government, or

citizens of the state concerned. In a number of states there

is no legal way, short of an organic amendment, by which

the national territory'can be alienated.1 A great deal of

national sentiment is expressed in the first article of Tur-

key's Constitution of 1909:

The Ottoman Empire comprises the existing territories and di-

visions and the privileged provinces. It forms an indivisible whole,

and can never allow any part to be detached for any reason what-

ever.2
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A similar limitation in Salvador is aimed expressly at the

treaty-making power:

None of the constituted powers shall have authority to conclude

or approve treaties or conventions by which the form of government

herein provided for be in any way altered, or by which the integrity

this type of limitation which affect the state's capacity to
make certain treaties, to make war in certain circumstances,
and to extradite certain classes of offenders.
Organic incapacities relating to the treaty power may be
divided for convenience into two groups; first, those designed to protect the essential bases of state existence; and
second, those intended to secure certain interests of a less
fundamental character. Limitations of the first group appear more frequently in the fundamental laws, and are created to protect the territory, independence, government, or
citizens of the state concerned. In a number of states there
is no legal way, short of an organic amendment, by which
the national territory· can be alienated. 1 A great deal of
national sentiment is expressed in the first article of Turkey's Constitution of 1909:

of the territory or the national sovereignty be abridged; this to be

understood without prejudice to the provisions of art. 151 of the

present Constitution.3

1 See Bulgaria, Arts. 1, 2, 141; Cuba, Appendix; Dominican Republic, Art. 3;

Luxemburg, Art. 1 (cf. Art. 37); Norway, Art. 1; Roumania, Art. 2; Salvador,

Art. 38; Servia, Art. 4; Sweden, Art. 78; Turkey, Art. 1 (cf. Art. 7); Venezuela,

The Ottoman Empire comprises the existing territories and divisions and the privileged provinces. It forms an indivisible whole,
and can never allow any part to be detached for any reason wbatever.2

Art. 11. The provision in the Cuban Constitution is the consequence of Cuba's

peculiar relation to the United States. Although in form an internal limitation,

it is in fact an external limitation, and will be considered presently as such.

'Art. 1 (transl. from B. F. S. P.). Cf. Art. 7 as revised in 1909.

A similar limitation in Salvador is aimed expressly at the
treaty-making power:

* Art. 38 (Rodriguez' transl.). Art. 151 refers to the formation of a Central

American union or a great Latin American confederation.

None of the constituted powers shall have authority to conclude
or approve treaties or conventions by which the form of government
herein provided for be in any way altered, or by which the integrity
of the territory or the national sovereignty be abridged; this to be
understood without prejudice to the provisions of art. 151 of the
present Constitution.3
See Bulgaria, Arts. 1 , 2, 141; Cuba, Appendix; Dominican Republic, Art. 3;
Luxemburg, Art. r (cf. Art. 37); Norway, Art. 1; Roumania, Art. 2; Salvador,
Art. 38; Servia, Art. 4; Sweden, Art. 78; Turkey, Art. 1 (cf. Art. 7); Venezuela,
Art. r I. The provision in the Cuban Constitution is the consequence of Cuba's
peculiar relation to the United States. Although in form an internal limitation,
it is in fact an external limitation, and will be considered presently as such.
2 Art. 1 (transl. from B . F. S. P .). Cf. Art. 7 as revised in 1909.
1 Art. 38 (Rodriguez' transl.). Art. 151 refers to the formation of a Central
American union or a great Latin American confederation.
1
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The Venezuelan Constitution provides:

The Venezuelan Constitution provides:

The territory of the nation cannot be alienated, nor leased, nor

ceded in any way to a foieign power.1

There are a few American constitutions which expressly

The territory of the nation cannot be alienated, nor leased, nor
ceded in any way to a foreign power.1

forbid all international agreements that would impair

national sovereignty or independence.2 An article has al-

ready been quoted which prohibits treaties that would alter

the form of government. The citizens of the state are some-

times protected by expressly forbidding their extradition,

as in Salvador,3 or by prohibiting all treaties which modify

or abridge the constitutional guaranties, as in Mexico.4 The

organic law of Salvador also stipulates that

no treaty or convention which in any way restricts or affects the

exercise of the right of insurrection, or violates any constitutional

provision, shall ever be ratified.*

References above are all to express enactments. Similar

limitations are held to be implied in the constitutional law

and practice of a number of states.

The attempt has been made in a few constitutions to se-
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cure less vital interests by creating similar incapacities.

There are a few American constitutions which expressly
forbid all international agreements that would impair
national sovereignty or independence. 2 An article has already been quoted which prohibits treaties that would alter
the form of government. The citizens of the state are sometimes protected by expressly forbidding their extradition,
as in Salvador,3 or by prohibiting all treaties which modify
or abridge the constitutional guaranties, as in Mexico.4 The
organic law of Salvador also stipulates that

The status of aliens is made the subject of constitutional

provisions, beyond the scope of the treaty power, in several

countries. It is expressly stipulated that no international

agreement shall be made which modifies the title dealing

with the status of aliens in the organic law of Salvador.6

no treaty or convention which in any way restricts or affects the
exercise of the right of insurrection, or violates any constitutional
provision, shall ever be ratified.6

The Venezuelan Government is forbidden to conclude

treaties to the detriment of two articles, one imposing re-

sponsibilities upon aliens involved in the country's domestic

1 Art i1 (transl. from B. P. S. P.).

* Cuba, Appendix; Costa Rica, Art. 15; Peru, Art. 2; Salvador, Art. 38.

Central American constitutions contain a reservation with reference to the future

reconstruction of a Central American union.

• Art. 11. • Art. 68, § 29 (Rodriguez' transl.).

4 Art. 15. 'Art. 49.

References above are all to express enactments. Similar
limitations are held to be implied in the constitutional law
and practice of a number of states.
The attempt has been made in a few constitutions to secure less vital interests by creating similar incapacities.
The status of aliens is made the subject of constitutional
provisions, beyond the scope of the treaty power, in several
countries. It is expressly stipulated that no international
agreement shall be made which modifies the title dealing
with the status of aliens in the organic law of Salvador. 8
The Venezuelan Government is forbidden to conclude
treaties to the detriment of two articles, one imposing responsibilities upon aliens involved in the country's domestic
Art II (transl. from B. F. S. P.).
Cuba, Appendix; Costa Rica, Art. 15; Peru, Art. 2; Salvador, Art. 38.
Central American constitutions contain a reservation with reference to the future
reconstruction of a Central American union.
6 Art. 68, § 29 (Rodriguez' transl.).
a Art. 11.
8 Art. 49.
' Art. 15.
1
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political controversies, and another denying the right to

claim indemnity for property losses caused by any but the

lawful authorities.1 The advantage in being able to assure

an asylum to political offenders is secured in Mexico and

several Central American republics in similar fashion.2 The

Mexican Constitution provides:

No treaty shall be authorized for the extradition of political offend-

ers, or of offenders of the common class, who have been slaves in

the country where the offense was committed. Nor shall any agree-

political controversies, and another denying the right to
claim indemnity for property losses caused by any but the
lawful authorities.1 The advantage in being able to assure
an asylum to political offenders is secured in Mexico and
several Central American republics in similar fashion. 2 The
Mexican Constitution provides:

ment or treaty be entered into which abridges or modifies the guaran-

tees and rights which this constitution grants to the individual and

to the citizen.*

Switzerland safeguards economic interests by establishing

certain principles with respect to commercial treaties. The

Constitution stipulates that import duties shall be as low as

possible on raw materials and the necessaries of life, and

highest on luxuries. It provides further:

Unless there are imperative reasons to the contrary, these princi-

No treaty shall be authorized for the extradition of political offenders, or of offenders of the common class, who have been slaves in
the country where the offense was committed. Nor shall any agreement or treaty be entered into which abridges or modifies the guarantees and rights which this constitution grants to the individual and
to the citizen.3

ples shall be observed also in the conclusion of treaties of commerce
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with foreign powers.4

It is a controverted question in the United States whether

and to what extent the treaty power is limited by the au-

thority reserved to the states under the federal system. If

the treaty power is possessed by the central government as

an attribute of national sovereignty, as some have argued,

there is no question of any incapacity of the kind under

consideration. On the other hand, if it is in any degree re-

Switzerland safeguards economic interests by establishing
certain principles with respect to commercial treaties. The
Constitution stipulates that import duties shall be as low as
possible on raw materials and the necessaries of life, and
highest on luxuries. It provides further:

stricted by the residuary powers of the states, there are

important limitations on capacity.5 The controversy can-

1 Arts. 20, 21, 22.

1 Mexico, Art. 15; Honduras, Art. 16; Nicaragua, Arts. 12, 16; Salvador,

Art. 11.

Unless there are imperative reasons to the contrary, these principles shall be observed also in the conclusion of treaties of commerce
with foreign powers.•

* Art. 15 (Branche's transl.). 4 Art. 29 (Dodd's transl.).

5 See Anderson, in A. J. I. L. (1907), 1,636-670; Bates, Lestraitésftdirauxetla

legislation des Hats aux Stats-Unis; Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United

It is a controverted question in the United States whether
and to what extent the treaty power is limited by the authority reserved to the states under the federal system. If
the treaty power is possessed by the central government as
an attribute of national sovereignty, as some have argued,
there is no question of any incapacity of the kind under
consideration. On the other hand, if it is in any degree restricted by the residuary powers of the states, there are
important limitations on capacity.b The controversy can1

Arts. 20, 21 1 22.
Mexico, Art. 15; Honduras, Art. 16; Nicaragua, Arts.

12, 16; Salvador,
Art. I I.
4 Art. 29 (Dodd's transl.).
' Art. 15 (Branche's transl.).
I See Anderson, in A. J . I. L. (1907), I, 636--670; Bates, wtraiUsfbihau:t ella
ltgislati<m des ltats aw: Btats-Unis; Butler, Treaty-Making Power of the United
1
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not be considered here, but its significance in relation to the

question of capacity for certain international transactions

may be suggested.

An organic inability to enter into treaties goes to the very

substance of that legal capacity which is the essence of

equality in the law of nations. When such an incapacity is

imposed from without it is said to limit independence and

sovereignty as well as equality. Pomeroy says:

The right to enter into treaties at will is certainly one of the most

important that belong to states. As all states are equal, they all have

the same capacity to contract with other bodies politic. Deprive a

nation of any portion of this capacity, and we would reduce it from

not be considered here, but its significance in relation to the
question of capacity for certain international transactions
may be suggested.
An organic inability to enter into treaties goes to the very
substance of that legal capacity which is the essence of
equality in the law of nations. When such an incapacity is
imposed from without it is said to limit independence and
sovereignty as well as equality. Pomeroy says:

its position of equality, and at the same time would restrict its com-

plete independence and sovereignty.1

When the incapacity is imposed from within independence

and sovereignty are not impaired; but the state is certainly

reduced from its position of equality, if that conception is

to have any practical legal significance.

Only the most rudimentary limitations on the capacity to
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make war have been developed thus far. In a few states the

attempt has been made to discourage arbitrary or unpro-

The right to enter into treaties at will is certainly one of the most
important that belong to states. As all states are equal, they all have
the same capacity to contract with other bodies politic. Deprive a
nation of any portion of this capacity, and we would reduce it from
its position of equality, and at the same time would restrict its complete independence and sovereignty.1

voked declarations of war by requiring certain preUminary

efforts at a peaceful adjustment, but the restriction is usually

defined with benevolent vagueness. The President of Uru-

guay may declare war, upon previous decision of the General

Assembly, " after having exhausted all means to avoid it,

without detriment to the national honor and independence."2

The Brazilian Congress may authorize the government to

declare war "when arbitration has failed or cannot take

place." 3 Portugal advocates the principle of arbitration in

States, 1,4 B. (presents national sovereignty view); Crandall, Treaties, §§105-110;

Tucker, Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power Under the Constitution of the United

States (presents states' rights view).

1 Lectures, § 258, p. 323.

•Art. 81. 'Art. 34, §11; Art. 48, §§7,8.

When the incapacity is imposed from within independence
and sovereignty are not impaired; but the state is certainly
reduced from its position of equality, if that conception is
to have any practical legal significance.
Only the most rudimentary limitations on the capacity to
make war have been developed thus far. In a few states the
attempt has been made to discourage arbitrary or unprovoked declarations of war by requiring certain preliminary
efforts at a peaceful adjustment, but the restriction is usually
defined with benevolent vagueness. The President of Uruguay may declare war, upon previous decision of the General
Assembly, "after having exhausted all means to avoid it,
without detriment to the national honor and independence." 2
The Brazilian Congress may authorize the government to
declare war "when arbitration has failed or cannot take
place." 3 Portugal advocates the principle of arbitration in
States, I, 4 ff. (presents national sovereignty view); Crandall, Trealics, §§ 105-IIo;
Tucker, Limitations on the Trealy-M aking Power Under the Constitution of the United
States (presents states' rights view) .
1 Lectures, § 258, p. 323.
1 Art. 81.
' Art. 34, § 11; Art. 48, §§ 7, 8.

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS

211

211

its Constitution,1 while the governments of the Dominican

Republic and Venezuela 2 are required to insert a general

arbitration clause in all treaties. The most explicit limita-

tion of this kind appears in the Constitution of the Domini-

can Republic:

The authorities (" poderes ") instituted under this Constitution

shall not declare war until and after having proposed arbitration.

In order to affirm this principle, the following clause shall be in-

serted in all international Treaties which are concluded by the Re-

public: "All differences which may arise between the contracting

parties shall be submitted to arbitration before appealing to arms."1

The extradition of political offenders from certain states

is definitely forbidden in the constitution. The same rule

is well established practice in other states, but is not a

legal incapacity. In certain of the Central American re-

publics there is no legal way of extraditing such an of-

fender, whatever the policy or the particular circumstances

its Constitution,1 while the governments of the Dominican
Republic and Venezuela 2 are required to insert a general
arbitration clause in all treaties. The most explicit limitation of this kind appears in the Constitution of the Dominican Republic:
The authorities (" poderes ") instituted under this Constitution
shall not declare war until and after having proposed arbitration.
In order to affirm this principle, the following clause shall be inserted in all international Treaties which are concluded by the Republic: " All differences which may arise between the contracting
parties shall be submitted lo arbitration before appealing to arms." 3

may be.4

It was suggested above that for reasons of policy the law
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of nations might conceivably disregard differences in the

form of international transactions. The objections to such

a policy are evident, although there may be a good deal to

be said in its favor. On the other hand, it is difficult to see

how the law of nations can disregard differences in capacity

for transactions without detracting from its positive signifi-

cance. Members of the society of nations may be presumed

1 Art. 73. "The Portuguese Republic, without prejudice to its engagements

under its Treaties of Alliance, advocates the principle of arbitration as the best

method of solving international questions." (Transl. from B. F. S. P.).

1 Art. 138. "In international Treaties the following clause shall be inserted: —

'All differences between the Contracting Parties shall be decided by arbitration

without appeal to war.'" (Transl. from B. F. S. P.).

* Art. 102 (transl. from B.F.S. P.). See remarks of Dominican delegate, La

Deux. Confer., II, 147. Interesting possibilities in the development of internal

limitations are suggested by the idea of autonomous neutralization. See Robinson,

in A.J.I. L. (1917), XI, 607-616.

* Honduras, Art. 16; Nicaragua, Art. 16; Salvador, Art. 11.

The extradition of political offenders from certain states
is definitely forbidden in the constitution. The same rule
is well established practice in other states, but is not a
legal incapacity. In certain of the Central American republics there is no legal way of extraditing such an offender, whatever the policy or the particular circumstances
may be.4
It was suggested above that for reasons of policy the law
of nations might conceivably disregard differences in the
form of international transactions. The objections to such
a policy are evident, although there may be a good deal to
be said in its favor. On the other hand, it is difficult to see
how the law of nations can disregard differences in capacity
for transactions without detracting from its positive significance. Members of the society of nations may be presumed
i Art. 73. "The Portuguese Republic, without prejudice to its engagements
under its Treaties of Alliance, advocates the principle of arbitration as the best
method of solving international questions" (Transl. from B. F. S. P.).
2 Art. 138. " In international Treaties the following clause shall be inserted : ' All differences between the Contracting Parties shall be decided by arbitration
without appeal to war.'" (Transl. from B. F. S. P.).
1 Art. 102 (transl. from B. F . S. P.). See remarks of Dominican delegate, La
Deux. Confb., II, 147. Interesting possibilities in the development of internal
limitations are suggested by the idea of autonomous neutralization. See Robinson,
in A. J. /. L. (1917), XI, 6o7-616.
c Honduras, Art. 16; Nicaragua, Art. 16; Salvador, Art. 11.
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to be equal as a general principle; but when it appears that

in certain aspects of legal capacity they are organically un-

equal, it would seem that the law must either take cogni-

zance of the facts or else admit its unreality.

Internal Limitations on Capacity for Rights

What has just been said applies with equal force to in-

to be equal as a general principle; but when it appears that
in certain aspects of legal capacity they are organically un·
equal, it would seem that the law must either take cogni·
zance of the facts or else admit its unreality.

ternal limitations on capacity for rights. The state, as an

international person, may be organically incapable of rights

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON CAPACITY FOR RIGHTS

as well as transactions, that is to say, it may be constitu-

tionally without power to conserve certain interests by ex-

acting particular acts, forbearances, services, or benefits.

Wherever an incapacity of this sort exists there is a limita-

tion upon that equality which the law of nations presumes

among its subjects.

There are internal limitations in several states on that

capacity to control the national domain which is presumed

among members of the international community. This is

true in the case of Panama, although here it is really the

consequence of an external limitation which has been for-
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mally recognized in the constitution.1 A better illustration

of incapacity for rights of jurisdiction is found in the pro-

visions of several American constitutions declaring the navi-

gation of interior rivers free to all flags.2

The law of nations presumes that each of its subjects is

capable of regulating the admission of goods and persons

from other countries. It has already been pointed out that

Switzerland's capacity for levying import duties is limited

by the terms of its organic law. In several other states there

are important restrictions on the capacity to exclude alien

1 Art. 3. Cf. Costa Rica, Art. 15.

1 Argentine, Arts. 20, 26; Honduras, Art. 141; Paraguay, Art. 7. Art. 26 of the

Constitution of Argentine is as follows: "Navigation on the rivers in the interior

of the nation is free to all flags, and subject to no other regulations than those pro-

claimed by the national authority." (Dodd's transl.).

What has just been said applies with equal force to in·
ternal limitations on capacity for rights. The state, as an
international person, may be organically incapable of rights
as well as transactions, that is to say, it may be constitutionally without power to conserve certain interests by exacting particular acts, forbearances, services, or benefits.
Wherever an incapacity of this sort exists there is a limitation upon that equality which the law of nations presumes
among its subjects.
There are internal limitations in several states on that
capacity to control the national domain which is presumed
among members of the international community. This is
true in the case of Panama, although here it is really the
consequence of an external limitation which has been formally recognized in the constitution. 1 A better illustration
of incapacity for rights of jurisdiction is found in the provisions of several American constitutions declaring the navigation of interior rivers free to all flags. 2
The law of nations presumes that each of its subjects is
capable of regulating the admission of goods and persons
from other countries. It has already been pointed out that
Switzerland's capacity for levying import duties is limited
by the terms of its organic law. In several other states there
are important restrictions on the capacity to exclude alien
Art. 3. Cf. Costa Rica, Art. 15.
2 Argentine, Arts. 20 1 26; Honduras, Art. 141; Paraguay, Art. 7. Art. 26 of the
1

Constitution of Argentine is as follows: " Navigation on the rivers in the interior
of the nation is free to all flags, and subject to no other regulations than those proclaimed by the national authority." (Dodd's transl.).
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persons.1 The provision in the Constitution of Argentine

is as follows:

The federal government shall encourage European immigration,

persons.1 The provision in the Constitution of Argentine
is as follows:

and shall not have power to restrict, limit, or obstruct, by taxation

of any kind, the entrance into the Argentine territory of foreigners

coming to it for the purpose of engaging in the cultivation of the soil,

the improvement of industrial business, or the introduction and

teaching of arts and sciences.2

Bolivia's fundamental law deals with the matter in more

general terms:

Every man has the right to enter the territory of the Republic,

remain therein, travel through it, leave it, without any other restric-

The federal government shall encourage European immigration,
and shall not have power to restrict, limit, or obstruct, by taxation
of any kind, the entrance into the Argentine territory of foreigners
coming to it for the purpose of engaging in the cultivation of the soil,
the improvement of industrial business, or the introduction and
teaching of arts and sciences.2

tions than those established by international law; . . .3

The provisions quoted above may be contrasted with the

rule in Venezuela, where the President, with a consultative

vote of the Council of State, has power

Bolivia's fundamental law deals with the matter m more
general terms:

To prohibit, when he thinks desirable, the immigration of foreign-

ers into national territory, or to expel from it foreigners who have no

domicile established in the country.4
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The recent Mexican Constitution is equally explicit:

the Executive shall have the exclusive right to expel from the Re-

Every man has the right to enter the territory of the Republic,
remain therein, travel through it, leave it, without any other restrictions than those establi'>hed hy international law; ...3

public forthwith, and without judicial process, any foreigner whose

presence he may deem inexpedient.6

Again, the law of nations leaves states very large discre-

tion in deterrnining the status of aliens who choose to reside

within their boundaries. There must be no manifest denials

of justice, no unfair discriminations, no unwarranted con-

fiscations of property, but so long as these general principles

1 Argentine, Art. 25; Bolivia, Art. 4; Ecuador, Art. 37; Paraguay, Art. 6;

Spain, Art. 2.

* Art. 25 (Dodd's transl.).

The provisions quoted above may be contrasted with the
rule in Venezuela, where the President, with a consultative
vote of the Council of State, has power
To prohibit, when he thinks desirable, the immigration of foreigners into national territory, or to expel from it foreigners who have no
domicile established in the country.4

* Art. 4 (Rodriguez* transl.).

4 Art. 81, { 7 (transl. from B. P. S. P.).

* Art. 33 (Branche's transl.).

The recent Mexican Constitution is equally explicit:
the Executive shall have the exclusive right to expel from the Republic forthwith, and without judicial process, any foreigner whose
presence he may deem inexpedient. 6

Again, the law of nations leaves states very large discretion in determining the status of aliens who choose to reside
within their boundaries. There must be no manifest denials
of justice, no unfair discriminations, no unwarranted confiscations of property, but so long as these general principles
Argentine, Art. :25; Bolivia, Art. 4; Ecuador, Art. 37; Paraguay, Art. 6;
Spain, Art. 2.
t Art. 25 (Dodd's transl.).
3 Art. 4 (Rodriguez' transl.).
4 Art. 81, § 7 (transl. from B . F. S. P.).
5 Art. 33 (Branche's transl.).
1
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are observed each state is free to determine the rights of

aliens as it pleases. There are a number of states, however,

whose capacity for dealing with this question is organically

restricted. Reciprocity is stipulated as a general principle

in the constitutions of Colombia and Panama.1 Other con-

stitutions specifically guarantee to aliens the privilege of

owning and transferring real property, engaging in business,

and other privileges.2 The organic law of Argentine pro-

vides:

Aliens shall enjoy in the territory of the nation all the civil rights

of citizens. They may exercise their trade, business, or profession;

own, buy, and transfer real estate; navigate the rivers and coasts;

practice freely their religion; make wills, and contract marriage in

conformity with the law. They shall not be compelled to become

are observed each state is free to determine the rights of
aliens as it pleases. There are a number of states, however,
whose capacity for dealing with this question is organically
restricted. Reciprocity is stipulated as a general principle
in the constitutions of Colombia and Panama.1 Other constitutions specifically guarantee to aliens the privilege of
owning and transferring real property, engaging in business,
and other privileges. 2 The organic law of Argentine provides:

citizens or to pay forced extraordinary taxes.'

In Haiti, on the other hand, it is constitutionally impossible

for any but Haitians to own real property or acquire it by

any means whatever.4

The capacity to protect citizens of other states is a matter
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of grave international concern. Only as it is complete can

an international person be assured of freedom from external

interference, or demand the fullest protection for its own

citizens abroad. Several American republics are curiously

Aliens shall enjoy in the territory of the nation all the civil rights
of citizens. They may exercise their trade, business, or profession;
own, buy, and transfer real estate; navigate the rivers and coasts;
practice freely their religion; make wills, and contract marriage in
conformity with the law. They shall not be compelled to become
citizens or to pay forced extraordinary taxes. 3

limited in this matter, the limitation operating directly in

some cases and indirectly in others. The problem of pro-

tection is somewhat complicated in a few instances by con-

stitutional provisions which come very near to establishing

involuntary naturalization, thus tending to subject aliens to

the responsibilities of citizens without free decision.6 Several

1 Colombia, Art. 11; Panama, Art. 9.

* Argentine, Art. 20; Costa Rica, Art. 12; Honduras, Arts. 11, 12, 13; Nica-

ragua, Art. 13; Paraguay, Art. 33; Peru, Art. 28; Salvador, Art. 47.

'Art. 20 (Dodd's transl.).

* Art. 6.

5 See Brazil, Art. 60; Dominican Republic, Art. 7; Guatemala, Art. 5.

In Haiti, on the other hand, it is constitutionally impossible
for any but Haitians to own real property or acquire it by
any means whatever. 4
The capacity to protect citizens of other states is a matter
of grave international concern. Only as it is complete can
an international person be assured of freedom from external
interference, or demand the fullest protection for its own
citizens abroad. Several American republics are curiously
limited in this matter, the limitation operating directly in
some cases and indirectly in others. The problem of protection is somewhat complicated in a few instances by constitutional provisions which come very near to establishing
involuntary naturalization, thus tending to subject aliens to
the responsibilities of citizens without free decision.6 Several
Colombia, Art. 11; Panama, Art. 9.
Argentine, Art. 20; Costa Rica, Art. 12; Honduras, Arts. u, 12, 13; Nicaragua, Art. 13; Paraguay, Art. 33; Peru, Art. 28; Salvador, Art. 47.
a Art. 20 (Dodd's transl.).
4 Art. 6.
~ See Brazil, Art. 69; Dominican Republic, Art. 7; Guatemala, Art. 5.
1
t

INTERNAL LIMITATIONS
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS

215

215

American constitutions deny citizens and aliens alike the

right to claim indemnity for damages caused by revolution-

ists.1 This restriction is aimed at the individual, but in

practice it seems to have an indirect effect upon the state.

The same may be said of another type of provision which

forbids aliens to resort to diplomatic protection.2 Such a

provision appears in the recent Mexican Constitution:

Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies

have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters and their appur-

tenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters or mineral

fuels in the Republic of Mexico. The Nation may grant the same

American constitutions deny citizens and aliens alike the
right to claim indemnity for damages caused by revolutionists.1 This restriction is aimed at the individual, but in
practice it seems to have an indirect effect upon the state.
The same may be said of another type of provision which
forbids aliens to resort to diplomatic protection. 2 Such a
provision appears in the recent Mexican Constitution:

right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Department of

Foreign Affairs to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property,

and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their Governments

in respect to the same, under penalty, in case of breach, of forfeiture

to the Nation of property so acquired.*

All public contracts in Venezuela must contain a clause,

expressed or implied, by which resort to diplomatic inter-

position is renounced:
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No contract of public interest made by the Federal Government

or that of the States, by the municipalities, or by any other public

authority, shall be transferred wholly or in part to a foreign Govern-

ment; and in all such contracts shall be considered incorporated,

although it may not be expressed, the following clause: "The dis-

Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies
have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters or mineral
fuels in the Republic of Mexico. The Nation may grant the same
right to foreigners, provided they agree before the Department of
Foreign Affairs to be considered Mexicans in respect to such property,
and accordingly not to invoke the protection of their Governments
in respect to the same, under penalty, in case of breach, of forfeiture
to the Nation of property so acquired.3

putes and controversies of whatever nature that may arise in con-

nection with this contract, and that cannot be settled amicably by

the Contracting Parties, shall be decided by the competent Tribunals

of Venezuela, in conformity with its laws, and cannot for any motive

or any cause become the subject of foreign claims." Companies

formed to carry out the above-mentioned contracts shall establish

All public contracts in Venezuela must contain a clause,
expressed or implied, by which resort to diplomatic interposition is renounced:

their legal domicile in the country.4

1 Guatemala, Art. 14; Haiti, Art. 185; Honduras, Art. 142; Salvador, Art. 46;

Venezuela, Art. 21. See also Nicaragua, Art. 14.

'Guatemala, Art. 23; Honduras, Art. 15; Mexico, Art. 27; Nicaragua, Art. 15.

* Art. 27 (Branche's transl.).

* Art. 142 (transl. from B. F. S. P.).

No contract of public interest made by the Federal Government
or that of the States, by the municipalities, or by any other public
authority, shall be transferred wholly or in part to a foreign Government; and in all such contracts shall be considered incorporated,
although it may not be expressed, the following clause: " The disputes and controversies of whatever nature that may arise in connection with this contract, and that cannot be settled amicably by
the Contracting Parties, shall be decided by the competent Tribunals
of Venezuela, in conformity with its laws, and cannot for any motive
or any cause become the subject of foreign claims." Companies
formed to carry out the above-mentioned contracts shall establish
their legal domicile in the country.'
1 Guatemala, Art. 14; Haiti, Art. 185; Honduras, Art. 142; Salvador, Art. 46;
Venezuela, Art. 21. See also Nicaragua, Art. 14.
' Guatemala, Art. 23; Honduras, Art. 15; Mexico, Art. 27; Nicaragua, Art. 15.
1 Art. 27 (Branche's transl.).
' Art. 142 (transl. from B. F. S. P.).
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It is difficult to determine the extent to which provisions

like those cited above affect international capacity for

rights. Certainly in practice they place a state in an un-

usual position with respect to other members of the society

of nations.

A constitutional division of authority between the central

and local governments within a state may create serious

incapacities with respect to the protection of aliens. Such

a situation exists in the United States where the federal

government assumes responsibility for the protection of

aliens, but leaves the actual enforcement of that protection

to the discretion of the local authorities.1 The problem may

arise under any federal constitution. It is highly developed

within the British Empire, where many of the obligations of

the Empire are executed by the self-governing dominions.

The British North America Act of 1867 provides with re-

spect to Canada:

The Parliament and government of Canada shall have all powers

necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

any provinces thereof, as part of the British empire, towards foreign

countries, arising under treaties between the empire and such foreign

countries*

There is a similar division of authority between the British

Government and the governments of the other autonomous

dominions.

Internal Limitations on Capacity for Political

Rights

It is difficult to determine the extent to which provisions
like those cited above affect international capacity for
rights. Certainly in practice they place a state in an unusual position with respect to other members of the society
of nations.
A constitutional division of authority between the central
and local governments within a state may create serious
incapacities with respect to the protection of aliens. Such
a situation exists in the United States where the federal
government assumes responsibility for the protection of
aliens, but leaves the actual enforcement of that protection
to the discretion of the local authorities. 1 The problem may
arise under any federal constitution. It is highly developed
within the British Empire, where many of the obligations of
the Empire are executed by the self-governing dominions.
The British North America Act of 1867 provides with respect to Canada:

Still another type of incapacity, imposed from within,

has recently become important and will no doubt grow in

importance as the society of nations struggles towards

1 See Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, §§ 45, 91» i6S, passim;

Despagnet, in R. G. D. I. P. (1895), II, 195.

* § 132.

The Parliament and government of Canada shall have all powers
necessary or proper for performing the obligations of Canada or of
any provinces thereof, as part of the British empire, towards foreign
countries, arising under treaties between the empire and such foreign
countries.2

There is a similar division of authority between the British
Government and the governments of the other autonomous
dominions.
INTERNAL LIMITATIONS ON CAPACITY FOR POLITICAL
RIGHTS

Still another type of incapacity, imposed from within,
has recently become important and will no doubt grow in
importance as the society of nations struggles towards
1 See Borchard, Diflomati.c Prol«tion of Citiuns Abroad, H 45, 91, 165, passim;
Despagnet, in R. G. D. I. P. (18<)5), II, 195.
2 § 132.
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greater perfection of organization. To what extent are the

members of international society incapacitated by their

fundamental laws from participating in the creation of super-

national institutions ?1 In other words, how far are they

organically incapable of what may be called international

political rights?

After the convention for the establishment of an inter-

national prize court was drafted, it was discovered that

certain states could not submit the judgment of a national

final court of appeal to review before an international tri-

bunal. In a voeu, included in the Final Protocol of the

London Naval Conference, the delegates agreed to call the

attention of their respective governments

to the advantage of concluding an arrangement under which such

States would have the power, at the time of depositing their ratifi-

cations, to add thereto a reservation to the effect that resort to the

International Prize Court in respect of decisions of their National

Tribunals shall take the form of a direct claim for compensation.*

Thirteen states signed an additional protocol at The Hague
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in iqio, making provision for difficulties of a constitutional

greater perfection of organization. To what extent are the
members of international society incapacitated by their
fundamental laws from participating in the creation of supernational institutions ? 1 In other words, how far are they
organically incapable of what may be called international
political rights ?
After the convention for the establishment of an international prize court was drafted, it was discovered that
certain states could not submit the judgment of a national
final court of appeal ·to review before an international tribunal. In a vreu, included in the Final Protocol of the
London Naval Conference, the delegates agreed to call the
attention of their respective governments

nature in the following terms:

The Powers signatory or adhering to the Hague convention of

October 18, 1907, relative to the establishment of an international

court of prize, which are prevented by difficulties of a constitutional

nature from accepting the said convention in its present form, have

the right to declare in the instrument of ratification or adherence that

in prize cases, whereof their national courts have jurisdiction, re-

course to the international court of prize can only be exercised against

to the advantage of concluding an arrangement under which such
States would have the power, at the time of depositing their ratifications, to add thereto a reservation to the effect that resort to the
International Prize Court in respect of decisions of their National
Tribunals shall take the form of a direct claim for compensation.'

them in the form of an action in damages for the injury caused by the

capture.

In the case of recourse to the international court of prize, in the

form of an action for damages, Article 8 of the convention is not appli-

cable; it is not for the court to pass upon the validity or the nullity

Thirteen states signed an additional protocol at The Hague
in 1910, making provision for difficulties of a constitutional
nature in the following terms:

1 See the discussion of this question by Wright, in A. J. I. L. (1918), XTJ, 64-95.

1 A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1909), III, 184; Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences,

P-443-

The Powers signatory or adhering to the Hague convention of
October 18, 1907, relative to the establishment of an international
court of prize, which are prevented by difficulties of a constitutional
nature from accepting the said convention in its present form, have
the right to declare in the instrument of ratification or adherence that
in prize cases, whereof their national courts have jurisdiction, recourse to the international court of prize can only be exercised against
them in the form of an action in damages for the injury caused by the
capture.
In the case of recourse to the international court of prize, in the
form of an action for damages, Article 8 of the convention is not applicable; it is not for the court to pass upon the validity or the nullity
See the discussion of this question by Wright, in A. J. I. L. {1918), XII, 64°"'95·
A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1909), III, 184; Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferenus,
p. 443.
1
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of the capture, nor to reverse or affirm the decision of the national

tribunals.

If the capture is considered illegal, the court determines the amount

of damages to be allowed, if any, to the claimants.1

The United States Senate approved the international prize

of the capture, nor to reverse or affirm the decision of the national
tribunals.
If the capture is considered illegal, the court determines the amount
of damages to be allowed, if any, to the claimants.1

court convention on condition that the declaration con-

templated in the above protocol be included in the instru-

ment of ratification.*

The United States has also encountered constitutional

difficulties which hamper its participation in certain inter-

national administrative arrangements.3 The significance of

limitations of this kind is only beginning to be appreciated.

They will undoubtedly become more important in the future

as further progress is made towards the creation of super-

national authority.

Summary

It has been the purpose of the present chapter to suggest

something of the relation which exists between the consti-

tution of the state and the state's legal and political capacity
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as a member of the community of nations. It seems evident

enough that the state's capacity as an international person

may be defined and limited in important respects by its

organic law. Certain of these limitations prescribe the form

of transactions in which the state participates by fixing the

The United States Senate approved the international prize
court convention on condition that the declaration contemplated in the above protocol be included in the instrument of ratification.2
The United States has also encountered constitutional
difficulties which hamper its participation in certain international administrative arrangements.3 The significance of
limitations of this kind is only beginning to be appreciated.
They will undoubtedly become more important in the future
as further progress is made towards the creation of supernational authority.

procedure of treaty making, war making, and other trans-

SUMMARY

actions of less importance. It has been suggested that it

may not be practicable, in determining the legal status of

the state as an international person, to take account of such

procedural limitations. The suggestion should not be per-

mitted to obscure the fact that, indirectly at least, such

limitations affect the substance of capacity as well as the

1 Arts. 1, 2; A.J. I. L.Suppl. (1911), V, 95.

! Ibid., p. 99.

* Reinsch, Public International Unions, pp. 48, 65, note 1.

It has been the purpose of the present chapter to suggest
something of the relation which exists between the constitution of the state and the state's legal and political capacity
as a member of the community of nations. It seems evident
enough that the state's capacity as an international person
may be defined and limited in important respects by its
organic law. Certain of these limitations prescribe the form
of transactions in which the state participates by fixing the
procedure of treaty making, war making, and other transactions of less importance. It has been suggested that it
may not be practicable, in determining the legal status of
the state as an international person, to take account of such
procedural limitations. The suggestion should not be permitted to obscure the fact that, indirectly at least, such
limitations affect the substance of capacity as well as the
1 Arts. l, 2; A. J. I. L. Suppl. (191 l), V, 95.
2 lltid., p. 99.
a Reinsch, Public Internatwnal Unions, pp. 48, 65, note x.
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particular procedure by which it finds expression. It can

not be overlooked that such limitations may be matters of

the gravest consequence for the entire international com-

munity. Other organic limitations restrict directly the

state's capacity for transactions by making it incapable of

becoming a party to certain kinds of treaties, declaring war

under certain circumstances, or extraditing certain kinds of

offenders. Of these three illustrations, it may be noted,

constitutional incapacities to participate in certain kinds of

treaties are at present of the greatest practical importance.

Organic limitations also restrict the state's capacity for

legal rights, notably in connection with the control of the

national domain, the admission of goods and of persons,

the determination of the status of aliens, and the protection

of aliens. Finally, organic limitations on capacity for po-

litical rights should be distinguished as belonging to a sep-

arate category. They have not received a great deal of

attention hitherto for the reason that the problem has arisen

only in connection with certain of the administrative unions
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and with the permanent tribunals proposed at the Second

Hague Peace Conference; but with the rapidly accelerating

demand for a more effective integration of the international

community and for the constitution of some recognized su-

pernational authority it is certain that organic limitations

on political capacity, as distinguished from legal capacity,

will require more attention in the future.

The subject of internal limitations has never received ade-

quate consideration. More often than otherwise it has been

dismissed with the dictum that the law of nations has no

concern with the constitution of the state. This dictum,

it is submitted, requires revaluation. It has been univer-

sally approved in the sense that each people must be free to

determine its own form of government without external

interference; but it certainly cannot be taken to mean that

particular procedure by which it finds expression. It can
not be overlooked that such limitations may be matters of
the gravest consequence for the entire international community. Other organic limitations restrict directly the
state's capacity for transactions by making it incapable of
becoming a party to certain kinds of treaties, declaring war
under certain circumstances, or extraditing certain kinds of
offenders. Of these three illustrations, it may be noted,
constitutional incapacities to participate in certain kinds of
treaties are at present of the greatest practical importance.
Organic limitations also restrict the state's capacity for
legal rights, notably in connection with the control of the
national domain, the admission of goods and of persons,
the determination of the status of aliens, and the protection
of aliens. Finally, organic limitations on capacity for political rights should be distinguished as belonging to a separate category. They have not received a great deal of
attention hitherto for the reason that the problem has arisen
only in connection with certain of the administrative unions
and with the permanent tribunals proposed at the Second
Hague Peace Conference; but with the rapidly accelerating
demand for a more effective integration of the international
community and for the constitution of some recognized supernational authority it is certain that organic limitations
on political capacity, as distinguished from legal capacity,
will require more attention in the future.
The subject of internal limitations has never received adequate consideration. More often than otherwise it has been
dismissed with the dictum that the law of nations has no
concern with the constitution of the state. This dictum,
it is submitted, requires revaluation. It has been universally approved in the sense that each people must be free to
determine its own form of government without external
interference; but it certainly cannot be taken to mean that
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the law of nations is blind to important capacities and in-

capacities arising out of the organic constitutions of its sub-

jects. Viewing equality in the law of nations as a matter

of legal and political capacity, and there is no other way in

which it can be viewed without denying the possibility of

future development along rational lines, the conclusion is

beyond doubt that account must be taken of internal limi-

tations. It is no answer to say that internal limitations may

be disregarded because the people in each state have it in

their power to amend or eliminate them. As observed at

the outset, the law of nations is not presently concerned

with potential changes in the legal condition of its subjects;

it is concerned with the existing capacities and incapacities

of the members of the international community to which

its rules apply. If the equality of states is to have practical

significance as a legal principle, it will be necessary for the

law of nations to take account of those limitations on legal

and political capacity which arise in each instance out of
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the fundamental organization of the state.

the law of nations is blind to important capacities and incapacities arising out of the organic constitutions of its subjects. Viewing equality in the law of nations as a matter
of legal and political capacity, and there is no other way in
which it can be viewed without denying the possibility of
future development along rational lines, the conclusion is
beyond doubt that account must be taken of internal limitations. It is no answer to say that internal limitations may
be disregarded because the people in each state have it in
their power to amend or eliminate them. As observed at
the outset, the law of nations is not presently concerned
with potential changes in the legal condition of its subjects;
it is concerned with the existing capacities and incapacities
of the members of the international community to which
its rules apply. If the equality of states is to have practical
significance as a legal principle, it will be necessary for the
law of nations to take account of those limitations on legal
and political capacity which arise in each instance out of
the fundamental organization of the state.

CHAPTER VII

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EQUALITY

of states

The Nature of External Limitations

External limitations upon a state's international capacity

are the result of certain relationships which it has with other

members of the society of nations. Such limitations are

CHAPTER VII

created by general treaties, by certain special treaties cre-

ating relationships which obtain general recognition, and

by the positive law of nations as proved by common usage.

They operate to restrict the legal capacity of the state as an

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS UPON THE EQUALITY
OF STATES

international person, rendering it incapable of acquiring

certain international rights or of entering into certain in-

ternational transactions. External limitations have two

important characteristics: (i) the state cannot divest itself

of the incapacity by its own act; (2) the state is placed in

a position of legal incapacity with respect to the entire com-

munity of nations. Wherever limitations of this kind apply

only to a single state or to a particular group of states, the

state or group affected is in a condition of legal inequality

with respect to other members of the society of nations.
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Inequalities of condition or status have always played an

important part in international relations.1 There are indi-

cations that their importance will increase as the interna-

tional community becomes more closely integrated.

Limitations Incident to Geographical Situation

In the first place, it is evident that positive incapacities

may be the result of an anomalous or exceptional situation

1 See supra, p. 124, note 1. Huber denies that positive limitations on equality

are recognized by international law. Die Gleichheit der S km ten, pp. 97 ff.

h1

THE NATURE OF EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS
EXTERNAL limitations upon a state's international capacity
are the result of certain relationships which it has with other
members of the society of nations. Such limitations are
created by general treaties, by certain special treaties creating relationships which obtain general recognition, and
by the positive law of nations as proved by common usage.
They operate to restrict the legal capacity of the state as an
international person, rendering it incapable of acquiring
certain international rights or of entering into certain international transactions. External limitations have two
important characteristics: (r) the state cannot divest itself
of the incapacity by its own act; (2) the state is placed in
a position of legal incapacity with respect to the entire community of nations. Wherever limitations of this kind apply
only to a single state or to a particular group of states, the
state or group affected is in a condition of legal inequality
with respect to other members of the society of nations.
Inequalities of condition or status have always played an
important part in international relations. 1 There are indications that their importance will increase as the international community becomes more closely integrated.
LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO GEOGRAPHICAL SITUATION
In the first place, it is evident that positive incapacities
may be the result of an anomalous or exceptional situation
1 See supra, p. 124, note 1. Huber denies that positive limitations on equality
are recognized by international law. Di~ Gleichheit der Slaaten, pp. 97 ff.
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as regards the physical bases of state existence. Thus, a

state may be so situated geographically as to be incapable

of acquiring certain rights or of entering into certain trans-

actions. The writers have been inclined to dismiss the

problem which this sort of incapacity suggests with the

dictum that states are equal " quite apart from diversity of

territory." The dictum's insufficiency has been recognized,

however, in at least a few instances. Fiore's discussion of

limitations on the equality of an inland state is in point.1

The inland state affords an excellent illustration of what is

meant by limitations incident to geographical situation.

The subject has received relatively little attention in the

books, but the practice of nations has necessarily made a

number of important distinctions between the international

capacity of non-maritime states on the one hand and of

states having access to the sea on the other. These distinc-

tions have occasionally found expression in formal conven-

tion and in the language of judicial opinion. Article 36 of

the Declaration of London recognized the exceptional status
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of an inland state by admitting the applicability of the prin-

ciple of continuous voyage to conditional contraband " where

the enemy country has no seaboard." During the World

War both German and British courts urged that the failure

of non-maritime belligerents like Servia and Montenegro

to ratify the maritime conventions, submitted by the Second

Hague Conference, should not be permitted to defeat the

operation of those conventions, notwithstanding the express

provision that they should be binding only when ratified by

all the belligerents.2 It requires no exhaustive marshalling

1 See supra, p. 121; Int. Law Cod., § 398.

1 See the dictum of Sir Samuel Evans in the case of The Mowe, quoted supra,

p. 163. In the case of The Fenix,in the Imperial Supreme Prize Court in Berlin,

December 17, 1914, it was argued that the convention relative to the status of

enemy merchant-ships at the outbreak of hostilities was applicable although it had

not been ratified by non-maritime belligerents. It was said: "Likewise the fact

that Servia and Montenegro did not ratify the convention stands just as little in

as regards the physical bases of state existence. Thus, a
state may be so situated geographically as to be incapable
of acquiring certain rights or of entering into certain transactions. The writers have been inclined to dismiss the
problem which this sort of incapacity suggests with the
dictum that states are equal " quite apart from diversity of
territory." The dictum's insufficiency has been recognized,
however, in at least a few instances. Fiore's discussion of
limitations on the equality of an inland state is in point.1
The inland state affords an excellent illustration of what is
meant by limitations incident to geographical situation.
The subject has received relatively little attention in the
books, but the practice of nations has necessarily made a
number of important distinctions between the international
capacity of non-maritime states on the one hand and of
states having access to the sea on the other. These distinctions have occasionally found expression in formal convention and in the language of judicial opinion. Article 36 of
the Declaration of London recognized the exceptional status
of an inland state by admitting the applicability of the principle of continuous voyage to conditional contraband " where
the enemy country has no seaboard." During the World
War both German and British courts urged that the failure
of non-maritime belligerents like Servia and Montenegro
to ratify the maritime conventions, submitted by the Second
Hague Conference, should not be permitted to defeat the
operation of those conventions, notwithstanding the express
provision that they should be binding only when ratified by
all the belligerents. 2 It requires no exhaustive marshalling
See supra, p. 121; Int. Law Cod.,§ 398.
See the dictum of Sir Samuel Evans in the case of The Mowe, quoted supra,
p. 163. In the case of The Fenix, in the Imperial Supreme Prize Court in Berlin,
December 17, 1914, it was argued that the convention relative to the status of
enemy merchant-shlps at the outbreak of hostilities was applicable although it had
not been ratified by non-maritime belligerents. It was said: "Likewise the fact
that Servia and Montenegro did not ratify the convention stands just as little in
1
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of the evidence to show that the inland state is without ca-

pacity for a multitude of important maritime rights and

transactions. Until the principles of international law have

been extensively revised, this type of incapacity must re-

main a matter of considerable importance in practice as well

as in theory.

Limitations Incident to the Character of

Civilization

The condition of a state's population, as well as the situ-

of the evidence to show that the inland state is without capacity for a multitude of important maritime rights and
transactions. Until the principles of international law have
been extensively revised, this type of incapacity must remain a matter of considerable importance in practice as well
as in theory.

ation of its territory, may give rise to important limitations

on equality. Here again, incapacities arise out of an anoma-

lous or exceptional situation as regards one of the physical

bases of state existence. Fundamental differences in the

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO THE CHARACTER OF
CIVILIZATION

character of civilization have always been the source of im-

portant limitations on capacity. A few authorities have

implied that such differences do not affect the application

of the principle of equality,1 but this is not the prevailing

opinion. Most of the modern publicists recognize that

equality can be the rule only among states having common
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standards of civilization. Fiore has stated the prevailing

opinion effectively:

The very necessity of things requires, therefore, that certain states

should not be called to enjoy international rights in an integral fashion

and with perfect equality. So it is reasonable that the states of

Europe should not admit perfect equality of right with Turkey and

its dependencies; with the states of Africa, with the exception of

Liberia and the English and French colonies; with the states of Asia,

the way of its application in this case, since they are not maritime states, and Art. 6

of the convention must be taken to mean that it shall not apply only if the belliger-

ents, being maritime states, are not parties to it." This argument was approved

by the court, which said: "Finally, the circumstance that the belligerent states

Servia and Montenegro did not ratify the convention raises no doubt, for the

reasons advanced by the claimants, concerning its applicability to the case under

review." Transl. in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 910, 912.

1 SeeBarbosa, supra, p. 183; Carnazza Amari, supra, p. 113; Sir William Scott,

The condition of a state's population, as well as the situation of its territory, may give rise to important limitations
on equality. Here again, incapacities arise out of an anomalous or exceptional situation as regards one of the physical
bases of state existence. Fundamental differences in the
character of civilization have always been the source of important limitations on capacity. A few authorities have
implied that such differences do not affect the application
of the principle of equality,1 but this is not the prevailing
opm1on. Most of the modern publicists recognize that
equality can be the rule only among states having common
standards of civilization. Fiore has stated the prevailing
opinion effectively:

supra, p. 159.

The very necessity of things requires, therefore, that certain states
should not be called to enjoy international rights in an integral fashion
and with perfect equality. So it is reasonable that the states of
Europe should not admit perfect equality of right with Turkey and
its dependencies; with the states of Africa, with the exception of
Liberia and the English and French colonies; with the states of Asia,
the way of its application in this case, since they are not maritime states, and Art. 6
of the convention must be taken to mean that it shall not apply only if the belligerents, being maritime states, are not parties to it." This argument was approved
by the court, which said: "Finally, the circumstance that the belligerent states
Servia and Montenegro did not ratify the convention raises no doubt, for the
reasons advanced by the claimants, concerning its applicability to the case under
review." Transl. in A. J. /. L. (1916), X, 910, 912.
1 See Barbosa, supra, p. 183; Camazza Amari, supra, p. u3; Sir William Scott,
supra, p. 159.
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with the exception of Siberia and Hindostan. In fact, certain limi-

tations are made necessary by the exceptional situations in which

these countries are placed.

Therefore, we may lay down the following rules:

(a) Full and entire juridical equality ought to be limited to those

states among which there have been developed the fundamental jurid-

ical ideas essential to the coexistence of states in society.

(b) A state which does not find itself in a position to fulfil its

international duties towards other states, either as a result of tra-

ditional prejudices, of its internal organization, or its customs and

its religious beliefs, can only demand the full enjoyment of inter-

national rights in perfect equality on condition that it change its

internal organization so as to enable it to fulfil its international duties

by giving substantial guaranties on this subject.

(c) As long as such reforms are not carried out within those states,

other states which have relations with them ought to observe the stipu-

lations of treaties. As far as international law is unwritten, they

ought to observe the rules which, considering the social conditions

of the uncivilized state, are compatible with the protection and de-
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fense of public rights and private citizens.1

Inequalities of legal capacity arising out of differences in

civilization are manifested in several important rules of the

positive law of nations. Those imposed in the form of ex-

traterritorial jurisdiction, in the application of the right of

diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, in the exclusion of

aliens, and in the practice of granting asylum in legations

and consulates and on public vessels may be considered

briefly.

It is fundamentally because of differences in civilization

that limitations have been imposed upon the jurisdiction of

eastern states over the nationals of western countries resid-

ing within their territories.2 Under treaties, reenforced

1 Trattato, J§ 425-427,1, 291; Int. Law Cod., §§ 395,399. See Bonfils, Manuel,

§ 273, p. 162; Chrftien, Principes, § 175, p. 176; Cobbett, Cases, I, 45-48; Lori-

mer, Institutes, I, 218; Oppenheim, Int. Law, §§ 102-103, I, *54-

• See Anninjon, Strangers et protégts dans I'Empire ottoman; Brown, Foreigners

in Turkey; Calary de Lamaziere, Les capitulations en Bulgarie; Hall, Foreign Powers

and Jurisdiction of the British Crown; Heyking, L'exterritorialiU; Hinckley, Ameri-

with the exception of Siberia and Hindostan. In fact, certain funi.
tations are made necessary by the exceptional situations in which
these countries are placed.
Therefore, we may lay down the following rules:
(a) Full and entire juridical equality ought to be limited to those
states among which there have been developed the fundamental jurid·
ical ideas essential to the coexistence of states in society.
(b) A state which does not find itself in a position to fulfil its
international duties towards other states, either as a result of tra·
ditional prejudices, of its internal organization, or its customs and
its religious beliefs, can only demand the full enjoyment of inter·
national rights in perfect equality on condition that it change its
internal organization so as to enable it to fulfil its international duties
by giving substantial guaranties on this subject.
(c) As long as such reforms are not carried out within those states,
other states which have relations with them ought to observe the stipulations of treaties. As far as international law is unwritten, they
ought to observe the rules which, considering the social conditions
of the uncivilized state, are compatible with the protection and defense of public rights and private citizens.1

Inequalities of legal capacity arising out of differences in
civilization are manifested in several important rules of the
positive law of nations. Those imposed in the form of extraterritorial jurisdiction, in the application of the right of
diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, in the exclusion of
aliens, and in the practice of granting asylum in legations
and consulates and on public vessels may be considered
briefly.
It is fundamentally because of differences in civilization
that limitations have been imposed upon the jurisdiction of
eastern states over the nationals of western countries residing within their territories. 2 Under treaties, reenforced
1 Trattalo, H 425-427 J I, 291; Im. Law Cod., §§ 395, 399· See Bonfils, M antul,
§ 273, p. 162; Chretien, Principes, § 175, p. 176; Cobbett, Cases, I, 45-48; Lorimer, /nstiluUs, I, 218; Oppenheim, Im. Law, §§ 102-103, I, 154.
1 See Anninjon, 2trangers el proUgts clans l'Empire ottoman; Brown, Foreigners
in Turkey; Calary de Lamaziere, Les capitulations en Bulgarie; Hall, Foreign Powers
and JurisdictU>n of the British Crown; Heyking, L'exterritorialiU; Hinckley, Amen-
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sometimes by custom,1 authority over Europeans and Amer-

icans in the Near East, the Far East, and many.parts of

Africa has been vested at different times in consular courts.

According to Borchard,

The extraterritorial privileges usually include an exemption from

the jurisdiction of the courts of the oriental state; inviolability of the

domicil; freedom from arrest by native officials, except when in the

act of committing a flagrant crime; if arrested, the right of surrender

to the consul for trial and punishment; criminal or civil trial in con-

sular or national courts of the accused or defendant; general juris-

diction of the foreign consul over his nationals, with right to require

the assistance of the local authorities; and notification of the consul

in case of the arrest of native employees of an American citizen.2

The treaty basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction may be

illustrated from the treaties in force between the United

States and China. Controversies involving subjects of

China and citizens of the United States are settled under

provisions of the treaties of 1858 and 1880 as follows:

Subjects of China guilty of any criminal act toward citizens of the

sometimes by custom,1 authority over Europeans and Americans in the Near East, the Far East, and many .parts of
Africa has been vested at different times in consular courts.
According to Borchard,
The extraterritorial privileges usually include an exemption from
the jurisdiction of the courts of the oriental state; inviolability of the
domicil; freedom from arrest by native officials, except when in the
act of committing a flagrant crime; if arrested, the right of surrender
to the consul for trial and punishment; criminal or civil trial in consular or national courts of the accused or defendant; general jurisdiction of the foreign consul over his nationals, with right to require
the assistance of the local authorities; and notification of the consul
in case of the arrest of native employees of an American citizen.2
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United States shall be punished by the Chinese authorities according

can Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient; Koo, Status of Aliens in China; Lippmann,

Die Konsularjurisdiction im Orient; Moore, Digest, §§ 250-290, II, 593—755; Pfi1is-

sif i du Rausas, Le régime des capitulations dans I'Empire ottoman; Piggot, Exter-

ritoriality; Rey, De la protection diplomatique el consulaire dans les tchelles du Levant

el de Barbarie; Rioche, Les juridictions consulaires anglaises dans les pays d'Orient.

See also The Indian Chief, 3 C. Rob. 12, 29 (1800); Papayanni v. The Russian

Steam Navigation and Trading Company, 2 Moore P. C1, n. s., 161 (1863); Dainese

The treaty basis for extraterritorial jurisdiction may be
illustrated from the treaties in force between the United
States and China. Controversies involving subjects of
China and citizens of the United States are settled under
provisions of the treaties of 1858 and 1880 as follows:

t. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 64, 71 (1879); The Imperial Japanese Government v.

The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 20 A. C. 644, 654 (1895);

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling and Company, 70

L. J. P. C. 25, 28, 29 (1901); The Derfninger, No. r, 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 386, 388

Subjects of China guilty of any criminal act toward citizens of the
United States shall be punished by the Chinese authorities according

(1915); The LUtzow; The Koerber, 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 528 (1915); Casdagli v.

Casdagli, 87 L. J. P. 73, 8i, 83, 84 (1917), 88 L. J. P. 49 (1918); Foreign.Juris-

diction Act (1890), 53 & 54 Vict. c. 37; M. L. R. (1919), XVII, 437, 451, 694.

1 "The so-called extraterritorial rights, resting in their origin upon treaty, have

in the course of time, particularly in Turkey, Morocco and other countries, gathered

around themselves by custom an accretion of further encroachments upon the local

jurisdiction, so as to constitute in some countries a veritable imperium in imperio."

Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, § 181, p. 431.

» Ibid., § 182, p. 433-

can Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient; Koo, Status of Aliens in China; Lippmann,
Die Konsularjurisdiction im Orient; Moore, Digest,§§ 25()-290, II, 593-755; Pelissie du Rausas, Le regime des capitulations dans l'Empire ottcman; Piggot, ExterriUwiaWy; Rey, De la protection diplomatique et consulaire dans les uhelles du Levant
et de Barbarie; Rioche, Les furidictions consulaires anglaises dans les pays d'Orient.
See also The Indian Chief, 3 C. Rob. 12, 29 (18oo); Papayanni v. The Russian
Steam Navigation and Trading Company, 2 Moore P. Cl, N. s., 161 (1863); Dainese
v. United States, 15 Ct. Cl. 64, 71 (1879); The Imperial Japanese Government t1.
The Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, 20 A. C. 644, 654 (1895);
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling and Company, 70
L.]. P. C. 25, 28, 29 (1901); The Derffiinger, No. r, x Br. & Col. P. C. 386, 388
(1915); The Liltzow; The Koerber, 1 Br. & Col. P. C. 528 (1915); Casdagli t1.
Casdagli, 87 L. J. P. 73, 81, 83, 84 (1917), 88 L. J. P. 49 (1918); Foreign.Jurisdiction Act (1890), 53 & 54 Viet. c. 37; M. L. R. (1919), XVII, 437, 451, ~4·
1 "The so-called extraterritorial rights, resting in their origin upon treaty, have
in the course of time, particularly in Turkey, Morocco and other countries, gathered
around themselves by custom an accretion of further encroachments upon the local
jurisdiction, so as to constitute in some countries a veritable imperium in imperio."
Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citiuns Abroad,§ 181, p. 431.
2 Ibid., § 182, p. 433.
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to the laws of China; and citizens of the United States, either on

shore or in any merchant vessel, who may insult, trouble or wound

the persons or injure the property of Chinese, or commit any other

improper act in China, shall be punished only by the Consul or other

public functionary thereto authorized, according to the laws of the

United States. Arrests in order to trial may be made by either the

Chinese or the United States authorities.1

When controversies arise in the Chinese Empire between citizens

of the United States and subjects of His Imperial Majesty, which

need to be examined and decided by the public officers of the two

nations, it is agreed between the Governments of the United States

and China that such cases shall be tried by the proper official of the

nationality of the defendant. The properly authorized official of the

plaintiff's nationality shall be freely permitted to attend the trial and

shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be

granted all proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the

interests of justice. If he so desires, he shall have the right to present,

to examine and to cross-examine witnesses. If he is dissatisfied with

the proceedings, he shall be permitted to protest against them in
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detail. The law administered will be the law of the nationality of

the officer trying the case.2

Controversies between citizens of the United States, or be-

tween citizens of the United States and of other foreign

countries, may be settled without any participation by

Chinese authorities:

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, aris-

ing between citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the

jurisdiction and regulated by the authorities of their own Govern-

to the laws of China; and citizens of the United States, either on
shore or in any merchant vessel, who may insult, trouble or wound
the persons or injure the property of Chinese, or commit any other
improper act in China, shall be punished only by the Consul or other
public functionary thereto authorized, according to the laws of the
United States. Arrests in order to trial may be made by either the
Chinese or the United States authorities. 1
When controversies arise in the Chinese Empire between citizens
of the United States and subjects of His Imperial Majesty, which
need to be examined and decided by the public officers of the two
nations, it is agreed between the Governments of the United States
and China that such cases shall be tried by the proper official of the
nationality of the defendant. The properly authorized official of the
plaintiff's nationality shall be freely permitted to attend the trial and
shall be treated with the courtesy due to his position. He shall be
granted all proper facilities for watching the proceedings in the
interests of justice. If he so desires, he shall have the right to present,
to examine and to cross-examine witnesses. If he is dissatisfied with
the proceedings, he shall be permitted to protest against them in
detail. The law administered .will be the law of the nationality of
the officer trying the case.2

ment; and all controversies occurring in China between citizens of

the United States and the subjects of any other Government shall

be regulated by the treaties existing between the United States and

such Governments, respectively, without interference on the part of

China."

1 Treaty of 1858, Art. 11; Malloy, Treaties, I, 215.

J Treaty of 1880, Art. 4; Malloy, Treaties, I, 240.

8 Treaty of 1858, Art. 27; Malloy, Treaties, I, 220. Cf. Treaty with Persia,

Controversies between citizens of the United States, or between citizens of the United States and of other foreign
countries, may be settled without any participation by
Chinese authorities:

1856, Art. 5; Treaty with Siam, 1856, Art. 2; Treaty with Turkey, 1830, Art. 4;

Malloy, Treaties, II, 1372, 1630, 1319. See Moore, Extradition, I, 100, note 5.

All questions in regard to rights, whether of property or person, aris. ing between citizens of the United States in China shall be subject to the
jurisdiction and regulated by the authorities of their own Government; and all controversies occurring in China between citizens of
the United States and the subjects of any other Government shall
be regulated by the treaties existing between the United States and
such Governments, respectively, without interference on the part of
China.3
Treaty of 1858, Art. u; Malloy, Treaties, I, 215.
Treaty of 1880, Art. 4; Malloy, Treaties, I, 240.
a Treaty of 1858, Art. 27; Malloy, Treaties, I, 220. Cf. Treaty with Persia,
1856, Art. 5; Treaty with Siam, 1856, Art. 2; Treaty with Turkey, 1830, Art. 4;
Malloy, Treaties, II, 1372, 1630, 1319. See Moore, Extradition, I, 100, note 5.
1
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The justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction is sug-

gested by Article 15 of the commercial treaty of 1903:

The Government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform

its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western

nations, the United States agrees to give every assistance to such re-

form and will also be prepared to relinquish extra-territorial rights

when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements

for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so

doing.1

Aside from extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is another

limitation upon the capacity of less advanced states which

is imposed by international usage in regard to the protection

of citizens residing abroad. The general principle upon

which the right of protection rests is stated by B orchard as

The justification for extraterritorial jurisdiction is suggested by Article 15 of the commercial treaty of 1903:
The Government of China having expressed a strong desire to reform
its judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western
nations, the United States agrees to give every assistance to such reform and will also be prepared to relinquish extra-territorial rights
when satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangements
for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in so
doing. 1

follows:

The common consent of nations has established a certain standard

of conduct by which a state must be guided in its treatment of aliens.

In the absence of any central authority capable of enforcing this

standard, international law has authorized the state of which the
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individual is a citizen to vindicate his rights by diplomatic and other

methods sanctioned by international law. This right of diplomatic

protection constitutes, therefore, a limitation upon the territorial

jurisdiction of the country in which the alien is settled or is conduct-

ing business.2

Aside from extraterritorial jurisdiction, there is another
limitation upon the capacity of less advanced states which
is imposed by international usage in regard to the protection
of citizens residing abroad. The general principle upon
which the right of protection rests is stated by Borchard as
follows:

The theory of state equality would require that this limita-

tion apply to all states equally. In practice, it does not.

The application of the right of diplomatic protection in-

creases in rigor in direct proportion to the weakness of local

protection afforded by the state of residence. As Borchard

says:

In countries which habitually maintain effective government, the

protective function of the national government of a resident alien is

usually limited to calling the attention of the local government to the

1 Malloy, Treaties, I, 269.

* Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, preface, p. v.

The common consent of nations has established a certain standard
of conduct by which a state must be guided in its treatment of aliens.
In the absence of any central authority capable of enforcing this
standard, international law has authorized the slate of which the
individual is a citizen to vindicate his rights by diplomatic and other
methods sanctioned by international law. This right of diplomatic
protection constitutes, therefore, a limitation upon the territorial
jurisdiction of the country in which the alien is settled or is conducting business.2

The theory of state equality would require that this limitation apply to all states equally. In practice, it does not.
The application of the right of diplomatic protection increases in rigor in direct proportion to the weakness of local
protection afforded by the state of residence. As Borchard
says:
In countries which habitually maintain effective government, the
protective function of the national government of a resident alien is
usually limited to calling the attention of the local government lo the
1
1

Malloy, Treatks, I, :z69.
Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, preface, p. v.
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performance of its international duty. The right, however, is always

reserved, and in the case of less stable and well-ordered governments

frequently exercised, of taking more effective measures to secure to

their citizens abroad a measure of fair treatment conforming to the

international standard of justice. . . .

The rules of international law in this matter fall with particular

severity upon those countries where law and administration frequently

deviate from and fall below this standard; for the fact that their own

citizens can be compelled to accept such maladministration is not a

criterion for the measure of treatment which the alien can demand,

and international practice seems to have denied these countries the

right to avail themselves of the usual defense that the alien is given

the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, and the same

protection as the national.1

This practice imposes positive limitations upon the legal

capacity of all states where the administration of justice

falls below the common standard. Not infrequently it ex-

ceeds the bounds of a reasonable legal limitation. In the

absence of supernational authority each state must deter-
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mine whether its citizens have received the full measure of

performance of its international duty. The right, however, is always
reserved, and in the case of less stable and well-ordered governments
frequently exercised, of taking more effective measures to secure to
their citizens abroad a measure of fair treatment conforming to the
international standard of justice....
The rules of international law in this matter fall with particular
severity upon those countries where law and administration frequently
deviate from and fall below this standard; for the fact that their own
citizens can be compelled to accept such maladministration is not a
criterion for the measure of treatment which the alien can demand,
and international practice seems to have denied these countries the
right to avail themselves of the usual defense that the alien is given
the benefit of the same laws, the same administration, and the same
protection as the national. 1

protection. The great powers have abused this responsi-

bility on many occasions, coercing the weaker states of the

world into conceding to resident aliens a more privileged

position than any fair application of international law would

require.

Differences in civilization also create incapacities in cer-

tain states in relation to the exclusion of aliens. Entire ex-

clusion of the subjects of a particular state has never been

attempted between states of the white race in the modern

society of nations. Although the admission of Japan to

what has been generally presumed to be a normal status in

1 Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, pp. 27-28. See Mr. Borchard's ad-

mirable treatise for an exhaustive discussion of all aspects of this question, and

particularly pp. 179, 182, 215, 221, 280, 331, 346, 350, 406, 447, 448, 451, 456, 782,

836, 837. Cf. the remarks of the Uruguayan delegate at the Second Hague Confer-

ence, La Deux. Confer., II, 270. See Cutting's Case, in Moore, Digest, § 201, II,

228-242.

This practice imposes positive limitations upon the legal
capacity of all states where the administration of justice
falls below the common standard. Not infrequently it exceeds the bounds of a reasonable legal limitation. In the
absence of supernational authority each state must determine whether its citizens have received the full measure of
protection. The great powers have abused this responsibility on many occasions, coercing the weaker states of the
world into conceding to resident aliens a more privileged
position than any fair application of international law would
require.
Differences in civilization also create incapacities in certain states in relation to the exclusion of aliens. Entire exclusion of the subjects of a particular state has never been
attempted between states of the white race in the modern
society of nations. Although the admission of Japan to
what has been generally presumed to be a normal status in
1 Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, pp. 27-28. See Mr. Borchard's admirable treatise for an exhaustive discussion of all aspects of this question, and
particularly pp. 179, 182, 215, 221, 28o, 331, 346, 350, 406, 447, 448, 451, 456, 782 1
836, 837. CL the remarks of the Uruguayan delegate at the Second Hague Conference, La Dcux. Confer., II, 270. See Cutting's Case, in Moore, Digest, § 201, II,

:228-242.
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the international community has complicated the question,

it would seem that as a general rule each state of full inter-

national capacity may demand admission for its nationals

into another state on the same terms as are accorded to the

nationals of other states of full capacity.1 It has never been

doubted, however, that sufficient ^similarities in civiliza-

tion may constitute a legal ground for exclusion. This prin-

ciple received recognition in the resolutions of the Institute

of International Law in 1892.2 Its significance in relation

to equality is suggested in a note on the question of Chinese

immigration into the United States in the Revue Generale de

Droit International Public:

On the one hand, the rule of the equality of states prevents a gov-

ernment from distinguishing between the aliens whom it intends to

keep out of its territory: it may not exclude the subjects of one na-

tion and at the same time admit those of another; however, since

juridical equality among states assumes the existence of a community

of right, the question can arise only among peoples equally civilized.1

The practice of granting asylum in legations and consu-
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lates and on public vessels,4 wherever it has survived, con-

the international community has complicated the question,
it would seem that as a general rule each state of full international capacity may demand admission for its nationals
into another state on the same terms as are accorded to the
nationals of other states of full capacity. 1 It has never been
doubted, however, that sufficient dissimilarities in civilization may constitute a legal ground for exclusion. This principle received recognition in the resolutions of the Institute
of International Law in 1892.2 Its significance in relation
to equality is suggested in a note on the question of Chinese
immigration into the United States in the Revue Generale de
Droi.t International, Public:

stitutes a limitation upon the capacity of the states in which

it prevails, and can be justified only on grounds similar to

those which explain extraterritorial jurisdiction, inequalities

arising out of the protection of citizens abroad, and the ex-

clusion of aliens.

1 Cf. Westlake, Int. Law, I, 216.

'A. I. D.I. (1892), XII, 191, 220. See Musgrove v. Chun TeeongToy (1891),

L. R. 16 A. C. 272.

>R. G.D.I. P. (1894), I, 555-

On the one hand, the rule of the equality of states prevents a government from distinguishing between the aliens whom it intends to
keep out of its territory: it may not exclude the subjects of one nation and at the same time admit those of another; however, since
juridical equality among states assumes the existence of a community
of right, the question can arise only among peoples equally civilized.8

4 See Gilbert, in A.J. I. L. (1909), III, 562-595; Michaud, Le droit d'asile en

Europe el en Angleterre; Moore, Digest, §§ 291-307, II, 755-883; Moore, in P. S. Q.

(1892), VII, 1-37,197-231,397-418; Robin, in R. G. D. I. P. (1908), XV, 461-508;

Tobar y Borgofio, L'asile interne devant le droit international; U. S. For. Rel. (1898),

p. 171.

The practice of granting asylum in legations and consulates and on public vessels,4 wherever it has survived, constitutes a limitation upon the capacity of the states in which
it prevails, and can be justified only on grounds similar to
those which explain extraterritorial jurisdiction, inequalities
arising out of the protection of citizens abroad, and the exclusion of aliens.
Cf. Westlake, lnJ. Law, I, 216.
2 A. I. D. I. (18<}2), XII, 191, 220. See Musgrove v. Chun Teeong Toy (18<}1),
L. R. 16 A. C. 272.
3 R. G.D. I. P. (18<}4), I, 555.
4 See Gilbert, in A. J. I. L. (1909), III, 562- 595; Michaud, u droit d'asik en
Europe el en Angleterre; Moore, Digest,§§ 291-307, II, 755- 883; Moore, in P. S . Q.
(1892), VII, 1-37, 197-231 1 397-418; Robin, in R. G.D. I. P. (1908), XV, 461-508;
Tobar y Borgofio, L'asiJe inlerne devant le droiJ internati<mal; U. S. For. Rel. (18<}8),
p. 171.
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Limitations Incident to Imperfect Union

It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that inter-

national capacity is sometimes limited by the provisions of

a state's organic constitution. In a few instances imperfect

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO IMPERFECT UNION

unions have been created in which legal capacity has been

restricted by division among the several parts of a composite

whole. Where such limitations have no other sanction than

the state's organic law, they belong to the category of in-

ternal limitations; but when they are imposed by a general

act of the international community, or of those who are

permitted to represent the international community, as by

the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Vienna, the Treaty

of Paris, or the Treaty of Berlin, they have all the attributes

of an external limitation. Imperfect unions are created

either by the partial disintegration of what was previously

a unified state, or by the confederation of what were previ-

ously separate states. In either case the condition is usually

transitional, representing a stage in development towards

complete disintegration in the first instance and towards

complete union in the second. It is important, although
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transitional, for there has hardly been a time in the history

of the international community when this type of state has

not had its representative. The course of international

events suggests that the state system is still far from that

condition of stability which may relegate all such incapac-

ities to the category of historical anomalies.

In the case of a composite international person full legal

capacity exists only in the hypothetical union of all partial

capacities belonging to the component parts. The com-

posite entity and each of its several parts have only a limited

capacity. Since this hypothetical union cannot become a

reality while the composite character endures, and since it

is only with the entity or with its separate components as

It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that international capacity is sometimes limited by the provisions of
a state's organic constitution. In a few instances imperfect
unions have been created in which legal capacity has been
restricted by division among the several parts of a composite
whole. Where such limitations have no other sanction than
the state's organic law, they belong to the category of internal limitations; but when they are imposed by a general
act of the international community, or of those who are
permitted to represent the international community, as by
the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Vienna, the Treaty
of Paris, or the Treaty of Berlin, they have all the attributes
of an external limitation. Imperfect unions are created
either by the partial disintegration of what was previously
a unified state, or by the confederation of what were previously separate states. In either case the condition is usually
transitional, representing a stage in development towards
complete disintegration in the first instance and towards
complete union in the second. It is important, although
transitional, for there has hardly been a time in the history
of the international community when this type of state has
not had its representative. The course of international
events suggests that the state system is still far from that
condition of stability which may relegate all such incapacities to the category of historical anomalies.
In the case of a composite international person full legal
capacity exists only in the hypothetical union of all partial
capacities belonging to the component parts. The composite entity and each of its several parts have only a limited
capacity. Since this hypothetical union cannot become a
reality while the composite character endures, and since it
is only with the entity or with its separate components as

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

231

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

231

such that the law of nations can be concerned, it follows

that the society of nations is presented with a group of in-

ternational persons of which no one has full legal capacity.

The first general act of the modern society of nations

wrought the partial disintegration of the Holy Roman Em-

pire into some hundreds of international persons whose legal

capacity was limited in the way described above. The

Peace of Westphalia 1 formally accorded to the princes and

potentates of the Empire a qualified international status.

The religious settlement stipulated for an exact and recipro-

cal equality among them in ecclesiastical affairs, thus assur-

ing their independence from imperial control in this respect.2

The political settlement divided international capacity be-

tween the Empire as a whole and its component states.

Article 8 of the Treaty of Osnabriick between the Emperor

and Sweden provided as follows:

And in order to provide that henceforth no more differences shall

arise in the political status, all and every one of the Electors, Princes,

and States of the Roman Empire are so established and confirmed in
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their former rights, prerogatives, liberties, privileges, the free exercise

of territorial right, spiritual as well as temporal, lordships, regal

rights and in the possession of all these things by virtue of the present

transaction, that they may never in fact be disturbed therein by any-

one under any pretext whatever.

1 On the Peace of Westphalia, see Bernard, Four Lectures on Diplomacy, pp. 1-

such that the law of nations can be concerned, it follows
that the society of nations is presented with a group of international persons of which no one has full legal capacity.
The first general act of the modern society of nations
wrought the partial disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire into some hundreds of international persons whose legal
capacity was limited in the way described above. The
Peace of Westphalia 1 formally accorded to the princes and
potentates of the Empire a qualified international status.
The religious settlement stipulated for an exact and reciprocal equality among them in ecclesiastical affairs, thus assuring their independence from imperial control in this respect. 2
The political settlement divided international capacity between the Empire as a whole and its component states.
Article 8 of the Treaty of Osnabrtick between the Emperor
and Sweden provided as follows:

60; Clement, Mtmoires el negociations; Combes, Histoire generale de la diplomatic

européenne, I; Hill, History of Diplomacy, II, 590-607; Lavisse et Rambaud,

Histoire generale, V, 579; Le Clerc, Negociations secrites; Mazarin, Letlres du

Cardinal Mazarin; Putter, Geist des wesiphtUischen Friedens; Urusov, Resume

historique des principaux iraités de paix; Ward, in Cambridge Modern History, IV,

395-433; Wheaton, History, p. 67. Good bibliographical notes may be found in

the Cambridge Modern History, IV, 865; Hill, History of Diplomacy, II, 607;

Lavisse et Rambaud, Histoire generale, V, 584; Vast, Les grands traites, I, 7.

The importance of the Peace of Westphalia in the history of the modern law of

nations is suggested in Bonfils, Manuel, § 87, p. 39; F. de Martens, Traite, I, 117;

Nys, Etudes, p. 1; Walker, History, p. 147; Walker, Science, p. 57; Westlake,

Int. Law, I, 44; Wheaton, History, p. 69.

And in order to provide that henceforth no more differences shall
arise in the political status, all and every one of the Electors, Princes,
and States of the Roman Empire are so established and confirmed in
their former rights, prerogatives, liberties, privileges, the free exercise
of territorial right, spiritual as well as temporal, lordships, regal
rights and in the possession of all these things by virtue of the present
transaction, that they may never in fact be disturbed therein by anyone under any pretext whatever.

1 Treaty of OsnabrUck, Art. 5; Dumont, VI, I, 473; Koch et Schoell, I, 129.

On the Peace of Westphalia, see Bernard, Four Lcclures on Diplomacy, pp. r60; Clement, M tmoires el ntgociations; Combes, JI istoirc gtntrale de la diplomatie
europtenne, I; Hill, History of Diplomacy, II, 59o--<io7; Lavisse et Rambaud,
JlisWire ginbale, V, 579; Le Clerc, Ntgociations secretes; Mazarin, Lellres d"
Cardinal Mazarin; Pi.itter, Geist des westphii.liscMn Friwens; Urusov, Rtsumt
lsistcrique des principaux lraiUs de pai:c; Ward, in Cambridge Modern History, IV,
395-433; Wheaton, History, p. 67. Good bibliographical notes may be found in
the Cambridge Modern History, IV, 865; Hill, History of Diplomacy, II, 607;
Lavisse et Rambaud, llistoire g~ntrale, V, 584; Vast, Les grands traites, I, 7.
The importance of the Peace of Westphalia in the history of the modern law of
nations is suggested in Bonfils, Manuel, § 87, p. 39; F. de Martens, Trailt, I, n7;
Nys, Studes, p. x; Walker, History, p. 147; Walker, Science, p. 57; Westlake,
Int. Law, I, 44; Wheaton, History, p. 6Q.
2 Treaty of OsnabrUck, Art. 5; Dumont, VI, I, 473; Koch et Schoell, I, u9.
1

232

THE £.QUALITY OF STATES

232

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

They shall enjoy without contradiction the right of suffrage in all

deliberations concerning the affairs of the Empire, above all where

the business in hand shall be to make or to interpret laws, to decide

upon a war, to impose a tax, to decree levies and quartering of soldiers,

to construct in the name of the public new fortresses within the terri-

tories of the states, or to reinforce the garrisons of existing forts, and

also where it shall be necessary to make a peace, or alliances, and to

treat of other like affairs; none of these or similar things shall be done

or decided hereafter without the advice and consent of a free assembly

of all the States of the Empire; above all every one of the States of the

Empire shall enjoy freely and in perpetuity the right to make alliances

among themselves and with foreign countries for the preservation and

security of each, provided, nevertheless, that these terms of alliance be

not against the Emperor and the Empire, nor against the public peace,

nor principally against this transaction, and that they be made with-

out prejudice in any respect to the oath by which each is bound to the

Emperor and to the Empire.1

The effect of this settlement was to limit the international

capacity of the Empire by attributing partial capacities to
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its component parts. More than three hundred quasi-states

were formally inducted into the international community.

Neither the Empire nor its states were legally the equals of

They shall enjoy without contradiction the right of suffrage in all
deliberations concerning the affairs of the Empire, above all where
the business in hand shall be to make or to interpret laws, to decide
upon a war, to impose a tax, to decree levies and quartering of soldiers,
to construct in the name of the public new fortresses within the territories of the states, or to reinforce the garrisons of existing forts, and
also where it shall be necessary to make a peace, or alliances, and to
treat of other like affairs; none of these or similar things shall be done
or decided hereafter without the advice and consent of a free assembly
of all the States of the Empire; above all every one of the States of the
Empire shall enjoy freely and in perpetuity the right to make alliances
among themselves and with foreign countries for the preservation and
security of each, provided, nevertheless, that these terms of alliance be
not against the Emperor and the Empire, nor against the public peace,
nor principally against this transaction, and that they be made without prejudice in any respect to the oath by which each is bound to the
Emperor and to the Empire. 1

their neighbors in the society of nations.

It is sometimes said that the principle of equality among

nations was established by the Peace of Westphalia. Taylor,

for illustration, holds this opinion:

As heretofore explained, the Grotian system depends upon a full

and unqualified recognition of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty

from which flow the corollaries that all states are formally equal, and

that territory and jurisdiction are coextensive. Such was the basis of

the settlement embodied in the Peace of Westphalia, so far as the

written treaty law was concerned, and upon that basis it has been

claimed from that day to this that, before the law of nations, the legal

rights of the greatest and smallest states are identical.2

1 Dumont, VI, I, 480. See also Treaty of Münster, §§ 64,65; Vast, Les grands

traiiés, I, 34-35; Koch et Schoell, I, 123.

* Int. Pub. Law, § 69, p. 98. See also Cohen, in Venez. Arbit., p. 1259; Dupuis,

Le Principe d'équiiibre et le concert europten, p. 20; Figgis, Gerson to Grotius, p. 160;

The effect of this settlement was to limit the international
capacity of the Empire by attributing partial capacities to
its component parts. More than three hundred quasi-states
were formally inducted into the international community.
Neither the Empire nor its states were legally the equals of
their neighbors in the society of nations.
It is sometimes said that the principle of equality among
nations was established by the Peace of Westphalia. Taylor,
for illustration, holds this opinion:
As heretofore explained, the Grotian system depends upon a full
and unqualified recognition of the doctrine of territorial sovereignty
from which fl.ow the corollaries that all states are formally equal, and
that territory and jurisdiction are coextensive. Such was the basis of
the settlement embodied in the Peace of Westphalia, so far as the
written treaty law was concerned, and upon that basis it has been
claimed from that day to this that, before the law of nations, the legal
rights of the greatest and smallest states are identical.2
1 Dumont, VI, I, 480. See also Treaty of Milnster, §§ 64, 65; Vast, w grands
traiUs, I, 34-35; Koch et Schoell, I, 123.
a Im. Pub. Low,§ 69, p. 98. See also Cohen, in Ve~z. Arbit., p. 1259; Dupuis,
Le principe d'tquililJre et le concert europien, p. 20; Figgis, Gerson lo Grotius, p. 160;
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Equality was established among the component states of

the Empire. Equal protection of the law may be said to

have received its vindication as an essential international

principle. Taylor's statement and all others like it are quite

misleading, however, in so far as they imply that the West-

phalian settlement established equality of legal capacity

among members of the society of nations as a general prin-

ciple of law. On the contrary, the most important article

in each of the two treaties provided expressly for important

inequalities of legal capacity in the reconstituted community

of nations.

The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the nine-

teenth century suggests certain interesting comparisons

with the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire in the

seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As outlying Turkish

provinces have approached separation from the Empire the

European powers have imposed a divided capacity during

prolonged periods of transition. Turkey has been permitted

to retain certain rights of suzerainty over the detached

provinces. The provinces have been accorded an autono-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

mous regime under international guaranty, placed under the

effective control of another power, or conceded a qualified

international status preliminary to annexation by another

power or to complete independence. As a consequence Tur-

key has never enjoyed full international capacity with re-

spect to its entire dominion, while each of the provinces has

been required to pass through a protracted period of partial

capacity on the road to complete separation.

Russia secured autonomy for the provinces of Moldavia

and Wallachia in 1829.1 For many years they remained

Lawrence, Essays, p. 206; Oppenheim, Int. Law, § 44, I, 62; Reeves, in The

University Record (1017), HI, 254; Twiss, Law of Nations, p. xvii; Vreeland,

Hugo Grotius, pp. 241-242; White, Seven Great Statesmen, p. 77. Cf. Rachel, De

jure gentium, § 121; Textor, Synopsis juris gentium, ch. 14; Twiss, Law of

Nations, p. 24.

1 Treaty of Adrianople, Art. 5; B. P. S. P., XVI, 647, 654.

Equality was established among the component states of
the Empire. Equal protection of the law may be said to
have received its vindication as an essential international
principle. Taylor's statement and all others like it are quite
misleading, however, in so far as they imply that the Westphalian settlement established equality of legal capacity
among members of the society of nations as a general principle of law. On the contrary, the most important article
in each of the two treaties provided expressly for important
inequalities of legal capacity in the reconstituted community
of nations.
The disintegration of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth century suggests certain interesting comparisons
with the dismemberment of the Holy Roman Empire in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As outlying Turkish
provinces have approached separation from the Empire the
European powers have imposed a divided capacity during
prolonged periods of transition. Turkey has been permitted
to retain certain rights of suzerainty over the detached
provinces. The provinces have been accorded an autonomous regime under international guaranty, placed under the
effective control of another power, or conceded a qualified
international status preliminary to annexation by another
power or to complete independence. As a consequence Turkey has never enjoyed full international capacity with respect to its entire dominion, while each of the provinces has
been required to pass through a protracted period of partial
capacity on the road to complete separation.
Russia secured autonomy for the provinces of Moldavia
and Wallachia in 1829.1 For many years they remained
Lawrence, Essays, p. 2o6; Oppenheim, Int. Law, § 44, I, 62;
University Record (1917), III, 254; Twiss, Law of Nations, p.
Hugo Grotius, pp. 241-242; White, s~ Great StatestMn, p. 77.
jure gentiflm, § 121; Textor, Synopsis juris genlium, ch. 14;
Nations, p. 24.
1 Treaty of Adrianople, Art. 5; B. F. S. P., XVI, 647, 654.

Reeves, in The
xvii; Vreeland,
Cf. Rachel, De
Twiss, Law of
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under Turkish suzerainty and Russian protection. The

Treaty of Paris of 1856 placed them under the collective

guaranty of the powers;1 and their independence was recog-

nized, subject to conditions, by the Treaty of Berlin.2 Servia

won virtual independence from Turkey early in the nine-

teenth century. As a principality under Turkish suzerainty

it was placed under the collective guaranty of the powers in

1856,3 and was recognized as independent, subject to con-

ditions, by the Treaty of Berlin.4 The same treaty consti-

tuted Bulgaria an autonomous and tributary principality

under Turkish suzerainty,6 a condition which continued un-

til Bulgaria's declaration of independence in 1908, and pro-

vided administrative autonomy for Eastern Roumelia under

the direct political and military authority of the Sultan.6

The Prince of Bulgaria was recognized as Governor-General

of Roumelia in 1886, thus constituting a de facto union which

became de jure with the recognition of Bulgarian independ-

ence. The Congress of Berlin handed the provinces of

Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria-Hungary to be
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occupied and administered without prejudice to the sov-

ereignty of Turkey.7 In 1908 the provinces were formally

annexed by the dual monarchy. Crete was promised an

autonomous regime in 1878,8 but the promise did not be-

come effective until after the joint intervention of the powers

in 1897.' Thereafter Crete enjoyed real autonomy, and even

1 Arts. 22-27. See also Convention of 1858, B. F. S. P., XLVIII, 70.

1 Arts. 43-51-

* Treaty of Paris, Arts. 28-29.

4 Arts. 34-42. * Arts. 1-12.

« Arts 13-22. See Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 579-582; Serkis,

La Roumdie orientale ct la Bulgarie actuelle.

7 Art. 25. See also Convention of 1879, B- F. S. P., LXXI, 1132; and Blunt-

schli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 582-586. The island of Cyprus was assigned

by the Sultan in the same year " to be occupied and administered by England."

Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question, pp. 354-356.

8 Treaty of Berlin, Art. 23.

• Ion, m A.J.I. L. (1910), IV, 277.

under Turkish suzerainty and Russian protection. The
Treaty of Paris of 1856 placed them under the collective
guaranty of the powers; 1 and their independence was recognized, subject to conditions, by the Treaty of Berlin.2 Servia
won virtual independence from Turkey early in the nineteenth century. As a principality under Turkish suzerainty
it was placed under the collective guaranty of the powers in
1856,3 and was recognized as independent, subject to conditions, by the Treaty of Berlin.4 The same treaty constituted Bulgaria an autonomous and tributary principality
under Turkish suzerainty ,6 a condition which continued until Bulgaria's declaration of independence in 1908, and provided administrative autonomy for Eastern Roumelia under
the direct political and military authority of the Sultan.6
The Prince of Bulgaria was recognized as Governor-General
of Roumelia in 1886, thus constituting a de facto union which
became de jure with the recognition of Bulgarian independence. The Congress of Berlin handed the provinces of
Bosnia and Herzegovina over to Austria-Hungary to be
occupied and administered without prejudice to the sovereignty of Turkey.7 In 1908 the provinces were formally
annexed by the dual monarchy. Crete was promised an
autonomous regime in 1878,8 but the promise did not become effective until after the joint intervention of the powers
in 1897.9 Thereafter Crete enjoyed real autonomy, and even
Arts. 22-27. See also Convention of 1858, B. F. S. P., XLVIII, 70.
Arts. 43-5 I.
a Treaty of Paris, Arts. 28-29.
4 Arts. 34-42.
6 Arts. 1-12.
8 Arts 13-22. See Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 57<r582; Serkis,
La Roumilie orienl<de et la Bulgarie actuelle.
7 Art. 25. See also Convention of 1879, B. F. S. P., LXXI, 1132; and Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 582-586. The island of Cyprus was assigned
by the Sultan in the same year " to be occupied and administered by England."
Holland, European Concer' in 'he &stern Qmstion, pp. 354-356.
e Treaty of Berlin, Art. 23.
• Ion, in A. J. I. L. (1910), IV, 277.
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a limited international status until its union with Greece in

1912. Egypt secured autonomy and a limited international

capacity in 1840, passing later into an anomalous condition

under the suzerainty of Turkey and the control of Great

Britain, which was terminated in 1914 by the proclamation

of a British protectorate.1 Thus for a century the Near

East has presented the society of nations with a disintegrat-

ing empire on the one hand and a number of incipient states

in various stages of evolution on the other. Neither the

empire nor its vassal states have stood in a relation of legal

equality to other members of the international community.

The German Confederation, which lasted from 1815 to

1866, is the great historical example of a composite inter-

national person formed by the confederation of existing

states. The Confederation was created at the Congress of

Vienna in 1815,* and its organization as an "indissoluble

union " was completed by an additional act signed at Vienna

May 15, 1820.3 The additional act of 1820 provided:

The Germanic Confederation is a union according to international
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law of the Sovereign Princes and Free Towns of Germany, for the

preservation of the independence and inviolability of the States com-

prised in it, and for maintaining the internal and external security of

Germany.

As to its internal relations, this union consists of a community of

States independent of each other, with reciprocal and equal rights and

obligations stipulated by Treaties. As to its external relations, it

constitutes a collective Power, bound together in political unity.4

The Confederation had power to make war, contract alli-

a limited international status until its union with Greece in
1912. Egypt secured autonomy and a limited international
capacity in 1840, passing later into an anomalous condition
under the suzerainty of Turkey and the control of Great
Britain, which was terminated in 1914 by the proclamation
of a British protectorate.1 Thus for a century the Near
East has presented the society of nations with a disintegrating empire on the one hand and a number of incipient states
in various stages of evolution on the other. Neither the
empire nor its vassal states have stood in a relation of legal
equality to other members of the international community.
The German Confederation, which lasted from 1815 to
1866, is the great historical example of a composite international person formed by the confederation of existing
states. The Confederation was created at the Congress of
Vienna in 181 5, 2 and its organization as an "indissoluble
union" was completed by an additional act signed at Vienna
:May 15, 1820.3 The additional act of 1820 provided:

ances, and conclude other treaties:

The Confederation has the right, as a Collective Power, to declare

war, to make peace, to contract alliances, and to conclude other

1 See infra, p. 238, note 3.

1 Treaty of Vienna, Arts. 53-64. See Wheaton, History, pp. 445 ff.

'B. F. S. P., VII, 399-414.

4 Arts. 1-2; Hertslet, I, 640.

The Germanic Confederation is a union according to international
law of the Sovereign Princes and Free Towns of Germany, for the
preservation of the independence and inviolability of the States comprised in it, and for maintaining the internal and external security of
Germany.
As to its internal relations, this union consists of a community of
States independent of each other, with reciprocal and equal rights and
obligations stipulated by Treaties. As to its external relations, it
constitutes a collective Power, bound together in political unity.•

The Confederation had power to make war, contract alliances, and conclude other treaties:
The Confederation has the right, as a Collective Power, to declare
war, to make peace, to contract alliances, and to conclude other
See infra, p. 238, note 3.
Treaty of Vienna, Arts. 53-64. See Wheaton, HistQry, pp. 445 ff.
I B. F. s. P., VII, 399-414.
• Arts. 1-2; Hertslet, I, 640.
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Treaties. According, however, to the object of the Confederation

expressed in Article II of the Federal Act, it only exercises this right

for its own defence, for the maintenance of the self-existence and ex-

ternal security of Germany, as well as for the independence and in-

violability of the individual States of the Confederation.1

On the other hand, the component states sent representa-

Treaties. According, however, to the object of the Confederation
expressed in Article II of the Federal Act, it only exercises this right
for its own defence, for the maintenance of the self.-existence and external security of Germany, as well as for the independence and inviolability of the individual States of the Confederation. 1

tives both to one another and to foreign states. They could

enter into relations with foreign states so long as they did

nothing against the security of any other member or of the

Confederation itself. Neither the Confederation as a whole

nor its constituent states enjoyed full international capacity.

Legally they were not the equals of other members of the

international community.

Limitations Incident to Suzerainty

The disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and of the

Ottoman Empire gave rise to another type of external limi-

tation upon international capacity, incident, in each case,

to the suzerainty of the imperial authority over the subject

states. The conception of suzerainty had its origin in feu-
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dalism, where it was used to describe a well-defined relation

On the other hand, the component states sent representatives both to one another and to foreign states. They could
enter into relations with foreign states so long as they did
nothing against the security of any other member or of the
Confederation itself. Neither the Confederation as a whole
nor its constituent states enjoyed full international capacity.
Legally they were not the equals of other members of the
international community.

between lord and vassal. The great historical example of

its application to the relations between separate states was

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO SUZERAINTY

furnished by the Holy Roman Empire, which ended in 1806.

The term was revived in the nineteenth century to describe

the relation between Turkey and its provinces during the

period of their gradual emancipation.

The status of Wallachia and Moldavia was denned in the

Treaty of Paris of 1856, as follows:

The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to

enjoy under the Suzerainty of the Porte, and under the Guarantee of

the Contracting Powers, the Privileges and Immunities of which they

are in possession. No exclusive Protection shall be exercised over

them by any of the guaranteeing Powers.

1 Art. 35; Hertslet, I, 649.

The disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire and of the
Ottoman Empire gave rise to another type of external limitation upon international capacity, incident, in each case,
to the suzerainty of the imperial authority over the subject
states. The conception of suzerainty had its origin in feudalism, where it was used to describe a well-defined relation
between lord and vassal. The great historical example of
its application to the relations between separate states was
furnished by the Holy Roman Empire, which ended in r8o6.
The term was revived in the nineteenth century to describe
the relation between Turkey and its provinces during the
period of their gradual emancipation.
·
The status of Wallachia and Moldavia was defined in the
Treaty of Paris of 1856, as follows:
The Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia shall continue to
enjoy under the Suzerainty of the Porte, and under the Guarantee of
the Contracting Powers, the Privileges and Immunities of which they
are in possession. No exclusive Protection shall be exercised over
them by any of the guaranteeing Powers.
1

Art. 35; Hertslet, I, 649.
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There shall be no separate right of interference in their Internal

Affairs.

The Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an

Independent and National Administration, as well as full liberty of

Worship, of Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation.1

Provision for the organization of the provinces was made in

There shall be no separate right of interference in their Internal
Affairs.
The Sublime Porte engages to preserve to the said Principalities an
Independent and National Administration, as well as full liberty of
Worship, of Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation. 1

the Convention of Paris of 1858, which began,

The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, constituted hence-

forward under the denomination of United Principalities of Mol-

davia and Wallachia, are placed under the Suzerainty of His Majesty

the Sultan.2

Recognition of independence, with the termination of suze-

rainty, was accorded by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.3

Servia received a similar status by the Peace of Paris, the

relation of vassal to suzerain being implied in the treaty

provisions:

The Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime

Provision for the organization of the provinces was made in
the Convention of Paris of 1858, which began,
The Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, constituted henceforward under the denomination of United Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, are placed under the Suzerainty of His Majesty
the Sultan. 2

Porte, in conformity with the Imperial Hats which fix and determine

its Rights and Immunities, placed henceforward under the Collective
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Guarantee of the Contracting Powers.

In consequence, the said Principality shall preserve its Independent

and National Administration, as well as full Liberty of Worship, of

Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation.

The right of garrison of the Sublime Porte, as stipulated by anterior

regulations, is maintained. No Armed Intervention can take place

in Servia without previous agreement between the High Contracting

Recognition of independence, with the termination of suzerainty, was accorded by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878.3
Servia received a similar status by the Peace of Paris, the
relation of vassal to suzerain being implied in the treaty
provismns:

Powers.4

Servia's vassalage also was terminated by the Treaty of

Berlin.6

1 Arts. 22, 23; Hertslet, II, 1260.

1 Art. 1; B.F. S. P., XLVIII, 70; Hertslet, II, 1332.

• Art. 43. See Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1880), XII, 410-424.

* Arts. 28, 29; Hertslet, II, 1262.

» Art. 34. See Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1880), XII, 284-293; Brunswik,

Recuett de documents diplomatiques relatifs d la Serine.

The Principality of Servia shall continue to hold of the Sublime
Porte, in conformity with the Imperial Hats which fix and determine
its Rights and Immunities, placed henceforward under the Collective
Guarantee of the Contracting Powers.
In consequence, the said Principality shall preserve its Independent
and National Administration, as well as full Liberty of Worship, of
Legislation, of Commerce, and of Navigation.
The right of garrison of the Sublime Porte, as stipulated by anterior
regulations, is maintained. No Armed Intervention can take place
in Servia without previous agreement between the High Contracting
Powers.4

Servia's vassalage also was terminated by the Treaty of
Berlin.6
Arts. :u, 23; Hertslet, II, 1260.
Art. 1; B. F. S. P ., XLVIII, 70; Hertslet, II, 1332.
1 Art. 43. See Bluntschli, in R. D. /. L. C. (1880) 1 XII, 410-424.
' Arts. 28, 29; Hertslet, II, 1262.
1 Art. 34. See Bluntschli, in R. D. l. L. C. (1880), XII, 284-293; Brunswik,
Recueil de documents diplomatiques relatifs a la Serbie.
1
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The Treaty of Berlin terminated two suzerainties, as in-

dicated above, and created another in the case of Bulgaria:

Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary Principality

The Treaty of Berlin terminated two suzerainties, as indicated above, and created another in the case of Bulgaria:

under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan; it will have

a Christian Government and a national militia.1

Bulgaria was to frame its own organic law, and also to elect

its own Prince, subject to confirmation by the Porte and the

assent of the powers. The Ottoman treaties were to remain

Bulgaria is constituted an autonomous and tributary Principality
under the suzerainty of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan; it will have
a Christian Government and a national militia.1

in force in the Principality. The payment of a part of the

Ottoman debt and also of an annual tribute were stipulated,

but neither obligation was ever performed. The powers at

first sent only consuls general to Sofia. In 1887 Russia ex-

changed diplomatic representatives with Bulgaria. Turkey

was represented at Sofia by a High Commissioner, while the

Principality insisted successfully on sending a diplomatic

agent to Constantinople. Bulgaria was represented at the

First Hague Conference, but ranked after Turkey. It was

represented at the Geneva Conference, which Turkey did

not attend, and received alphabetical rank at the Second

Hague Conference, as well as a place in the Permanent Court
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of Arbitration and in the scheme of apportioning seats for

the International Prize Court.2 Bulgarian independence was

declared in 1908.

Egypt,3 from 1840 to 1914, and Crete,4 from 1898 to 1912,

1 Art. 1; Hertslet, IV, 2766. See Andieades, in R.G.D.I.P. (1908), XV,

585, 586; Balaktschieff, Die rechtliche Stettung des FUrstentums Bulgarien; Blunt-

schli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 571-579; Chaunier, La Bnlgarie; Karami-

chaloff, La Principauté de Bulgarie au point de vue du droit international; Lutfi, Die

vSlkerrechtliche SteUung Bulgariens und Ostrumeliens; Sartivanoff, La Bulgarie est-

elle un (tat mi-souverain?; Scelle, in A. J. I. L. (1911), V, 144-177, 394-413, 680-

704; (1912), VI, 86-106, 659-678.

» Ibid. (1911), V, 693-704.

» B. F. S. P., XXVIII, 342; A.J.I. L. (1915), IX, 202; Dupuis, Le Principe

d'tquilibre et le concert européen, Pt. II, chs. 4, 9; Gibbons, New Map of Africa,

chs. 20,21; Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question, ch. 4; The Charkieh,

L. R. 4 A. & E. 59 (1873); Abd-ul-Messih v. Farra, L. R. 13 A. C. 431 (1888).

4 Ion, in A.J.I. L. (1910), IV, 276-284; Streit, in R.G.D.I.P. (1897), IV,

61-104, 446-483; (1900), VII, 5-52, 301-369; (1903). X, 222-282, 345-418.

Bulgaria was to frame its own organic law, and also to elect
its own Prince, subject to confirmation by the Porte and the
assent of the powers. The Ottoman treaties were to remain
in force in the Principality. The payment of a part of the
Ottoman debt and also of an annual tribute were stipulated,
but neither obligation was ever performed. The powers at
first sent only consuls general to Sofia. In 1887 Russia exchanged diplomatic representatives with Bulgaria. Turkey
was represented at Sofia by a High Commissioner, while the
Principality insisted successfully on sending a diplomatic
agent to Constantinople. Bulgaria was represented at the
First Hague Conference, but ranked after Turkey. It was
represented at the Geneva Conference, which Turkey did
not attend, and received alphabetical rank at the Second
Hague Conference, as well as a place in the Permanent Court
of Arbitration and in the scheme of apportioning seats for
the International Prize Court. 2 Bulgarian independence was
declared in 1908.
Egypt,3 from 1840 to 1914, and Crete,4 from 1898 to 1912,
1 Art. l; Hertslet, IV, 2766. See Andreades, in R. G.D. I. P. (19o8), XV,
585, 586; Balaktschieff, Die rechtliche Ste/lung des Filrslentums Bulgarien; Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1881), XIII, 571-579; Chaunier, La Btdgarie; Karamichaloff, La Principaull de Bulgarie au point de tme du dr&iJ international; Lutfi, Die
~iilkerrechtliche Stdlung Bulgariens und Ostrumeliens; Sarilvanoff, La Bulgarie estelk un ttat mi-sollverain 'I; Scelle, in A. J. I. L. {19II), V, 144-177, 394-413, 680704; (1912), VI, 86-1o6, 65~78.
s Ibid. (1911), V, 6<)3-704.
1 B. F. S. P., XXVIII, 342; A. J. I. L. (1915), IX, 202; Dupuis, Le principe
d'tquilibre et le concert europten, Pt. II, chs. 4, 9; Gibbons, New Map of Africa,
chs. 20, 21; Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Questum, ch. 4; The Charkieh,
L. R. 4 A. & E. 59 (1873); Abd-ul-Messih P. Farra, L. R. 13 A. C. 431 (1888).
4 Ion, in A. J. I. L. (1910), IV, 276-284; Streit, in R. G.D. I. P. (1&)7), IV,
61-104, 446-483; (1900), VII, 5-52, 301-36<); (1903), X, 222-282, 345-418.
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were recognized as autonomous under the suzerainty of the

Sultan. In fact, each enjoyed a very limited international

capacity, and in each case the international status was fur-

ther complicated by the protection of other states. The

term "suzerainty" has been little used elsewhere than in

connection with the moribund Empire of the Near East.

The Convention of Pretoria of 1881 placed the South Afri-

can Republic under the suzerainty of the Queen of the United

Kingdom.1 The little republic of Andorra still exists under

the joint suzerainty of the bishop of Urgel in Spain and

France as successor to the Counts of Foix.2

The most recent application of suzerainty in international

relations was defined in a series of agreements between China

and Russia with regard to the status of Outer Mongolia,3 by

virtue of which Mongolia was given a limited international

capacity under Russian protection and Chinese suzerainty.

An agreement of 1913 between Russia and China provided:

Russia recognizes that Outer Mongolia is under the suzerainty of

China.
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China recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.4

Mongolia's status was further defined in an agreement of

1915 between China, Russia, and Mongolia, as follows:

Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty. China and Russia

recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese

territory.

Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international

treaties with foreign Powers respecting political and territorial ques-

were recognized as autonomous under the suzerainty of the
Sultan. In fact, each enjoyed a very limited international
capacity, and in each case the international status was further complicated by the protection of other states. The
term "suzerainty" has been little used elsewhere than in
connection with the moribund Empire of the Near East.
The Convention of Pretoria of 1881 placed the South African Republic under the suzerainty of the Queen of the United
Kingdom. 1 The little republic of Andorra still exists under
the joint suzerainty of the bishop of Urgel in Spain and
France as successor to the Counts of Foix. 2
The most recent application of suzerainty in international
relations was defined in a series of agreements between China
and Russia with regard to the status of Outer Jvlongolia,3 by
virtue of which Mongolia was given a limited international
capacity under Russian protection and Chinese suzerainty.
An agreement of 1913 between Russia and China provided:

tions. . . .

China and Russia . . . recognize the exclusive right of the Autono-

mous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of

1 B. F. S. P., LXXII, 900.

• Westlake, Int. Lake, I, 25.

Russia recognizes that Outer Mongolia is under the suzerainty of
China.
China recognizes the autonomy of Outer Mongolia.4

• A.J.I.L.Suppl. (1916), X, 239-258; Williams, in A. J.I.L. (1916), X, 798-

808.

4 Arts. 1, 2, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 247.

Mongolia's status was further defined in an agreement of
1915 between China, Russia, and Mongolia, as follows:
Outer Mongolia recognizes China's suzerainty. China and Russia
recognize the autonomy of Outer Mongolia forming part of Chinese
territory.
Autonomous Mongolia has no right to conclude international
treaties with foreign Powers respecting political and territorial questions. . . .
China and Russia ... recognize the exclusive right of the Autonomous Government of Outer Mongolia to attend to all the affairs of
1
2
J

B . F. S. P., LXXII, 900.
Westlake, Int. Law, I, 25 .
A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 239-258; Williams, in A.J. I. L. (1916), X, 798-

8o8.
4

Arts. 1, 2, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 247.
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its internal administration and to conclude with foreign Powers in-

ternational treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a com-

mercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia.1

Mongolia was to have complete internal autonomy and its

its internal administration and to conclude with foreign Powers international treaties and agreements respecting all questions of a commercial and industrial nature concerning autonomous Mongolia. 1

own national army. There was to be no Chinese coloniza-

tion, and China engaged to send neither civil nor military

officials nor troops into Mongolian territory. On the other

hand, Mongolia was declared to be a part of the territory

of China. China was represented at Urga by a Dignitary

who enjoyed the first place of honor on all ceremonial occa-

sions and who might be accompanied by a military escort

not to exceed two hundred men. No customs duties could

be levied on goods imported by Chinese merchants, and

China reserved extraterritorial jurisdiction over its subjects.

The feudal relation of vassal to suzeiain has been con-

siderably attenuated in its international application. This

may have been due to the peculiar conditions prevailing

in the Near East and the Far East, where it has received its

only important application in recent times. Whatever the
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reason, it is true that in most cases its significance as a limi-

tation upon the capacity of vassal states has been concerned

chiefly with matters of form.

Limitations Incident to Protection

Certain of the most familiar of international incapacities

arise out of the relation of protection.2 This relation has

been established in an extraordinary variety of cases between

more powerful or more highly civilized states, on the one

hand, and small, weak, backward, incipient, or decaying

states on the other. It may exist in all degrees, shading off

1 Arts. 2, 3, 5, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 251, 252.

» See Engelhardt, in R. G. I. L. C. (1892), XXTV, 345-383 (1893), XXV, 230-

238, 466-480; Heilborn, Das vSlkerrechtliche Protektorat; Oppenheim, Int. Law,

§§ 92-94,1, 144; Piedelievre, Précis, § 283,1, 255; Pillet, in R. G. D. I. P. (1895),

II, 583-608.

Mongolia was to have complete internal autonomy and its
own national army. There was to be no Chinese colonization, and China engaged to send neither civil nor military
officials nor troops into Mongolian territory. On the other
hand, Mongolia was declared to be a part of the territory
of China. China was represented at Urga by a Dignitary
who enjoyed the first place of honor on all ceremonial occasions and who might be accompanied by a military escort
not to exceed two hundred men. No customs duties could
be levied on goods imported by Chinese merchants, and
China reserved extraterritorial jurisdiction over its subjects.
The feudal relation of vassal to suzerain has been considerably attenuated in its international application. This
may have been due to the peculiar conditions prevailing
in the Near East and the Far East, where it has received its
only important application in recent times. Whatever the
reason, it is true that in most cases its significance as a limitation upon the capacity of vassal states has been concerned
chiefly with matters of form.
LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO PROTECTION

Certain of the most familiar of international incapacities
arise out of the relation of protection. 2 This relation has
been established in an extraordinary variety of cases between
more powerful or more highly civilized states, on the one
hand, and small, weak, backward, incipient, or decaying
states on the other. It may exist in all degrees, shading off
Arts. 2, 3, 5, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 251, 252.
See Engelhardt, in R. G. I. L . C. (1892), XXIV, 345-383 (1893), XXV, 230238, 466-480; Heilborn, Das f!iilkerrechtliche Prouklorat; Oppenheim, Int. Law,
§§ 92-"94, I, 144; Piedeli~vre, Prtcis, § 283, I, 255; Pillet, in R. G.D. l. P. (1895),
II, 583-00S.
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imperceptibly from the relationship which imposes only

slight limitations on the protected state to the so-called pro-

tectorate which has no international capacity at all.1 It may

constitute a stage in the process which leads ultimately to

annexation, or, less frequently, in the development which

leads to unrestricted international capacity. More infre-

quently still, it may become a permanent relationship.

Whatever its degree or its significance it is generally agreed

that it imposes a limitation upon the legal capacity of the

protected state.

More often than otherwise protection has been preliminary

to annexation. Before annexation has been consummated,

however, it has frequently happened that for a long period

the society of nations has been presented with a protected

state of limited capacity. The Treaty of Vienna consti-

tuted the city of Cracow a free, neutral, and independent

town under the protection of Austria, Prussia, and Russia.2

This arrangement continued until 1846, when Cracow was

absorbed by Austria.3 Another part of the settlement of

1815 provided that the Ionian Islands should form " a single,
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free and Independent State, under the denomination of the

United States of the Ionian Islands."4 The new state was

placed under the exclusive protection of Great Britain:

This State shall be placed under the immediate and exclusive Pro-

tection of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great

Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors. The other Contract-

ing Powers do consequently renounce every right or particular pre-

tension which they might have formed in respect to them, and formally

guarantee all the dispositions of the present Treaty.6

1 See The King v. The Earl of Crewe, L. R. [1910] 2 K. B. 576.

» Art. 6.

'Convention between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in B. F. S. P., XXXV, 1088.

See the Austrian Declaration, and British and French protests, in Hertslet, II, 1065,

1068, 1073.

4 Convention of November 5, 1815, Art. 1, in B. F. S. P., Ill, 250.

5 Art. 2, in Hertslet, I, 338. See The Ionian Ships, 2 Spinks, 212 (1855).

imperceptibly from the relationship which imposes only
slight limitations on the protected state to the so-called protectorate which has no international capacity at all. 1 It may
constitute a stage in the process which leads ultimately to
annexation, or, less frequently, in the development which
leads to unrestricted international capacity. More infrequently still, it may become a permanent relationship.
Whatever its degree or its significance it is generally agreed
that it imposes a limitation upon the legal capacity of the
protected state.
More often than otherwise protection has been preliminary
to annexation. Before annexation has been consummated,
however, it has frequently happened that for a long period
the society of nations has been presented with a protected
state of limited capacity. The Treaty of Vienna constituted the city of Cracow a free, neutral, and independent
town under the protection of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. 2
This arrangement continued until 18461 when Cracow was
absorbed by Austria.3 Another part of the settlement of
1815 provided that the Ionian Islands should form" a single,
free and Independent State, under the denomination of the
United States of the Ionian Islands." 4 The new state was
placed under the exclusive protection of Great Britain:
This State shall be placed under the immediate and exclusive Protection of His .Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Ireland, his heirs and successors. The other Contracting Powers do consequently renounce every right or particular pretension which they might have formed in respect to them, and formally
guarantee all the dispositions of the present Treaty. 5
See The King v. The Earl of Crewe, L. R. [1910]

2 K. B. 576.
Art. 6.
a Convention between Austria, Prussia, and Russia, in B. F. S. P., XXXV, 1o88.
See the Austrian Declaration, and British and French protests, in Hertslet, II, 1o65,
Io68, 1073.
4 Convention of November 51 1&5, Art. 1, in B. F. S. P., III, 250.
6 Art. 2, in Hertslet, I, 338. See The Ionian Ships, 2 Spinks, 212 (1855).
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In 1863 the Ionian Islands were united to Greece.1 As a

protected state they represented, from 1815 to 1863, the

vanishing point of international personality. They were

governed by British commissioners, and all relations with

other states were conducted by British officials. A separate

trading flag and neutrality during British wars were almost

the only indications of separate existence.

Protection has also taken the form of guardianship over

small or weak states during the period necessary for their

development to full capacity. Although the word "pro-

tection " has not appeared in the treaties, this has been the

practical effect of the responsibilities assumed at different

times by the great powers of Europe toward Greece and the

Balkan states. Protection appears to be a normal and per-

manent condition for a petty state like San Marino, which

was under the protection of the Pope by formal treaty from

the beginning of the seventeenth century, and which has

been under " the exclusive protective friendship" of Italy

since 1862.2
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It has often happened, particularly in connection with

the states of Africa and the East, that protection as a tran-

sitional stage between independence and annexation or its

equivalent has been ill-defined and of short duration. Thus

in 1906 the Act of Algeciras, framed conjointly by repre-

sentatives of the Sultan of Morocco, eleven European powers,

and the United States, was

based upon the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence

of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and eco-

nomic liberty without any inequality.*

French penetration proceeded apace, however, and five years

later a convention between France and Germany recognized

1 Treaty of 1863, in B. F. S. P., LIU, 19; Treaty of 1864, in Hertslet, III, 1589.

1 Westlake, Int. Law, I, 13.

'Preamble, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 47.

In 1863 the Ionian Islands were united to Greece.1 As a
protected state they represented, from 1815 to 1863, the
vanishing point of international personality. They were
governed by British commissioners, and all relations with
other states were conducted by British officials. A separate
trading flag and neutrality during British wars were almost
the only indications of separate existence.
Protection has also taken the form of guardianship over
small or weak states during the period necessary for their
development to full capacity. Although the word "protection " has not appeared in the treaties, this has been the
practical effect of the responsibilities assumed at different
times by the great powers of Europe toward Greece and the
Balkan states. Protection appears to be a normal and permanent condition for a petty state like San :Marino, which
was under the protection of the Pope by formal treaty from
the beginning of the seventeenth century, and which has
been under " the exclusive protective friendship " of Italy
since 1862.2
It has often happened, particularly in connection with
the states of Africa and the East, that protection as a transitional stage between independence and annexation or its
equivalent has been ill-defined and of short duration. Thus
in 1906 the Act of Algeciras, framed conjointly by representatives of the Sultan of Morocco, eleven European powers,
and the United States, was
based upon the triple principle of the sovereignty and independence
of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his domains, and economic liberty without any inequality. 3

French penetration proceeded apace, however, and five years
later a convention between France and Germany recognized
Treaty of 1863, in B. F. S. P., Liil, 19i Treaty of 1864, in Hertslet, III, 1589.
Westlake, [nJ. Law, I, 23.
a Preamble, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 47.
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the end of Moroccan independence and the creation of a

French protectorate.1

The protectorate treaty of 1912 defined Franco-Moroccan

relations as follows:

The French Government shall be represented near his Shereefian

the end of Moroccan independence and the creation of a
French protectorate. 1
The protectorate treaty of 1912 defined Franco-Moroccan
relations as follows:

Majesty by a resident commissioner general, representative of all the

powers of the republic in Morocco, who shall attend to the execution

of the present agreement.

The resident commissioner general shall be the sole intermediary

of the Sultan near foreign representatives and in the relations which

these representatives maintain with the Moroccan Government. In

particular, he shall have charge of all matters relating to foreigners

in the Shereefian Empire.

He shall have the power to approve and promulgate, in the name

of the French Government, all the decrees issued by his Shereefian

Majesty.

The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with

the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests

abroad.
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His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of

an international nature without the previous approval of the French

Republic.2

Persia acquired two protectors under the Anglo-Russian

accord of 1907,3 and was well on the way to extinction in-

ternationally when the World War began. In 1894 Japan

made an alliance with Korea "to strongly establish the

independence of Korea." 4 The Treaty of Shimonoseki in

1895 required China to recognize "definitely the full and

complete independence and autonomy of Korea." 6 Korean

independence was again recognized by Japan and Russia in

1898,6 and by Japan and Great Britain in 1902.7 When the

The French Government shall be represented near his Shereefian
Majesty by a resident commissioner general, representative of all the
powers of the republic in :Morocco, who shall attend to the execution
of the present agreement.
The resident commissioner general shall be the sole intermediary
of the Sultan near foreign representatives and in the relations which
these representatives maintain with the Moroccan Government. In
particular, he shall have charge of all matters relating to foreigners
in the Shereefian Empire.
He shall have the power to approve and promulgate, in the name
of the French Government, all the decrees issued by his Shereefian
Majesty.
The diplomatic and consular agents of France shall be charged with
the representation and protection of Moroccan subjects and interests
abroad.
His Majesty the Sultan pledges himself not to conclude any act of
an international nature without the previous approval of the French
Republic. 2

1 Convention of 1911, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1912), VI, 62.

* Arts.S,6,ini4././.i.5«^.(i912),VIl207. See Harris, in/I././. L. (1913),

VII, 245-267.

* A.J.I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 400.

4 Ibid., p. 214. 6 Ibid., p. 217.

5 Ibid., p. 378. 7 Ibid., p. 14.

Persia acquired two protectors under the Anglo-Russian
accord of 1907 ,3 and was well on the way to extinction internationally when the World \Var began. In 1894 Japan
made an alliance with Korea " to strongly establish the
independence of Korea." 4 The Treaty of Shimonoseki in
1895 required China to recognize "definitely the full and
complete independence and autonomy of Korea." 6 Korean
independence was again recognized by Japan and Russia in
1898,6 and by Japan and Great Britain in 1902.7 When the
1 Convention of 19n, in A. J. /. L. Suppl. (1912), VI, 62.
Arts. 51 6, in A. J. /. L. Suppl. (1912), VI, 207. See Harris, in A. J. I. L. (1913),
VII, 245-267.
1 A. J. / . L. Suppl. (1907), I, 400.
8 Ibid., p. 217.
' Ibid., p. 214.
5 Ibid., p. 378.
7 Ibid., p. 14.
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Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905, Great Britain

recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea:

Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed in 1905, Great Britain
recognized Japan's paramount interests in Korea:

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic

interests in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take

such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she

may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those

interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to

the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry

of all nations.1

Russia accorded similar recognition-to Japan's interests in

the Peace of Portsmouth of the same year.2 At the out-

break of war with Russia in 1904 Japan had signed a pro-

Japan possessing paramount political, military, and economic
interest5 in Korea, Great Britain recognizes the right of Japan to take
such measures of guidance, control, and protection in Korea as she
may deem proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those
interests, provided always that such measures are not contrary to
the principle of equal opportunities for the commerce and industry
of all nations. 1

tocol with Korea, which provided:

For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship

between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the Far

East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence

in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the

latter in regard to improvements in administration.

The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friend-

Russia accorded similar recognition · to Japan's interests in
the Peace of Portsmouth of the same year. 2 At the outbreak of war with Russia in 1904 Japan had signed a protocol with Korea, which provided:
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ship ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea.

The Imperial Government of Japan definitively guarantees the

independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire.*

This was followed a few months later by another agreement:

The Korean Government shall engage as financial adviser to the

Korean Government a Japanese subject recommended by the Japanese

Government, and all matters concerning finance shall be dealt with

after his counsel being taken.

The Korean Government shall engage as diplomatic adviser to the

Department of Foreign Affairs a foreigner recommended by the

Japanese Government, and all important matters concerning foreign

relations shall be dealt with after his counsel being taken.

The Korean Government shall previously consult the Japanese

For the purpose of maintaining a permanent and solid friendship
between Japan and Korea and firmly establishing peace in the Far
East, the Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence
in the Imperial Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the
latter in regard to improvements in administration.
The Imperial Government of Japan shall in a spirit of firm friendship ensure the safety and repose of the Imperial House of Korea.
The Imperial Government of Japan definitively guarantees the
independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire. 8

Government in concluding treaties and conventions with foreign

powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such

This was followed a few months later by another agreement:

as the grant of concessions to or contracts with foreigners.4

1 A. J. I. L. Suppl (1907), 1,16.

» Ibid., p. 18.

* Ibid., p. 217.

4 Ibid., p. 218.

The Korean Government shall engage as financial adviser to the
Korean Government a Japanese subject recommended by the Japanese
Government, and all matters concerning finance shall be dealt with
after his counsel being taken.
The Korean Government shall engage as diplomatic adviser to the
Department of Foreign Affairs a foreigner recommended by the
Japanese Government, and all important matters concerning foreign
relations shall be dealt with after his counsel being taken.
The Korean Government shall previously consult the Japanese
Government in concluding treaties and conventions with foreign
powers, and in dealing with other important diplomatic affairs, such
as the grant of concessions to or contracts with foreigners.•
1

I

A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 16.
Ibid., p. 18.

' Ibid., p. 'lI7.
' Ibid., p. 'l 18.
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After the conclusion of peace in 1905 Korea was required to

yield control and direction of its foreign relations to the

Japanese Government.1 Diplomatic representatives were

accredited to the Court of Seoul for some time thereafter;

but in 1907 Japan prevented the delegates of Korea from

obtaining a hearing at the Second Hague Conference, and

in 1910 Korea was formally annexed.2

The understanding of 1906 between Great Britain, France,

and Italy with respect to Abyssinia apparently brings that

country under the joint protection of the three powers. It

is agreed that

France, Great Britain, and Italy shall cooperate in maintaining

the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by

the state of affairs at present existing, and by the following Agree-

ments: . . .

It is understood that the various Conventions mentioned in this

After the conclusion of peace in 1905 Korea was required to
yield control and direction of its foreign relations to the
Japanese Govemment. 1 Diplomatic representatives were
accredited to the Court of Seoul for some time thereafter;
but in 1907 Japan prevented the delegates of Korea from
obtaining a hearing at the Second Hague Conference, and
in 1910 Korea was formally annexed. 2
The understanding of 1906 between Great Britain, France,
and Italy with respect to Abyssinia apparently brings that
country under the joint protection of the three powers. It
is agreed that

Article do not in any way infringe the sovereign rights of the Emperor

of Abyssinia, and in no respect modify the relations between the three

Powers and the Ethiopian Empire as stipulated in the present Agree-
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ment. . . .

In the event of the status quo laid down in Article 1 being disturbed,

France, Great Britain, and Italy shall make every effort to preserve

the integrity of Ethiopia. In any case, they shall concert together,

on the basis of the Agreements enumerated in the above-mentioned

Article, ... 3

In the agreement of 1912, Russia assumed the protection

of the vassal state of Mongolia:

The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to main-

tain the autonomous regime which she has established, as also the

right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence

of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by

the Chinese.4

The possibility that China may pass under the protection

of Japan is suggested by recent developments in the Far

1 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 221. » Ibid. (1907), I, 226.

• Ibid. (1910), IV, 280, 282. 4 Ibid. (1916), X, 240. See supra, p. 239.

France, Great Britain, and Italy shall cooperate in maintaining
the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by
the state of affairs at present existing, and by the following Agreements: . . .
It is understood that the various Conventions mentioned in this
Article do not in any way infringe the sovereign rights of the Emperor
of Abyssinia, and in no respect modify the relations between the three
Powers and the Ethiopian Empire as stipulated in the present Agreement . . . .
In the event of the status quo laid down in Article 1 being disturbed,
France, Great Britain, and Italy shall make every effort to preserve
the integrity of Ethiopia. In any case, they shall concert together,
on the basis of the Agreements enumerated in the above-mentioned
Article, . . . 3

In the agreement of 1912, Russia assumed the protection
of the vassal state of l\'1ongolia:
The Imperial Russian Government shall assist Mongolia to maintain the autonomous regime which she has established, as also the
right to have her national army, and to admit neither the presence
of Chinese troops on her territory nor the colonization of her land by
the Chinese.•

The possibility that China may pass under the protection
of Japan is suggested by recent developments in the Far
1

2

A. J . I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 221.
Ibid. (1910), IV, 28o, 282.

a /bro . {1907), I, n6.
• Ibid. (1916), X, 240. See supra, p. 239.
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East.1 This and other applications of the principles of pro-

tection await the settlement of pending controversies and

the readjustment of the state system.

Protection has received an important application in the

New World in the guardianship of the United States over

the small republics of the Caribbean and of Central America.

The relations of the United States with Cuba are defined in

the so-called Piatt Amendment, incorporated in an act of

the United States Congress, in an appendix to the Cuban

Constitution, and in a permanent treaty between the two

states. Certain of its most important articles provide as

follows:

The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other

compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend

to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or

permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for

military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over

any portion of said island.

East. 1 This and other applications of the principles of protection await the settlement of pending controversies and
the readjustment of the state system.
Protection has received an important application in the
New World in the guardianship of the United States over
the small republics of the Caribbean and of Central America.
The relations of the United States with Cuba are defined in
the so-called Platt Amendment, incorporated in an act of
the United States Congress, in an appendix to the Cuban
Constitution, and in a permanent treaty between the two
states. Certain of its most important articles provide as
follows;

The Government of Cuba shall not assume or contract any public
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debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinking-

fund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary

revenues of the Island of Cuba, after defraying the current expenses

of the Government, shall be inadequate.

The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may

exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban inde-

pendence, the maintenance of U government adequate for the pro-

tection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging

the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris

on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the

Government of Cuba.

To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba,

and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the

Government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands

necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to

be agreed upon with the President of the United States.*

1 A. J. I. L. Sup pi. (1916), X, 1-18; Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far

East, ch. 17; North, in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 222-237.

'Treaty of 1903, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 7, in Malloy, Treaties, I, 362.

The Government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other
compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend
to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or
permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for
military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over
any portion of said island.
The Government of Cuba shall not assume or contract any public
debt to pay the interest upon which, and to make reasonable sinkingfund provision for the ultimate discharge of which, the ordinary
revenues of the Island of Cuba, after defraying the current expenses
of the Government, shall be inadequate.
The Government of Cuba consents that the United States may
exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of '3. government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging
the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris
on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the
Government of Cuba.
To enable the United States to maintain the independence of Cuba,
and to protect the people thereof, as well as for its own defense, the
Gov~rnment of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands
necessary for coaling or naval stations, at certain specified points, to
be agreed upon with the President of the United States.2
i A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 1-18; Hornbeck, Contemporary Polilics in the Far
East, ch. 17; North, in A. J. I. L. (1916), X, 222-237.
i Treaty of 1903, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 7, in Malloy, Treaties, I, 362.
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The protection of the United States has also been extended

to Panama, under the Treaty of 1903, and to San Domingo

and Haiti, under the arrangements for the financial rehabili-

tation of those republics, and has been contemplated for

others of the Central American republics.1

Limitations Incident to Guaranty

The relation of guaranty is really a special form of pro-

tection. It is created by treaty, and is denned by Pifid-

The protection of the United States has also been extended
to Panama, under the Treaty of 1903, and to San Domingo
and Haiti, under the arrangements for the :financial rehabilitation of those republics, and has been contemplated for
others of the Central American republics. 1

elievre as follows:

Treaties of guaranty are those by which a state binds itself to give

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO GUARANTY

aid to another, whenever the other may be injured or threatened in

the peaceable enjoyment of its rights. The idea that comes out of

the notion of guaranty is therefore an idea of protection and assistance

in view of the acquisition or the preservation of certain rights, of

assistance against actual or possible threats or injuries, of tutelage

exercised over one power by another in order to safeguard its political

The relation of guaranty is really a special form of protection. It is created by treaty, and is defined by Piedelievre as follows :

or international interests.*

Where the guaranteed state is incapable of freeing itself

from the relationship by its own act and the relationship
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is recognized by the society of nations generally, there is

an inequality of legal capacity of considerable importance.

The guarantor acquires a capacity for doing things in behalf

of the guaranteed state which states are generally presumed

to be capable of doing for themselves. As Pieclelievre says,

the relation is one of protection or of tutelage.

Treaties of guaranty have been a common device for as-

suring the permanence and stability of international ar-

rangements throughout the history of the modern society of

Treaties of guaranty are those by which a state binds itself to give
aid to another, whenever the other may be injured or threatened in
the peaceable enjoyment of its rights. The idea that comes out of
the notion of guaranty is therefore an idea of protection and assistance
in view of the acquisition or the preservation of certain rights, of
assistance against actual or possible threats or injuries, of tutelage
exercised over one power by another in order to safeguard its political
or international interests.2

nations. The execution of the Peace of Westphalia within the

Holy Roman Empire was guaranteed by France and Sweden.

The treaties were declared to be a perpetual law and prag-

1 See infra, pp. 251, 257, 258, 258, note 1.

'Prfcis, § 286, I, 258. See Idman, Le train de garantie en droit international;

Milanowitch, Les traites de garantie au XIX' sihcle.

Where the guaranteed state is incapable of freeing itself
from the relationship by its own act and the relationship
is recognized by the society of nations generally, there is
an inequality of legal capacity of considerable importance.
The guarantor acquires a capacity for doing things in behalf
of the guaranteed state which states are generally presumed
to be capable of doing for themselves. As Piedelievre says,
the relation is one of protection or of tutelage.
Treaties of guaranty have been a common device for assuring the permanence and stability of international arrangements throughout the history of the modern society of
nations. The execution of the Peace of Westphalia within the
Holy Roman Empire was guaranteed by France and Sweden.
The treaties were declared to be a perpetual law and pragSee infra, pp. 251, 257, 258, 258, note I.
Pr&is, § 286, I, 258. See Idman, Le traiU de garantu en droit international;
Milanowitch, Les traites de garantie au XIX• siecle.
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matic sanction of the Empire,1 and their enforcement was

assured by the following provision:

That nevertheless the concluded peace shall remain in force and

effect, and that all those who have participated in this transaction

shall be obliged to defend and protect all and every one of the laws or

conditions of this peace against whomsoever it may be, without dis-

tinction of religion; and if it happens that any point is violated, the

offended shall first endeavor to turn the offender from his present

course, by submitting the cause to a friendly composition, or to the

ordinary proceedings of justice; and if the difference cannot be settled

by one or the other of these means in the space of three years, that

each and every one of the parties concerned in this transaction shall

be bound to join the injured party, and to assist with their counsel

and their forces to repel the injury, after the offender shall have given

them to understand that the ways of moderation and of justice avail

nothing; without prejudice in all other respects, however, to the

jurisdiction of each, and of the competent administration of justice,

according to the laws and constitutions of each prince and state, and

that it shall not be permitted to any state of the Empire to pursue
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its right by force and by arms*

Koch explains the above provision as follows:

It is clear from this passage that the guaranty in question has for

its object the execution of the treaty in all that concerns the interior

of Germany and the states of the Empire in relation to one another....

The only obligation which that guaranty imposes on the foreign

powers who have participated in the treaty is to concur with their

efforts in the maintenance of the Germanic system and liberty, which

the general interest of Europe has opposed as a barrier to the enter-

prise of Imperial authority.*

matic sanction of the Empire, 1 and their enforcement was
assured by the following provision:
That nevertheless the concluded peace shall remain in force and
effect, and that all those who have participated in this transaction
shall be obliged to defend and protect all and every one of the laws or
conditions of this peace against whomsoever it may be, without distinction of religion; and if it happens that any point is violated, the
offended shall first endeavor to turn the offender from his present
course, by submitting the ~use to a friendly composition, or to the
ordinary proceedings of justice; and if the difference cannot be settled
by one or the other of these means in the space of three years, that
each and every one of the parties concerned in this transaction shall
be bound to join the injured party, and to assist with their counsel
and their forces to repel the injury, after the offender shall have given
them to understand that the ways of moderation and of justice avail
nothing; without prejudice in all other respects, however, to the
jurisdiction of each, and of the competent administration of justice,
according to the laws and constitutions of each prince and state, and
that it shall not be permitted to any state of the Empire to pursue
its right by force and by arms.2

The treaties of Westphalia were renewed and confirmed

at Utrecht, the system of guaranties was extended, and

Great Britain became an important factor as guarantor of

1 Treaty of Osnabriick, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, I, 488. Cf. Treaty of Mtinster,

§ 116, in Vast, Les grands traiiés, I, 54.

'Treaty of Osnabriick, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, 1,488. Cf. Treaty of Milnster,

§J 110-120, in Vast, Les grands traités, I, 55.

* Koch et Schoell, I, 248.

Koch explains the above provision as follows:
It is clear from this passage that the guaranty in question has for
its object the execution of the treaty in all that concerns the interior
of Germany and the states of the Empire in relation to one another. . ..
The only obligation which that guaranty imposes on the foreign
powers who have participated in the treaty is to concur with their
efforts in the maintenance of the Germanic system and liberty 1 which
the general interest of Europe has opposed as a barrier to the enterprise of Imperial authority.1

The treaties of Westphalia were renewed and confirmed
at Utrecht, the system of guaranties was extended, and
Great Britain became an important factor as guarantor of
Treaty of Osnabriick, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, I, 488. Cf. Treaty of Munster,
§ u6, in Vast, Les grands traills, I, 54.
• Treaty of Osnabriick, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, I, 488. Cf. Treaty of Milnster,
§§ 11cr120, in Vast, Les grands traites, I, 55.
1 Koch et Schoell, I, 248.
1

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

249

249

the new political arrangements. The Peace of Utrecht1

consisted of a series of separate treaties which acquired the

significance of a general act through the insertion of clauses

of guaranty. Thus in the treaty between France and Prus-

sia it was provided:

The said Most Christian King and the said King of Prussia will

consent that the Queen of Great Britain, who has contributed so much

through the indefatigable exertions of her Ambassadors Extraordinary

the new political arrangements. The Peace of Utrecht 1
consisted of a series of separate treaties which acquired the
significance of a general act through the insertion of clauses
of guaranty. Thus in the treaty between France and Prussia it was provided:

and Plenipotentiary, present at the Congress of Utrecht, to the con-

clusion of peace, and all other Potentates and Princes who wish to

enter into like engagements, may give to His Most Christian Majesty

and to His Prussian Majesty their promises and obligations of guar-

anty for the execution and observation of all that is contained in the

present treaty.*

The treaty between France and Great Britain contained ex-

press guaranties of other parts of the general settlement.

France's treaty with Portugal was guaranteed in the follow-

ing terms:

The Treaty of Peace signed today between His Most Christian
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Majesty and His Portuguese Majesty shall be a part of the present

Treaty, as if it were inserted here word for word; Her Majesty the

The said Most Christian King and the said King of Prussia will
consent that the Queen of Great Britain, who has contributed so much
through the indefatigable exertions of her Ambassadors Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary, present at the Congress of Utrecht, to the conclusion of peace, and all other Potentates and Princes who wish to
enter into like engagements, may give to His Most Christian Majesty
and to His Prussian Majesty their promises and obligations of guaranty for the execution and observation of all that is contained in the
present treaty.2

Queen of Great Britain declaring that she has offered her guaranty,

which she gives in the most solemn form for the most exact observa-

tion and execution of all that is contained in the said treaty.*

The system of international guaranties established at West-

phalia and Utrecht remained a part of the public order of

Europe until the entire state system was overturned follow-

ing the French Revolution.

The treaty between France and Great Britain contained express guaranties of other parts of the general settlement.
France's treaty with Portugal was guaranteed in the following terms:

In the nineteenth century important settlements of gen-

eral interest were frequently placed under the collective

guaranty of the great powers. The neutralization of Switz-

1 On the Peace of Utrecht, see Gerard, Peace of Utrecht; Giraud, Le traitt

d'Utrecht; Weber, Der Friede von Utrecht. There is a list of references in Vast, Les

grands traités, HI, 60.

* Art. 11, in Vast, Les grands trains, III, 126.

• Art. 24, in Vast, Les grands traités, III, 85.

The Treaty of Peace signed today between His Most Christian
Majesty and His Portuguese Majesty shall be a part of the present
Treaty, as if it were inserted here word for word; Her Majesty the
Queen of Great Britain declaring that she has offered her guaranty,
which she gives in the most solemn form for the most exact observation and execution of all that is contained in the said treaty.3

The system of international guaranties established at Westphalia and Utrecht remained a part of the public order of
Europe until the entire state system was overturned following the French Revolution.
In the nineteenth century important settlements of general interest were frequently placed under the collective
guaranty of the great powers. The neutralization of Switz1 On the Peace of Utrecht, see Gerard, Peace of Utrecht; Giraud, Le traitt
d'Utrecht; Weber, Der Fride von Utrecht. There is a list of references in Vast, Les
grands trai~, III, 60.
1 Art. u, in Vast, Les grands tra~, III, 126.
1 Art. 24, in Vast, Les grands traitts, III, 85.
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erland, Belgium, and Luxemburg was secured in this way

in each instance.1 Greece was constituted an independent

state under the guaranty of Great Britain, France, and

Russia. The vassal principalities of Roumania and Servia

received the same kind of collective sanction for their sepa-

rate existence by the Treaty of Paris in 1856.

In the case of Greece a guaranty was contemplated in the

Treaty of 1827 between Great Britain, France, and Russia:

The arrangements for reconciliation and Peace which shall be defin-

itively agreed upon between the Contending Parties, shall be guaran-

teed by those of the Signing Powers who may judge it expedient or

possible to contract that obligation. The operation and the effects

of such Guarantee shall become the subject of future stipulation be-

tween the High Powers.2

erland, Belgium, and Luxemburg was secured in this way
in each instance. 1 Greece was constituted an independent
state under the guaranty of Great Britain, France, and
Russia. The vassal principalities of Roumania and Servia
received the same kind of collective sanction for their separate existence by the Treaty of Paris in 1856.
In the case of Greece a guaranty was contemplated in the
Treaty of 1827 between Great Britain, France, and Russia:

The three powers gave their formal guaranty in the Treaty

of 1832:

Greece, under the Sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and

under the Guarantee of the 3 Courts, shall form a monarchical and

independent State, according to the terms of the Protocol signed be-

tween the said Courts on the 3d February, 1830, and accepted both
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by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte.*

This guaranty was restated in 1864, when the Ionian Islands

were united with Greece:

The arrangements for reconciliation and Peace which shall be definitively agreed upon between the Contending Parties, shall be guaranteed by those of the Signing Powers who may judge it expedient or
possible to contract that obligation. The operation and the effects
of such Guarantee shall become the subject of future stipulation between the High Powers.2

In consequence, Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor

of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in

their character of signing parties to the Convention of the 7th May,

1832, recognize such Union, and declare that Greece, within the Limits

The three powers gave their formal guaranty in the Treaty
of 1832:

determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between

the Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Ottoman

Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, including the Ionian Islands, shall form

a Monarchical, Independent, and Constitutional State, under the

1 See infra, pp. 252-254.

1 Art. 6, in Hertslet, I, 772.

* Art. 4, in Hertslet, II, 895. See Art. 8 of the Protocol of Feb. 3,1830, in ibid.,

II, 841.

Greece, under the Sovereignty of the Prince Otho of Bavaria, and
under the Guarantee of the 3 Courts, shall form a monarchical and
independent State, according to the terms of the Protocol signed between the said Courts on the 3d February, 1830, and accepted both
by Greece and by the Ottoman Porte.3

This guaranty was restated in 1864, when the Ionian Islands
were united with Greece:
In consequence, Her Britannic Majesty, His Majesty the Emperor
of the French, and His Majesty the Emperor of All the Russias, in
their character of signing parties to the Convention of the 7th May,
1832, recognize such Union, and declare that Greece, within the Limits
determined by the arrangement concluded at Constantinople between
the Courts of Great Britain, France, and Russia, and the Ottoman
Porte, on the 21st July, 1832, including the Ionian Islands, shall form
a Monarchical, Independent, and Constitutional State, under the
See infra, pp. 252-254.
Art. 6, in Hertslet, I, 772.
3 Art. 4, in Hertslet, II, 895. See Art. 8 of the Protocol of Feb. 3, 1830, in ibid.,
II, 841.
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Sovereignty of His Majesty King George, and under the Guarantee of

the 3 Courts.1

In the western world the United States is guarantor of the

Sovereignty of His Majesty King George, and under the Guarantee of
the 3 Courts. 1

independence of Panama. Article 1 of the Treaty of 1903

between the two countries provides:

The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence

of the Republic of Panama.*

Several of the obligations of a guarantor are involved in the

responsibilities which the United States has assumed in its

treaties with Cuba 3 and Haiti,4 although, strictly speaking,

neither relationship is an international guaranty. In each

of the three instances mentioned there are important limita-

In the western world the United States is guarantor of the
independence of Panama. Article 1 of the Treaty of 1903
between the two countries provides:
The United States guarantees and will maintain the independence
of the Republic of Panama. 2

tions on international capacity.

More recently the integrity of Norway has been secured

by the Treaty of 1907 between that state and four of the

great powers. Although the word " guaranty " is not used,

this is the effect of the treaty, as its substantive articles

indicate:

The Norwegian Government undertake not to cede any portion of
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the territory of Norway to any power to hold on a title founded either

on occupation or on any other ground whatsoever.

The German, French, British, and Russian Governments recognize

and undertake to respect the integrity of Norway.

If the integrity of Norway is threatened or impaired by any power

whatsoever, the German, French, and Russian Governments under-

take, on the receipt of a previous communication to this effect from

the Norwegian Government, to afford to that Government their sup-

port, by such means as may be deemed the most appropriate, with a

view to safeguarding the integrity of Norway.6

1 Treaty of 1864, Art. 1, in Hertslet, HI, 1591. See Holland, European Concert

in the Eastern Question, ch. 2; Isambert, L'indtpendance grecque et I'Europe.

2 Malloy, Treaties, II, 1349.

* Supra, p. 246. 4 Infra, p. 258.

« Treaty of 1907, in A.J.I. L. Suppl. (1908), II, 267. Cf. Treaty of 1855, in

B. F. S. P., XLV, 33. Cf. Treaty of 1852, with regard to the Danish succession and

the integrity of Denmark, in B. F. S. P., XXI, 13.

Several of the obligations of a guarantor are involved in the
responsibilities which the United States has assumed in its
treaties with Cuba 3 and Haiti,4 although, strictly speaking,
neither relationship is an international guaranty. In each
of the three instances mentioned there are important limitations on international capacity.
More recently the integrity of Norway has been secured
by the Treaty of 1907 between that state and four of the
great powers. Although the word " guaranty " is not used,
this is the effect of the treaty, as its substantive articles
indicate:
The Norwegian Government undertake not to cede any portion of
the territory of Norway to any power to hold on a title founded either
on occupation or on any other ground whatsoever.
The German, French, British, and Russian Governments recognize
and undertake to respect the integrity of Norway.
If the integrity of Norway is threatened or impaired by any power
whatsoever, the German, French, and Russian Governments undertake, on the receipt of a previous communication to this effect from
the Norwegian Government, to afford to that Government their support, by such means as may be deemed the most appropriate, with a
view to safeguarding the integrity of Norway.6
1 Treaty of 1864, Art. 1, in Hertslet, III, 1591. See Holland, European Concert
in the &stern Question, ch. :z; Isambert, L'indepe11dance grecque et l'Europe.
2 Malloy, Treaties, II, 1349.
• Supra, p. 246.
' Infra, p. 258.
1 Treaty of 1907, in A. J. I. L. S14ppl. (19o8), II, 267.
Cf. Treaty of 1855, in
B. F. S. P., XLV, 33. Cf. Treaty of 1852, with regard to the Danish succession and
the integrity of Denmark, in B. F. S. P., XLI, 13.
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It may be observed that Norway's status is less restricted

than is usually the case where the relation of guaranty is

created. In this instance, protection is to be invoked by

the guaranteed state, and the treaty may be denounced by

any of the parties, including Norway, at the end of ten-year

periods.

Limitations Incident to Neutralization

The collective guaranty of the great powers has been used

in three cases in the nineteenth century to sanction a par-

ticular status in respect to the guaranteed state, namely,

that of perpetual neutralization.1 In the case of Switzer-

It may be observed that Norway's status is less restricted
than is usually the case where the relation of guaranty is
created. In this instance, protection is to be invoked by
the guaranteed state, and the treaty may be denounced by
any of the parties, including Norway, at the end of ten-year
periods.

land, of Belgium, and of Luxemburg neutralization has been

so guaranteed, has been generally recognized by other mem-

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO NEUTRALIZATION

bers of the international community, and has limited, in the

interest of the neutralized state and of the general European

order, the international capacity of each of those countries.

The neutralization of Switzerland dates from the settle-

ment of 1815. A declaration of the eight powers who signed

the general act of the Vienna Congress acknowledged that

"the general interest demands that the Helvetic States
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should enjoy the benefit of a perpetual neutrality."2 This

declaration was accepted by the Swiss Confederation 3 and

confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna.4 On November 20,1815,

the five great powers signed an act in which the perpetual

neutrality of Switzerland was formally acknowledged and

guaranteed in the following terms:

the Powers who signed the declaiation of Vienna of the 20th March

declare, by this present act, their formal and authentic acknowledg-

1 See Baldassari, La neutralizzazione; Descamps, Vétat neutre d titre permanent;

Garner, in A.J. I. L. (1915), LX, 72-86; Idman, Le traité de garantie en droit inter-

national; Milanowitch, Les traités de garantie au XIX' steele; Morand, in

R.G.D.I. P. (1894), I, S22-S37; PiMelievre, Prtcis, §§ 284-285, I, 256; Wilson,

in The Yale Review (1915), n. b., IV, 474-486; Window, in A. J. I. L. (1908),

II, 366-386.

1 Declaration of March id, 1915, in B. F. S. P., II, 142.

* Ibid., p. 147. 4 Art. 84.

The collective guaranty of the great powers has been used
in three cases in the nineteenth century to sanction a particular status in respect to the guaranteed state, namely,
that of perpetual neutralization. 1 In the case of Switzerland, of Belgium, and of Luxemburg neutralization has been
so guaranteed, has been generally recognized by other members of the international community, and has limited, in the
interest of the neutralized state and of the general European
order, the international capacity of each of those countries.
The neutralization of Switzerland dates from the settlement of 1815. A declaration of the eight powers who signed
the general act of the Vienna Congress acknowledged that
" the general interest demands that the Helvetic States
should enjoy the benefit of a perpetual neutrality." 2 This
declaration was accepted by the Swiss Confederation 3 and
confirmed by the Treaty of Vienna. 4 On November 20, 1815,
the five great powers signed an act in which the perpetual
neutrality of Switzerland was formally acknowledged and
guaranteed in the following terms:
the Powers who signed the declaration of Vienna of the 20th March
declare, by this present act, their formal and authentic acknowledg1 See Baldassari, La neutralizzazione; Descamps, L'ttat neulre d litre permaMnt;
Garner, in A. J. I . L. (1915}, IX, 72-86; Idman, Le traitt de garantie en droit internaJional; Milanowitch, Les traiUs de garantie au XIX• si~de; Morand, in
R. G.D. I. P. (1894) 1 I, 522-537; Piedelievre, Prtcis, §§ 284-285, I, 256; Wilson,
in Tiu Yale Review (1915), N. s., IV, 474-486; Winslow, in A. J. I . L. (u1o8),
II, 366--386.
1 Declaration of March :z'c:J, 1915, in B. F. S. P., II, 142.
I /bid., p. 147.
' Art. 84.
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ment of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland; and they guarantee

to that country the integrity and inviolability of its territory in its

new limits, such as they are fixed, as well by the act of the Congress

of Vienna, as by the Treaty of Paris of this day, and such as they will

be hereafter; . . .

The powers who signed the declaration of the 20th of March

acknowledge, in the most formal manner, by the present act, that

the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, and her independence

of all foreign influence, enter into the true interests of the policy of

the whole of Europe.1

The Congress of Vienna united Belgium with Holland in

the interest of the European balance of power. Following

the revolt of 1830, the great powers intervened, and, by the

Treaty of London of November 15, 1831,2 accorded Belgium

ment of the perpetual neutrality of Switzerland; and they guarantee
to that country the integrity and inviolability of its territory in its
new limits, such as they are fixed, as well by the act of the Congress
of Vienna, as by the Treaty of Paris of this day, and such as they will
be hereafter; . . .
The powers who signed the declaration of the 20th of March
acknowledge, in the most formal manner, by the present act, that
the neutrality and inviolability of Switzerland, and her independence
of all foreign influence, enter into the true interests of the policy of
the whole of Europe. 1

an independent and neutralized status under their collective

guaranty:

Belgium . . . shall form an independent and perpetually Neutral

State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other

States. . . .
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The Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia

guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians the execution of

all the preceding Articles.3

Holland resisted the arrangement for several years, but

came to terms with Belgium in 1839. In another treaty

the great powers confirmed the agreement and repeated their

The Congress of Vienna united Belgium with Holland in
the interest of the European balance of power. Following
the revolt of 1830, the great powers intervened, and, by the
Treaty of London of November 15, 1831,2 accorded Belgium
an independent and neutralized status under their collective
guaranty:

guaranty of Belgium's independence and neutralization.4

Luxemburg was constituted an independent state in 1815

under the King of Holland and was united with the Germanic

Confederation. After the dissolution of the Confederation

1 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1909), m, 106; B. F. S. P., m, 359. See Aberdeen to

Morier, February 11,1845, in B. F. S. P., LVII, 833. See Milanowitch, Les traités

de garantie, pp. 141-173; Sherman, in A. J. I. L. (1918), XII, 241-250, 462-474,

780-795; (19i9) XIII, 227-241.

• B. F. S. P., XVHI, 645.

Belgium ... shall form an independent and perpetually Neutral
State. It shall be bound to observe such Neutrality towards all other
States. . ..
The Courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia
guarantee to His Majesty the King of the Belgians the execution of
all the preceding Arlicles.3

'Arts. 7, 25, in Hertslet, II, 863, 870.

4 Treaty of 1839, in B. F. S. P., XXVII, 990,1000. See Descamps, La neutrolité

de la Belgique; Milanowitch, Les traités de garantie, pp. 173-200.

Holland resisted the arrangement for several years, but
came to terms with Belgium in 1839. In another treaty
the great powers confirmed the agreement and repeated their
guaranty of Belgium's independence and neutralization.4
Luxemburg was constituted an independent state in 1815
under the King of Holland and was united with the Germanic
Confederation. After the dissolution of the Confederation
A. J. l. L. Suppl. (1909), III, 106; B. F. S. P., III, 359. See Aberdeen to
Morier, February 11, 1845, in B. F. S. P., LVII, 833. See Milanowitch, us traiUs
de garantie, pp. 141-173; Sherman, in A. J. I. L. (1918), XII, 241-250, 462-474,
780--795; (1919} XIII, 227-241.
' B. F. S. P., XVIII, 645.
' Arts. 7, 25, in Hertslet, II, 863, 870.
' Treaty of 1839, in B. F. S. P., XXVII, 990, 1000. See Descamps, La neutraliU
de la Belgique; Milanowitch, us trait~ de garantie, pp. 173-200.
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in 1866 it was placed under the guaranty of the great powers

as a permanently neutralized state. The Treaty of London

of 1867 provided:

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, . . . under the guarantee of the

courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall

henceforth form a perpetually neutral state.

It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other

states.

The high contracting parties engage to respect the principle of

neutrality stipulated by the present article.

That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the

collective guarantee of the powers signing parties to the present

treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral state.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being neutralized, according to

the terms of the preceding article, the maintenance or establishment

of fortresses upon its territory becomes without necessity as well as

without object.

In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the city of

Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a
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federal fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.

His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain

in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the

maintenance of good order.1

The above are the most important instances of neutraliza-

tion, although the principle has had a limited application

elsewhere. In 1885 the Congo Free State took advantage

of the provisions of the act of the Conference on African

affairs to issue a declaration

that in accordance with Article 10 of the General Act of the Confer-

ence of Berlin, the Congo Free State declares itself, by these presents,

to be perpetually neutral, and that it claims the advantages guaran-

teed by Chapter III of the same act, at the same time that it assumes

the duties which accompany neutrality.2

in 1866 it was placed under the guaranty of the great powers
as a permanently neutralized state. The Treaty of London
of 1867 provided:
The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, ... under the guarantee of the
courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia, and Russia, shall
henceforth form a perpetually neutral state.
It shall be bound to observe the same neutrality towards all other
states.
The high contracting parties engage to respect the principle of
neutrality stipulated by the present article.
That principle is and remains placed under the sanction of the
collective guarantee of the powers signing parties to the present
treaty, with the exception of Belgium, which is itself a neutral state.
The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg being neutralized, according to
the terms of the preceding article, the maintenance or establishment
of fortresses upon its territory becomes without necessity as well as
without object.
In consequence, it is agreed by common consent that the city of
Luxemburg, considered in time past, in a military point of view, as a
federal fortress, shall cease to be a fortified city.
His Majesty the King Grand Duke reserves to himself to maintain
in that city the number of troops necessary to provide in it for the
maintenance of good order.1

1 Arts. 2, 3, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1909), III, 118; B. F. S. P., LVII, 32. See

Eyschen, in R. D. I. L. C. (1899) 2e ser., I, 5-42; Milanowitch, Les traités de gar-

antie, pp. 275-289.

* A.J.I. L. Suppl. (1909), ni, 26; B. F. S. P., LXXVT, 11, 210. See Reeves,

in A.J.I.L. (1909), III, 99-118.

The above are the most important instances of neutralization, although the principle has had a limited application
elsewhere. In 1885 the Congo Free State took advantage
of the provisions of the act of the Conference on African
affairs to issue a declaration
that in accordance with Article 10 of the General Act of the Conference of Berlin, the Congo Free State declares itself, by these presents,
to be perpetually neutral, and that it claims the advantages guaranteed by Chapter III of the same act, at the same time that it assumes
the duties which accompany neutrality.2
1 Arts. 2, 3, in A . J. I . L. Suppl. (190<)), III, u8; B. F. S. P., LVII, 32.
See
Eyschen, in R. D. I. L. C. (1899) :2 8 ser., I, 5-42; Milanowitch, Les traiUs de garantie, pp. 275-289.
2 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (190<J), III, 26; B. F. S. P., LXXVI, u, 210. See Reeves,
in A. J. /. L. (190<)), III, 9<rn8.
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Parts of states have been declared neutralized in a few

instances, as Savoy by the Treaty of Vienna and the Con-

vention of November 20, 1815,1 and Corfu and Paxo by the

treaties which united the Ionian Islands with Greece.2 The

Black Sea was neutralized from 1856 to 1871, while neutral-

ization in a somewhat different sense was extended to

the Straits of Magellan by the Treaty of 1881 between the

Argentine Republic and Chile, to the Suez Canal by the

Convention of 1888, and to the Panama Canal by treaties

between the United States and New Granada, Great Britain,

and Panama respectively.*

Neutralization imposes certain obvious limitations on

legal capacity. War and preparations for war must be re-

stricted to the necessities of defense and must be undertaken

with absolute impartiality. In the case of Luxemburg even

defensive preparation was interdicted. A cession of territory

by a neutralized state would probably require the consent of

the guaranteeing powers. Intervention in the affairs of

other states, even in the limited number of cases approved
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by the law of nations, would seem to be inconsistent with

neutralization. Neutralized states are also incapacitated

for entering into certain kinds of treaties. Thus Belgium

could not participate in the guaranty of Luxemburg's neu-

trality,4 while Luxemburg, at the Second Hague Conference,

abstained from voting on the convention limiting the em-

ployment of force for the recovery of contract debts because

of its status.8 Experience has revealed other limitations,

some of which are controverted, as incident to the condition

of neutralization.

1 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1909), in, 107. See infra, p. 265.

• A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1909), m, 116.

'Ibid., pp. 114, 121, 123, 108, 110, 127, 130.

* Treaty of London, 1867, Art. 2.

6 La Deux. Confer., I, 558.

Parts of states have been declared neutralized in a few
instances, as Savoy by the Treaty of Vienna and the Convention of November 20, 1815, 1 and Corfu and Paxo by the
treaties which united the Ionian Islands with Greece. 2 The
Black Sea was neutralized from 1856 to 1871, while neutralization in a somewhat different sense was extended to
the Straits of Magellan by the Treaty of 1881 between the
Argentine Republic and Chile, to the Suez Canal by the
Convention of 1888, and to the Panama Canal by treaties
between the United States and New Granada, Great Britain,
and Panama respectively. 1
Neutralization imposes certain obvious limitations on
legal capacity. War and preparations for war must be restricted to the necessities of defense and must be undertaken
with absolute impartiality. In the case of Luxemburg even
defensive preparation was interdicted. A cession of territory
by a neutralized state would probably require the consent of
the guaranteeing powers. Intervention in the affairs of
other states, even in the limited number of cases approved
by the law of nations, would seem to be inconsistent with
neutralization. Neutralized states are also incapacitated
for entering into certain kinds of treaties. Thus Belgium
could not participate in the guaranty of Luxemburg's neutrality,4 while Luxemburg, at the Second Hague Conference,
abstained from voting on the convention limiting the employment of force for the recovery of contract debts because
of its status. 6 Experience has revealed other limitations,
some of which are controverted, as incident to the condition
of neutralization.
1 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1909), III, 107. See infra, p. 265.
1 A.J.I. L. Suppl. (1909), III, u6.
1 Ibid., pp. u4, 121, 123, 108, 110, 127, 130.
4 Treaty of London, 1867, Art. 2.
' La Deux. Confb., I, 558.
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Limitations Incident to Supervision of Finance

The financial control of debtor states 1 is also a special

form of protection, sanctioned by international practice, the

effect of which is to impose important limitations upon the

capacity of the debtor state for an indefinite period, or until

a condition of solvency can be restored. Of the practice of

nations in this respect, Borchard says:

The European powers have on several occasions intervened to

secure the payment of public loans due their subjects. Their action

has taken various forms. Sometimes it has been merely the use of

good offices and an approval of arrangements for financial control

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO SUPERVISION OF FINANCE

The financial control of debtor states 1 is also a special
form of protection, sanctioned by international practice, the
effect of which is to impose important limitations upon the
capacity of the debtor state for an indefinite period, or until
a condition of solvency can be restored. Of the practice of
nations in this respect, Borchard says:

made by national bankers or associations of bondholders with the

debtor state, as in the case of Turkey (1881) and Servia (1904); an

assumption of limited governmental control, as in the case of the

United States in the Dominican Republic (1907); or joint interven-

tion of several powers assuming financial control as in the case of

Tunis (1868), of Greece (1897), and of Egypt (1880). This is inter-

vention in the true sense, in that it involves an administrative control

over a certain portion of national resources and revenues. It seems
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to be more proper on the part of a state or states guaranteeing the

debt of some weak state placed under their guardianship.2

A very detailed scheme of international control was elabo-

rated in case of Greece.3 The Egyptian Commission of 1880

and the Macedonian Commission of 1906-1909 also gave rise

to important incapacities.4 The Piatt Amendment in the

treaty between the United States and Cuba includes a form

of financial control, the Government of Cuba undertaking

to contract no public debts beyond the resources provided

by the ordinary revenues.6

1 Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, §§ 121, 125, pp. 313, 325;

Imbert, Les emprunts d'états étrangers; Kaufmann, Das internationale Recht der

The European powers have on several occasions intervened to
secure the payment of public loans due their subjects. Their action
has taken various forms. Sometimes it has been merely the use of
good offices and an approval of arrangements for financial control
made by national bankers or associations of bondholders with the
debtor state, as in the case of Turkey (1881) and Servia (1904); an
assumption of limited governmental control, as in the case of the
United States in the Dominican Republic (1907); or joint intervention of several powers assuming financial control as in the case of
Tunis (1868), of Greece (1897), and of Egypt (1880). This is intervention in the true sense, in that it involves an administrative control
over a certain portion of national resources and revenues. It seems
to be more proper on the part of a state or states guaranteeing the
debt of some weak state placed under their guardianship. 2

egyptischen Staatschuld; Kebedgy, in J. D. I. P. (1894), XXI, 59-72, 504-519; and

in R. G. D. I. P. (1894), I, 261-271; Reinsch, Public International Unions, p. 75.

1 Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, § 121, p. 313.

• Martens, Nouveau recueil general, 2' ser., XXV, 475-491.

• See the Macedonian Financial R&glement, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 209.

• Supra, p. 246.

A very detailed scheme of international control was elaborated in case of Greece. 3 The Egyptian Commission of l88o
and the Macedonian Commission of 1906-1909 also gave rise
to important incapacities. 4 The Platt Amendment in the
treaty between the United States and Cuba includes a form
of financial control, the Government of Cuba undertaking
to contract no public debts beyond the resources provided
by the ordinary revenues. 5
1 Borchard, DipW1na#c Protection of Citizens Abroad,§§ 121 1 125, pp. 313, 325;
Imbert, Les emprunts d'ttals tlrangers; Kaufmann, Das in~ionalt Rec/U der
egyptischen StaaJschuld; Kebedgy, in 1. D. I. P . (18<)4), XXI, 59-72, 504-519; and
in R. G.D. I. P. {18<)4), I, 261-271; Reinsch, Public buernaJional Unions, p. 75.
t DipWmalic Protuti<m of Citizens Abroad,§ 121 1 p. 313.
1 Martens, Nouveau recueil gtntral, 2 9 ser., XXV, 475-491.
• See the Macedonian Financial R~glemenl, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 209.
1 Supra, p. 246.
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Financial protection is denned in detail in the treaty of

1907 between the United States and the Dominican Republic:

Financial protection is defined in detail in the treaty of
1907 between the United States and the Dominican Republic:

And whereas the whole of said plan is conditioned and dependent

upon the assistance of the United States in the collection of customs

revenues of the Dominican Republic and the application thereof so

far as necessary to the interest upon and the amortization and re-

demption of said bonds, and the Dominican Republic has requested

the United States to give and the United States is willing to give such

assistance: . . .

That the President of the United States shall appoint a General

Receiver of Dominican Customs, who, with such Assistant Receivers

and other employees of the Receivership as shall be appointed by the

President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the

customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Domini-

can Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds

received by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan

and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore

recited; . . .

The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment
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of all customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants, and

will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to

the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will

give to the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it

may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.

Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the

bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by

previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the

United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the

import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modifi-

cation of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate

and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the

basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like

character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired

to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at

such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in

excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.

The accounts of the General Receiver shall be rendered monthly

to the Contaduria General of the Dominican Republic and to the

State Department of the United States and shall be subject to exami-

And whereas the whole of said plan is conditioned and dependent
upon the assistance of the United States in the collection of customs
revenues of the Dominican Republic and the application thereof so
far as necessary to the interest upon and the amortization and redemption of said bonds, and the Dominican Republic has requested
the United States to give and the United States is willing to give such
assistance: . . .
That the President of the United States shall appoint a General
Receiver of Dominican Customs, who, with such Assistant Receivers
and other employees of the Receivership as shall be appointed by the
President of the United States in his discretion, shall collect all the
customs duties accruing at the several customs houses of the Dominican Republic until the payment or retirement of any and all bonds
received by the Dominican Government in accordance with the plan
and under the limitations as to terms and amounts hereinbefore
recited; . . .
The Dominican Government will provide by law for the payment
of all customs duties to the General Receiver and his assistants, and
will give to them all needful aid and assistance and full protection to
the extent of its powers. The Government of the United States will
give to the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it
may find to be requisite for the performance of their duties.
Until the Dominican Republic has paid the whole amount of the
bonds of the debt its public debt shall not be increased except by
previous agreement between the Dominican Government and the
United States. A like agreement shall be necessary to modify the
import duties, it being an indispensable condition for the modification of such duties that the Dominican Executive demonstrate
and that the President of the United States recognize that, on the
basis of exportations and importations to the like amount and the like
character during the two years preceding that in which it is desired
to make such modification, the total net customs receipts would at
such altered rates of duties have been for each of such two years in
excess of the sum of $2,000,000 United States gold.
The accounts of the General Receiver shall be rendered monthly
to the Contaduria General of the Dominican Republic and to the
State Department of the United States and shall be subject to exami-
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nation and verification by the appropriate officers of the Dominican

and the United States Governments.1

nation and verification by the appropriate officers of the Dominican
and the United States Governments. 1

The recent treaty between the United States and Nica-

ragua, whereby the United States acquires control of the

interoceanic canal route across Nicaraguan territory and a

naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, contemplates a limited

financial supervision. The three million dollars gold which

the United States pays for the concessions is

to be applied by Nicaragua upon its indebtedness or other public pur-

poses for the advancement of the welfare of Nicaragua in a manner

to be determined by the two high contracting parties, all such dis-

bursements to be made by orders drawn by the Minister of Finance

The recent treaty between the United States and Nicaragua, whereby the United States acquires control of the
interoceanic canal route across Nicaraguan territory and a
naval base in the Gulf of Fonseca, contemplates a limited
financial supervision. The three million dollars gold which
the United States pays for the concessions is

of the Republic of Nicaragua and approved by the Secretary of State

of the United States or by such person as he may designate.*

A very complete scheme of financial protection is outlined

in the recent treaty between the United States and Haiti.

The treaty contemplates much more than financial rehabili-

tation, as its more important articles show:

The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, aid
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the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of

its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the estab-

to be applied by Nicaragua upon its indebtedness or other public purposes for the advancement of the welfare of Nicaragua in a manner
to be determined by the two high contracting parties, all such disbursements to be made by orders drawn by the Minister of Finance
of the Republic of Nicaragua and approved by the Secretary of State
of the United States or by such person as he may designate.2

lishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the

President of the United States, a General Receiver and such aids and

employees as may be necessary, who shall collect, receive and apply

all customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several

custom houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.

The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the

A very complete scheme of financial protection is outlined
in the recent treaty between the United States and Haiti.
The treaty contemplates much more than financial rehabilitation, as its more important articles show:

President of the United States, a Financial Adviser, who shall be an

1 A.J.I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 231. See Hollander, in A.J.I. L. (1907), I, 287-

296; and the proclamation of the military occupation of San Domingo by the United

States under the above treaty, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 94. Seethe unrati-

fied loan conventions between the United States and Honduras, and between the

United States and Nicaragua, ibid. (1911), V, 274, 291. On the relations of

the United States with Liberia, see V. S. For. Rel. (1910), pp. 694-711; and

Falkner, in A.J.I. L. (1910), IV, 529-545.

• A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 260.

The Government of the United States will, by its good offices, aid
the Haitian Government in the proper and efficient development of
its agricultural, mineral and commercial resources and in the establishment of the finances of Haiti on a firm and solid basis.
The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the
President of the United States, a General Receiver and such aids and
employees as may be necessary, who shall collect, receive and apply
all customs duties on imports and exports accruing at the several
custom houses and ports of entry of the Republic of Haiti.
The President of Haiti shall appoint, upon nomination by the
President of the United States, a Financial Adviser, who shall be an
1 A. J. /. L. Srtppl. (1907), I, 231. See Hollander, in A. J. /. L. (1907), I, 287296; and the proclamation of the military occupation of San Domingo by the United
States under the above treaty, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 94. See the unrati-

fied loan conventions between the United States and Honduras, and between the
United States and Nicaragua, ibid. (1911), V, 274, 291. On the relations of
the United States with Liberia, see U.S. For. Rel. (1910), pp. 694-711; and
Falkner, in A. J. /. L. (1910), IV, 529-545.
• A. J. /. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 260.
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officer attached to the Ministry of Finance, to give effect to whose

proposals and labors the Minister will lend efficient aid. The Finan-

cial Adviser shall devise an adequate system of public accounting,

aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses,

inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both

governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend im-

proved methods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make

such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be

deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.

The Government of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or

appropriate decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the

General Receiver, and will extend to the Receivership, and to the

Financial Adviser, all needful aid and full protection in the execution

of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein; and the United

States on its part will extend like aid and protection. . . .

The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by

previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall

not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the

ordinary revenues of the Republic available for that purpose, after

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:50 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

defraying the expenses of the government, shall be adequate to pay

the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such

debt.

The Republic of Haiti will not without a previous agreement with

the President of the United States, modify the customs duties in a

manner to reduce the revenues therefrom; and in order that the

revenues of the Republic may be adequate to meet the public debt

and the expenses of the government, to preserve tranquillity and to

promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti will cooperate

with the Financial Adviser in his recommendations for improvement

in the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and for new

sources of needed income. . . .

The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the terri-

tory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease, or otherwise, or jurisdic-

tion over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to

enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers

that will impair the independence of Haiti. . . .

The high contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps

as may be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the

objects comprehended in this treaty; and, should the necessity occur,

the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of

officer attached to the Ministry of Finance, to give effect to whose
proposals and labors the Minister will lend efficient aid. The Financial Adviser shall devise an adequate system of public accounting,
aid in increasing the revenues and adjusting them to the expenses,
inquire into the validity of the debts of the Republic, enlighten both
governments with reference to all eventual debts, recommend improved methods of collecting and applying the revenues, and make
such other recommendations to the Minister of Finance as may be
deemed necessary for the welfare and prosperity of Haiti.
The Government of the Republic of Haiti will provide by law or
appropriate decrees for the payment of all customs duties to the
General Receiver, and will extend to the Receivership, and to the
Financial Adviser, all needful aid and full protection in the execution
of the powers conferred and duties imposed herein; and the United
States on its part will extend like aid and protection. . . .
The Republic of Haiti shall not increase its public debt except by
previous agreement with the President of the United States, and shall
not contract any debt or assume any financial obligation unless the
ordinary revenues of the Republic available for that purpose, after
defraying the expenses of the government, shall be adequate to pay
the interest and provide a sinking fund for the final discharge of such
debt.
The Republic of Haiti will not without a previous agreement with
the President of the United States, modify the customs duties in a
manner to reduce the revenues therefrom; and in order that the
revenues of the Republic may be adequate to meet the public debt
and the expenses of the government, to preserve tranquillity and to
promote material prosperity, the Republic of Haiti will cooperate
with the Financial Adviser in his recommendations for improvement
in the methods of collecting and disbursing the revenues and for new
sources of needed income. . . .
The Government of Haiti agrees not to surrender any of the territory of the Republic of Haiti by sale, lease, or otherwise, or jurisdiction over such territory, to any foreign government or power, nor to
enter into any treaty or contract with any foreign power or powers
that will impair the independence of Haiti....
The high contracting parties shall have authority to take such steps
as may be necessary to insure the complete attainment of any of the
objects comprehended in this treaty; and, should the necessity occur,
the United States will lend an efficient aid for the preservation of
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Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate

for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.1

Haitian independence and the maintenance of a government adequate
for the protection of life, property and individual liberty.1

The treaty also provides for a native constabulary, to be

organized and officered by Americans appointed by the

President of Haiti on the nomination of the President of

the United States, and for measures of sanitation and public

improvement under the direction of American engineers

selected in the same way. American officers of the constab-

ulary will be replaced by Haitians as rapidly as the latter

become qualified and pass appropriate examinations. Cus-

toms receipts are to be applied first to the expenses of the

receivership, second to the interest and sinking fund on the

public debt, third to the maintenance of the constabulary,

and the remainder to the current expenses of the Haitian

Government. The General Receiver reports to the Haitian

Government and the United States Department of State.

The arrangement is for ten years, and for a further period

of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either party,

its purpose has not been fully accomplished.
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Limitations Incident to Intervention

Other limitations upon equality are incident to interven-

tion by one state in the internal affairs of another state.2 If

the relation out of which the right of intervention arises is

more than transitory, if it cannot be terminated at the pleas-

ure of the state that is subject to intervention, and if it is

recognized by the international community the resulting

capacities and incapacities constitute differences of status

to which the principle of equality is quite inapplicable.

Capacity is expanded on the one hand and restricted on the

other, creating inequalities of considerable significance.

The treaty also provides for a native constabulary, to be
organized and officered by Americans appointed by the
President of Haiti on the nomination of the President of
the United States, and for measures of sanitation and public
improvement under the direction of American engineers
selected in the same way. American officers of the constabulary will be replaced by Haitians as rapidly as the latter
become qualified and pass appropriate examinations. Customs receipts are to be applied first to the expenses of the
receivership, second to the interest and sinking fund on the
public debt, third to the maintenance of the constabulary,
and the remainder to the current expenses of the Haitian
Government. The General Receiver reports to the Haitian
Government and the United States Department of State.
The arrangement is for ten years, and for a further period
of ten years if, for specific reasons presented by either party,
its purpose has not been fully accomplished.

1 Arts. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, 11, 14, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 234-238.

'See Floeckher, in R. G. D. I. P. (1896), III, 329-333; Hodges, Doctrine of

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO INTERVENTION

Intervention; Kebedgy, Vintervention en droit international public; Pifidelievre,

Prtcis, §§ 289-312,1, 259-278; Rougier, in R. G. D. I. P. (1910), XVII, 468-526.

Other limitations upon equality are incident to intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another state.2 If
the relation out of which the right of intervention arises is
more than transitory, if it cannot be terminated at the pleasure of the state that is subject to intervention, and if it is
recognized by the international community the resulting
capacities and incapacities constitute differences of status
to which the principle of equality is quite inapplicable.
Capacity is expanded on the one hand and restricted on the
other, creating inequalities of considerable significance.
Arts. 1, 2, 3, 8, 9, u, 14, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 234-238.
z See Floeckher, in R. G. D. I. P. (1896), III, 329-333; Hodges, Doctrine of
/~ion; Kebedgy, L'inkrvenlfrm en droiJ intern-Otional puhlic; Piedelievre,
Prtcis, §§ 2&)-312, I, 25~278; Rougier, in R. G.D. I. P. (1910), XVII, 468-526.
1
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The legality of intervention in certain circumstances was

conceded by many of the classical publicists, particularly

among those who wrote before the development of the con-

ception of state equality.1 The subject has given modern

writers a great deal of difficulty, for it is generally agreed

that intervention and equality are irreconcilable.2 There

has been a tendency to solve the difficulty by denouncing

all intervention as illegal, political, exceptional, or matter

of fact as opposed to matter of law. The practice of nations

contains few suggestions of a recognized international prin-

ciple. As Lawrence remarks, " history speaks with a medley

of discordant voices." 3

Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in the subject

it must receive some consideration, for interventions on one

pretext or another have occurred with great frequency, and

in certain instances they clearly have the sanction of the law

of nations. For the present purpose they may be divided

into three categories: (1) interventions prompted by policy

in violation of law; (2) interventions of an exceptional
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character, justified by equitable considerations, but not

recognized by law; (3) interventions justified by law or the

peculiar legal relationships existing between certain states.

Limitations upon legal capacity arise only out of interven-

tions of the third category.

Intervention to preserve the balance of power4 is so ill-

defined and so consistently abused that it can hardly be

1 Gentilis, Dejure belli, I, 15; Grotius, Dejure bMi ac Paris, 11, 20,40; Zouche,

Juris eljudiciifecialis, etc., II, 7, 1. Cf. the Vindicia contra tyrannos, Q. IV.

2 See Hicks, in A.J.I.L. (1908), II, 541; Kebedgy, in Z.S.R. (1900) Neue

Folge, XDC, 91; Pifidelievre, Precis, § 290,1, 260; Pillet, in R. G. D. I. P. (1898),

V, 87.

* Int. Law, § 63, p. 125. Hodges says: "European practice in general, to which

England is not an exception, has led to numerous interventions on such varied and

slight pretexts that it is hard to find, for any long period, a general feeling that in-

tervention is, in principle, contrary to the essence of sovereignty." Doctrine of

Intervention, p. 148. .

4 See Dupuis, Le principe d'equilibre el le concert europeen, Pt. I, ch. 6.

The legality of intervention in certain circumstances was
conceded by many of the classical publicists, particularly
among those who wrote before the development of the conception of state equality. 1 The subject has given modern
writers a great deal of difficulty, for it is generally agreed
that intervention and equality are irreconcilable. 2 There
has been a tendency to solve the difficulty by denouncing
all intervention as illegal, political, exceptional, or matter
of fact as opposed to matter of law. The practice of nations
contains few suggestions of a recognized international principle. As Lawrence remarks, " history speaks with a medley
of discordant voices." 3
Notwithstanding the difficulties involved in the subject
it must receive some consideration, for interventions on one
pretext or another have occurred with great frequency, and
in certain instances they clearly have the sanction of the law
of nations. For the present purpose they may be divided
into three categories: (1) interventions prompted by policy
in violation of law; (2) interventions of an exceptional
character, justified by equitable considerations, but not
recognized by law; (3) interventions justified by law or the
peculiar legal relationships existing between certain states.
Limitations upon legal capacity arise only out of interventions of the third category.
Intervention to preserve the balance of power 4 is so illdefined and so consistently abused that it can hardly be
1 Gentilis, Dcjure bclli, I, 15; Grotius, Dejure belli ac pacis, II, 20, 40; Zouche,
Juris etjudiciifecialis, etc., II, 7, I. Cf. the Vindicia cornra tyrannos, Q. IV.
2 See Hicks, in A. J. /. L. (19o8), II, 541; Kebedgy, in Z. S . R. (1900) Neue
Folge, XIX, 91; Piedelievre, Prtcis, § 290, I, 260; Pillet, in R. G.D./. P. (18<)8),

v, 87.

Im. Law,§ 63, p. 125. Hodges says: "European practice in general, to which
England is not an exception, has led to numerous interventions on such varied and
slight pretexts that it is hard to find, for any long period, a general feeling that intervention is, in principle, contrary to the essence of sovereignty." Doctri~ of
Intervention, p. 148.
• See Dupuis, Le principe d'equilibre et le concert europun, Pt. I, ch. 6.
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included in the third category. It must either be included

in another category or justified on other grounds. As al-

ready indicated, however, the great political settlements

intended to establish a balance of power have frequently

contained clauses of guaranty from which interventions of

the third category may arise. The legal significance of the

international guaranty is here regarded from another point

of view. The guaranties of Westphalia gave France and

Sweden a right to intervene in the Empire,1 and subjected

the Empire and its states to corresponding incapacities.

Similar incapacities were created by the treaties of Utrecht.2

Intervention is the corollary of many of the limitations

considered elsewhere from another point of view. Thus

many interventions are explained by essential differences in

civilization. It cannot be doubted that states having extra-

territorial rights may intervene if necessary to conserve

them. The precedents for intervention on behalf of citizens

residing in the less advanced countries of the world are so

numerous as to leave no doubt as to the positive principle
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which justifies them. It is suggested that the so-called in-

terventions in the interests of humanity,3 wherever they can

be justified legally, are really the consequence of differences

in civilization, and that wherever this is the situation there

exist legal incapacities which can only be removed by the

natural processes of orderly progress. Repeated interven-

tions in Turkey,4 the action taken by the United States in

1898 in relation to Cuba,6 the intervention of the powers in

1 Treaty of OsnabrUck, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, I, 488; Treaty of MUnster,

§§ 119-120, in Vast, Les grands traités, I, 55.

* France-Great Britain, Arts. 24-25; France-Portugal, Art. 18; France-Prussia,

Art. 11; France-Savoy, Arts. 5-7; France-United Provinces, Art. 31; Vast, Les

grands traités, III, 85, 118, 126, 133, 156.

* Cf. Hodges, Doctrine of Intervention, p. 91; Rougier, in R. G. D. I. P. (1910),

XVH, 468-526.

4 See Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question,

5 See Moore, Digest, §§908-910, VI, 105-239.

included in the third category. It must either be included
in another category or justified on other grounds. As already indicated, however, the great political settlements
intended to establish a balance of power have frequently
contained clauses of guaranty from which interventions of
the third category may arise. The legal significance of the
international guaranty is here regarded from another point
of view. The guaranties of Westphalia gave France and
Sweden a right to intervene in the Empire,1 and subjected
the Empire and its states to corresponding incapacities.
Similar incapacities were created by the treaties of Utrecht. 2
Intervention is the corollary of many of the limitations
considered elsewhere from another point of view. Thus
many interventions are explained by essential differences in
civilization. It cannot be doubted that states having extraterritorial rights may intervene if necessary to conserve
them. The precedents for intervention on behalf of citizens
residing in the less advanced countries of the world are so
numerous as to leave no doubt as to the positive principle
which justifies them. It is suggested that the so-called interventions in the interests of humanity, 3 wherever they can
be justified legally, are really the consequence of differences
in civilization, and that wherever this is the situation there
exist legal incapacities which can only be removed by the
natural processes of orderly progress. Repeated interventions in Turkey, 4 the action taken by the United States in
1898 in relation to Cuba,11 the intervention of the powers in
1 Treaty of Osnabriick, Art. 17, in Dumont, VI, I, 488; Treaty of Milnster,
§§ II<)-120, in Vast, Les grands trailts, I, 55.
2 France-Great Britain, Arts. 24-25; France-Portugal, Art. 18; France-Prussia,
Art. u; France-Savoy, Arts. 5-7; France-United Provinces, Art. 31; Vast, Les
grands trailes, III, 85, u8, 126, 133, 156.
1 Cf. Hodges, Doctri~ of Interventian, p. 91; Rougier, in R. G. D. I . P. (1910),
XVII, 46S-526.
4 See Holland, European Conart in the Eas~ Qucsticn,
6 See Moore, Digest, §§ 9~10, VI, ·105-239.
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China in 1900,1 and of the United States in Mexico during

the late revolutions 2 afford illustrations.

The protection of one state by another implies interven-

tion if necessary to make protection effective. Intervention

is the normal order in connection with the protection of

backward or partially civilized states. It is always held in

reserve in the protection of more advanced states. The

right is expressly stipulated in the treaty between the United

States and Cuba, quoted above,3 and has been exercised by

the United States in the performance of its obligations as

protecting power.4

It has never been seriously doubted that the relation of

guaranty implies intervention as a sanction. The European

powers have intervened to make effective the collective

guaranties undertaken at Vienna, Paris, and Berlin.6 The

guarantors of Greece have been obliged to intervene on more

than one occasion.6 Intervention to enforce a guaranty re-

ceives express recognition in the Constitution of Panama,

which provides:
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The Government of the United States of America shall have the

power to intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama to reestab-

lish public peace and constitutional order, in the event of their being

disturbed, if the said Government, by public treaty, assumes the

obligation of guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of this

Republic.7

The incapacities incident to intervention are also involved

in the financial control of debtor states, as appears from the

1 See Clements, The Boxer Rebellion.

1 See correspondence regarding the American punitive expedition of 1916, in

A.J.I.L.Suppl. (1916), X, 179-225.

* Supra, p. 246. 4 U. S. For. Rd. (1906), pp. 454-510.

China in 1900,1 and of the United States in Mexico during
the late revolutions 2 afford illustrations.
The protection of one state by another implies intervention if necessary to make protection effective. Intervention
is the normal order in connection with the protection of
backward or partially civilized states. It is always held in
reserve in the protection of more advanced states. The
right is expressly stipulated in the treaty between the United
States and Cuba, quoted above, 3 and has been exercised by
the United States in the performance of its obligations as
protecting power.4
It has never been seriously doubted that the relation of
guaranty implies intervention as a sanction. The European
powers have intervened to make effective the collective
guaranties undertaken at Vienna, Paris, and Berlin. 6 The
guarantors of Greece have been obliged to intervene on more
than one occasion. 6 Intervention to enforce a guaranty receives express recognition in the Constitution of Panama,
which provides:

• See the treaties between Great Britain and Prussia, Aug. 9,1870, and between

Great Britain and France, Aug. 11, 1870, in Hertslet, III, 1886, 1889.

6 See Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question, ch. 2.

7 Art. 136 (Rodriguez' transl.). See also the Treaty of 1903, in Malloy, Treaties,

II, 1349.

The Government of the United States of America shall have the
power to intervene in any part of the Republic of Panama to reestablish public peace and constitutional order, in the event of their being
disturbed, if the said Government, by public treaty, assumes the
obligation of guaranteeing the independence and sovereignty of this
Republic.7

The incapacities incident to intervention are also involved
in the financial control of debtor states, as appears from the
See Clements, TM Boxer Rebellion.
See correspondence regarding the American punitive expedition of 1916, in
A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916), X, 17C)-225.
4 U.S. For. Rel. (1900), pp. 454-510.
1 Supra, p. 246.
1 See the treaties between Great Britain and Prussia, Aug. 9, 1870, and between
Great Britain and France, Aug. 1 l, 1870, in Hertslet, III, 1886, 188<).
• See Holland, European Concerl in tM Eastern Question, ch. 2.
7 Art. 136 (Rodriguez' transl.). See also the Treaty of 1903, in Malloy, Treat~,
II, 1349.
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experience of Egypt, Turkey, and Greece. The United

States engages, in the Treaty of 1907 with San Domingo, to

"give the General Receiver and his assistants such protec-

tion as it may find to be requisite for the performance of

their duties." 1 The military occupation of San Domingo

has been undertaken recently in the execution of the treaty.2

Should the necessity occur in Haiti, the United States under-

takes to " lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian

independence and the maintenance of a government ade-

quate for the protection of life, property, and individual

liberty." 3

Limitations Incident to International Servitudes

The question of servitudes in the law of nations has been

the subject of considerable controversy. The authorities

were reviewed from divergent points of view in the argument

before the Hague Tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fish-

eries Arbitration without reaching any very satisfactory con-

clusions.4 It is certain that international relationships afford

experience of Egypt, Turkey, and Greece. The United
States engages, in the Treaty of 1907 with San Domingo, to
"give the General Receiver and his assistants such protection as it may find to be requisite for the performance of
their duties." 1 The military occupation of San Domingo
has been undertaken recently in the execution of the treaty. 2
Should the necessity occur in Haiti, the United States undertakes to " lend an efficient aid for the preservation of Haitian
independence and the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual
liberty." 3

many examples of a restricted condition of jurisdiction which
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is of the nature of a servitude, whatever it may be called.

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES

Distinct from the state's contractual obligations which in-

volve in each case no more than a duty of performance to-

ward the other contracting state, there are incumbrances on

the state's jurisdiction, imposed for the benefit or advantage

of another state or group of states, and requiring that the

state either allow something to be done within its jurisdic-

tion which it would not otherwise be obliged to allow, or

that it refrain from doing something which it would other-

• Supra, p. 257.

2 Proclamation of occupation, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 94.

• Supra, p. 259.

• See N. A. C. F. Proceedings, VIII, 16-31; IX, 306-314, 560-696; XI, 1655-

1711, 2123-2130. Cf. The Japanese House Tax Arbitration, in Wilson, The Hague

Arbitration Cases, pp. 40 ff.; Aix-la-Chapelle-Maastricht Railroad Co. v. Thewis

and the Royal Dutch Government, in A.J.I. L. (1914), VIII, 907-913.

The question of servitudes in the law of nations has been
the subject of considerable controversy. The authorities
were reviewed from divergent points of view in the argument
before the Hague Tribunal in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration without reaching any very satisfactory conclusions. 4 It is certain that international relationships afford
many examples of a restricted condition of jurisdiction which
is of the nature of a servitude, whatever it may be called.
Distinct from the state's contractual obligations which involve in each case no more than a duty of performance toward the other contracting state, there are incumbrances on
the state's jurisdiction, imposed for the benefit or advantage
of another state or group of states, and requiring that the
state either allow something to be done within its jurisdiction which it would not otherwise be obliged to allow, or
that it refrain from doing something which it would otherSupra, p. 257.
Proclamation of occupation, in A. J. l. L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 94.
i Supra, p. 259.
• See N. A. C. F. Proceedings, VIII, 16-31; IX, 3o6-314, 56o-696; XI, 165517n, 2123-2130. Cf. The Japanese House Tax Arbitration, in Wilson, TM Hague
Arbitralion Cases, pp. 40 ff.; Aix-la-Chapelle-Maastricht Railroad Co. v. Thewis
and the Royal Dutch Government, in A. J. l. L. (1914), VIII, 907-<JIJ.
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wise be free to do. The state for whose advantage such an

incumbrance or limitation exists may assert its right, not

only against the state whose jurisdiction is restricted, but

also against the entire community of nations.

These incumbrances on jurisdiction are also limitations on

legal capacity.1 In this respect international burdens of the

nature of servitudes are essentially different from the servi-

tudes of municipal law. The latter are burdens imposed on

ownership and are without any effect on the legal capacity

of the owner. The former are burdens on jurisdiction, which

is one of the most important elements of international ca-

pacity.

The neutralization of northern Savoy in 1815, in support

of the neutrality of Switzerland, may be regarded as a servi-

tude of neutrality in the interest of Switzerland. The

convention which provided for the neutralization of Switzer-

land also stipulated:

The powers acknowledge likewise and guarantee the neutrality of

those parts of Savoy, designated by the act of the Congress of Vienna

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

of the 20th May 1815, and by the Treaty of Paris signed this day,

the same being entitled to participate in the neutrality of Switzerland,

equally as if they belonged to that country.*

It is evident that this provision limited Sardinia's inter-

national capacity in important respects. The neutralization

of the Black Sea by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, as part of

the program designed to secure the independence and in-

tegrity of the Ottoman Empire, was aimed primarily at

wise be free to do. The state for whose advantage such an
incumbrance or limitation exists may assert its right, not
only against the state whose jurisdiction is restricted, but
also against the entire community of nations.
These incwnbrances on jurisdiction are also limitations on
legal capacity. 1 In this respect international burdens of the
nature of servitudes are essentially different from the servitudes of municipal law. The latter are burdens imposed on
ownership and are without any effect on the legal capacity
of the owner. The former are burdens on jurisdiction, which
is one of the most important elements of international capacity.
The neutralization of northern Savoy in 1815, in support
of the neutrality of Switzerland, may be regarded as a servitude of neutrality in the interest of Switzerland. The
convention which provided for the neutralization of Switzerland also stipulated:

Russia. Article n provided:

The Black Sea is neutralized; its waters and its ports, thrown open

to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in per-

petuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the powers possessing

1 Cf. Piedelievre, Prtcis, § 288,1, 259.

* Convention of November 20, 1815, in A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1909), III, 106;

Treaty of Vienna, Art. 92.

The powers acknowledge likewise and guarantee the neutrality of
those parts of Savoy, designated by the act of the Congress of Vienna
of the 20th May 1815, and by the Treaty of Paris signed this day,
the same being entitled to participate in the neutrality of Switzerland,
equally as if they belonged to that country.2

It is evident that this provision limited Sardinia's international capacity in important respects. The neutralization
of the Black Sea by the Treaty of Paris of 1856, as part of
the program designed to secure the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire, was aimed primarily at
Russia. Article 1 1 provided:
The Black Sea is neutralized; its waters and its ports, thrown open
to the mercantile marine of every nation, are formally and in perpetuity interdicted to the flag of war, either of the powers possessing
l

Cf.

PiMeli~vre,

Prtcis, § 288, I, 259.

s Convention of November 20, 1815, in A. J. I. L. S11ppl. (ICJOC)), III, 1o6;
Treaty of Vienna, Art. 92.

266

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

266

THE EQUALITY OF STATES

its coasts, or of any other power, with the exceptions mentioned in

Articles 14 and 19 of the present treaty.1

its coasts, or of any other power, with the exceptions mentioned in
Articles 14 and 19 of the present treaty. 1

The Russian Government made it perfectly clear that it

regarded the stipulation as a restriction on capacity.2

Servitudes of a different kind were imposed on the Balkan

states by the Treaty of Berlin. They were required to treat

the subjects, citizens, and commerce of all the powers on the

basis of equality, were forbidden to levy transit duties on

goods passing through their territories, and were subjected to

other restrictions of less consequence.3 Limitations upon

Roumanian jurisdiction incident to the vesting of extensive

powers in the European Commission of the Danube were

confirmed and extended. Articles 52 and 53 provided as

follows:

In order to increase the guarantees which assure the freedom of

navigation on the Danube which is recognized as of European interest,

the High Contracting Parties determine that all the fortresses and

fortifications existing on the course of the river from the Iron Gates

to its mouths shall be razed, and no new ones erected. No vessel of
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war shall navigate the Danube below the Iron Gates with the excep-

tion of vessels of light tonnage in the service of the river police and

Customs. The "stationnaires " of the Powers at the mouths of the

The Russian Government made it perfectly clear that it
regarded the stipulation as a restriction on capacity.2
Servitudes of a different kind were imposed on the Balkan
states by the Treaty of Berlin. They were required to treat
the subjects, citizens, and commerce of all the powers on the
basis of equality, were forbidden to levy transit duties on
goods passing through their territories, and were subjected to
other restrictions of less consequence.3 Limitations upon
Roumanian jurisdiction incident to the vesting of extensive
powers in the European Commission of the Danube were
confirmed and extended. Articles 52 and 53 provided as
follows:

Danube may, however, ascend the river as far as Galatz.

The European Commission of the Danube on which Roumania

shall be represented is maintained in its functions, and shall exercise

them henceforth as far as Galatz in complete independence of the

territorial authorities. All the Treaties, arrangements, acts, and de-

cisions relating to its rights, privileges, prerogatives, and obligations

are confirmed.4

1 A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1909), III, 114. Articles 14 and 19 made an exception of

light coast-guard vessels and of a limited number of light vessels stationed by the

powers at the mouth of the Danube to insure the execution of regulations to be

adopted with regard to its navigation.

1 See Gortchakoff to Brunnow, October 19/31, 1870, in Parliamentary Papers

(1871), LXXII, 1; and same to same, November 8/20, 1870, in ibid., p. 24.

• Arts. 5, 8, 1i, 12, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37, 39, 44, 48. Note also Arts. 61 and 62

in regard to Turkey.

4 See Treaty of Paris, 1856, Arts. 16-18; Public Act of November 2, 1865, in

In order to increase the guarantees which assure the freedom of
navigation on the Danube which is recognized as of European interest,
the High Contracting Parties determine that all the fortresses and
fortifications existing on the course of the river from the Iron Gates
to its mouths shall be razed, and no new ones erected. No vessel of
war shall navigate the Danube below the Iron Gates with the exception of vessels of light tonnage in the service of the river police and
Customs. The "stationnaires" of the Powers at the mouths of the
Danube may, however, ascend the river as far as Galatz.
The European Commission of the Danube on which Roumania
shall be represented is maintained in its functions, and shall exercise
them henceforth as far as Galatz in complete independence of the
territorial authorities. All the Treaties, arrangements, acts, and decisions relating to its rights, privileges, prerogatives, and obligations
are confirmed.'
1 A. J. /. L. Suppl. (1909), III, II4. Articles 14 and 19 made an exception of
light coast-guard vessels and of a limited number of light vessels stationed by the
powers at the mouth of the Danube to insure the execution of regulations to be
adopted with regard to its navigation.
2 See Gortcha.koff to Brunnow, October l9/J1, 1870, in Parliamentary Papers
{1871), LXXII, 1; and same to same, November 8/20, 1870, in ibid., p. 24.
3 Arts. 5, 8, n, 12, 27, 29, 30, 35, 37, 39, 44, 48.
Note also Arts. 61 and 62
in regard to Turkey.
4 See Treaty of Paris, 1856, Arts. 16-18; Public Act of November 2, 1865, in
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Very important limitations were imposed on Montenegro in

connection with the annexation of Antivari and its seaboard:

Montenegro shall have full and complete freedom of navigation on

Very important limitations were imposed on Montenegro in
connection with the annexation of Antivari and its seaboard:

the Boyana. No fortifications shall be constructed on the course of

that river except such as may be necessary for the local defence of

the stronghold of Scutari, and they shall not extend beyond a distance

of 6 kilometers from that town.

Montenegro shall have neither ships of war nor flag of war.

The port of Antivari and all the waters of Montenegro shall remain

closed to the ships of war of all nations.

The fortifications situated on Montenegrin territory between the

lake and the coast shall be razed, and none shall be rebuilt within

this zone.

The administration of the maritime and sanitary police, both at

Antivari and along the coast of Montenegro, shall be carried out by

Austria-Hungary by means of light coast-guard boats.

Montenegro shall adopt the maritime code in force in Dalmatia.

On her side Austria-Hungary undertakes to grant Consular protec-

tion to the Montenegrin merchant flag.
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Montenegro shall come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary

on the right to construct and keep up across the new Montenegrin

territory a road and a railway.

Absolute freedom of communication shall be guaranteed on these

roads.1

Most of these limitations on Montenegro were terminated

in 1009, as a result of the readjustments which took place in

southeastern Europe in the preceding year.

The Peace Protocol of 1901 between the powers and China

imposed important limitations of a somewhat similar nature

on the latter state, such as exclusive control of the legation

quarter at Peking by the foreign nations, with the exclusion

Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, XII, 884; Protocol of March 28, 1866, in ibid., XII,

919; Regulations of 1911, in ibid., XXVT, 862; Pitisteano, La question du Danube;

Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, pp. 38-47.

Montenegro shall have full and complete freedom of navigation on
the Boyana. No fortifications shall be constructed on the course of
that river except such as may be necessary for the local defence of
the stronghold of Scutari, and they shall not extend beyond a distance
of 6 kilometers from that town.
Montenegro shall have neither ships of war nor flag of war.
The port of Antivari and all the waters of Montenegro shall remain
closed to the ships of war of all nations.
The fortifications situated on Montenegrin territory between the
lake and the coast shall be razed, and none shall be rebuilt within
this zone.
The administration of the maritime and sanitary police, both at
Antivari and along the coast of Montenegro, shall be carried out by
Austria-Hungary by means of light coast-guard boats.
Montenegro shall adopt the maritime code in force in Dalmatia.
On her side Austria-Hungary undertakes to grant Consular protection to the Montenegrin merchant flag.
l\fontenegro shall come to an understanding with Austria-Hungary
on the right to construct and keep up across the new Montenegrin
territory a road and a railway.
Absolute freedom of communication shall be guaranteed on these
roads. 1

1 Art. 29. Cf. Arts. 52 to 57, in regard to fortifications on the Danube. See

Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1880), XII, 276-284; Brunswik, Recueil de documents

diphmatiques relatifs au Montenegro; Vaclick, La souverainété du Monlénégro et Ic

droit des gens moderne de VEurope.

Most of these limitations on 1\1ontenegro were terminated
in 1909, as a result of the readjustments which took place in
southeastern Europe in the preceding year.
The Peace Protocol of 1901 between the powers and China
imposed important limitations of a somewhat similar nature
on the latter state, such as exclusive control of the legation
quarter at Peking by the foreign nations, with the exclusion
Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, XII, 884; Protocol of March 28, 1866, in ibid., XII,
919; Regulations of 1911, in ibid., XXVI, 862; Pitisteano, La question du Danube;
Sayre, Ezperiments in International Administration, pp. 38-47.
1 Art. 29. Cf. Arts. 52 to 57, in regard to fortifications on the Danube. See
Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1880), XII, 276-284; Brunswik, Recueil de documents
dipk>malUples relaJifs au Montenegro; Vaclick, La souveraineU du MonUnlgro el le
droi# des gens nwderne de l' Europe.
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of Chinese residents and the right to make the quarter de-

fensible, the razing of forts which might impede free com-

munication between Peking and the sea, the stationing of

foreign troops at certain points in China, the control of

tariffs, and the undertaking of certain conservancy works

by China.1

Panama's concession of an interoceanic canal route to

the United States carries with it important rights of the

nature of servitudes. In addition to granting the United

States all the rights which it would have if it were sovereign

in the canal zone and auxiliary lands and waters, certain

subsidiary rights are conceded in perpetuity or for a long

period. Such are the right to use rivers and lakes for navi-

gation, water power, and water supply, the right to acquire

property by purchase or eminent domain in the cities of

Panama and Colon for works of sanitation, and to collect

water and sewerage rates, the right to prescribe sanitary

ordinances in the two cities, to make use of their harbors,

and, if need be, to maintain public order, and the monopoly

of all railroad and canal communication between the Carib-
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bean and the Pacific.2

Many other examples of limitations on jurisdiction of the

nature of servitudes might be given. Restrictions appurte-

nant to fishing rights in territorial waters3 and to leased

territories4 are important applications of similar principles.

Perhaps the illustrations given are adequate, however, to

indicate the nature of this type of limitation, as well as its

importance in relation to the principle of equality.

1 A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1907), I, 388; Clements, The Boxer Rebellion.

* Treaty of 1003, in Malloy, Treaties II, 1340-1357. See also the Treaty of 1914

between the United States and Nicaragua, in A.J.I.L. Suppl. (1916), X, 258;

and Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, in A. J. I. L. (1917), XI, 181, 217.

* See the award on question one in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitra-

tion (1010), in Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases, pp. 154 ff., discussed supra,

p. 168. Also Cobbett, Cases, I, 160.

4 See the treaties of 1898 between China and Germany, Russia, France, and

Great Britain respectively, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1910), IV, 285-298.

of Chinese residents and the right to make the quarter defensible, the razing of forts which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea, the stationing of
foreign troops at certain points in China, the control of
tariffs, and the undertaking of certain conservancy works
by China. 1
Panama's concession of an interoceanic canal route to
the United States carries with it important rights of the
nature of servitudes. In addition to granting the United
States all the rights which it would have if it were sovereign
in the canal zone and auxiliary lands and waters, certain
subsidiary rights are conceded in perpetuity or for a long
period. Such are the right to use rivers and lakes for navigation, water power, and water supply, the right to acquire
property by purchase or eminent domain in the cities of
Panama and Colon for works of sanitation, and to collect
water and sewerage rates, the right to prescribe sanitary
ordinances in the two cities, to make use of their harbors,
and, if need be, to maintain public order, and the monopoly
of all railroad and canal communication between the Caribbean and the Pacific.2
Many other examples of limitations on jurisdiction of the
nature of servitudes might be given. Restrictions appurtenant to fishing rights in territorial waters 3 and to leased
territories 4 are important applications of similar principles.
Perhaps the illustrations given are adequate, however, to
indicate the nature of this type of limitation, as well as its
importance in relation to the principle of equality.
A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1907), I, 388; Clements, The Boxer Rebellion.
Treaty of 1903, in Malloy, TrealU$ II, 134cr1357. See also the Treaty of 1914
between the United States and Nicaragua, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1916) 1 X, 258;
and Costa Rica 11. Nicaragua, in A. J. I. L. (1917), XI, 181, 217.
• See the award on question one in the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Arbitration (1910), in Wilson, The Hague Arbitration Cases, pp. 154 ff., discuS5ed supra,
p. 168. Also Cobbett, Cases, I, l6o.
' See the treaties of 1898 between China and Germany, Russia, France, and
Great Britain respectively, in A. J. I. L. S11ppl. (1910), IV, 285-298.
l

t

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

EXTERNAL LIMITATIONS

269

Limitations Incident to Remedial Processes

Among the most important limitations on the equality of

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO REMEDIAL PROCESSES

nations are those which result from the recognition of self-

help as a remedial process in international law. Individual

vindication of rights and redress of grievances are always

important in the primitive stages of legal development.

They are peculiarly characteristic of the law of nations,

where other remedial processes have had only a rudimentary

development. The importance of self-help as a legal remedy

has been indicated by leading publicists of all centuries.

Victoria affirmed that bellum justum est justitiae executio.1

Grotius developed a similar thesis in great detail,2 while

Zouche denned war as " a lawful contention between differ-

ent princes or peoples." 3 Phillimore says:

The violation of rights stricti juris may be redressed by forcible

means, by the operation of war, which in the community of nations

answers to the act of the Judicial and Executive Power in the com-

munity of individuals.4

1 See Rel. VI, De jure belli. This conception of the place of self-help in the
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Law of Nations seems to have been anticipated as early as 1360 by Legnano, who

explained reprisals as follows: "But when the Empire began gradually to be ex-

hausted, so that now there are some who in fact recognize no superior, and by them

justice is neglected, the need arose for a subsidiary remedy, when the ordinary

remedies fail, but which is on no account to be resorted to when they exist.... But

Among the most important limitations on the equality of
nations are those which result from the recognition of selfhelp as a remedial process in international law. Individual
vindication of rights and redress of grievances are always
important in the primitive stages of legal development.
They are peculiarly characteristic of the law of nations,
where other remedial processes have had only a rudimentary
development. The importance of self-help as a legal remedy
has been indicated by le.ading publicists of all centuries.
Victoria affirmed that bellum justum est justitiae executio.1
Grotius developed a similar thesis in great detail,2 while
Zouche defined war as "a lawful contention between different princes or peoples." 3 Phillimore says:

this extraordinary remedy had its origin in the law of nations. For it is a form of

lawful war. For it is lawful to take arms in defence of one's own body;. .. and not

only in defence of one's private and individual body, but also of the mystical body.

For a community is one body, whose parts are the several members of the com-

munity; . . . and so a community may defend the parts of its own body. It had

its origin, too, in divine law. . . . From all that has been said, we may infer the

The violation of rights stricti juris may be redressed by forcible
means, by the operation of war, which in the community of nations
answers to the act of the Judicial and Executive Power in the community of individuals. 4

reason of the introduction of this remedy. For its final object is that justice may

obtain its due effect, and its occasion is when there is a failure of remedy, arising

from the neglect of those who govern and rule peoples, and the absence of recog-

nition of superiors in fact, at which time this extraordinary remedy is needed."

Tracfatus, ch. 23 (Brierly's transl.).

1 See Dejure belli ac pacis, Proleg. 25, 28; and passim.

* Juris et judicii fecialis, etc., I, 6, p. 32.

* Commentaries, I, 215.

See Rel. VI, De jure belli. This conception of the place of self-help in the
Law of Nations seems to have been anticipated as early as 136o by Legnano, who
explained reprisals as follows: "But when the Empire began gradually to be exhausted, so that now there are some who in fact recognize no superior, and by them
justice is neglected, the need arose for a subsidiary remedy, when the ordinary
remedies fail, but which is on no account to be resorted to when they exist .... But
this extraordinary remedy had its origin in the law of nations. For it is a form of
lawful war. For it is lawful to take arms in defence of one's own body; ... and not
only in defence of one's private and individual body, but also of the mystical body.
For a community is one body, whose parts are the several members of the community; .. . and so a community may defend the parts of its own body. It had
its origin, too, in divine law. . . . From all that has been said, we may infer the
reason of the introduction of this remedy. For its final object is that justice may
obtain its due effect, and its occasion is when there is a failure of remedy, arising
from the neglect of those who govern and rule peoples, and the absence of recognition of superiors in fact, at which time this extraordinary remedy is needed."
Traclalus, ch. 23 (Brierly's transl.).
i See Dejure belli ac pacis, Proleg. 25, 28; and passim.
' lt1ris el judicii fecialis, etc., I, 6, p. 32.
' Commentaries, I, 215.
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His definition of war is to the same effect:

His definition of war is to the same effect:

War is the exercise of the international right of action, to which,

from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common superior

tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert

and vindicate their rights.1

Many of the modern publicists, to be sure, would attach

qualifications to Phillimore's definition, but, directly or in-

War is the exercise of the international right of action, to which,
from the nature of the thing and the absence of any common superior
tribunal, nations are compelled to have recourse, in order to assert
and vindicate their rights. 1

directly, all reach about the same result.

The degree to which the law of nations recognizes self-

help as a legal remedy, and even as a source of substantive

rights, is well illustrated by the rule as to duress. There is

no system of municipal law that makes a general practice

of enforcing agreements made under duress. In international

law, if duress is applied to the persons of the state's repre-

sentatives the agreement is not binding, but if to the state

itself it is a valid and binding agreement. Grotius' reason

is probably as good as any, that without such a rule wars

could neither be moderated nor concluded.2 In the Vene-

zuelan preferential claims case certain of the smaller states
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argued that force could not be a source of right;3 but the

blockading powers denied the point4 and were sustained by

the award of the tribunal. Of the thirteen conventions

framed by the Second Hague Peace Conference, eleven were

concerned with war or neutrality. The first American dele-

gate reminded the Conference that they had "done much

to regulate war, but very little to prevent it." 6

1 Commentaries, III, 77; Moore, Digest, § 1100, VII, 153. See Higgins, The Hague

Peace Conferences, Introd., p.xi; and cf. Westlake, Int.Law, II, 1-5. Moore defines

war as " the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be

prosecuted by force."

'Dejure belli ac pacts, III, 19,11, 1. See the limitations on the rule proposed by

the Brazilian delegation at the Second Hague Conference, La Deux. Confer., I,

556. Also a proposition to abolish title by conquest under the public law of America

(Moore, Digest, § 1156, VTI, 315), and Westlake's proposal for limiting reprisals

(L.Q.R. (1909), XXV, 136).

* Venez. Arbit., pp. 867, 11il. 4 Ibid., pp. 983, 984.

* La Deux. Confer., II, 330. Cf. remarks of Renault, ibid., I, 166.

Many of the modem publicists, to be sure, would attach
qualifications to Phillimore's definition, but, directly or indirectly, all reach about the same result.
The degree to which the law of nations recognizes selfhelp as a legal remedy, and even as a source of substantive
rights, is well illustrated by the rule as to duress. There is
no system of municipal law that makes a general practice
of enforcing agreements made under duress. In international
law, if duress is applied to the persons of the state's representatives the agreement is not binding, but if to the state
itself it is a valid and binding agreement. Grotius' reason
is probably as good as any, that without such a rule wars
could neither be moderated nor concluded. 2 In the Venezuelan preferential claims case certain of the smaller states
argued that force could not be a source of right; 3 but the
blockading powers denied the point 4 and were sustained by
the award of the tribunal. Of the thirteen conventions
framed by the Second Hague Peace Conference, eleven were
concerned with war or neutrality. The first American delegate reminded the Conference that they had " done much
to regulate war, but very little to prevent it." 6
1 Commentaries, III, 77; Moore, Digest,§ uoo, VII, 153. See Higgins, The Hag1u
Peace Conferences, Introd., p.xi; and cf. Westlake, lnl.Law, II, 1-5. l\foore defines

war as " the existence of the legal condition of things in which rights are or may be
prosecuted by force."
i Dejttre belli ac pacis, III, 19, 11, 1. See the limitations on the rule proposed by
the Brazilian delegation at the Second Hague Conference, La Deux. Conftr., I,
556. Also a proposition to abolish title by conquest under the public law of America
(Moore, Digest,§ 1156, VII, 315), and Westlake's proposal for limiting reprisals
(L. Q. R. (1909), XXV, 136).
1 Vena. Arbit., pp. 867, 1n1.
4 Ibid., pp. 983, 984.
' La Deux. Conftr., II, 330. Cf. remarks of Renault, ibid., I, 166.
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In so far as the law of nations recognizes self-help in any

form as a legal procedure for vindicating rights and redress-

ing grievances, it concedes to nations an inequality of legal

capacity directly proportioned to the distribution of re-

sources which make for military strength. It is possible to

regard the state in its normal peaceful relations as a moral

person having, for many purposes, the same legal capacity

as every other state, without regard to differences in terri-

tory, population, wealth, military strength, and the like;

but as soon as the use of these resources in self-help is recog-

nized by the law as a proper remedial process even the fiction

of equality becomes a vain and useless thing. Legal capacity

can no longer be sharply distinguished from physical capac-

ity. As Leon Bourgeois pertinently observed before the

First Hague Conference, " when swords are thrown into the

balance, one side may easily outweigh the other." 1

The impossibility of reconciling self-help with equality

has been recognized, particularly in relation to the much

controverted questions of pacific blockade and the forcible
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recovery of contract debts. Pacific blockade was considered

by the Institute of International Law in 1888.2 In opposing

its recognition as a legal proceeding, Geffcken said:

Now, all states being equal, it should not be lawful to do anything

to a weak state that a strong state would not tolerate. . . .

Finally, it is indisputable that if we review the cases where a so-

called pacific blockade has been instituted we will find in every case

that it has been used by a powerful state against a weak state.1 . . .

No doubt such a blockade is for a great state a very convenient means

of imposing its will on the weak, whereas a war is a grave measure of

which one may not anticipate the consequences in advance; but it

is an essential principle of the law of nations that states are equal and

have equal rights.4

1 Quoted supra, p. 181.

1 A. I. D.I. (1888), DC, 275,301. See also Hogan, Pacific Blockade; Holland,

Studies, pp. 130-150; Westlake, in L. Q. R. (1909), XXV, 13-23.

* See Bulmerincq, in /. D. I. P. (1884), XI, 569-583; Cobbett, Cases, 1,345-348.

* A. I. D. I. (1888), DC, 289-293.

In so far as the law of nations recognizes self-help in any
form as a legal procedure for vindicating rights and redressing grievances, it concedes to nations an inequality of legal
capacity directly proportioned to the distribution of resources which make for military strength. It is possible to
regard the state in its normal peaceful relations as a moral
person having, for many purposes, the same legal capacity
as every other state, without regard to differences in territory, population, wealth, military strength, and the like;
but as soon as the use of these resources in self-help is recognized by the law as a proper remedial process even the fiction
of equality becomes a vain and useless thing. Legal capacity
can no longer be sharply distinguished from physical capacity. As Leon Bourgeois pertinently observed before the
First Hague Conference, " when swords are thrown into the
balance, one side may easily outweigh the other." 1
The impossibility of reconciling self-help with equality
has been recognized, particularly in relation to the much
controverted questions of pacific blockade and the forcible
recovery of contract debts. Pacific blockade was considered
by the Institute of International Law in 1888.2 In opposing
its recognition as a legal proceeding, Geffcken said:
Now, all states being equal, it should not be lawful to do anything
to a weak state that a strong state would not tolerate ....
Finally, it is indisputable that if we review the cases where a socalled pacific blockade has been instituted we will find in every case
that it has been used by a powerful state against a weak state.3 • • •
No doubt such a blockade is for a great state a very convenient means
of imposing its will on the weak, whereas a war is a grave measure of
which one may not anticipate the consequences in advance; but it
is an essential principle of the law of nations that states are equal and
have equal rights.'
Quoted supra, p. 18I.
A. I. D. /. (1888), IX, 275, 301. See also Hogan, Pacific Blockade; Holland,
Studies, pp. 130-150; Westlake, in L. Q. R. (1909), XXV, 13-23.
1 See Bulmerincq, in J. D. I. P. (1884), XI, 569- 583; Cobbett, Cases, I, 345-348.
' A. I. D. I . (1888), IX, 289-293.
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Among the advocates of pacific blockade it was argued that

the process should be recognized as available to the great

powers when acting in concert,1 and that with respect to the

principle of equality it was necessary to distinguish between

a right and the possibility of exercising a right. The right

of blockade existed for all, but could only be used against

the weak.2

The more vigorous advocates of equality among the

smaller states have not been satisfied with so illusory a dis-

tinction. This is brought out clearly in the attempt that has

been made to limit the use of self-help as a procedure for

obtaining the settlement of claims held by the nationals of

one state against another state. Such operations have in-

variably been carried out against weak states.3 When Great

Britain, Germany, and Italy adopted coercive measures

against Venezuela in 1902 4 there was a unanimous protest

throughout Central and South America. In his famous

despatch of December 29, 1002, the Minister of Foreign Re-

lations of the Argentine Republic gave particular attention
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to the forcible collection of public loans. He said:

Among the fundamental principles of public international law which

humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that which

decrees that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal, are

entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually entitled

by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect.

The acknowledgment of the debt, the payment of it in its entirety,

can and must be made by the nation without diminution of its in-

herent rights as a sovereign entity, but the summary and immediate

collection at a given moment, by means of force, would occasion

nothing less than the ruin of the weakest nations, and the absorption

of their governments, together with all the functions inherent in

Among the advocates of pacific blockade it was argued that
the process should be recognized as available to the great
powers when acting in concert,1 and that with respect to the
principle of equality it was necessary to distinguish between
a right and the possibility of exercising a right. The right
of blockade existed for all, but could only be used against
the weak.2
The more vigorous advocates of equality among the
smaller states have not been satisfied with so illusory a distinction. This is brought out clearly in the attempt that has
been made to limit the use of self-help as a procedure for
obtaining the settlement of claims held by the nationals of
one state against another state. Such operations have invariably been carried out against weak states. 3 When Great
Britain, Germany, and Italy adopted coercive measures
against Venezuela in 1902 4 there was a unanimous protest
throughout Central and South America. In his famous
despatch of December 29, 1902, the Minister of Foreign Relations of the Argentine Republic gave particular attention
to the forcible collection of public loans. He said:

1 Brusa, A.I.D. I. (1888), IX, 298.

* Perels, ibid., p. 296. See supra, p. 120, note 2.

* Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, }§ 121, 126, pp. 314, 328;

AfVeagh, in Venez. Arbit., p. 1136; Triana, in La Deux. Confer., II, 258.

* See supra, p. 164.

Among the fundamental principles of public international law which
humanity has consecrated, one of the most precious is that which
decrees that all states, whatever be the force at their disposal, are
entities in law, perfectly equal one to another, and mutually entitled
by virtue thereof to the same consideration and respect.
The acknowledgment of the debt, the payment of it in its entirety,
can and must be made by the nation without diminution of its inherent rights as a sovereign entity, but the summary and immediate
collection at a given moment, by means of force, would occasion
nothing less than the ruin of the weakest nations, and the absorption
of their governments, together with all the functions inherent in
Brusa, A. I. D. I. (1888) 1 IX, 298.
z Perels, ibid., p. 296. See supra, p. l 20, note 2.
1 Borchard, DiplomaJic Prolectwn of Citizens Abroad, §§ 121, 126, pp. 314, 328;
M'Veagh, in Venez. Arbt"t., p. 1136; Triana, in La Deux. Conj&., II, 258.
' See supra, p. 164.
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them, by the mighty of the earth. The principles proclaimed on this

continent of America are otherwise.1

them, by the mighty of the earth. The principles proclaimed on this
continent of ...\merica are otherwise.1

The forcible collection of contract debts, without dis-

tinction between public loans and other contractual obliga-

tions, was considered at the Second Hague Conference.2 A

convention was framed, of which the substantive part was

as follows:

The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force

for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of

one country by the Government of another country as being due to

its nationals.

This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor

State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after

accepting the offer, renders the settlement of the Compromis im-

possible, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.*

The effect of this convention is to prevent coercion of debtor

states unless they refuse to submit to arbitration, or, having

submitted to arbitration, refuse to abide by the award. In

other words, equality prevails in the absence of bad faith or
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of an attempt to evade responsibility. Otherwise self-help

and inequality become the rule.

This settlement has not been acceptable to those states

The forcible collection of contract debts, without distinction between public loans and other contractual obligations, was considered at the Second Hague Conference.2 A
convention was framed, of which the substantive part was
as follows:
The Contracting Powers agree not to have recourse to armed force
for the recovery of contract debts claimed from the Government of
one country by the Government of another country as being due to
its nationals.
This undertaking is, however, not applicable when the debtor
State refuses or neglects to reply to an offer of arbitration, or, after
accepting the offer, renders the settlement of the Compromis impossible, or, after the arbitration, fails to submit to the award.3

which have stood most consistently for equality. Brazil,

Venezuela, and six small states have never signed the con-

vention. Argentine and ten small states signed with reser-

vations. Only a few of the second rank powers have ratified

without reservations.4 The Argentinian reservation at sig-

nature was as follows:

1 U. S. For. Rel. (1903), p. 2. See Drago, in A.J.I. L. (1907), I, 692-726;

Hershey, in ibid., 26-45; Moulin, La doctrine de Drago.

• See La Deux. Confer., I, 336-338, 553-561, II, 139-144, 246-253, 258-260,

268-308, 548-553, 916-923; Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 184-197.

■ Art. 1; Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 180; A. J. I. L. Suppl.

(1008), n, 81.

* Denmark, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Portugal,

and Spain.

The effect of this convention is to prevent coercion of debtor
states unless they refuse to submit to arbitration, or, having
submitted to arbitration, refuse to abide by the award. In
other words, equality prevails in the absence of bad faith or
of an attempt to evade responsibility. Otherwise self-help
and inequality become the rule.
This settlement has not been acceptable to those states
which have stood most consistently for equality. Brazil,
Venezuela, and six small states have never signed the convention. Argentine and ten small states signed with reservations. Only a few of the second rank powers have ratified
without reservations. 4 The Argentinian reservation at signature was as follows:
U.S. For. Rel. (1903), p. 2. See Drago, in A. J. I. L. (1907), I, 692-726;
Hershey, in ibid., 26-45; Moulin, La doctrine de Drago.
2 See La Deux. Conftr., I, 336-338, 553-561, II, 139-144, 246-253, 258-2601
268-3o8, 548-553, 916-Q23; Higgins, The I/ague Peace Conferences, pp. 184-197.
1 Art. 1; Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 18o; A. J. I. L. Suppl.
(1Q08), II, 81.
• Denmark, Haiti, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Panama, Portugal,
and Spain.
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1. With regard to debts arising from ordinary contracts between

the citizen or subject of a nation and a foreign government, recourse

shall not be had to arbitration except in the specific case of denial of

justice by the courts of the country which made the contract, the

remedies before which courts must first have been exhausted.

2. Public loans, secured by bond issues and constituting the na-

tional debt, shall in no case give rise to military aggression or the

material occupation of the soil of American nations.1

The Bolivian delegate said:

It seems to me, therefore, that the acceptance of the proposition

1. With regard to debts arising from ordinary contracts between
the citizen or subject of a nation and a foreign government, recourse
shall not be had to arbitration except in the specific case of denial of
justice by the courts of the country which made the contract, the
remedies before which courts must first have been exhausted.
2. Public loans, secured by bond issues and constituting the national debt, shall in no case give rise to military aggression or the
material occupation of the soil of American nations. 1

before us will but mean the legitimation by the Peace Conference of

a certain class of wars, or, at least, of interventions resulting from

disputes which relate neither to the honor nor vital interests of the

The Bolivian delegate said:

creditor States.

In consequence of these forceful reasons, the delegation of Bolivia

regrets not to give its entire assent to the proposition under discussion.*

Colombia made the following reservation:

It does not agree to the employment of force in any case for the

recovery of debts; and neither does it agree to arbitration before
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recourse to the tribunals of the debtor state.3

If it is true that self-help in the form of pacific blockade

or forcible recovery of contract debts is inconsistent with

equality, and there seems to be no escape from that conclu-

sion, then war is inconsistent with equality a fortiori. So

It seems to me, therefore, that the acceptance of the proposition
before us will but mean the legitimation by the Peace Conference of
a certain class of wars, or, at least, of interventions resulting from
disputes which relate neither to the honor nor vital interests of the
creditor States.
In consequence of these forceful reasons, the delegation of Bolivia
regrets not to give its entire assent to the proposition under discussion.2

long as self-help remains a recognized and important reme-

dial process of the law of nations, it will be necessary to take

Colombia made the following reservation:

account of important limitations upon equality of legal ca-

pacity. The society of nations may be fortunate, indeed,

if it secures unqualified support for the basic principle of

equality before the law.

1 La Deux. Confér., I, 337.

It does not agree to the employment of force in any case for the
recovery of debts; and neither does it agree to arbitration before
recourse to the tribunals of the debtor state.3

• Ibid., II, 142.

> Ibid., II, 306.

If it is true that self-help in the form of pacific blockade
or forcible recovery of contract debts is inconsistent with
equality, and there seems to be no escape from that conclusion, then war is inconsistent with equality a fortiori. So
long as self-help remains a recognized and important remedial process of the law of nations, it will be necessary to take
account of important limitations upon equality of legal capacity. The society of nations may be fortunate, indeed,
if it secures unqualified support for the basic principle of
equality before the law.
La Deu:r. Confb., I, 337.
z Ibid., II, 142.
• Ibid., II, 3o6.
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Limitations Incident to Supernational

LIMITATIONS INCIDENT TO SUPERNATIONAL

Organization

The creation of true supernational authority, capable of

ORGANIZATION

enforcing its decisions on participating states, is obviously

a limitation upon the capacity of participating states. As

between the states which are members of such an organiza-

tion this limitation may apply equally and therefore equality

of capacity may be unimpaired. Indeed, not only may

equality be preserved, but the legal capacity of each may

become much more significant through the subordination of

individual freedom of action to the common interest and the

substitution of orderly procedure for self-help. Where a

limited number of states constitute such an organization,

however, an inequality of capacity arises between those

states and others outside the organization. Attendant ad-

vantages may more than compensate for the inequality in

relation to other states, but the inequality arises, neverthe-

less, in a form which the law cannot overlook.

The development of this type of limitation has been al-
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most negligible in the past. It is worthy of mention chiefly

because of its possible importance in the future. It has been

exemplified in recent times by the creation of the Central

American Court of Justice. The Treaty of Washington,

December 21, 1907, negotiated under the friendly offices of

the United States and Mexico, provided:

The Republics of Central America consider as one of their first

duties, in their mutual relations, the maintenance of peace; and they

bind themselves to always observe the most complete harmony, and

decide every difference or difficulty that may arise amongst them, of

whatsoever nature it may be, by means of the Central American

Court of Justice, created by the Convention which they have con-

cluded for that purpose on this date.1

1 Art. 1, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1908), II, 220. See the Protocol of September 17,

1907, in ibid. (1007), I, 406. Read the remarks of the Court in Costa Rica s.

Nicaragua (1916), in A. J. I. L. (1917), XI, 181-229, at p. 211. See Anderson, in

The creation of true supernational authority, capable of
enforcing its decisions on participating states, is obviously
a limitation upon the capacity of participating states. As
between the states which are members of such an organization this limitation may apply equally and therefore equality
of capacity may be unimpaired. Indeed, not only may
equality be preserved, but the legal capacity of each may
become much more significant through the subordination of
individual freedom of action to the common interest and the
substitution of orderly procedure for self-help. Where a
limited number of states constitute such an organization,
however, an inequality of capacity arises between those
states and others outside the organization. Attendant advantages may more than compensate for the inequality in
relation to other states, but the inequality arises, nevertheless, in a form which the law cannot overlook.
The development of this type of limitation has been almost negligible in the past. It is worthy of mention chiefly
because of its possible importance in the future. It has been
exemplified in recent times by the creation of the Central
American Court of Justice. The Treaty of Washington,
December 21, HJ07, negotiated under the friendly offices of
the United States and Mexico, provided:
The Republics of Central America consider as one of their first
duties, in their mutual relations, the maintenance of peace; and they
bind themselves to always observe the most complete harmony, and
decide every difference or difficulty that may arise amongst them, of
whatsoever nature it may be, by means of the Central American
Court of Justice, created by the Convention which they have concluded for that purpose on this date. 1
1 Art. 1, in A. J . I. L . Suppl. (19o8), II, 220. See the Protocol of September 171
1907, in il>id. (1907), I, 4o6. Read the remarks of the Court in Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua (1916), in A . J. I. L. (1917), XI, 181-229, at p. 211. See Anderson, in
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The Convention for the establishment of the Court began

as follows:

The High Contracting Parties agree by the present Convention to

constitute and maintain a permanent tribunal which shall be called

the " Central American Court of Justice," to which they bind them-

selves to submit all controversies or questions which may arise among

them, of whatsoever nature and no matter what their origin may be,

in case the respective Departments of Foreign^Affairs should not have

been able to reach an understanding.

This Court shall also take cognizance of the questions which indi-

viduals of one Central American country may raise against any of the

other contracting Governments, because of the violation of treaties

or conventions, and other cases of an international character; no

matter whether their own Government supports said claim or not;

and provided that the remedies which the laws of the respective

country provide against such violation shall have been exhausted or

that denial of justice shall have been shown.1

The Court was declared to represent the national conscience

of Central America. It formulated its rules of procedure,
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determined its own jurisdiction, executed its orders through

the contracting governments or by special commissioners,

decreed the preservation of the status quo pending a decision,

and rendered judgments by default. The contracting gov-

ernments formally bound themselves to obey and enforce

The Convention for the establishment of the Court began
as follows:
The High Contracting Parties agree by the present Convention to
constitute and maintain a permanent tribunal which shall be called
the" Central American Court of Justice," to which they bind themselves to submit all controversies or questions which may arise among
them, of whatsoever nature and no matter what their origin may be,
in case the respective Departments of F oreigl!, Affairs should not have
been able to reach an understanding.
.
This Court shall also take cognizance of the questions which individuals of one Central American country may raise against any of the
other contracting Governments, because of the violation of treaties
or conventions, and other cases of an international character; no
matter whether their own Government supports said claim or not;
and provided that the remedies which the laws of the respective
country provide against such violation shall have been exhausted or
that denial of justice shall have been shown. 1

the court's orders, and to lend all the moral support neces-

sary to secure the execution of its judgments. The practical

importance of limitations arising out of the creation of an

institution like the Central American Court of Justice was

suggested by two of the Court's decisions with regard to the

Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between Nicaragua and the United

States.2

A.J.l.L. (1908), II, 144-151; Scott, in ibid., 121-143. The Court was reported

closed March 17, 1918. Ibid. (1918), XTI, 380.

1 Arts. i, 2, in A.J. I. L. Suppl. (1908), II, 231.

1 Costa Rica v. Nicaragua (1916), in A.J.l.L. (1917), XI, 181-229; Salvador v.

Nicaragua (1916), in ibid., 674-730. See note of November 9, 1916, in regard to

Nicaragua's protest, in A.J.l.L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 3.

The Court was declared to represent the national conscience
of Central America. It formulated its rules of procedure,
determined its own jurisdiction, executed its orders through
the contracting governments or by special commissioners,
decreed the preservation of the status quo pending a decision,
and rendered judgments by default. The contracting governments formally bound themselves to obey and enforce
the court's orders, and to lend all the moral support necessary to secure the execution of its judgments. The practical
importance of limitations arising out of the creation of an
institution like the Central American Court of Justice was
suggested by two of the Court's decisions with regard to the
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty between Nicaragila and the United
States. 2
A. J. I. L. (19o8) 1 II, 144-151; Scott, in ibid., 121-143. The Court was reported
closed March 17, 1918. Ibid. (1918), XII, 380.
1 Arts. 1, 2, in A. J. I. L. Sttpp/. (19o8), II, 231.
2 Costa Rica ii. Nicaragua (1916) 1 in A. J. I. L. (1917), XI, 181-229; Salvador 11.
Nicaragua (1916), in ibid., 674-730. See note of November 9, 1916, in regard to
Nicaragua's protest, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1917), XI, 3.
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Summary

In contrast with internal limitations upon the equality of

SUMMARY

states arising out of the state's organic constitution, external

limitations upon equality are imposed from without by

treaty arrangements securing general recognition and by

the usages which are defined in the practice of nations. Ex-

ternal limitations are of greater importance, not only be-

cause their development is synchronous with the accretion

of that common opinion which eventually finds expression

in usage and treaties, but also because they are the practi-

cal outcome of that vast complexity of relationships which

constitutes the raison d'etre for the law of nations. Then-

importance has been recognized by the publicists of all cen-

turies, although their true significance has been frequently

obscured by those theories which were considered in earlier

chapters. The present chapter has been written to indicate

the basis upon which the different types of external limi-

tation rest and to suggest the significance of each type in

relation to the problem of status among the members of in-
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ternational society.

It has been pointed out, in the first place, that external

limitations upon the legal capacity of the state as an inter-

national person may be imposed by usage or treaty because

of something anomalous or exceptional in the physical bases

of state existence. This anomalous condition may consist

either in something peculiar about the state's geographical

situation, as in case of an inland state, or it may consist in

the unusual character of a state's civilization, as in case of

those states peculiarly affected by treaty provisions and

custom in regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction, the diplo-

matic protection of citizens abroad, the exclusion of aliens,

and the granting of asylum in legations, consulates, or on

In contrast with internal limitations upon the equality of
states arising out of the state's organic constitution, external
limitations upon equality are imposed from without by
treaty arrangements securing general recognition and by
the usages which are defined in the practice of nations. External limitations are of greater importance, not only because their development is synchronous with the accretion
of that common opinion which eventually finds expression
in usage and treaties, but also because they are the practical outcome of that vast complexity of relationships which
constitutes the raison d'etre for the law of nations. Their
importance has been recognized by the publicists of all centuries, although their true significance has been frequently
obscured by those theories which were considered in earlier
chapters. The present chapter has been written to indicate
the basis upon which the different types of external limitation rest and to suggest the significance of each type in
relation to the problem of status among the members of international society.
It has been pointed out, in the first place, that external
limitations upon the legal capacity of the state as an international person may be imposed by usage or treaty because
of something anomalous or exceptional in the physical bases
of state existence. This anomalous condition may consist
either in something peculiar about the state's geographical
situation, as in case of an inland state, or it may consist in
the unusual character of a state's civilization, as in case of
those states peculiarly affected by treaty provisions and
custom in regard to extraterritorial jurisdiction, the diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, the exclusion of aliens,
and the granting of asylum in legations, consulates, or on
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public vessels. In the second place, external limitations

may take the form of an anomalous organization imposed

from without and resulting in the division of legal capacity

among the several parts of a composite whole. Imperfect

unions of this kind have been constituted by the partial dis-

integration of existing states and by the partial federation

of separate states. The condition has always been tran-

sitional. Again, external limitations may arise out of an

exceptional or anomalous relationship between two or more

states. Such limitations were classified as those incident

to international suzerainty, international protection, guar-

anty, neutralization, supervision of finance, and intervention.

Wherever these relationships receive general recognition

there is a true limitation upon the legal capacity of the

subordinate state. External limitations may also arise out

of a restricted condition of jurisdiction having many of the

characteristics of the servitude of municipal law. Perhaps

the most important of all external limitations are those

which are necessarily incident to many of the remedial
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processes recognized by international law, such as pacific

blockade, the forcible collection of debts, reprisals, and war.

The recognition of self-help as a legitimate remedial process

inevitably proportions the legal capacity of states to corre-

spond to the distribution of whatever makes self-help an

effective remedy. It tends to obliterate all distinction be-

tween legal capacity and physical capacity.

The law of nations will become increasingly scientific and

rational as it takes account of limitations on equality of the

kind considered in the present chapter. These limitations

exist. There is abundant evidence that in one form or an-

other they will become more important in the future. Little

advantage can be derived from attempting to subordinate

them to theories which tend to deny or distort their true

public vessels. In the second place, external limitations
may take the form of an anomalous organization imposed
from without and resulting in the division of legal capacity
among the several parts of a composite whole. Imperfect
unions of this kind have been constituted by the partial disintegration of existing states and by the partial federation
of separate states. The condition has always been transitional. Again, external limitations may arise out of an
exceptional or anomalous relationship between two or more
states. Such limitations were classified as those incident
to international suzerainty, international protection, guaranty, neutralization, supervision of finance, and intervention.
Wherever these relationships receive general recognition
there is a true limitation upon the legal capacity of the
subordinate state. External limitations may also arise out
of a restricted condition of jurisdiction having many of the
characteristics of the servitude of municipal law. Perhaps
the most important of all external limitations are those
which are necessarily incident to many of the remedial
processes recognized by international law, such as pacific
blockade, the forcible collection of debts, reprisals, and war.
The recognition of self-help as a legitimate remedial process
inevitably proportions the legal capacity of states to correspond to the distribution of whatever makes self-help an
effective remedy. It tends to obliterate all distinction between legal capacity and physical capacity.
The law of nations will become increasingly scientific and
rational as it takes account of limitations on equality of the
kind considered in the present chapter. These limitations
exist. There is abundant evidence that in one form or another they will become more important in the future. Little
advantage can be derived from attempting to subordinate
them to theories which tend to deny or distort their true
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significance. By frankly recognizing their significance,

publicists may contribute substantially to the development

of a system of rules which must become a more efficient in-

strument for the preservation of order and justice in the
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international community of the future.

significance. By frankly recognizing their significance,
publicists may contribute substantially to the development
of a system of rules which must become a more efficient instrument for the preservation of order and justice in the
international community of the future.

CHAPTER VIII

limitations upon the political equality

of states

International Congresses and Conferences

The limitations upon equality considered in the two preced-

ing chapters have to do with the legal capacity or status of

the state as an international person. The political capacity

of the state is something fundamentally different. Legal

CHAPTER VIII

rights and transactions constitute the principal subject matter

of legal capacity, while political capacity is concerned with

such matters as representation, voting, and contributions

in international conferences and congresses, administrative

LIMITATIONS UPON THE POLITICAL EQUALITY
OF STATES

unions, and arbitral or judicial tribunals. Laws in regard to

legal capacity affect the relations between states as individual

entities, while laws in regard to political capacity affect their

participation in the privileges and responsibilities of collective

international activity. A good deal of the confusion in the

books on the subject of equality is the consequence of fail-

ure to observe this fundamental distinction.

The international congress or conference is the earliest

manifestation of a collective international interest and au-
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thority. Wherever such a congress or conference is truly

international, political equality is assured by recognizing

the right of every interested state to participate on an equal

footing, by conceding to the delegations of every state an

equality of voting strength whenever votes are taken and

requiring unanimity for all important decisions, and by

limiting the assembly to decisions ad referendum, that is to

say, by giving it no authority to bind participating states

unless they choose to ratify what it does.

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES

THE limitations upon equality considered in the two preceding chapters have to do with the legal capacity or status of
the state as an international person. The political capacity
of the state is something fundamentally different. Legal
rights and transactions constitute the principal subject matter
of legal capacity, while political capacity is concerned with
such matters as representation, voting, and contributions
in international conferences and congresses, administrative
unions, and arbitral or judicial tribunals. Laws in regard to
legal capacity affect the relations between states as individual
entities, while laws in regard to political capacity affect their
participation in the privileges and responsibilities of collective
international activity. A good deal of the confusion in the
books on the subject of equality is the consequence of failure to observe this fundamental distinction.
The international congress or conference is the earliest
manifestation of a collective international interest and authority. Wherever such a congress or conference is truly
international, political equality is assured by recognizing
the right of every interested state to participate on an equal
footing, by conceding to the delegations of every state an
equality of voting strength whenever votes are taken and
requiring unanimity for all important decisions, and by
limiting the assembly to decisions ad referendum, that is to
say, by giving it no authority to bind participating states
unless they choose to ratify what it does.
18o
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The great war congresses have usually been constituted

on the basis of equal representation, although occasionally

the principle has been arbitrarily denied. The assemblies

at Westphalia, Utrecht, and Vienna were called in each in-

stance to settle the terms of peace at the conclusion of a

long period of European war. All the interested states sent

delegates.1 Eveiy part of Europe, except England, Poland,

Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire, was represented at

Munster and Osnabriick. Great states and small states

sent delegates to Utrecht, where a series of separate treaties

were negotiated embodying the terms of a general peace.

All the European states except Turkey sent envoys to

Vienna, but in this case only the delegates of Portugal, Spain,

and Sweden, states which had been parties to the alliance

against France, were admitted to the deliberations of the

five great powers. The three states named did little more

than ratify the decisions which the great powers reached,

while the envoys of the smaller states were merely permitted

to be present at Vienna and make known the wishes of their

respective governments.
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In the nineteenth century the equal representation of all

interested states was recognized in only a few of the con-

ferences called to consider political questions. Belgium,

Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and

Norway, and the United States participated with five of

the European great powers and Morocco in the Madrid

Conference of 1880.2 Four years later the same powers, not

including Morocco, and with the addition of Russia and

Turkey, sent delegates to the Conference on African affairs

held at Berlin.3 Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands joined

1 The purpose, composition, procedure, and accomplishments of the principal

conferences and congresses are conveniently summarized in Satow, Guide to Diplo-

matic Practice, II, chs. 25, 26. For a list of international conferences and con-

gresses, see Baldwin, in A.J.I.L. (1907), I, 565-578, 808-829.

1 B. F. SJ>., LXXI, 814. 'Ibid., LXXV, 1018,1178.

The great war congresses have usually been constituted
on the basis of equal representation, although occasionally
the principle has been arbitrarily denied. The assemblies
at Westphalia, Utrecht, and Vienna were called in each instance to settle the terms of peace at the conclusion of a
long period of European war. All the interested states sent
delegates.1 Every part of Europe, except England, Poland,
Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire, was represented at
Munster and Osnabrock. Great states and small states
sent delegates to Utrecht, where a series of separate treaties
were negotiated embodying the terms of a general peace.
All the European states except Turkey sent envoys to
Vienna, but in this case only the delegates of Portugal, Spain,
and Sweden, states which had been parties to the alliance
against France, were admitted to the deliberations of the
five great powers. The three states named did little more
than ratify the decisions which the great powers reached,
while the envoys of the smaller states were merely permitted
to be present at Vienna and make known the wishes of their
respective govemmen ts.
In the nineteenth century the equal representation of all
interested states was recognized in only a few of the conferences called to consider political questions. Belgium,
Denmark, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
Norway, and the United States participated with five of
the European great powers and Morocco in the Madrid
Conference of 188o.2 Four years later the same powers, not
including Morocco, and with the addition of Russia and
Turkey, sent delegates to the Conference on African affairs
held at Berlin.3 Belgium, Spain, and the Netherlands joined
1 The purpose, composition, procedure, and accomplishments of the principal
conferences and congresses are conveniently summarized in Satow, Guide lo Diplomatic Practice, II, chs. 25, 26. For a list of international conferences and congresses, see Baldwin, in A. J. l. L. (1907), I, 565-578, 8o8-829.
1 B. F. S.P., LXXI, 814.
' Ibid., LXXV, 1018, u78.
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with the eight great powers in the Conference of Peking

in 1900,1 and together with the United States, Portugal,

Sweden, and Morocco they deliberated with the European

Concert at Algeciras in 1906.2

On the other hand, the principle of equal representation

received repeated recognition in conferences on non-political

questions. Fourteen states participated in the Conference

of Copenhagen of 1857, called to consider the abolition of

the Danish Sound dues.3 The Conference of Geneva of 1864,

for the amelioration of the condition of wounded soldiers in

the field, included delegates from fourteen states,4 and the

same number participated at Geneva in 1868 in extending

the principles of the Convention of 1864 to maritime war-

fare.6 Most of the states of Europe were represented in

1874 at the Brussels Conference on the rules of land war-

fare.6 Seventeen delegations from four continents attended

the Brussels Conference on the abolition of the slave trade

in 1889.7 Thirty-six states were represented at Geneva in

1906, when the Convention of 1864 was revised.8 The rule
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of equal representation has been applied in innumerable con-

ferences and congresses called to agree upon international

administrative arrangements of one kind or another. Every

one of the American republics has been represented in the

International American Conferences. The most far-reaching

application of equal representation in a true international

assembly occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century

in the Peace Conferences at The Hague.

Prior to the Hague Conferences it was not a common prac-

tice in international assemblies to reach decisions by voting;

1 B.F.S.P.,XCTV, 686.

» Martens, Nouveau recueil general, 2" ser., XXXIV, 3.

• B. P. S. P., XLIX, 902.

4 Martens, Nouveau recueil general, XX, 375.

» Ibid., p. 400. • Ibid., 2" ser., IV, 1.

'B. P. S. P., LXXXI, 1091; LXXXII, 379.

'Martens, Nouveau recueil général, 30 ser., II, 323.

with the eight great powers in the Conference of Peking
in 1<)00,1 and together with the United States, Portugal,
Sweden, and Morocco they deliberated with the European
Concert at Algeciras in i906. 2
On the other hand, the principle of equal representation
received repeated recognition in conferences on non-political
questions. Fourteen states participated in the Conference
of Copenhagen of i857, called to consider the abolition of
the Danish Sound dues. 3 The Conference of Geneva of i864,
for the amelioration of the condition of wounded soldiers in
the field, included delegates from fourteen states,4 and the
same number participated at Geneva in i868 in extending
the principles of the Convention of i864 to maritime warfare. & Most of the states of Europe were represented in
i874 at the Brussels Conference on the rules of land warfare.6 Seventeen delegations from four continents attended
the Brussels Conference on the abolition of the slave trade
in i889. 7 Thirty-six states were represented at Geneva in
1906, when the Convention of i864 was revised. 8 The rule
of equal representation has been applied in innumerable conferences and congresses called to agree upon international
administrative arrangements of one kind or another. Every
one of the American republics has been represented in the
International American Conferences. The most far-reaching
application of equal representation in a true international
assembly occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century
in the Peace Conferences at The Hague.
Prior to the Hague Conferences it was not a common practice in international assemblies to reach decisions by voting;
1 B . F. S. P., XCIV, 686.
' Martens, Nouveau recueil gbibaJ, :ze ser., XXXIV, 3.
1 B . F . S. P., XLIX, 902.
4 Martens, N<>Uveau recueil gtntraJ, XX, 375.
8 Ibid., 2 9 ser., IV, I.
I Ibid., p. 400.
1 B. F. S. P., LXXXI, 1091; LXXXII, 379.
I Martens, NoUWIJU recueil gbibaJ, 3e ser., II, 323.

LIMITATIONS UPON POLITICAL EQUALITY

283

LIMITATIONS UPON POLITICAL EQUALITY 283

but wherever votes were taken it was almost always under-

stood that there should be equality of voting strength and

the requirement of unanimity for important decisions. There

was a discussion at the Geneva Conference of 1864, in the

first session, as to whether voting should be individual or by

delegations. The first French delegate pointed out that

there could be no vote on the articles of the Convention, since the

majority could not bind the minority, no matter how small it might

be.1

At the Geneva Conference of 1868 the decision in regard to

but wherever votes were taken it was almost always understood that there should be equality of voting strength and
the requirement of unanimity for important decisions. There
was a discussion at the Geneva Conference of 1864, in the
first session, as to whether voting should be individual or by
delegations. The first French delegate pointed out that

voting was recorded as follows:

As to voting, it is understood that, for everything which relates to

internal procedure, they will vote as individuals and that, for every-

thing which results in an adoption, or rejection, or simply concerns

the taking up of subjects engaging in some manner the attention of

there could be no vote on the articles of the Convention, since the
majority could not bind the minority, no matter how small it might
be.1

the high contracting parties, voting will be by states. It is stipulated,

moreover, that a majority will be sufficient to bring a subject up for

discussion, but that unanimity will be necessary for definitive adop-

tion.2

At the Geneva Conference of 1868 the decision in regard to
voting was recorded as follows:

The rules of the first International American Conference of
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1889 provided:

The delegation of each State represented in this Conference shall

have only one vote, and the votes shall be given separately by States.3

Similar rules have been adopted in later American confer-

ences, in the Geneva Conference of 1906,4 and in the Peace

Conferences at The Hague.

The most important assurance of complete equality in

international congresses or conferences is the principle that

they have no authority to bind participating states unless

1 Martens, Nouveau recueil général, XX, 380.

• Ibid., 403. Cf. procedure at the Congress of Berlin, B. F. S. P., LXIX, 892,

918.

* Art. 16, in Int. Am. Confer., I, 58.

4 Martens, Nouveau recueil general, 3" ser., II, 354.

As to voting, it is understood that, for everything which relates to
internal procedure, they will vote as individuals and that, for everything which results in an adoption, or rejection, or simply concerns
the taking up of subjects engaging in some manner the attention of
the high contracting parties, voting will be by states. It is stipulated,
moreover, that a majority will be sufficient to bring a subject up for
discussion, but that unanimity will be necessary for definitive adoption.2

The rules of the first International American Conference of
1889 provided:
The delegation of each State represented in this Conference shall
have only one vote, and the votes shall be given separately by States.3

Similar rules have been adopted in later American conferences, in the Geneva Conference of 1906,4 and in the Peace
Conferences at The Hague.
The most important assurance of complete equality in
international congresses or conferences is the principle that
they have no authority to bind participating states unless
1
2

Martens, Nouioeau reciuil genbal, XX, 380.
Ibid., 403. Cf. procedure at the Congress of Berlin, B. F. S. P., LXIX, 8c)2,

918.

' Art. 16, in Int. Am. Confer., I, 58.
• Martens, Nouveau recueil genbal, 3e ser., II, 354.
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the participating states choose to ratify their decisions. Such

assemblies are sometimes compared to national legislatures;

but the comparison is somewhat confusing, for true inter-

national assemblies legislate, if they can be said to legislate

at all, ad referendum. They have no supernational authority

whatever. It not infrequently happens that states partici-

pate, but fail to ratify what the conference does. At the

outbreak of the World War in 1914, more than a third of

the states which were represented at the Second Hague Con-

ference in 1907 had failed to ratify any of the conventions

which that Conference submitted.1

Although political equality in the international conference

is secured through equal representation and voting strength,

and through the absence of all supernational authority, it

cannot be overlooked that the influence of states has never

been even approximately equal in such assemblies. Indeed,

international conferences have more than once provided the

occasion on which small states were coerced into accepting

the decisions of their more powerful neighbors. This has
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been conspicuously true where the questions before the con-

ference were of a political nature. There is evidence enough

of substantial inequality even in respect to the non-political

conferences. Thus the initiative at Copenhagen in 1857

came from France, Great Britain, and Prussia, while the

draft treaty received their preliminary approval before it

was submitted to the other states.2 The special commission

appointed to frame the draft convention at Geneva in 1868

consisted of British, German, French, Italian, and Dutch

naval officers, while the head of the French delegation occu-

pied the important position of rapporteur of the commission.3

1 See Pamphlet No. 3, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division

of International Law (Washington, 1914). The states were the Argentine Republic,

Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Monte-

negro, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Servia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

• B. F. S. P., XLLX, 902-932.

* Martens, Nouveau recueil gtnfral, XX, 405, 420.

the participating states choose to ratify their decisions. Such
assemblies are sometimes compared to national legislatures;
but the comparison is somewhat confusing, for true international assemblies legislate, if they can be said to legislate
at all, ad referendum. They have no supernational authority
whatever. It not infrequently happens that states participate, but fail to ratify what the conference does. At the
outbreak of the World War in 1914, more than a third of
the states which were represented at the Second Hague Conference in 1907 had failed to ratify any of the conventions
which that Conference submitted.1
Although political equality in the international conference
is secured through equal representation and voting strength,
and through the absence of all supernational authority, it
cannot be overlooked that the influence of states has never
been even approximately equal in such assemblies. Indeed,
international conferences have more than once provided the
occasion on which small states were coerced into accepting
the decisions of their more powerful neighbors. This has
been conspicuously true where the questions before the conference were of a political nature. There is evidence enough
of substantial inequality even in respect to the non-political
conferences. Thus the initiative at Copenhagen in 1857
came from France, Great Britain, and Prussia, while the
draft treaty received their preliminary approval before it
was submitted to the other states.2 The special commission
appointed to frame the draft convention at Geneva in 1868
consisted of British, German, French, Italian, and Dutch
naval officers, while the head of the French delegation occupied the important position of rapporteur of the commission.3
See Pamphlet No. 3, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Division
of International Law (Washington, 1914). The states were the Argentine Republic,
Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Greece, Italy, Montenegro, Paraguay, Persia, Peru, Servia, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
I B. F. s. P., XLIX, 902-<JJ2.
1 Martens, Nouveau recueil gbseral, XX, 405, 420.
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Formal equality is preserved, but actual inequality increases

in importance in direct proportion to the magnitude of the

interests at stake and of the decisions that are to be made.

Political equality in international congresses and confer-

ences received its most conspicuous application in modern

times in the two peace conferences held at The Hague in

1899 and 1007. The importance of political equality and

the difficulties involved in its practical application were

manifested so strikingly in the constitution and procedure

of those assemblies that they are entitled to special consid-

eration at this point.

At the First Hague Conference there were twenty-six

states represented, of which twenty were European, two

were American, and four Asiatic.1 Through the efforts of

the United States no less than forty-seven states were in-

vited to send delegates to the second Conference, and forty-

four were actually represented, of which twenty-one were

European (Norway having become a separate state), nine-

teen were American, and four Asiatic.2 For the first time

in history practically all the independent states of the earth
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participated in an international conference on the basis of

complete equality of representation. The fact was hailed in

many quarters as a vindication of political equality. "We

may affirm henceforth," declared the first delegate of the

Argentine Republic in the closing session, " that the political

1 La Confer. Int., Pt. I, pp. 3-8.

1 La Deux. Confer., I, 1-14. Speaking before the third International American

Conference at Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 1006, Secretary Root said: "Within a few

months, for the first time, the recognized possessors of every foot of soil upon the

American continents can be and I hope will be represented with the acknowledged

rights of equal sovereign states in the great World Congress at The Hague." Latin

America and the United States, p. 10. See Choate, in A.S.J.S. I. D. Proceedings

(1010), p. 196; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 95-100.

On the Peace Conferences see Choate, The Two Hague Conferences; Hicks, in

A.J.I. L. (1908), II, 530-561; Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences; Holls, Peace

Conference at The Hague; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten; Mengnhac, La con-

ference international de la paix; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences.

Formal equality is preserved, but actual inequality increases
in importance in direct proportion to the magnitude of the
interests at stake and of the decisions that are to be made.
Political equality in international congresses and conferences received its most conspicuous application in modern
times in the two peace conferences held at The Hague in
1899 and 1907 · The importance of political equality and
the difficulties involved in its practical application were
manifested so strikingly in the constitution and procedure
of those assemblies that they are entitled to special consideration at this point.
At the First Hague Conference there were twenty-six
states represented, of which twenty were European, two
were American, and four Asiatic. 1 Through the efforts of
the United States no less than forty-seven states were invited to send delegates to the second Conference, and fortyfour were actually represented, of which twenty-one were
European (Norway having become a separate state), nineteen were American, and four Asiatic. 2 For the first time
in history practically all the independent states of the earth
participated in an international conference on the basis of
complete equality of representation. The fact was hailed in
many quarters as a vindication of political equality. " We
may affirm henceforth," declared the first delegate of the
Argentine Republic in the closing session, "that the political
1 La Confer. Int., Pt. I, pp. 3-8.
2 La Deux. Confer., I, 1-14. Speaking before the third International American
Conference at Rio de Janeiro, July 31, 19o6, Secretary Root said: "Within a few

months, for the first time, the recognized possessors of every foot of soil upon the
American continents can be and I hope will be represented with the acknowledged
rights of equal sovereign states in the great World Congress at The Hague." Lalin
America and the United States, p. 10. See Choate, in A. S. J. S. I. D. Proceedings
(1910), p. 196; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 95-100.
On the Peace Conferences see Choate, The Two Hagiu Conferences; Hicks, in
A. J. l. l. (19o8), II, 530-561; Higgins, Hagtre Peace Conferences; Rolls, Peace
Conference al The Hague; Huber, Die Gkichheit der StaaJcn; Merignhac, La conference international de la paix; Scott, Hagut. Peace Conferences.
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equality of states has ceased to be a fiction and that it abides

established as an obvious reality." 1

In other quarters the Conference was denounced as a fail-

ure and its alleged impotence was attributed to the basic

principle of its constitution. One of its most hostile critics,

The London Times, observed editorially the day after the

Conference closed that it

was predestined to fail, because the convocation of such a body at all

was based upon a gross violation of the " law of facts." In plain

English, the Conference was a sham and has brought forth a progeny

of shams, because it was founded on a sham. The only principle upon

equality of states has ceased to be a fiction and that it abides
established as an obvious reality." 1
In other quarters the Conference was denounced as a failure and its alleged impotence was attributed to the basic
principle of its constitution. One of its most hostile critics,
The London Times, observed editorially the day after the
Conference closed that it

which all these powers could be induced to send delegates to it was

the legal and diplomatic convention that all sovereign States are

equal. For certain purposes that convention is useful, but, on the

face of it, it is a fiction, and a very absurd fiction at that. Everybody

knows that all sovereign States are not equal. The differences be-

tween them in population, in territory, in wealth, in armed strength,

in their habits of thought, in their conceptions of law and right — in

all that goes to make up civilization — are amongst the most obvious
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and insistent of facts. By pretending to ignore this fundamental and

essential truth, the Conference condemned itself to impotence. The

simplest common sense is enough to teach us that Powers like Great

Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States

will not, and cannot, in any circumstances, allow Haiti, Salvador,

Turkey, and Persia to have an equal right with themselves in laying

down the law by which their fleets, their armies, their diplomatists,

and their jurists are to be guided on matters of the supremest moment.

The suggestion that they should submit to such a doctrine is simply

fatuous. Such submission would involve the subjugation of the higher

civilization by the lower, and would inevitably condemn the more

advanced peoples to moral and intellectual retrogression.*

It was not so much equality of representation as equality

of voting strength that gave rise to difficulties and provoked

1 La Deux. Confer., I, 593, quoted supra, 181. See ibid., II, 20, quoted supra,

182; and Huber, Die Gleichheit der Siaaien.

1 Oct. 19, 1907, p. 9c. For an especially vitriolic attack on the Conference and

equality, read Alfred Stead's letter, in The London Times, October 24,1907, p. Se.

was predestined to fail, because the convocation of such a body at all
was based upon a gross violation of the " law of facts." In plain
English, the Conference was a sham and has brought forth a progeny
of shams, because it was founded on a sham. The only principle upon
which all these powers could be induced to send delegates to it was
the legal and diplomatic convention that all sovereign States are
equal. For certain purposes that convention is useful, but, on the
face of it, it is a fiction, and a very absurd fiction at that. Everybody
knows that all sovereign States are not equal. The differences be~
tween them in population, in territory, in wealth, in armed strength,
in their habits of thought, in their conceptions of law and right - in
all that goes to make up civilization - are amongst the most obvious
and insistent of facts. By pretending to ignore this fundamental and
essential truth, the Conference condemned itself to impotence. The
simplest common sense is enough to teach us that Powers like Great
Britain, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, and the United States
will not, and cannot, in any circumstances, allow Haiti, Salvador,
Turkey, and Persia to have an equal right with themselves in laying
down the law by which their fleets, their armies, their diplomatists,
and their jurists are to be guided on matters of the supremest moment.
The suggestion that they should submit to such a doctrine is simply
fatuous. Such submission would involve the subjugation of the higher
civilization by the lower, and would inevitably condemn the more
advanced peoples to moral and intellectual retrogression. 2

It was not so much equality of representation as equality
of voting strength that gave rise to difficulties and provoked
1 La De11x. Conjtr., I, 593, quoted supra, 181. See ibid., II, 20, quoted supra,
182; and Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten.
2 Oct. 19, 1907, p. 9C· For an especially vitriolic attack on the Conference and
equality, read Alfred Stead's letter, in TM Lendon Times, October 24, 1907, p. 5e.
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criticism. The invitation sent out by the Government of

the Netherlands to the states invited to send delegates to

the first Conference read as follows:

My Government trusts that the . . . Government will associate

itself with the great humanitarian work to be entered upon under

criticism. The invitation sent out by the Government of
the Netherlands to the states invited to send delegates to
the first Conference read as follmvs:

the auspices of His Majesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and that

it will be disposed to accept this invitation, and to take the necessary

steps for the presence of its Representatives at The Hague on the 18th

May, next, for the opening of the Conference, at which each Power,

whatever may be the number of its Delegates, will have only one

vote.1

The rules of procedure gave each state one vote in the com-

mittees and in plenary sessions.2 Similar rules were adopted

at the second Conference.3 There was considerable uncer-

tainty as to the effect of a negative vote. Sometimes com-

plete unanimity was held to be essential, while on other

occasions a majority was regarded as sufficient to entitle a

My Government trusts that the . . . Government will associate
itself with the great humanitarian work to be entered upon under
the auspices of His 1\1ajesty, the Emperor of all the Russias, and that
it will be disposed to accept this invitation, and to take the necessary
steps for the presence of its Representatives at The Hague on the 18th
May, next, for the opening of the Conference, at which each Power,
whatever may be the number of its Delegates, will have only one
vote. 1

proposal to be recorded as part of the proceedings. Every

state had one vote, however, and all really important de-

cisions required unanimity.
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Equality of voting strength and the requirement of una-

nimity for decisions of consequence were more widely and

severely criticized than anything else about the Peace Con-

ferences. Certain sections of the press were particularly

vigorous in their attacks on the Conference of 1007. The

Spectator insisted that the radical defect in its constitution

was " the equality of voting-power enjoyed by all the Powers

convened, great, minor, and infinitesimally small." 4 The

London Times attacked the same defect in an editorial en-

titled " The Danger Point at The Hague," as follows:

Cf. the Victory Program adopted November 23, 1918, as the official platform of the

League to Enforce Peace.

1 Holls, Peace Conference at The Hague, p. 34. See the remarks of Asser, in La

Confer. Int., Pt. I, p. 202.

'Ibid., Pt. I, pp. 18-19.

• La Deux. Confer., I, 61-62. * (1907), XCLX, 418, 472.

The rules of procedure gave each state one vote in the committees and in plenary sessions. 2 Similar rules were adopted
at the second Conference.3 There was considerable uncertainty as to the effect of a negative vote. Sometimes complete unanimity was held to be essential, while on other
occasions a majority was regarded as sufficient to entitle a
proposal to be recorded as part of the proceedings. Every
state had one vote, however, and all really important decisions required unanimity.
Equality of voting strength and the requirement of unanimity for decisions of consequence were more widely and
severely criticized than anything else about the Peace Conferences. Certain sections of the press were particularly
vigorous in their attacks on the Conference of H)07. The
Spectator insisted that the radical defect in its constitution
was " the equality of voting-power enjoyed by all the Powers
convened, great, minor, and infinitesimally small." 4 The
London Times attacked the same defect in an editorial entitled " The Danger Point at The Hague," as follows:
Cf. the Victory Program adopted November 23, 1918, as the official platform of the
League to Enforce Peace.
1 Holls, Peace Conference al The Hague, p. 34. See the remarks of Asser, in La
Conj&. Im., Pt. I, p. 202.
1 Ibid., Pt. I, pp. 18-19.
4 (1907), XCIX, 418, 472.
a La Deux. Conftr., I, 61-62.
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In the conference which was to settle these questions, subject, of

course, to the subsequent ratification of the several Governments

represented, there have been assembled upon a footing — which in

theory is one of absolute equality — the delegates of the greatest and

of the least States upon the globe. The most palpable and material

of the realities which decide the true rank and status of nations among

themselves do not, nominally, affect the authority of their representa-

tives. On military questions the voice of Germany or of France

weighs no more than the voice of Belgium. In naval matters Great

Britain may be outvoted by Rumania and Salvador, or Japan by

China and Persia. Population and wealth, past history and present

civilization, are ignored with equal completeness. By a diplomatic

fiction, China, Persia, and Turkey are supposed to stand upon the

same plane of civilization as the nations of the West, and the most

backward and corrupt of South American Republics are imputed the

legal attainments and the moral qualities which inspire the judgments

and the writings of a Marshall, a Kent, or a Story. In the Confer-

ence every Power counts as one, and no Power as more than one.

"Sententiae numerantur non ponderantur." The representatives of
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Countries in which Roman and English law are alike unknown, in

which the most rudimentary ideas of evidence and of procedure do

not exist, and in which the established Courts habitually violate the

first principles of natural justice, are held competent to determine

problems which have divided for generations the most accomplished

and the most upright of European jurists. That a body so composed

could legislate effectively upon the whole of the programme prepared

for it, during the few months available for its deliberations, was and

is manifestly impossible. That it should so legislate upon any of the

more controversial parts of the programme is possible only upon con-

dition that the decision on each subject should be left virtually to the

Powers invested with the moral and material authority indispensable

to give weight to its recommendations.1

The opinion has spread since 1907 that the usefulness of

international assemblies like those held at The Hague can-

not be greatly expanded until some limitations have been

imposed on equality in voting and the unanimity rule. Sir

1 September 14, 1907, p. 9c. See also September 21, 1907, p. 9c; October 19,

1907, p. 9c; October 21, 1907, p. 3f.

In the conference which was to settle these questions, subject, of
course, to the subsequent ratification of the several Governments
represented, there have been assembled upon a footing- which in
theory is one of absolute equality - the delegates of the greatest and
of the least States upon the globe. The most palpable and material
of the realities which decide the true rank and status of nations among
themselves do not, nominally, affect the authority of their representatives. On military questions the voice of Germany or of France
weighs no more than the voice of Belgium. In naval matters Great
Britain may be outvoted by Rumania and Salvador, or Japan by
China and Persia. Population and wealth, past history and present
civilization, are ignored with equal completeness. By a diplomatic
fiction, China, Persia, and Turkey are supposed to stand upon the
same plane of civilization as the nations of the West, and the most
backward and corrupt of South American Republics are imputed the
legal attainments and the moral qualities which inspire the judgments
and the writings of a Marshall, a Kent, or a Story. In the Conference every Power counts as one, and no Power as more than one.
" Sententiae numerantur non ponderantur." The representatives of
Countries in which Roman and English law are alike unknown, in
which the most rudimentary ideas of evidence and of procedure do
not exist, and in which the established Courts habitually violate the
first principles of natural justice, are held competent to determine
problems which have divided for generations the most accomplished
and the most upright of European jurists. That a body so composed
could legislate effectively upon the whole of the programme prepared
for it, during the few months available for its deliberations, was and
is manifestly impossible. That it should so legislate upon any of the
more controversial parts of the programme is possible only upon con·
dition that the decision on each subject should be left virtually to the
Powers invested with the moral and material authority indispensable
to give weight to its recommendations. 1

The opinion has spread since HJ07 that the usefulness of
international assemblies like those held at The Hague cannot be greatly expanded until some limitations have been
imposed on equality in voting and the unanimity rule. Sir
September 14, 1907, p. 9C· See also September :n, 1907, p. C}C; October 19,
1907, p. 9Ci October 21, 1()07, p. 3£.
1
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Edward Fry, Great Britain's representative at the second

Conference, pointed out the defect in his report to the

British Foreign Office:

In the next place the machinery of this Conference has proved in a

high degree dilatory and confusing, the rights of individual Delegates

Edward Fry, Great Britain's representative at the second
Conference, pointed out the defect in his report to the
British Foreign Office:

to take up the time of the Conference, the rights of a majority over a

minority in the absence of unanimity, the power of a Chairman to

confine the discussions within due limits — these and many other

questions demand solution before another meeting of the Conference

can prove satisfactory.1

Renault, one of the French delegates, has declared that " the

juridical equality of states, taken literally, leads to absurd

conclusions":

Can it be admitted that in a question of maritime law the voice of

the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg or even of Montenegro should have

In the next place the machinery of this Conference has proved in a
high degree dilatory and confusing, the rights of individual Delegates
to take up the time of the Conference, the rights of a majority over a
minority in the absence of unanimity, the power of a Chairman to
confine the discussions within due limits - these and many other
questions demand solution before another meeting of the Conference
can prove satisfactory. 1

the same weight as that of Great Britain? Can these small countries,

pleading the principle of unanimity, block reforms on which the great

maritime powers are agreed ?2

It has also been suggested that a plan may have to be de-

vised whereby the weight attributed to the votes of differ-
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ent states will bear some proportion to the real influence

which they represent.3 Westlake has voiced the opinion

that in the future all voting had better be avoided.4

In another important respect the Hague Conferences il-

lustrate the way in which political equality is preserved in

a true international assembly. They are absolutely with-

out supernational authority. Not only is equality assured

1 Fry to Grey, October 16, 1907, in British Doc. (1908), CXXIV, Misc. No. 1

Renault, one of the French delegates, has declared that" the
juridical equality of states, taken literally, leads to absurd
conclusions ":
Can it be admitted that in a question of maritime law the voice of
the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg or even of Montenegro should have
the same weight as that of Great Britain ? Can these small countries,
pleading the principle of unanimity, block reforms on which the great
maritime powers are agreed? 2

(Cd. 3857), p. 20.

1 Annates des sciences politiques (1908), XXIII, 444, quoted supra, p. 144.

See Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 37, 163, 169; and the Victory Program

adopted November 23,1918, as the official platform of the League to Enforce Peace.

* " In The Hague Conferences it may be needful that some system be devised

whereby the vote of Great Britain on naval affairs shall weigh more than that of

Switzerland, and that of the United States more than that of Hayti." Wilson, in

L. M. C. I. A. (1912), XVIII, 117.

* Collected Papers, p. 536.

It has also been suggested that a plan may have to be devised whereby the weight attributed to the votes of different states will bear some proportion to the real influence
which they represent. 3 Westlake has voiced the opinion
that in the future all voting had better be avoided. 4
In another important respect the Hague Conferences illustrate the way in which political equality is preserved in
a true international assembly. They are absolutely without supernational authority. Not only is equality assured
t Fry to Grey, October 16, 1907, in British Doc. (19o8), CXXIV, Misc. No. l
(Cd. 3857), p. 20.
2 Annales des sciences politiq11es (19o8), XXIII, 444, quoted supra, p. 144.
See Scott, Hague Peaa Conferences, I, 37, 163, 169; and the Victory Program
adopted November 23, 1918, as the official platform of the League to Enforce Peace.
1 " In The Hague Conferences it may be needful that some system be devised
whereby the vote of Great Britain on naval affairs shall weigh more than that of
Switzerland, and that of the United States more than that of Hayti." Wilson, in
L. M. C. l. A. (1912), XVIII, 117.
4 Collected Papers, p. 536.
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in representation, voting, and the unanimity rule, but once

the conference has agreed on a convention its agreement is

no more than a recommendation to the participating states,

which may ratify it or not as they please.1 As pointed out

above, more than a third of the states represented at the

Second Hague Conference have never ratified any of the

conventions which that Conference submitted.

This lack of supernational authority is after all the most

effective safeguard of political equality. There was an un-

reality about the formal proceedings at The Hague, due to

the overwhelming inequality of influence that prevailed

among the delegations. The initiative in calling the Con-

ferences came from Russia. The program, organization,

and procedure were practically determined by a single gov-

ernment in consultation with a few of the more influential

powers. The conventions were framed in most cases by

delegates of the great powers, while proposals approved by

large majorities were dropped on several occasions because

of the opposition of a few of the great powers.2
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1 "The international Conference which met at The Hague in 1809 and the sec-

ond Conference, which met in the same attractive city in 1907, is a diplomatic body.

... In such an assembly nations are regarded as equal. They send their dele-

gates or representatives. They have an equal vote. Proposals are made and

voted upon, but the vote merely implies a recommendation. The completed drafts,

called conventions or declarations, are laid before the various governments by the

respective delegates, and, if the drafts are found acceptable and are ratified by the

governments according to the constitutional methods in force, they thereupon be-

come binding upon the nations which have ratified them, from the time of such

ratification. They become universally binding when they have been ratified by the

nations participating in the conference. The draft has thus become a national

in representation, voting, and the unanimity rule, but once
the conference has agreed on a convention its agreement is
no more than a recommendation to the participating states,
which may ratify it or not as they please. 1 As pointed out
above, more than a third of the states represented at the
Second Hague Conference have never ratified any of the
conventions which that Conference submitted.
This lack of supernational authority is after all the most
effective safeguard of political equality. There was an unreality about the formal proceedings at The Hague, due to
the overwhelming inequality of influence that prevailed
among the delegations. The initiative in calling the Conferences came from Russia. The program, organization,
and procedure were practically determined by a single government in consultation with a few of the more influential
powers. The conventions were framed in most cases by
delegates of the great powers, while proposals approved by
large majorities were dropped on several occasions because
of the opposition of a few of the great powers.2

statute, and by the action of the nations it has become an international statute.

The conference, therefore, proposes; the national government disposes. If the

conference can be called a legislature without a misuse of terms, it is a legislature

ad referendum." Scott, in L. M. C. I. A. (1912), XVIII, 121.

1 "It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the delegations at The Hague did not

and could not possess equal influence in framing the conventions, and that, not-

withstanding the principle of legal equality the larger States either forced their

views upon the Conference or by their opposition prevented an unacceptable prop-

osition from being accepted." Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 165.

The Autobiography of the first American delegate at the Hague Conference of

1 " The international Conference which met at The Hague in 1899 and the second Conference, which met in the same attractive city in 1907, is a diplomatic body.
. . . In such an assembly nations are regarded as equal. They send their delegates or representatives. They have an equal vote. Proposals are made and
voted upon, but the vote merely implies a recommendation. The completed drafts,
called conventions or declarations, are laid before the various governments by the
respective delegates, and, if the drafts are found acceptable and are ratified by the
governments according to the constitutional methods in force, they thereupon become binding upon the nations which have ratified them, from the time of such
ratification. They become universally binding when they have been ratified by the
nations participating in the conference. The draft has thus become a national
statute, and by the action of the nations it has become an international statute.
The conference, therefore, proposes; the national government disposes. If the
conference can be called a legislature without a misuse of terms, it is a legislature
ad referendum." Scott, in L. M. C. I. A. (1912), XVIII, 121.
2 " It is abundantly clear, therefore, that the delegations at The Hague did not
and could not possess equal influence in framing the conventions, and that, notwithstanding the principle of legal equality the larger States either forced their
views upon the Conference or by their opposition prevented an unacceptable proposition from being accepted." Scott, Hague PetJCe Conferences, I, 165.
The Autobiography of the first American delegate at the Hague Conference of
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The unreality of equality in the formal proceedings was

admitted by delegates from several of the smaller states.

The Chinese Minister to Holland presented his government

with a memorial on the second Conference, in which he said:

At the Conference there was no possibility of concealing the pre-

cise condition of each Power in comparison with another and the mere

fact of participating in the Conference implied an admission on the

The unreality of equality in the formal proceedings was
admitted by delegates from several of the smaller states.
The Chinese Minister to Holland presented his government
with a memorial on the second Conference, in which he said:

part of the participant that it accepted such a classification. The

Great Powers naturally availed themselves of their power to benefit

themselves by coercing others on the pretext of law. When they

wished to carry some proposal they tried to sway the assembly by an

oratorical appeal to each other, and when they wished to defeat a pro-

posal they secretly exercised methods of obstruction to promote dis-

agreement. ... This shows that a division into great and small Powers

is not easily obliterated, and emphasizes the fierce and ever-increasing

competition in diplomacy of the present day.

After urging that China perfect itself in the essentials of a

great power before another conference was called, he con-

cluded:

If by so doing both our political and legal systems could be brought
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into order in the next four years, China would be in a position to show

that she could hold her own with the other Powers when the invitation

to the next Conference reaches her. If she could at the next Confer-

ence win a position among the Great Powers, such as that which Japan

At the Conference there was no possibility of concealing the precise condition of each Power in comparison with another and the mere
fact of participating in the Conference implied an admission on the
part of the participant that it accepted such a classification. The
Great Powers naturally availed themselves of their power to benefit
themselves by coercing others on the pretext of law. When they
wished to carry some proposal they tried to sway the assembly by an
oratorical appeal to each other, and when they wished to defeat a proposal they secretly exercised methods of obstruction to promote disagreement .... This shows that a division into great and small Powers
is not easily obliterated, and emphasizes the fierce and ever-increasing
competition in diplomacy of the present day.

holds at the present day, what an unspeakable blessing it would be for

our country.1

Notwithstanding the inevitable inequalities of influence

in a conference of nations, a substantial political equality is

1899 contains an interesting account of a conversation with the delegate from

Sweden and Norway on the immunity of private property at sea: "Curious things

came out during our conversation. Baron de Bildt informed me that, strongly as

he favored the measure, and prepared as he was to vote for it, he should have to be

very careful in discussing it publicly, since his instructions were to avoid, just as

far as possible, any clash between the opinions expressed by the Swedish representa-

tives and those of the great powers. Never before have I so thoroughly realized

the difficult position which the lesser powers in Europe hold as regards really serious

questions." White, Autobiography, II, 296-297.

1 The London Times, February 20, 1908, p. 4b.

After urging that China perfect itself in the essentials of a
great power before another conference was called, he concluded:
If by so doing both our political and legal systems could be brought
into order in the next four years, China would be in a position to show
that she could hold her own with the other Powers when the invitation
to the next Conference reaches her. If she could at the next Conference win a position among the Great Powers, such as that which Japan
holds at the present day, what an unspeakable blessing it would be for

our country.1

Notwithstanding the inevitable inequalities of influence
in a conference of nations, a substantial political equality is
1899 contains an interesting account of a conversation with the delegate from
Sweden and Norway on the immunity of private property at sea: "Curious things
came out during our conversation. Baron de Bildt informed me that, strongly as
he favored the measure, and prepared as he was to vote for it, he should have to be
very careful in discussing it publicly, since his instructions were to avoid, just as
far as possible, any clash between the opinions expressed by the Swedish representatives and those of the great powers. Never before have I so thoroughly realized
the difficult position which the lesser powers in Europe hold as regards really serious
questions." White, Aut<Jbiography, II, 296-297.
l Tire Lmdon Ti~, February 20, 19o8, p. 4b.
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preserved wherever all interested states are represented with

an equal vote and the requirement of unanimity, and above

all wherever such a conference acts ad referendum without

any supernational authority. The increasing protest against

these principles suggests that limitations are likely to be im-

posed on political equality in such assemblies, or that really

important questions will be determined by another type of

conference, a type to be considered forthwith.

Supernational Congresses and Conferences

Parallel to the development of the international congress

or conference, in which political equality is preserved as in-

dicated above, there has been evolving within the society

of nations another type of institution, which has several of

preserved wherever all interested states are represented with
an equal vote and the requirement of unanimity, and above
all wherever such a conference acts ad referendum without
any supernational authority. The increasing protest against
these principles suggests that limitations are likely to be imposed on political equality in such assemblies, or that really
important questions will be determined by another type of
conference, a type to be considered forthwith.

the marks of a rudimentary supernational authority, and

which imposes important limitations upon the political

equality of states where it does not deny it altogether. This

is the concerted action of the great powers.1

The concerted action of the great powers has grown up in

the last century. Prior to the French Revolution only the

vaguest notions of supernational authority had made their
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appearance in European politics. The existence of an inter-

dependent society of nations with common interests was

recognized at Westphalia in 1648. The balance of power2

was accepted as the basis for common interests. It was to be

preserved by means of international guaranties and inter-

vention. The same policy received more explicit definition

at Utrecht, and the system of guaranties with intervention

as a corollary was developed in greater detail.

1 Dupuis, Le principe d'fquilibre el le concert européen, pp. 111-513, is by all

odds the best account of the European Concert. The following may also be read

with profit: Lawrence, Essays, pp. 208-233; Nys, Etudes, II, 1-46; Streit, in

R. D. I. L. C. (1900), 29 sfir., II, 5-25.

1 On the balance of power, see Donnadieu, Essai sur la theorie de I'fquUibre;

Dupuis, Le principe d'equilibre el le concert européen; Kaeber, Die Idee des euro-

paischen Gleichgewichts.

SUPERNATIONAL CONGRESSES AND CONFERENCES

Parallel to the development of the international congress
or conference, in which political equality is preserved as indicated above, there has been evolving within the society
of nations another type of institution, which has several of
the marks of a rudimentary supernational authority, and
which imposes important limitations upon the political
equality of states where it does not deny it altogether. This
is the concerted action of the great powers.1
The concerted action of the great powers has grown up in
the last century. Prior to the French Revolution only the
vaguest notions of supernational authority had made their
appearance in European politics. The existence of an interdependent society of nations with common interests was
recognized at Westphalia in 1648. The balance of power 2
was accepted as the basis for common interests. It was to be
preserved by means of international guaranties and intervention. The same policy received more explicit definition
at Utrecht, and the system of guaranties with intervention
as a corollary was developed in greater detail.
1 Dupuis, Le principe d'eqttilibre et le concert europten, pp. 111- 513, is by all
odds the best account of the European Concert. The following may also be read
with profit: Lawrence, Essays, pp. 2o8-233; Nys, £11«1es, II, 1-46; Streit, in
R. D. I. L. C. (1900), 2e ser., II, 5-25.
2 On the balance of power, see Donnadieu, Essai sur la theoru de l'tq11iJibre;
Dupuis, Le principe d'tquilibre et le concert europeen; Kaeber, Die !dee des europaischen Gleichge-.i.>ichts.
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The system of guaranties and intervention by the more

powerful states provided a very primitive machinery for

checking disorder after it had become acute, but it lacked

the most rudimentary essentials of an organization capable

of anticipating the event and exercising a supervision over

the society of nations in the common interest. The idea of

cooperative supervision had its first practical application in

Europe during the Napoleonic wars. At the first session of

the Congress of Chatillon, February 5, 1814, the represen-

tatives of the four allied powers declared that they would

treat for peace with France " in the name of Europe form-

ing a single whole." 1 On March 10, 1814, the four powers

concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, which began:

The high contracting parties above named solemnly obligate them-

selves to one another by the present treaty, in case France should

refuse to accede to the proposed terms of peace, to devote all the

resources of their respective states to the vigorous prosecution of the

present war against that power, and to employ them in perfect con-

cert, in order to obtain for themselves and for Europe a general peace,

under the protection of which the rights and the liberties of all nations
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may be established and secured.2

The system of guaranties and intervention by the more
powerful states provided a very primitive machinery for
checking disorder after it had become acute, but it lacked
the most rudimentary essentials of an organization capable
of anticipating the event and exercising a supervision over
the society of nations in the common interest. The idea of
cooperative supervision had its first practical application in
Europe during the Napoleonic wars. At the first session of
the Congress of Chatillon, February 5, 1814, the representatives of the four allied powers declared that they would
treat for peace with France " in the name of Europe forming a single whole." 1 On :March 10, 1814, the four powers
concluded the Treaty of Chaumont, which began:

The allies also announced their intention of concerting to-

gether, after peace had been made with France, with refer-

ence to the best means of guaranteeing to themselves and

to Europe the continuance of peace. The treaty was to re-

main in force for a period of twenty years and to be extended

thereafter by the powers in concert if circumstances required

it.3 On the rupture of negotiations at Chatillon the allied

powers declared in a formal proclamation that the progress

of events had. made them conscious of the imperative neces-

sity of la Ligue Europeenne.*

1 Angeberg, I, 105.

1 Ibid., I, 117; B. F. S. P., I, 121. The treaty was antedated March 1, 1814.

The high contracting parties above named solemnly obligate themselves to one another by the present treaty, in case France should
refuse to accede to the proposed terms of peace, to devote all the
resources of their respective states to the vigorous prosecution of the
present war against that power, and to employ them in perfect concert, in order to obtain for themselves and for Europe a general peace,
under the protection of which the rights and the liberties of all nations
may be established and secured. 2

* Arts. 5, 16.

4 B. F. S. P., I, 912. "The significance of the European Coalition during the

eight years that followed the signature of the Treaty of Chaumont is, that it rep-

The allies also announced their intention of concerting together, after peace had been made with France, with reference to the best means of guaranteeing to themselves and
to Europe the continuance of peace. The treaty was to remain in force for a period of twenty years and to be extended
thereafter by the powers in concert if circumstances required
it. 3 On the rupture of negotiations at Chatillon the allied
powers declared in a formal proclamation that the progress
of events had made them conscious of the imperative necessity of la Ligue Europeenne. 4
Angeberg, I, 105.
/bUJ., I, u7; B. F. S. P., I, l2I. The treaty was antedated March 1, 1814.
i Arts. 5, 16.
4 B. F. S. P., I, 912. "The significance of the European Coalition during the
eight years that followed the signature of the Treaty of Chaumont is, that it rep1
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The significance of the allied concert appears in the secret

articles of the first Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814.1 This

treaty outlined the general basis for the pacification of

Europe, and provided for a definitive settlement by a con-

gress to be held at Vienna. It was signed by representatives

of Portugal, Sweden, and Spain, in addition to France and

the four allies; but the first of the secret articles included

in each of the treaties between France and the four great

powers provided:

The disposition to be made of the territories which His Most Chris-

tian Majesty renounces by the 3d article of the public treaty, and the

relations from which a system of real and lasting equilibrium in Europe

is to result, shall be settled at the congress on the bases determined by

the allied powers among themselves, and in accordance with the

The significance of the allied concert appears in the secret
articles of the first Treaty of Paris, May 30, 1814.1 This
treaty outlined the general basis for the pacification of
Europe, and provided for a definitive settlement by a congress to be held at Vienna. It was signed by representatives
of Portugal, Sweden, and Spain, in addition to France and
the four allies; but the first of the secret articles included
in each of the treaties between France and the four great
powers provided:

several dispositions contained in the following articles.

Then followed an outline of the manner in which Europe

was to be reconstituted by the four great powers in concert.

When the Congress of Viennas assembled it became evi-

dent that the Concert of Europe was limited to the four
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great powers. All Europe, except Turkey and its dependent

principalities, was represented by delegates;3 but no general

meeting of the Congress ever took place. By virtue of the

Treaty of Paris, particularly the first of its secret articles,

The disposition to be made of the territories which His Most Christian Majesty renounces by the 3d article of the public treaty, and the
relations from which a system of real and lasting equilibrium in Europe
is to result, shall be settled at the congress on the bases determined by
the allied powers among themselves, and in accordance with the
several dispositions contained in the following articles.

the representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and

resented, whatever the motives of the several Allies may have been, an experiment

in international government, an attempt to solve the problem of reconciling central

and general control by a ' European Confederation ' with the maintenance of the

liberties of its constituent states, and thus to establish a juridical system." Phillips,

Confed. of Europe, p. 9.

1 Separate treaties containing the same stipulations were concluded on the same

day between France and Great Britain, Austria, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, and

Sweden. The treaty between France and Spain was signed July 20, 1814.

B.F.S.P.,1, 151.

1 Protocols in B. F. S. P., II, 549-773. See also Angeberg, Le Congris de Vienne

el les traités de 1815; Debidour, Histoire diplomatique de I'Europe; Flassan, Histoire

du Congris de Vienne; Kluber, Acten des Wiener Congresses; Phillips, Confederation

of Europe; Pradt, Du Congris de Vienne; Sorel, L'Europe el la revolution fronfoise.

* Altogether 216 chefs de mission. Sorel, ibid., VIII, 382.

Then followed an outline of the manner in which Europe
was to be reconstituted by the four great powers in concert.
When the Congress of Vienna 2 assembled it became evident that the Concert of Europe was limited to the four
great powers. All Europe, except Turkey and its dependent
principalities, was represented by delegates; 3 but no general
meeting of the Congress ever took place. By virtue of the
Treaty of Paris, particularly the first of its secret articles,
the representatives of Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and
resented, whatever the motives of the several Allies may have been, an experiment
in international government, an attempt to solve the problem of reconciling central
and general control by a ' European Confederation ' with the maintenance of the
liberties of its constituent states, and thus to establish a juridical system." Phillips,
Confed. of Europe, p. 9.
1 Separate treaties containing the same stipulations were concluded on the same
day between France and Great Britain, Austria, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, and
Sweden. The treaty between France and Spain was signed July 20, 1814.
B.F.S.P., I, 151.
1 Protocols in B. F. S. P., II, 54<r773· See also Angeberg, Le Congres tk Vientui
eJ ks traiUs de 1815; Debidour, Histoire dipWmaiique de I'Europe; Flassan, Histoire
du Congres de Vienne; Kluber, Actm des Wiener Congresses,· Phillips, Confederation
of Europe; Pradt, Du Congres tk Vimne; Sorel, L'Europe el la rholutionfra~aise.
1 Altogether 216 chefs tk mission. Sorel, ibid., VIII, 382.
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Russia asserted their right, over the protests of smaller

states, to determine the organization and procedure of the

Congress and make its decisions.1 The delegates of the four

allied powers and France were constituted a directing com-

mittee. Provision was also made for meetings which should

include representatives of Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, but

it is significant that of sixty-seven protocols only seventeen

were signed by delegates of the three countries last men-

tioned. The great powers rearranged the map of Europe,

restored dynasties, confirmed the partition of Poland, united

Belgium with Holland, neutralized Switzerland, created the

German Confederation, and prescribed rules of international

law with respect to the free navigation of rivers, the rank of

diplomatic representatives, and the suppression of the slave

trade. The spirit in which they went about their work was

summarized very well by Palmerston a generation later,

in discussing a proposal for a congress of the great powers

on the affairs of Italy. He observed that

The Congress of Vienna . . . was assembled under circumstances

very different from those which at present exist. The tide of war had
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swept over the whole surface of Europe from the Rhine to Moscow,

and from Moscow back to the Seine; all the smaller States of Europe

had been conquered and reconquered, and were considered almost at

the arbitrary disposal of the Great Powers whose armies had- decided

the fate of the war. The statesmen who sat in Congress therefore con-

sidered themselves at liberty to parcel out with great freedom the

several territories of Europe.

The smaller Sovereigns, Princes, and States, had no representatives

in the deciding congress, and no voice in the decisions by which their

future destiny was determined. They were all obliged to yield to

Russia asserted their right, over the protests of smaller
states, to determine the organization and procedure of the
Congress and make its decisions. 1 The delegates of the four
allied powers and France were constituted a directing committee. Provision was also made for meetings which should
include representatives of Portugal, Spain, and Sweden, but
it is significant that of sixty-seven protocols only seventeen
were signed by delegates of the three countries last mentioned. The great powers rearranged the map of Europe,
restored dynasties, confirmed the partition of Poland, united
Belgium with Holland, neutralized Switzerland, created the
German Confederation, and prescribed rules of international
law with respect to the free navigation of rivers, the rank of
diplomatic representatives, and the suppression of the slave
trade. The spirit in which they went about their work was
summarized very well by Palmerston a generation later,
in discussing a proposal for a congress of the great powers
on the affairs of Italy. He observed that

overruling power, and to submit to decisions which were the result,

as the case might be, of justice or of expediency, of generosity or of

partiality, of regard to the welfare of nations, or of concession to per-

sonal solicitations.*

1 Protocol of September 22, 1814, and annex, in B. F. S. P., II, 554, 556.

* Palmerston to Marquis of Normandy, October 10,1848, in B. F. S. P., LI, 672.

The Congress of Vienna . . . was assembled under circumstances
very different from those which at present exist. The tide of war had
swept over the whole surface of Europe from the Rhine to Moscow,
and from Moscow back to the Seine; all the smaller States of Europe
had been conquered and reconquered, and were considered almost at
the arbitrary disposal of the Great Powers whose armies had. decided
the fate of the war. The statesmen who sat in Congress therefore considered themselves at liberty to parcel out with great freedom the
several territories of Europe.
The smaller Sovereigns, Princes, and States, had no representatives
in the deciding congress, and no voice in the decisions by which their
future destiny was determined. They were all obliged to yield to
overruling power, and to submit to decisions which were the result,
as the case might be, of justice or of expediency, of generosity or of
partiality, of regard to the welfare of nations, or of concession to personal solicitations.'
1
2

Protocol of September 22, 1814, and annex, in B. F. S. P., II, 554, 556.
Palmerston to Marquis of Normandy, October 10, 1848, inB. F. S. P., LI, 672.
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It is hardly necessary to remark that the supervision of

the society of nations by the concerted action of the great

powers, as manifested at Vienna, is absolutely irreconcilable

with the notion of political equality. The lesser powers were

denied equality of representation; they had no voice in the

decisions except as they were required to ratify what the

great powers had done; and they had no choice but to ac-

cept a settlement which the Concert had agreed upon and

which it stood ready to enforce.

On Napoleon's return to France, the Concert was strength-

ened and the Treaty of Chaumont expressly reaffirmed.1

Requests from the smaller powers participating in the new

campaign that they be admitted to the conference on terms

of peace were denied. November 20, 1815, after the second

downfall of Napoleon, the four great powers concluded a

new treaty of alliance in which the principle of concerted

action was again affirmed and the allies were constituted a

directing committee for Europe.2 Article 6 provided:

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and
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to consolidate the connections, which at the present moment so closely

unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the World, the High

Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their Meetings at fixed

periods, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns them-

selves, or by their respective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting

upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the meas-

ures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salu-

tary, for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance

of the Peace of Europe.

In 1818 the European Directory met at Aix-la-Chapelle

It is hardly necessary to remark that the supervision of
the society of nations by the concerted action of the great
powers, as manifested at Vienna, is absolutely irreconcilable
with the notion of political equality. The lesser powers were
denied equality of representation; they had no voice in the
decisions except as they were required to ratify what the
great powers had done; and they had no choice but to accept a settlement which the Concert had agreed upon and
which it stood ready to enforce.
On Napoleon's return to France, the Concert was strengthened and the Treaty of Chaumont expressly reaffirmed. 1
Requests from the smaller powers participating in the new
campaign that they be admitted to the conference on terms
of peace were denied. November 20, 1815, after the second
downfall of Napoleon, the four great powers concluded a
new treaty of alliance in which the principle of concerted
action was again affirmed and the allies were constituted a
directing committee for Europe. 2 Article 6 provided:

to consider the internal condition of France and the question

of terminating the military occupation of French territory.3

1 B.F.S.P.n,443, 671, 674, 478.

» Ibid., m, 248, 273; V, 1216.

• Protocols in B. F. S. P., V, 1081, and VI, 11. See Pradt, L'Europe apris U

Congris d'Aix-la-ChapelU.

To facilitate and to secure the execution of the present Treaty, and
to consolidate the connections, which at the present moment so .closely
unite the four Sovereigns for the happiness of the World, the High
Contracting Parties have agreed to renew their Meetings at fixed
periods, either under the immediate auspices of the Sovereigns themselves, or by their respective Ministers, for the purpose of consulting
upon their common interests, and for the consideration of the measures which at each of those periods shall be considered the most salutary, for the repose and prosperity of Nations, and for the maintenance
of the Peace of Europe.

In 1818 the European Directory met at Aix-la-Chapelle
to consider the internal condition of France and the question
of terminating the military occupation of French territory. 3
l
I

1

B. F. S. P. II, 443 1 671, 674, 478.
Ibid., III, :z48, :z73; v, I :z 16.
Protocols in B. F. S. P., V, 1o81, and VI,

Congr~s d'Ai~la-Chapelk.

11.

See Pradt, L'Europe apres le

LIMITATIONS UPON POLITICAL EQUALITY

LIMITATIONS UPON POLITICAL EQUALITY

297

297

The government of France accepted an invitation to join the

Concert.1 Before the Conference assembled a circular was

addressed to the other European governments in which it

was declared that the meetings were not to have the char-

acter of a congress and that no other delegates would be

admitted.2 Nevertheless the Conference heard appeals and

received petitions of all kinds from subjects and sovereigns

alike, revised the decision made at Vienna with reference to

the grades of diplomatic representatives, decided upon the

evacuation of French territory by allied troops, and per-

fected other details of the general settlement. On Novem-

ber 15, 1818, the representatives of the five states agreed to

an important set of resolutions explaining the purpose and

method of the European Concert of the great powers as

follows:

1. That they are firmly resolved never to depart, neither in their

mutual relations, nor in those which bind them to other States, from

the principle of intimate Union which has hitherto presided over all

their common relations and interests — a Union rendered more strong
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and indissoluble by the bonds of Christian fraternity which the Sover-

eigns have formed among themselves.

2. That this Union, which is the more real and durable, inasmuch

as it depends on no separate interest or temporary combination, can

only have for its object the Maintenance of general Peace, founded

The government of France accepted an invitation to join the
Concert.1 Before the Conference assembled a circular was
addressed to the other European governments in which it
was declared that the meetings were not to have the character of a congress and that no other delegates would be
admitted.2 Nevertheless the Conference heard appeals and
received petitions of all kinds from subjects and sovereigns
alike, revised the decision made at Vienna with reference to
the grades of diplomatic representatives, decided upon the
evacuation of French territory by allied troops, and perfected other details of the general settlement. On November 15, 1818, the representatives of the five states agreed to
an important set of resolutions explaining the purpose and
method of the European Concert of the great powers as
follows:

on a religious respect for the engagements contained in the Treaties,

and for the whole of the rights resulting therefrom.

3. That France, associated with other Powers by the restoration

of the legitimate Monarchical and Constitutional Power, engages

henceforth to concur m the maintenance and consolidation of a Sys-

tem which has given Peace to Europe, and which can alone insure its

duration.

4. That if, for the better attaining the above declared object, the

Powers which have concurred in the present Act, should judge it

necessary to establish particular meetings, either of the Sovereigns

themselves, or of their respective Ministers and Plenipotentiaries,

there to treat in common of their own interests, in so far as they have

1 B.F.S.P..V1,16,17.

»Ibid., V, 1216.

1. That they are firmly resolved never to depart, neither in their
mutual relations, nor in those which bind them to other States, from
the principle of intimate union which has hitherto presided over all
their common relations and interests - a Union rendered more strong
and indissoluble by the bonds of Christian fraternity which the Sovereigns have formed among themselves.
2. That this Union, which is the more real and durable, inasmuch
as it depends on no separate interest or temporary combination, can
only have for its object the Maintenance of general Peace, founded
on a religious respect for the engagements contained in the Treaties,
and for the whole of the rights resulting therefrom.
3. That France, associated with other Powers by the restoration
of the legitimate Monarchical and Constitutional Power, engages
henceforth to concur m the maintenance and consolidation of a System which has given Peace to Europe, and which can alone insure its
duration.
4. That if, for the better attaining the above declared object, the
Powers which have concurred in the present Act, should judge it
necessary to establish particular meetings, either of the Sovereigns
themselves, or of their respective Ministers and Plenipotentiaries,
there to treat in common of their own interests, in so far as they have
i

B.F.S.P., VI, 16, 17.

• Ibid., V, 1216.
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reference to the object of their present deliberations, the time and

place of these meetings shall, on each occasion, be previously fixed by

means of diplomatic communications; and that in the case of these

meetings having for their object affairs specially connected with the

interests of the other States of Europe, they shall only take place in

pursuance of a formal invitation on the part of such of those States

as the said affairs may concern, and under the express reservation of

their right of direct participation therein, either directly or by then-

Plenipotentiaries.

5. That the resolutions contained in the present Act shall be made

known to all the Courts of Europe, by the annexed Declaration, which

shall be considered as sanctioned by the Protocol, and forming part

thereof.1

Their purpose was further defined in the annexed Decla-

ration:

The intimate Union established among the Monarchs, who are

joint parties to this System, by their own principles, no less than by

reference to the object of their present deliberations, the time and
place of these meetings shall, on each occasion, be previously fixed by
means of diplomatic communications; and that in the case of these
meetings having for their object affairs specially connected with the
interests of the other States of Europe, they shall only take place in
pursuance of a formal invitation on the part of such of those States
as the said affairs may concern, and under the express reservation of
their right of direct participation therein, either directly or by their
Plenipotentiaries.
5. That the resolutions contained in the present Act shall be made
known to all the Courts of Europe, by the annexed Declaration, which
shall be considered as sanctioned by the Protocol, and forming part
thereof. 1

the interests of their people, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge

of its future tranquillity.
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The object of this Union is as simple as it is great and salutary.

It does not tend to any new political combination — to any change

Their purpose was further defined in the annexed Declaration:

in the Relations sanctioned by existing Treaties. Calm and consist-

ent in its proceedings, it has no other object than the maintenance of

Peace, and the guarantee of those transactions on which the Peace

was founded and consolidated".

The Sovereigns, in forming this august Union, have regarded as its

fundamental basis their invariable resolution never to depart, either

among themselves, or in their Relations with other States, from the

strictest observation of the principles of the Right of Nations; prin-

ciples, which, in their application to a state of permanent Peace, can

alone effectually guarantee the Independence of Each Government,

and the stability of the general association.

Faithful to these principles, the Sovereigns will maintain them

equally in those meetings at which they may be personally present,

or in those which shall take place among their Ministers; whether

1 B. F. S. P., VI, 14; Hertslet, I, 571. The provision in paragraph four for the

participation of other states in conferences of the great powers was applied in

some cases and disregarded in others. Cf. B. F. S. P., XVTII, 728; and ibid.,

LXXTV, i841, 1238.

The intimate Union established among the Monarchs, who are
joint parties to this System, by their own principles, no less than by
the interests of their people, offers to Europe the most sacred pledge
of its future tranquillity.
The object of this Union is as simple as it is great and salutary.
It does not tend to any new political combination - to any change
in the Relations sanctioned by existing Treaties. Calm and consistent in its proceedings, it has no other object than the maintenance of
Peace, and the guarantee of those transactions on which the Peace
was founded and consolidated:
The Sovereigns, in forming this august Union, have regarded as its
fundamental basis their invariable resolution never to depart, either
among themselves, or in their Relations with other States, from the
strictest observation of the principles of the Right of Nations; principles, which, in their application to a state of permanent Peace, can
alone effectually guarantee the Independence of Each Government,
and the stability of the general association.
Faithful to these principles, the Sovereigns will maintain them
equally in those meetings at which they may be personally present,
or in those which shall take place among their Ministers; whether
1 B. F. S. P., VI, 14; Hertslet, I, 571. The provision in paragraph four for the
participation of other states in conferences of the great powers was applied in
some cases and disregarded in others. Cf. B. F. S. P., XVIII, 728; and ibid.,
LXXIV, 1241, 1238.
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they be for the purpose of discussing in common their own interests,

or whether they shall relate to questions in which other Governments

shall formally claim their interference. The same spirit which will

direct their councils, and reign in their diplomatic communications,

will preside also at these meetings; and the repose of the world will

be constantly their motive and their end.1

It soon appeared that the great powers were not agreed

among themselves with respect to the authority which they

had assumed as a supernational directing council for Europe.

they be for the purpose of discussing in common their own interests,
or whether they shall relate to questions in which other Governments
shall formally claim their interference. The same spirit which will
direct their councils, and reign in their diplomatic communications,
will preside also at these meetings; and the repose of the world will
be constantly their motive and their end. l

Revolution broke out in Spain in 1820 and soon spread to

Naples. The three powers that had joined in the Holy Al-

liance in 1815, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were anxious

that the Concert should intervene to suppress revolutionary

movements. They regarded such intervention as no more

than a proper application of the principles established by

the great powers at Paris, Vienna, and Aix-la-Chapelle. In

a circular issued at Troppau in 1820, they declared that

The Powers have exercised an undeniable right, in concerting to-

gether upon means of safety against those States in which the over-

throw of a Government caused by revolution could only be considered
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as a dangerous example, which could only result in an hostile attitude

against constitutional and legitimate Governments. The exercise of

1 B. F. S. P., VI, 18; Hertslet, I, 573. "Under den rein völkerrechtlichen Or-

ganisationen begegnen wir einer einzigen, in welcher nicht die absolute Gleichheit

der Staaten anerkannt wäre. Es ist dies, sofern man hier von einer rechtlichen Or-

ganisation überhaupt sprechen will, die Pentarchie, wie sie besonders durch den

Kongress von Aachen gestaltet wurde, beziehungsweise deren Stellung innerhalb

It soon appeared that the great powers were not agreed
among themselves with respect to the authority which they
had assumed as a supernational directing council for Europe.
Revolution broke out in Spain in 1820 and soon spread to
Naples. The three powers that had joined in the Holy Alliance in 1815, Austria, Prussia, and Russia, were anxious
that the Concert should intervene to suppress revolutionary
movements. They regarded such intervention as no more
than a proper application of the principles established by
the great powers at Paris, Vienna, and Aix-la-Chapelle. In
a circular issued at Troppau in 1820, they declared that

der Staatengemeinschaft. Dass damals Tendenzen, zunächst unwidersprochen,

sich geltend machten, welche eine Art Vormundschaft der fünf Grossmächte über

die übrigen Staaten im Sinne der Heiligen Allianz und der Laibacher Beschlüsse

bezweckten, ist gewiss und war auch ganz natürlich, wenn man einerseits das

damalige Ruhebedürfnis Europas und anderseits die ohnmächtige Kleinstaaterei

ausserhalb der fünf Grossmächte berücksichtigt. Aus dem Wortlaut des Aachener

Protokolls lässt sich aber eine eigentliche Organisation nicht ableiten, ebensowenig

ein formeller Anspruck der Grossmächte auf Regelung aller internationalen Ver-

The Powers have exercised an undeniable right, in concerting together upon means of safety against those States in which the overthrow of a Government caused by revolution could only be considered
as a dangerous example, which could only result in an hostile attitude
against constitutional and legitimate Governments. The exercise of

hältnisse. Und wenn auch ein solcher gelegentlich erhoben worden ist, so ist dessen

allgemeine Anerkennung oder auch nur dessen konstante und tatsächliche Geltend-

machung durch die Grossmächte nicht nachweisbar." Huber, Die Gleichheit der

Staaten, p. 101.

1 B . F. S. P., VI, 18; Hertslet, I, 573. "Under den rein volkerrechtlichen Organisationen begegnen wir einer einzigen, in welcher nicht die absolute Gleichheit
der Staaten anerkannt wiire. Es ist dies, sofern man hier von einer rechtlichen Organisation ilberhaupt sprechen will, die Pentarchie, wie sie besonders durch den
Kongress von Aachen gestaltet wurde, beziehungsweise deren Stellung innerhalb
der Staatengemeinschaft. Dass damals Tendenzen, zuniichst unwidersprochen,
sich geltend machten, welche eine Art Vormundschaft der fiinf Grossmachte tiber
die tibrigen Staaten im Sinne der Heiligen Allianz und der Laibacher BeschlUsse
bezweckten, ist gewiss und war auch ganz natilrlich, wenn man einerseits das
damalige Ruhebedilrfnis Europas und anderseits die ohnmachtige Kleinstaaterei
ausserhalb der ftinf Grossmlchte berticksichtigt. Aus dem Wortlaut des Aachener
Protokolls lisst sich aber eine eigentliche Organisation nicht ableiten, ebensowenig
ein fonneller Anspruck der Grossmachte auf Regelung aller internationalen Verhaltnisse. Und wenn auch ein solcher gelegentlich erhoben worden ist, so ist dessen
allgemeine Anerkennung oder auch nur dessen konstante und tatslichliche Geltendmachung durch die Grossmichte nicht nachweisbar." Huber, Die Gleid1Mil der
Staaten, p. IOI.
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this right became still more urgent, when those who had placed them-

selves in that position, sought to communicate to neighboring States

the misfortune into which they had themselves plunged, and to prop-

agate revolution and confusion around them.

There is in that attitude and that conduct an evident rupture of

the pact which guarantees to all the Governments of Europe, besides

the inviolability of their territory, the enjoyment of the peaceful re-

lations which exclude all reciprocal infringement of their rights.1

Great Britain dissented from this interpretation of the

responsibilities assumed by the great powers in concert, and

refused to participate in the proceedings at Troppau, Lai-

this right became still more urgent, when those who had placed themselves in that position, sought to communicate to neighboring States
the misfortune into which they had themselves plunged, and to propagate revolution and confusion around them.
There is in that attitude and that conduct an evident rupture of
the pact which guarantees to all the Governments of Europe, besides
the inviolability of their territory, the enjoyment of the peaceful relations which exclude all reciprocal infringement of their rights. 1

bach, and Verona.2 The British Government admitted that

individual states might be justified in resorting to interven-

tion, but denied that intervention to prevent the spread of

revolutionary propaganda was a legitimate function of the

great powers in concert.3 In 1823 Russia invited the great

powers to a conference at St. Petersburg on the affairs of

Greece, requesting that their representatives be authorized

to communicate decisions directly to Constantinople with-
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out reference to their respective governments. Great Britain

refused to participate on the proposed basis and the con-

ferences accomplished nothing. The attempt to organize

Europe under the established control of the great powers

had failed. Thereafter the European Concert claimed the

somewhat less ambitious function of preventing, limiting,

and liquidating the crises that threatened the established

order in the different danger zones of Europe.4

Between 1814 and 1823 the " Confederation of Europe"

denied the political equality of states. After 1823 the lesser

1 B.F.S. P., VIII, 1149; Hertslet, 1,658. See also B. F. S. P., VIII, 1147, 1199,

1201.

* Papers and correspondence relative to Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, in

B. F. S. P., VIII, 1128 ff., and X, 3 ff. See Chateaubriand, Congris de Vérone.

* Castlereagh to British Ministers at Foreign Courts, January 19, 1821, in

B.F.S. P., VIII, 1160.

* Dupuis, Le principe d'tquUibre et le concert ewopeen, pp. 192-198.

Great Britain dissented from this interpretation of the
responsibilities assumed by the great powers in concert, and
refused to participate in the proceedings at Troppau, Laibach, and Verona.2 The British Government admitted that
individual states might be justified in resorting to intervention, but denied that intervention to prevent the spread of
revolutionary propaganda was a legitimate function of the
great powers in concert.3 In 1823 Russia invited the great
powers to a conference at St. Petersburg on the affairs of
Greece, requesting that their representatives be authorized
to communicate decisions directly to Constantinople without reference to their respective governments. Great Britain
refused to participate on the proposed basis and the conferences accomplished nothing. The attempt to organize
Europe under the established control of the great powers
had failed. Thereafter the European Concert claimed the
somewhat less ambitious function of preventing, limiting,
and liquidating the crises that threatened the established
order in the different danger zones of Europe.4
Between 1814 and 1823 the " Confederation of Europe"
denied the political equality of states. After 1823 the lesser
1

B. F. S. P., VIII, 1149; Hertslet, I, 658. See also B. F. S. P., VIII, 1147, 1199,

1201.
1 Papers and correspondence relative to Troppau, Laibach, and Verona, in
B. F. S. P., VIII, u:z8 ff., and X, 3 ff. See Chateaubriand, Congres de Vbone.
1 Castlereagh to British Ministers at Foreign Courts, January 19, 1821, in
B. F. S. P., VIII, 1160.
4 Dupuis, Le principe d'tquilibre et le concert europun, pp. 192-198.
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powers might claim equality, but wherever their interests

came within the purview of the great powers in concert po-

litical equality was no more than a fiction. The activities

of the European Concert were manifold. It had many fail-

ures. It was frequently disrupted through internal dissen-

sion; but it also achieved a remarkable record of performance

as a rudimentary kind of supernational organism.

The most conspicuous achievements of concerted action

among the great powers, as well as some of the most disas-

trous failures, have been concerned with the problems of the

Near East. The entire Concert did not act in the Grecian

question, but three of its members, Great Britain, France,

and Russia, intervened in the affairs of Greece between 1827

and 1832, destroyed the Turkish fleet, created a new Greek

state, denned its boundaries, provided it with a king, and

took it under their collective guaranty.1 On later occasions

the same powers confirmed the choice of another king, ren-

dered financial assistance, and made their guaranty effective

in other ways. The Concert confirmed the union of the

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

Ionian Islands with Greece in 1863.2 Four years later it

intervened to prevent a war with Turkey over the Cretan

question. Greece refused to participate in the conferences

d titre consultatif, but was constrained to accept the decision

reached by the great powers.3 On several occasions the

Concert has refused to let Greece engage in war. Once it

has intervened and imposed its own settlement of a bound-

ary dispute, and again it has resorted to pacific blockade to

restrain a threatened outbreak of hostilities.4 In 1897 it

1 b.f.s.p., xrv, 629; xvn, 3; xvm, 597; xrx, 2; xxii, 93i; xxv,

727; XL, 1204.

1 Ibid., Lm, 19, 23; LIV, 11, 38.

'Ibid., UX, 584, 813.

* Ibid., LXXI, 661; LXXII, 405; LXXVTI, 643. Although he explains away

practically everything that appears to have been inconsistent with equality in the

events of the last century, Huber says: "Immerhin kann nicht bestritten werden,

dass in einzelnen Fallen, so bei der Donauschiffahrt und in den kretischen und

powers might claim equality, but wherever their interests
came within the purview of the great powers in concert political equality was no more than a fiction. The activities
of the European Concert were manifold. It had many failures. It was frequently disrupted through internal dissension; but it also achieved a remarkable record of performance
as a rudimentary kind of supernational organism.
The most conspicuous achievements of concerted action
among the great powers, as well as some of the most disastrous failures, have been concerned with the problems of the
Near East. The entire Concert did not act in the Grecian
question, but three of its members, Great Britain, France,
and Russia, intervened in the affairs of Greece between 1827
and 1832, destroyed the Turkish fleet, created a new Greek
state, defined its boundaries, provided it with a king, and
took it under their collective guaranty. 1 On later occasions
the same powers confirmed the choice of another king, rendered financial assistance, and made their guaranty effective
in other ways. The Concert confirmed the union of the
Ionian Islands with Greece in 1863. 2 Four years later it
intervened to prevent a war with Turkey over the Cretan
question. Greece refused to participate in the conferences
a titre consultatif, but was constrained to accept the decision
reached by the great powers.3 On several occasions the
Concert has refused to let Greece engage in war. Once it
has intervened and imposed its own settlement of a boundary dispute, and again it has resorted to pacific blockade to
restrain a threatened outbreak of hostilities.4 In 1897 it
B. F. S. P., XIV, 629; XVII, 3; XVIII, 597; XIX, 2; XXII, 931; XXV,
727; XL, 1204.
% Ibid., LIII, 19, 23; LIV, II, 38.
3 Ibid., LIX, 584, 813.
' Ibid., LXXI, 661; LXXII, 405; LXXVII, 643. Although he explains away
practically everything that appears to have been inconsistent with equality in the
events of the last century, Huber says: "Immerhin kann nicht bestritten werden,
dass in einzelnen Fallen, so bei der Donauschiffahrt und in den kretischen und
1
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vetoed the union of Crete with Greece and instituted an

international control of Greek finances. The various diplo-

matic papers have referred to a " mandate " and to " medi-

ation"; but the truth is that for nearly a century the great

powers have governed the affairs of Greece in a series of

conferences in which that state has not participated.

Other aspects of the Near Eastern question have occupied

the attention of the European Concert throughout the past

one hundred years. The Concert was temporarily disrupted

over the crisis in Turkey in 1839, but was rehabilitated a

few years later. It was again disrupted, this time with more

disastrous consequences, at the time of the Crimean War.

At the termination of that war the great powers, with Sar-

dinia and Turkey, adjusted the Eastern question at the

Congress of Paris.1 The treaty determined the status and

provided for the organization of the principalities of the

Danube, defined the status of Servia, neutralized the Black

Sea and confirmed the closing of the Dardanelles and the

Bosphorus, regulated the navigation of the Danube, guar-

anteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and admitted
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Turkey into the public law and concert of Europe. Other

questions of general European interest were also discussed,

including the pacification of Greece, affairs in Italy, and the

revolutionary tendencies of the Belgian press. Finally, the

Declaration of Paris on privateering, blockade, and neutral

trade was prepared and promulgated.

Outrages in the Lebanon district of Syria provoked the

intervention of the Concert in i860.2 France undertook to

despatch a force of 6000 men for the work of pacification,

while each of the great powers agreed to maintain an ade-

griechischen Angelegenheiten ein Vorgehen eingeschlagen wurde, welches mit der

Aneikennung der Gleichheit der unmittelbar betroffenen Nichtgrossmachte nicht

wobi vereinbar gewesen; auch sonst begegnet man vereinzflten Kundgebungen der

Grossmachte im Sinne eines Anspruchs auf eine ausschliessliche Regelung von

Verhfiltnissen dritter Staaten." Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 100.

1 B. F. S. P., XLVI, 8, 63. « Ibid., LI, 478, 287.

vetoed the union of Crete with Greece and instituted an
international control of Greek finances. The various diplomatic papers have referred to a " mandate " and to " mediation "; but the truth is that for nearly a century the great
powers have governed the affairs of Greece in a series of
conferences in which that state has not participated.
Other aspects of the Near Eastern question have occupied
the attention of the European Concert throughout the past
one hundred years. The Concert was temporarily disrupted
over the crisis in Turkey in 1839, but was rehabilitated a
few years later. It was again disrupted, this time with more
disastrous consequences, at the time of the Crimean War.
At the termination of that war the great powers, with Sardinia and Turkey, adjusted the Eastern question at the
Congress of Paris. 1 The treaty determined the status and
provided for the organization of the principalities of the
Danube, defined the status of Servia, neutralized the Black
Sea and confirmed the closing of the Dardanelles and the
Bosphorus, regulated the navigation of the Danube, guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, and admitted
Turkey into the public law and concert of Europe. Other
questions of general European interest were also discussed,
including the pacification of Greece, affairs in Italy, and the
revolutionary tendencies of the Belgian press. Finally, the
Declaration of Paris on privateering, blockade, and neutral
trade was prepared and promulgated.
Outrages in the Lebanon district of Syria provoked the
intervention of the Concert in 186o.2 France undertook to
despatch a force of 6ooo men for the work of pacification,
while each of the great powers agreed to maintain an adegriechischen Angelegenheiten ein Vorgehen eingeschlagen wurde, welches mit der
Anerkennung der Gleichheit der unmittelbar betroffenen Nichtgrossmli.chte nicht
wohl vereinbar gewesen; auch sonst begegnet man ve~lten Kundgebungen der
Grossmachte im Sinne eines Anspruchs auf cine ausschliessliche Regelung von
Verhiiltnissen dritter Staaten." ~ GkichheU do- Staakn, p. 100.
1 B. F. S. P., XLVI, 8, 63.
t Ibid., LI, 278, 287.
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quate naval force on the Syrian coast. Conferences held

at Constantinople approved a reglement organique which

regulated the administration of the Lebanon thereafter

under the supervision of the great powers.

The neutralization of the Black Sea was terminated in

1871.1 Renewed crises in the Balkans led to a conference of

the Concert at Constantinople in 1876, at which a program

of administrative reform and readjustment was worked out

and communicated to the Porte.2 Turkey rejected the pro-

posals, was overwhelmed by Russia in a short war, and in

1878 representatives of the great powers assembled at Berlin

to revise the terms of peace and effect a general settlement

of the Eastern question.3 None of the small states interested

in the settlement were admitted to the Congress of Berlin.

Roumania was permitted, after some discussion, to send

delegates a plaider sa cause devant la haute assemblee} Rep-

resentatives of Greece and Persia were admitted in a similar

capacity at sessions designated for that purpose;B but even

this barren privilege was not extended to Servia, Monte-

negro, and the other Balkan populations. At the nineteenth
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session the president was authorized to communicate un-

officially to interested states the decisions reached concern-

ing them. The complete treaty was not to be communicated

to them until after it had been ratified.6 The treaty upon

which the great powers finally agreed redrew the map of the

Balkans, recognized the independence of Roumania, Servia,

and Montenegro, subject to important conditions and limi-

• B.F.S.P..LKI, 7,1193.

• Ibid., LXVni, 1064, 1114. Read the interesting remarks of former President

Washburn of Robert College, in L. M. C. I. A. (1905), XI, 24.

• B. F. S. P., LXTX, 749, 794, 862; Avril, Negociations relatives au traité de Ber-

lin; Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. (1879), XI, 1-37,411-430; (1880), XII, 276-294,

410-424; (1881), Xni, 571-586; Choublier, La question d'Orient depuis le traité de

Berlin; Holland, European Concert in the Eastern Question.

• B. P. S. P., LXTX, 964, 972, 978.

5 Ibid., LXTX, 891, 894, 901, 916, 947, 964, 968, 1021, 1031.

• Ibid., LXIX, 1075.

quate naval force on the Syrian coast. Conferences held
at Constantinople approved a reglement organique which
regulated the administration of the Lebanon thereafter
under the supervision of the great powers.
The neutralization of the Black Sea was terminated in
1871.1 Renewed crises in the BaJkans led to a conference of
the Concert at Constantinople in 1876, at which a program
of administrative reform and readjustment was worked out
and communicated to the Porte. 2 Turkey rejected the proposals, was overwhelmed by Russia in a short war, and in
1878 representatives of the great powers assembled at Berlin
to revise the terms of peace and effect a general settlement
of the Eastern question. 3 None of the small states interested
in the settlement were admitted to the Congress of Berlin.
Roumania was permitted, after some discussion, to send
delegates a plaider sa cause devant la haute. assemblee. 4 Representatives of Greece and Persia were admitted in a similar
capacity at sessions designated for that purpose; 6 but even
this barren privilege was not extended to Servia, Montenegro, and the other Balkan populations. At the nineteenth
session the president was authorized to communicate unofficially to interested states the decisions reached concerning them. The complete treaty was not to be communicated
to them until after it had been ratified. 6 The treaty upon
which the great powers finally agreed redrew the map of the
Balkans, recognized the independence of Roumania, Servia,
and Montenegro, subject to important conditions and limiB. F. S. P., LXI, 7, 1193.
Ibid., LXVIII, lo64, u14. Read the interesting remarks of former President
Washburn of Robert College, in L. M. C. I. A. (1905), XI, 24.
1 B. F. S. P., LXIX, 749, 794, 862; Avril, N~gocialions relaJfoes au traiU de Berlin; Bluntschli, in R. D. I. L. C. {1879), XI, 1-37, 4n- 430; (1880), XII, 276-294,
410-424; {1881), XIII, 571-586; Choublier, La question d'~ depuis le traiU de
Berlin; Holland, European Concert in IM Eastern Question.
t B. F. S. P., LXIX, 964, 972, 978.
' Ibid., LXIX, 891 1 894, 901 1 916, 947, 964, 968, 1021, 1031.
1 Ibid., LXIX, 1075.
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tations of the nature of servitudes, and created the autono-

mous principality of Bulgaria under Ottoman suzerainty.

Eastern Roumelia was accorded an autonomous regime un-

der the military and political authority of the Sultan. Its

governor-general was to be nominated by the Sultan with

the assent of the great powers, and a European commission

was to arrange for its organization. The Porte promised

reforms in Crete, while Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed

over to the administration of Austria-Hungary.

The Treaty of Berlin also contained new provisions with

reference to the navigation of the Danube. A conference of

the great powers and Turkey was held at London in 1883 to

consider the execution of these articles.1 Notwithstanding

their obvious interest in the forthcoming decisions, the Bal-

kan states were not admitted with a deliberative voice. Their

exclusion was justified on the ground that the Conference

was in a sense a sequel to the Congress of Berlin, in which

the smaller states had not participated; but Count Miin-

ster's remarks in the second session were a more accurate
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statement of the real reason — if admitted on an equal

footing with the great powers the principle of unanimity

would enable them to veto the Concert's decisions.2 Bul-

garia was required to present its views through the Turkish

ambassador; Servia agreed to participate in a consultative

capacity; while Roumania refused to participate except sur

1 B.F.S.P., LXXIV, 20, 1231.

* "Le Comte Minister croit devoir s'opposer a l'admission de la Roumanie sur

le meme pied que les Grandes Puissances. Le Plenipotentiaire d'Allemagne recon-

nalt volontiers le grand interet qu'a la Roumanie a la solution heureuse des ques-

tions pendantes a la Conference. Cependant le Gouvernement Allemand serait

d'avis de conserver a celle-ci son caractere Europeen en s'abstenant de mettre la

Roumanie au pair des Grandes Puissances. Si, tout en maintenant le principe de

l'unanimitd dans la Conference, on donnait une voix a la Roumanie, on lui creerait

une position qui ne serait nullement desirable, celle de pouvoir a sa volontfi imposer

son veto. La Roumanie ne pourrait done 6tre admise qu'en qualitfi d'invitee et

non comme maltresse de maison." Protocol of February io, 1883, in B. F. S. P.,

LXXIV, 1236.

tations of the nature of servitudes, and created the autonomous principality of Bulgaria under Ottoman suzerainty.
Eastern Roumelia was accorded an autonomous regime under the military and political authority of the Sultan. I ts
governor-general was to be nominated by the Sultan with
the assent of the great powers, and a European commission
was to arrange for its organization. The Porte promised
reforms in Crete, while Bosnia and Herzegovina were handed
over to the administration of Austria-Hungary.
The Treaty of Berlin also contained new provisions with
reference to the navigation of the Danube. A conference of
the great powers and Turkey was held at London in 1883 to
consider the execution of these articles. 1 Notwithstanding
their obvious interest in the forthcoming decisions, the Balkan states were not admitted with a deliberative voice. Their
exclusion was justified on the ground that the Conference
was in a sense a sequel to the Congress of Ber1in, in which
the smaller states had not participated; but Count Mtinster's remarks in the second session were a more accurate
statement of the real reason- if admitted on an equal
footing with the great powers the principle of unanimity
would enable them to veto the Concert's decisions. 2 Bulgaria was required to present its views through the Turkish
ambassador; Servia agreed to participate in a consultative
capacity; while Roumania refused to participate except sur
B.F.S.P., LXXIV, 20, 1231.
"Le Comte Munster croit devoir s'opposer A !'admission de la Roumanie sur
le m~me pied que !es Grandes Puissances. Le Plenipotentiaire d 'Allemagne reconnatt volontiers le grand inter~t qu'a la Roumanie a la solution heureuse des questions pendantes a la Conference. Cependant le Gouvernement Allemand serait
d'avis de conserver a celle-ci son caractere Europeen en s'abstenant de mettre la
Roumanie au pair des Grandes Puissances. Si, tout en maintenant le principe de
l'unanimite dans la Conference, on donnait une voix A la Roumanie, on lui creerait
une position qui ne serait nullement desirable, celle de pouvoir A sa volonte imposer
son veto. La Roumanie ne pourrait done etre admise qu'en qualite d'invitee et
non comme mattresse de maison." Protocol of February 10, 1883, in B. F. S. P.,
LXXIV' I 236.
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le pied de la plus parfaite Sgaliti. This the great powers re-

fused to concede, so Roumania did not participate at all.1

The European Concert has dealt with varied phases of

the Eastern question since the Congress of Berlin. Affairs

in Egypt, Roumelia, Macedonia, and Crete have been con-

sidered in its conferences. Sometimes it has been successful,

sometimes not. Its record has been stained by intrigue, dis-

sension, and incapacity for compromising rival jealousies and

ambitions. Its final failure has been the prelude to Euro-

pean war. However, the nearness of these recent events

should not be permitted to obscure the real significance of

concerted action in the Near East as an experiment in super-

national control.

In western Europe the Concert of the great powers has

also had a somewhat checkered development. It did not

succeed in preventing crises in Italy, Denmark, and Poland,

nor in liquidating the crises after they became acute.2 There

is an interesting precedent in connection with the confer-

ence on Italian affairs which was proposed in 1859. Sardinia

claimed admission as a directly interested state, but the
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powers were unanimous in denying Sardinia's demand. In

a statement to the House of Lords, the British Minister of

Foreign Affairs said:

Your Lordships will recollect that the Russian Government pro-

posed that the five great Powers should alone sit in Congress. This

has been the custom of Europe for a great many years when ques-

tions affecting the great public law of Europe have been discussed;

and there appeared to none of us any reason why we should depart

from the usual practice, and make an exception on the present occa-

sion by calling in any other Power to assist us.

The Concert's decision and the reason therefor appeared in

Lord Malmesbury's statement:

1 See B.F.S.P., LXXIV, 1236, 1238, 1241, 1243, 1245, 1250, 1251.

'Dupuis, Le principe d'tquilibre et le concert européen, Pt. II, ch. 6.

le pied de la plus parfaite egalite. This the great powers refused to concede, so Roumania did not participate at all.1
The European Concert has dealt with varied phases of
the Eastern question since the Congress of Berlin .. Affairs
in Egypt, Roumelia 1 Macedonia, and Crete have been considered in its conferences. Sometimes it has been successful,
sometimes not. Its record has been stained by intrigue, dissension, and incapacity for compromising rival jealousies and
ambitions. Its final failure has been the prelude to European war. However, the nearness of these recent events
should not be permitted to obscure the real significance of
concerted action in the Near East as an experiment in supernational control.
In western Europe the Concert of the great powers has
also had a somewhat checkered development. It did not
succeed in preventing crises in Italy, Denmark, and Poland,
nor in liquidating the crises after they became acute. 2 There
is an interesting precedent in connection with the conference on Italian affairs which was proposed in 1859. Sardinia
claimed admission as a directly interested state, but the
powers were unanimous in denying Sardinia's demand. In
a statement to the House of Lords, the British Minister of
Foreign Affairs said:
Your Lordships will recollect that the Russian Government proposed that the five great Powers should alone sit in Congress. This
has been the custom of Europe for a great many years when questions affecting the great public law of Europe have been discussed;
and there appeared to none of us any reason why we should depart
from the usual practice, and make an exception on the present occasion by calling in any other Power to assist us.

The Concert's decision and the reason therefor appeared in
Lord Malmesbury's statement:
1 See B. F. S. P., LXXIV, 1236, 1238, 1241, 1243, 1245, 1250, 1251.
z Dupuis, Le principc d'equiJibre et le co11cerl europeen, Pt. II, ch. 6.
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All the great Powers resisted that demand, and agreed that it

would be very inconvenient to depart from the usual precedents. If

Sardinia claimed to sit as a principal in the Congress, because she is

interested in Italian affairs and the preservation of the peace of

Europe, then the same claim might be made by Switzerland, the

smaller German States, or any other country on the confines of Italy

who might be in any way affected. It was, therefore, completely de-

termined by all the five Powers, that Sardinia and the other Italian

States should be invited to sit in the Congress only after it should

have assembled; and that then those States might send delegates to

inform the Congress of the wishes of their various Governments.1

The crisis caused by the revolt in Belgium in 1830 was

liquidated very effectively, although not without disagree-

ment among the great powers as to the best procedure.2 It

was agreed at the Conference of London that Belgium should

All the great Powers resisted that demand, and agreed that it
would be very inconvenient to depart from the usual precedents. If
Sardinia claimed to sit as a principal in the Congress, because she is
interested in Italian affairs and the preservation of the peace of
Europe, then the same claim might be made by Switzerland, the
smaller German States, or any other country on the confines of Italy
who might be in any way affected. It was, therefore, completely determined by all the five Powers, that Sardinia and the other Italian
States should be invited to sit in the Congress only after it should
have assembled; and that then those States might send delegates to
inform the Congress of the wishes of their various Governments. 1

be independent and permanently neutralized under the col-

lective guaranty of the powers. Boundaries were denned,

the public debt divided, Antwerp declared a commercial

port, and a stipulation adopted with reference to the free
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navigation of rivers traversing Belgium and Holland. When

Holland rejected the arrangement, Austria, Prussia, and

Russia opposed coercion. Coercive measures were adopted

by Great Britain and France, however, and in 1839 the

original agreement was put into effect under the sanction of

all the great powers.

Another grave international crisis arose over Luxemburg

in 1867. The difficulty was adjusted by the Concert at the

Conference of London by decreeing the permanent neutral-

ization of Luxemburg under the collective guaranty of the

powers.3 At the time of this Conference Italy was added

to the council of the great powers.

1 Parliamentary Debates (1859) 3d series, CLIII, cols. 1836-1837. See Malmes-

bury to Cowley, March 19, 1859, and Malmesbury to Loftus, March 19, 1859, in

B. F. S. P., LVTT, 174.

» See »m,XVin, 64S,7«3; XTX,SS,»S8, 653, 1417, Mio, 1438; XXVII, 990,

iOOO.

'Ibid., LVH, 32; LX, 497-

The crisis caused by the revolt in Belgium in 1830 was
liquidated very effectively, although not without disagreement among the great powers as to the best procedure.2 It
was agreed at the Conference of London that Belgium should
be independent and permanently neutralized under the collective guaranty of the powers. Boundaries were defined,
the public debt divided, Antwerp declared a commercial
port, and a stipulation adopted with reference to the free
navigation of rivers traversing Belgium and Holland. When
Holland rejected the arrangement, Austria, Prussia, and
Russia opposed coercion. Coercive measures were adopted
by Great Britain and France, however, and in 1839 the
original agreement was put into effect under the sanction of
all the great powers.
Another grave international crisis arose over Luxemburg
in 1867. The difficulty was adjusted by the Concert at the
Conference of London by decreeing the permanent neutralization of Luxemburg under the collective guaranty of the
powers. 3 At the time of this Conference Italy was added
to the council of the great powers.
Parliamentary Debates (1859) 3d series, CLIII, cols. 1836-1837. See Malmesbury to Cowley, March 19, 18591 and Malmesbury to Loftus, March 191 18591 in
B. F. S. P., LVII, 174.
I See ibid., XVIII, 645, 723; XIX, 55, 258, 653, 1417, 1420, 1438; XXVII, 990,
1

1000.
1

Ibid., LVII, 32; LX, 497·
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In 1907, four of the great powers most directly interested

joined in a guaranty of the integrity of Norway, and in the

following year the same powers were parties to declarations

in support of the status quo in the territories bordering upon

the Baltic and the North Sea.1

It has been suggested in the twentieth century that the

United States and Japan may be joined with the great powers

of Europe to form a World Concert. Such a possibility was

demonstrated in the International Naval Conference held at

London in 1908 and 1909. The Second Hague Conference

had submitted an international prize court convention,

which made it desirable to have a clearer understanding

with reference to the rules that such a court would apply.

Accordingly, the Naval Conference was called by Great

Britain to agree upon a code of international maritime law.

The head of the British delegation at The Hague had al-

ready pointed out that the claim of small states to political

equality might lead the greater powers to act by themselves.

In his report to the British Foreign Office, Sir Edward Fry

said:
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The claim of many of the smaller States to equality as regards not

only their independence, but their share in all international institu-

tions, waived by most of them in the case of the Prize Court, but

successfully asserted in the case of the proposed new Arbitral Court,

is one which may produce great difficulties, and may perhaps drive

greater Powers to act in many cases by themselves.*

Experience at The Hague and the great importance of the

proposed code to the principal naval powers led Great

Britain to take the course which Sir Edward Fry had an-

ticipated. The following is from the call of the Conference

as issued by the British Government:

1 A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1908), II, 267, 270, 272.

• British Doc. (1008), CXXTV, Misc. No. 1 (Cd. 3857), p. 21. See also the

In 1907, four of the great powers most directly interested
joined in a guaranty of the integrity of Norway, and in the
following year the same powers were parties to declarations
in support of the status quo in the territories bordering upon
the Baltic and the North Sea. 1
It has been suggested in the twentieth century that the
United States and Japan may be joined with the great powers
of Europe to form a World Concert. Such a possibility was
demonstrated in the International Naval Conference held at
London in 1908 and 1909. The Second Hague Conference
had submitted an international prize court convention,
which made it desirable to have a clearer understanding
with reference to the rules that such a court would apply.
Accordingly, the Naval Conference was called by Great
Britain to agree upon a code of international maritime law.
The head of the British delegation at The Hague had already pointed out that the claim of small states to political
equality might lead the greater powers to act by themselves.
In his report to the British Foreign Office, Sir Edward Fry
said:

French Yellow Book, quoted by Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 96.

The claim of many of the smaller States to equality as regards not
only their independence, but their share in all international institutions, waived by most of them in the case of the Prize Court, but
successfully asserted in the case of the proposed new Arbitral Court,
is one which may produce great difficulties, and may perhaps drive
greater Powers to act in many cases by themselves. 2

Experience at The Hague and the great importance of the
proposed code to the principal naval powers led Great
Britain to take the course which Sir Edward Fry had anticipated. The following is from the call of the Conference
as issued by the British Government:
A. J . I. L. Suppl. (1908), II, 267, 270, 272.
British Doc. (1908), CXXIV, Misc. No. 1 (Cd. 3857), p. 21. See also the
French Yellow Book, quoted by Huber, Die Gkichheit der Staalen, p. 96.
1
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The rules by which appeals from national prize courts would be

decided affect the rights of belligerents in a manner which is far more

serious to the principal naval powers than to others, and His Majesty's

Government are therefore communicating only with the Governments

of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain,

and the United States of America.1

As Admiral Stockton, one of the American delegates, has

The rules by which appeals from national prize courts would be
decided affect the rights of belligerents in a manner which is far more
serious to the principal naval powers than to others, and His Majesty's
Government are therefore communicating only with the Governments
of Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, Spain,
and the United States of America. 1

observed:

The experience of the Second Hague Conference showed certain

delays and discordances arising from the great number of national-

ities assembled. Uruguay could block the proceedings of a Confer-

As Admiral Stockton, one of the American delegates, has
observed:

ence where unanimity was required for decision. Besides, many of

the countries assembled at The Hague were either manifest shadows

or satellites of more powerful states or had no sea frontiers or mari-

time interests. Hence Great Britain intended to limit her invitation

to those powers whose maritime interests were great enough to ma-

terially affect the countries concerned*

Although concerted action among the great powers has

not developed into an organized supernational authority, it
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represents a highly significant experiment in supernational

control. Considering the absence of a common basis for

collective government and the relatively short time in which

the experiment has developed, it must be admitted that

concerted action is much more remarkable for its achieve-

ments than for its failures.3 It is significant that wherever

The experience of the Second Hague Conference showed certain
delays and discordances arising from the great number of nationalities assembled. Uruguay could block the proceedings of a Conference where unanimity was required for decision. Besides, many of
the countries assembled at The Hague were either manifest shadows
or satellites of more powerful states or had no sea frontiers or maritime interests. Hence Great Britain intended to limit her invitation
to those powers whose maritime interests were great enough to materially affect the countries concemed.2

it has been successful the Concert of the great powers has

denied absolutely the political equality of states except

among the great powers themselves. Smaller states have

been unrepresented in its councils or have been permitted

1 Malloy, Treaties, III, 326. See The London Times, September 21, 1907, p. 9c.

The Netherlands, as containing the seat of the proposed prize court and the home

of the Peace Conferences, was also invited to participate.

• L. M. C.I. A. (1909), XV, 47. See Stockton, in A.J.I. L. (1909), HI, 596-

618.

* See the conclusions of Dupuis, Le principe d'fquilibre et le concert europten,

Pt. II, ch. 11.

Although concerted action among the great powers has
not developed into an organized supernational authority, it
represents a highly significant experiment in supernational
control. Considering the absence of a common basis for
collective government and the relatively short time in which
the experiment has developed, it must be admitted that
concerted action is much more remarkable for its achievements than for its failures. 3 It is significant that wherever
it has been successful the Concert of the great powers has
denied absolutely the political equality of states except
among the great powers themselves. Smaller states have
been unrepresented in its councils or have been permitted
1 Malloy, T,.eaJres, III, 326. See TM Londqn Times, September 21, 1907, p. 9C·
The Netherlands, as containing the seat of the proposed prize court and the home
of the Peace Conferences, was also invited to participate.
1 L. JI. C. I . A. (1909), XV, 47. See Stock.ton, in A. J. I. L. (1909), III, 596618.
1 See the conclusions of Dupuis, Le pri11cipe d'tquilibre el le co1farl 81U'opkn,
Pt. II, ch. 11.
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to send delegates a litre consultatif. They have had no real

voice in its decisions and no veto. Under whatever diplo-

matic fiction the real situation may have been concealed on

different occasions, the great powers in concert have exer-

cised a real supernational authority. They have defined

boundaries, determined status, and exercised all manner of

guardianship over weaker states. They have formulated

rules, rendered judgment in controversies, and enforced

their decisions.

Publicists have admitted that all this is inconsistent with

equality, although many explain it as a matter of fact or

policy which does not affect equality in law. Others admit

that it violates equality in law and denounce it accordingly,

while many of the ablest publicists have regarded concerted

action as the incipient manifestation of supernational or-

ganization, in which political equality must be limited in

the interest of a more stable international order.1

This opinion has been voiced by statesmen on many occa-

sions. Speaking of the position of the great powers with

reference to Greece and the Cretan question, in a debate in
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the House of Lords in 1897, Lord Salisbury said:

At least it may be said for them that they are representing a con-

tinuity of policy, and that they are maintaining the law of Europe

as it has been laid down by the only authority competent to create

law for Europe. They have been defied by a State which owes its

very existence to the Concert of Europe. Had it not been for the

Concert of Europe the Hellenic kingdom would never have been

heard of. . . . I feel it is our duty to sustain the federated action of

Europe. I think it has suffered by the somewhat absurd name which

has been given to it — the Concert of Europe — and the intense im-

portance of the fact has been buried under the bad jokes to which the

word has given rise. But the federated action of Europe — if we can

maintain it, if we can maintain this Legislature — is our sole hope of

escaping from the constant terror and the calamity of war, the con-

1 For the opinions of the writers, see supra, pp. 126-131, 138-145.

to send delegates a titre consultatif. They have had no real
voice in its decisions and no veto. Under whatever diplomatic fiction the real situation may have been concealed on
different occasions, the great powers in concert have exercised a real supernational authority. They have defined
boundaries, determined status, and exercised all manner of
guardianship over weaker states. They have formulated
rules, rendered judgment in controversies, and enforced
their decisions.
Publicists have admitted that all this is inconsistent with
equality, although many explain it as a matter of fact or
policy which does not affect equality in law. Others admit
that it violates equality in law and denounce it accordingly,
while many of the ablest publicists have regarded concerted
action as the incipient manifestation of supernational organization, in which political equality must be limited in
the interest of a more stable international order. 1
This opinion has been voiced by statesmen on many occasions. Speaking of the position of the great powers with
reference to Greece and the Cretan question, in a debate in
the House of Lords in 1897, Lord Salisbury said:
At least it may be said for them that they are representing a continuity of policy, and that they are maintaining the law of Europe
as it has been laid down by the only authority competent to create
law for Europe. They have been defied by a State which owes its
very existence to the Concert of Europe. Had it not been for the
Concert of Europe the Hellenic kingdom would never have been
heard of. . . . I feel it is our duty to sustain the federated action of
Europe. I think it has suffered by the somewhat absurd name which
has been given to it - the Concert of Europe - and the intense importance of the fact has been buried under the bad jokes to which the
word has given rise. But the federated action of Europe - if we can
maintain it, if we can maintain this Legislature - is our sole hope of
escaping from the constant terror and the calamity of war, the con1 For the opinions of the writers, sec supra, pp. 126-131, 138--145.
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stant pressure of the burdens of an armed peace which weigh down

the spirits and darken the prospects of every nation in this part of

the world.1

Hanotaux declared in the French Chamber in the same year

that the European Concert was le seul tribunal et la seule

stant pressure of the burdens of an armed peace which weigh down
the spirits and darken the prospects of every nation in this part of
the world. 1

autorite devant lesquels tout le monde peut et doit s'incliner.2

It cannot be overlooked that while conferences based on

equality have been concerned in the last century chiefly

with technical, administrative, or non-political subjects,

most of the seriously controverted and political questions

have been settled in conferences which deny political equal-

ity. Although these institutions are at present in a rudi-

mentary stage the tendency is significant.

International Administrative Unions

There is another type of collective international activity

which has developed with extraordinary rapidity during the

past half century. It is the internationalizing of adminis-

tration by means of more or less permanent administrative

unions. A great many associations of states have been

established to watch over and promote international inter-
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ests which separate states have found themselves incapable

of supervising effectively. The development has been some-

Hanotaux declared in the French Chamber in the same year
that the European Concert was le seul tribunal et la seule
autorite devant lesque/.s tout le monde peut et doit s'incliner.2
It cannot be overlooked that while conferences based on
equality have been concerned in the last century chiefly
with technical, administrative, or non-political subjects,
most of the seriously controverted and political questions
have been settled in conferences which deny political equality. Although these institutions are at present in a rudimentary stage the tendency is significant.

what spontaneous. It is still in its infancy. It has already

progressed far enough, however, to exhibit important tend-

encies, of which some are of particular interest from the

point of view of political equality.

Administrative unions3 are usually constituted by an inter-

national conference or congress which serves as the constitu-

ent assembly and legislature ad referendum. Meetings of

1 Parliamentary Debates (1897), 4th series, XLVII, col. 1012.

• Quoted by Streit, in R.D.I.L.C. (1900), 2" ser., II, 12. See Lyons to Claren-

don, December 20, 1868, in B. F. S. P., LLX, 615.

* Conventions, reglements, and other documents may be consulted in Annuaire

de la vie international*, 1908-09, 1910-11, 20 sir. For a general survey, see Reinsch,

INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE UNIONS

There is another type of collective international activity
which has developed with extraordinary rapidity during the
past half century. It is the internationaJizing of administration by means of more or less permanent administrative
unions. A great many associations of states have been
established to watch over and promote international interests which separate states have found themselves incapable
of supervising effectively. The development has been somewhat spontaneous. It is still in its infancy. It has already
progressed far enough, however, to exhibit important tendencies, of which some are of particular interest from the
point of view of political equality.
Administrative unions 3 are usually constituted by an international conference or congress which serves as the constituent assembly and legislature ad referendum. Meetings of
1 Parliamentary Debates {1897), 4th series, XLVII, col. 1012.
a Quoted by Streit, in R.D.I.L.C. (1900), 2e ~r., II, 12. See Lyons to Clarendon, December 20, 1868, in B. F. S. P., LIX, 615.
1 Conventions, ~glemems, and other documents may be consulted in Annuaire
de la vie imernationale, 19o8-o<J, 1910-11, 2° ~r. For a general survey, see Reinsch,
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the conference or congress may occur at regular periods in-

dicated in the convention, or at a time determined in each

case by the preceding conference or congress, or upon special

call by the member states. Many of the unions have a com-

mission, a kind of governing board, which superintends the

work of the bureau and of other agencies of the union, some-

times prepares administrative regulations, and usually exer-

cises some fiscal control over the bureau. Practically all of

the unions have a central office or bureau as their principal

administrative agency. The bureau keeps in touch with the

various national administrations, collects and disseminates

information, and performs the specific administrative duties

entrusted to it by the reglement.

Political equality has been abandoned by many of the

most important unions in at least three significant respects,

viz., in representation, voting, and financial support. By

admitting colonies, protectorates, or other possessions to

separate representation, certain unions have accorded to

states with dependencies several times as much repre-

sentation as other states. Inequality of voting has been
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recognized by giving separate votes to dependencies, by ap-

portioning votes in direct proportion to each country's con-

tribution to the union's financial support, and by providing

for majority decisions. Inequality of contribution to the

financial support of the union has become a familiar prin-

ciple. In a few cases contributions are in proportion to

population, or to the distribution of whatever furnishes the

union's raison d'etre, as railway mileage or commerce. In a

large number of unions financial support is on a unit basis.

The countries are divided into classes, each class requiring

the contribution of a different number of units. Each country

Public International Unions; Sayre, Experiments in International Administration;

Woolf, International Government, pp. 153 ff. Huber insists that the development

of international administration has been in general in accord with the equality of

states. See Die Gkichheit der Staaten, p. 103.

the conference or congress may occur at regular periods indicated in the convention, or at a time determined in each
case by the preceding conference or congress, or upon special
call by the member states. Many of the unions have a commission, a kind of governing board, which superintends the
work of the bureau and of other agencies of the union, sometimes prepares administrative regulations, and usually exercises some fiscal control over the bureau. Practically all of
the unions have a central office or bureau as their principal
administrative agency. The bureau keeps in touch with the
various national administrations, collects and disseminates
information, and performs the specific administrative duties
entrusted to it by the reglement.
Political equality has been abandoned by many of the
most important unions in at least three significant respects,
viz., in representation, voting, and financial support. By
admitting colonies, protectorates, or other possessions to
separate representation, certain unions have accorded to
states with dependencies several times as much representation as other states. Inequality of voting has been
recognized by giving separate votes to dependencies, by apportioning votes in direct proportion to each country's contribution to the union's financial support, and by providing
for majority decisions. Inequality of contribution to the
financial support of the union has become a familiar principle. In a few cases contributions are in proportion to
population, or to the distribution of whatever furnishes the
union's raison d'etre, as railway mileage or commerce. In a
large number of unions financial support is on a unit basis.
The countries are divided into classes, each class requiring
the contribution of a different number of units. Each country
Public lnJernational Unicns; Sayre, Experiments in International Administration;
Woolf, International Government, pp. x53 ff. Huber insists that the development
of international administration has been in general in accord with the equality of
states. See Die Gleichheil der Staalen, p. 103.
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may decide, on joining the union, the class in which it wishes

to be entered.

Eight international administrative unions accord separate

representation to dependencies under conditions of varying

significance.1 Some of the most important official unions

are among the number, which includes the Universal Postal

Union, the International Telegraphic Union, the Interna-

tional Union of Weights and Measures, the International

Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, the Interna-

tional Institute of Agriculture, the International Wireless

Telegraph Union, the International Sanitary Conference,

and the International Conference on Expositions. Repre-

sentatives of dependencies participated in the Conference of

Brussels in 1890, at which the Convention concerning the

formation of a Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs

was signed; and the Convention provides that

The States and colonies that have not yet taken part in this con-

vention shall have the privilege of acceding thereto hereafter.'

The Convention of 1905 for the creation of an International
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Institute of Agriculture stipulates explicitly that

Colonies may, at the request of the nations to which they belong,

be admitted to form part of the institute on the same conditions as

the independent nations.*

The final protocol of the Berlin Conference of 1906, at which

the International Wireless Telegraph Union was constituted,

may decide, on joining the union, the class in which it wishes
to be entered.
Eight international administrative unions accord separate
representation to dependencies under conditions of varying
significance.1 Some of the most important official unions
are among the number, which includes the Universal Postal
Union, the International Telegraphic Union, the International Union of Weights and Measures, the International
Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs, the International Institute of Agriculture, the International Wireless
Telegraph Union, the International Sanitary Conference,
and the International Conference on Expositions. Representatives of dependencies participated in the Conference of
Brussels in 1890, at which the Convention concerning the
formation of a Union for the Publication of Customs Tariffs
was signed; and the Convention provides that

contemplated separate representation for dependencies:

The adherence to the Convention by the Government of a country

having colonies, possessions or protectorates shall not carry with it

The States and colonies that have not yet taken part in this convention shall have the privilege of acceding thereto hereafter.•

the adherence of its colonies, possessions or protectorates, unless a

declaration to that effect is made by such Government. Such colonies,

1 Myers, Non-Sovereign Representation in Public International Organs; the same

author, in A.J.I. L. (1914), VIII, 97.

* Art. 14, Malloy, Treaties, II, 1998.

'Art. 1o, ibid., II, 2143.

The Convention of 1905 for the creation of an International
Institute of Agriculture stipulates explicitly that
Colonies may, at the request of the nations to which they belong,
be admitted to form part of the institute on the same conditions as
the independent nations.1

The final protocol of the Berlin Conference of 1906, at which
the International Wireless Telegraph Union was constituted,
contemplated separate representation for dependencies:
The adherence to the Convention by the Government of a country
having colonies, possessions or protectorates shall not carry with it
the adherence of its colonies, possessions or protectorates, unless a
declaration to that effect is made by such Government. Such colonies,
Myers, Non-Swereign &presenlalion in Public /nJeTnational Oriam; the same
author, in A. J. I. L. (1914), VIII, 97.
1 Art. 14, Malloy, Treaties, II, 1998.
I Art. 10, ibid., II, 2143.
1
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possessions and protectorates as a whole, or each of them separately,

may form the subject of a separate adherence or a separate denunci-

ation within the provisions of Articles 16 and 22 of the Convention.1

Inequalities in voting strength are perhaps more signifi-

cant than multiple representation. They may result, in the

possessions and protectorates as a whole, or each of them separately,
may form the subject of a separate adherence or a separate denunciation within the provisions of Articles 16 and 22 of the Convention. 1

first place, from according the right to vote to representa-

tives of dependencies. This is the situation in the Universal

Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union, and the

International Union for Weights and Measures, and a similar

provision seems to have been contemplated at the Inter-

national Conference on Expositions' It has been provided

for very definitely in the International Wireless Telegraph

Union. Article 12 of the Convention of 1906 provides with

reference to both diplomatic and administrative conferences:

Such conferences shall be composed of delegates of the Govern-

ments of the contracting countries.

In the deliberations each country shall have but one vote.

If a Government adheres to the Convention for its colonies, pos-

sessions or protectorates, subsequent conferences may decide that

such colonies, possessions or protectorates, or a part thereof, shall be
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considered as forming a country as regards the application of the pre-

ceding paragraph. But the number of votes at the disposal of one

Government, including its colonies, possessions or protectorates,

shall in no case exceed six.*

Inequalities in voting strength are perhaps more significant than multiple representation. They may result, in the
first place, from according the right to vote to representatives of dependencies. This is the situation in the Universal
Postal Union, the International Telegraphic Union, and the
International Union for Weights and Measures, and a similar
provision seems to have been contemplated at the International Conference on Expositions.2 It has been provided
for very definitely in the International Wireless Telegraph
Union. Article 12 of the Convention of 1906 provides with
reference to both diplomatic and administrative conferences:

The same article reappears in the Convention of 1912, with

the addition of a list of thirty-four dependencies or groups

of dependencies, each of which is to be considered hereafter

as forrning a single country. Under this arrangement Ger-

many, the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia

each secure five votes for their dependencies; Italy, Holland,

and Portugal each secure two; while Belgium, Spain, and

1 Art. 5, Malloy, Treaties, III, 161. This paragraph was embodied in Art. 16 of

the revised Convention of 1912.

1 See La vie int., I, 254-255, 270,320; andMyers,in.4././. L. (1914), VIII, 100.

• Malloy, Treaties, III, 153-154.

Such conferences shall be composed of delegates of the Governments of the contracting countries.
In the deliberations each country shall have but one vote.
If a Government adheres to the Convention for its colonies, possessions or protectorates, subsequent conferences may decide that
such colonies, possessions or protectorates, or a part thereof, shall be
considered as forming a country as regards the application of the preceding paragraph. But the number of votes at the disposal of one
Government, including its colonies, possessions or protectorates,
shall in no case exceed six.•

The same article reappears in the Convention of 1912, with
the addition of a list of thirty-four dependencies or groups
of dependencies, each of which is to be considered hereafter
as forming a single country. Under this arrangement Germany, the United States, France, Great Britain, and Russia
each secure five votes for their dependencies; Italy, Holland,
and Portugal each secure two; while Belgium, Spain, and
1 Art. 5 1 Malloy, TreaJies, III, 161. This paragraph was embodied in Art. 16 of
the revised Convention of 1912.
1 See liJ m inl., I, 254-255, 270, 320; and Myers, in A. J. I. L. (1914), VIII, 100.
1 Malloy, TreaJies, III, 153-154.
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Japan each gain one.1 It may be noted that it was definitely

contemplated at Berlin in 1906 that dependencies should

exercise their vote at the next conference. Article 1 of the

Final Protocol provided:

The High Contracting Parties agree that at the next Conference

the number of votes to which each country is entitled shall be decided

at the beginning of the deliberations, so that the colonies, possessions

or protectorates admitted to the privilege of voting may exercise their

right to vote during the entire course of the proceedings of such

Conference.1

In the second place, several unions base inequality of

voting strength upon the principle that privilege ought to

be apportioned in the same way as responsibility. The dis-

tribution of votes is proportioned according to the contribu-

tion which each state makes to the support of the union.

Thus the Organic By-Laws of the International Office of

Public Hygiene provide:

There is established in Paris an International Office of Public Hy-

giene under the States which accept participation in its operation....
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The Office is placed under the authority and supervision of an In-

ternational Committee consisting of technical representatives desig-

nated by the participating States in the proportion of one representa-

tive for each State.

Each State is allowed a number of votes inversely proportioned to

the number of the class to which it belongs as regards its participation

in the expenses of the Office.*

The same principle is recognized in the organization of the

International Institute of Agriculture:

There is hereby created a permanent international institute of agri-

culture, having its seat in Rome.

1 Malloy, Treaties, III, 188. » Ibid., Ill, 160.

'Ibid., II, 2216, Arts. 1, 6. An interesting apportionment of voting power was

provided in the Articles Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine annexed to the

Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815. It was stipulated that in the selection of river

inspectors voting power in the Central Commission of Control should be appor-

tioned among the states represented according to " the extent of their respective

possessions on the bank." Art. 13, in Hertslet, I, 82.

Japan each gain one. 1 It may be noted that it was definitely
contemplated at Berlin in 1906 that dependencies should
exercise their vote at the next conference. Article 1 of the
Final Protocol provided:
The High Contracting Parties agree that at the next Conference
the number of votes to which each country is entitled shall be decided
at the beginning of the deliberations, so that the colonies, possessions
or protectorates admitted to the privilege of voting may exercise their
right to vote during the entire course of the proceedings of such
Conference.2

In the second place, several unions base inequality of
voting strength upon the principle that privilege ought to
be apportioned in the same way as responsibility. The distribution of votes is proportioned according to the contribution which each state makes to the support of the union.
Thus the Organic By-Laws of the International Office of
Public Hygiene provide:
There is established in Paris an International Office of Public Hy·
giene under the States which accept participation in its operation....
The Office is placed under the authority and supervision of an International Committee consisting of technical representatives designated by the participating States in the proportion of one representative for each State.
Each State is allowed a number of votes inversely proportioned to
the number of the class to which it belongs as regards its participation
in the expenses of the Office.1

The same principle is recognized in the organization of the
International Institute of Agriculture:
There is hereby created a permanent international institute of agriculture, having its seat in Rome.
2 Ibid., III, 160.
Malloy, Treaties, III, 188.
Ibid., II, 2216, Arts. 1, 6. An interesting apportionment of voting power was
provided in the Articles Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine annexed to the
Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815. It was stipulated that in the selection of river
inspectors voting power in the Central Commission of Control should be apportioned among the states represented according to " the extent of their respective
possessions on the bank." Art. 13, in Hertslet, I, 82.
1
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The international institute of agriculture is to be a government

institution, in which each adhering power shall be represented by

delegates of its choice.

The institute shall be composed of a general assembly and a per-

manent committee, the composition and duties of which are defined

in the ensuing articles.

The general assembly of the institute shall be composed of the

representatives of the adhering governments. Each nation, whatever

be the number of its delegates, shall be entitled to a number of votes

in the assembly which shall be determined according to the group to

which it belongs, and to which reference will be made in article 10....

The executive power of the institute is intrusted to the permanent

committee, which, under the direction and control of the general as-

sembly, shall carry out the decisions of the latter and prepare propo-

sitions to submit to it.

The permanent committee shall be composed of members desig-

nated by the respective governments. Each adhering nation shall

be represented in the permanent committee by one member. How-

ever, the representation of one nation may be intrusted to a delegate

of another adhering nation, provided that the actual number of mem-
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bers shall not be less than fifteen.

The conditions of voting in the permanent committee shall be the

same as those indicated in article 3 for the general assemblies.1

The distribution of votes and units of assessments is gov-

erned by Article 10, as follows:

The nations adhering to the institute shall be classed in five groups,

according to the place which each of them thinks it ought to occupy.

The number of votes which each nation shall have and the number

of units of assessment shall be established according to the following

gradations:

Number

Units

Groups of Nations

The international institute of agriculture is to be a government
institution, in which each adhering power shall be represented by
delegates of its choice.
The institute shall be composed of a general assembly and a perm.anent committee, the composition and duties of which are defined
in the ensuing articles.
The general assembly of the institute shall be composed of the
representatives of the adhering governments. Each nation, whatever
be the number of its delegates, shall be entitled to a number of votes
in the assembly which shall be determined according to the group to
which it belongs, and to which reference will be made in article 10.•.•
The executive power of the institute is intrusted to the permanent
committee, which, under the direction and control of the general assembly, shall carry out the decisions of the latter and prepare propositions to submit to it.
The permanent committee shall be composed of members designated by the respective governments. Each adhering nation shall
be represented in the permanent committee by one member. However, the representation of one nation may be intrusted to a delegate
of another adhering nation, provided that the actual number of members shall not be less than fifteen.
The conditions of voting in the permanent committee shall be the
same as those indicated in article 3 for the general assemblies. 1

of votes

of Assessn

I

s

16
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4

8
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3

4

IV
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The distribution of votes and units of assessments is governed by Article ro, as follows:
The nations adhering to the institute shall be classed in five groups,
according to the place which each of them thinks it ought to occupy.
The number of votes which each nation shall have and the number
of units of assessment shall be established according to the following
gradations:
Groups of Nations

I ........... . ......... .. . . ......... .
II . .... . .... . ..... . ....... . ......... .

1 Malloy, Treaties, II, 2140, Arts. 1, 2,3,6,7. Huber dismisses the International

III

Institute of Agriculture with the remark that " the inequalities that exist in t&e;
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Malloy, Treaties, II, 2140, Arts. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7. Huber dismisses the International
Institute of Agriculture with the remark that "the inequalities that exist in 1:be·
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Finally, inequality in voting has been established in

numerous instances by substituting majority decisions for

the unanimity requirement. It is commonly assumed that

the traditional notion of political equality is inconsistent

with any provision whereby a majority may bind the mi-

nority in an international organization. Nevertheless, pro-

vision has been made for majority decisions in several

international administrative institutions of the first im-

portance. This seems to be the practice in the Congress of

the Universal Postal Union.1 It was expressly stipulated

in the International Sanitary Convention of 1903 for the

Superior Board of Health of Constantinople. This Board

was composed of four Turkish members and one representa-

tive from each of the signatory powers, and was empowered

to decide on " the measures to be adopted in order to pre-

vent the introduction of epidemic diseases into the Ottoman

Empire and their transmission to foreign countries." Article

170 of the Convention provided:

The decisions of the Superior Board of Health, reached by a ma-

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

jority of the members who compose it, are of an executory character

and without appeal.2

The European Commission of the Danube is one of the most

successful of international commissions and also one of the

few which has been invested with real powers of control.

This Commission determines administrative questions and

fixes tolls by a majority vote. Article 12 of the Regulations

fixing the order of procedure in the Commission contains

the following provisions:

representation of states in the Institute of Agriculture are irrelevant to the prin-

Finally, inequality in voting has been established in
numerous instances by substituting majority decisions for
the unanimity requirement. It is commonly assumed that
the traditional notion of political equality is inconsistent
with any provision whereby a majority may bind the minority in an international organization. Nevertheless, provision has been made for majority decisions in several
international administrative institutions of the first importance. This seems to be the practice in the Congress of
the Universal Postal Union. 1 It was expressly stipulated
in the International Sanitary Convention of 1903 for the
Superior Board of Health of Constantinople. This Board
was composed of four Turkish members and one representative from each of the signatory powers, and was empowered
to decide on " the measures to be adopted in order to prevent the introduction of epidemic diseases into the Ottoman
Empire and their transmission to foreign countries." Article
170 of the Convention provided:

ciple of equality, since each state classifies itself and the classification corresponds

essentially with the obligation to contribute." Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 102,

note 2.

See Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, pp. 158-166.

1 See ibid., pp. 157, 19-25.

The decisions of the Superior Board of Health, reached by a majority of the members who compose it, are of an executory character
and without appeal.2

• 'Malloy, Treaties, II, 2104.

The European Commission of the Danube is one of the most
successful of international commissions and also one of the
few which has been invested with real powers of control.
This Commission determines administrative questions and
fixes tolls by a majority vote. Article l 2 of the Regulations
fixing the order of procedure in the Commission contains
the following provisions:
representation of states in the Institute of Agriculture are irrelevant to the principle of equality, since each state classifies itself and the classification corresponds
essentially with the obligation to contribute." Die Gkichheit der Sta4ten, p. 102,
note 2.
See Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, pp. 158-166.
I See ibid., pp. 157, ICT25•
· ~ Malloy, Treatiu, II, 2104.
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Decisions are by a majority of votes:

(a) When it is a question of form, in particular if it concerns the

interior service of the commission, the relations of the commission

with its employees, or details of execution of measures decided upon

in commission;

(b) When it is a question of modifying the tolls of navigation

established by virtue of Article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of March 30,

1856.

On important questions [questions de fond] for which unanimity is

required, decisions made unanimously by the delegates present become

final two months after having been communicated to the absent dele-

gates, unless a formal contrary vote is sent by one or several of these

delegates before the expiration of the said period of two months.1

Article 18 provides that decisions of the same character

shall be made by majority vote in the Executive Committee

which carries on the work of the Commission between regu-

lar sessions. Probably the most striking example of an

international institution with real powers of control over

1 Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, Appendix B, p. 185. See

Decisions are by a majority of votes:
(a) When it is a question of form, in particular if it concerns the
interior service of the commission, the relations of the commission
with its employees, or details of execution of measures decided upon
in commission;
(b) When it is a question of modifying the tolls of navigation
established by virtue of Article 16 of the Treaty of Paris of March 30,
1856.
On important questions [questions de fond] for which unanimity is

required, decisions made unanimously by the delegates present become
final two months after having been communicated to the absent delegates, unless a fonnal contrary vote is sent by one or several of these
delegates before the expiration of the said period of two months. 1
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also Article 16 of the Treaty of Paris, March 20, 1856, in Hertslet, II, 1258; De-

morgny, La question du Danube; Pitisteano, La question du Danube; Sayre, op. cit.,

pp. 38-47; Sturdza, Recueil des documents relatifs d la liberlé de navigation du

Danube.

The international commissions which have been created to supervise the navi-

gation of the Rhine have also been authorized to reach decisions by majority vote,

but the decisions of these commissions have not been binding until approved by the

signatory governments. See Annex XVI of the Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815,

Articles Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine, Art. 17, in Hertslet, I, 84; Treaty

of March 31, 1831, Art. 94, in Clercq, Recueil des traités, IV, 53, and Martens,

Nouveau recueil, DC, 294; Treaty of October 17,1868, Art. 46, in Martens, Nouveau

recueil general, XX, 369; Sayre, op. cit., pp. 131-141, 157.

The principle of majority decisions has also been invoked in other instances

which are not strictly relevant to the subject of permanent administrative institu-

tions. In 1881, for example, the Great Powers intervened to establish the boundary

between Greece and Turkey. Article 1 of the Treaty provided: "this delimitation

will be fixed on the spot by a Commission composed of the Delegates of the Six

Powers and of the two parties interested. The Delimitation Commission will pass

their Resolutions by a majority of votes, each Power having but one vote." See

Hertslet, IV, 3044, 3061, 3069. For another illustration, see the General Act of

the Algeciras Conference of 1906, Art. 76, in Martens, Nouveau recueil general, 2*

sir., XXXTV, 275.

Article r8 provides that decisions of the same character
shall be made by majority vote in the Executive Committee
which carries on the work of the Commission between regular sessions. Probably the most striking example of an
international institution with real powers of control over
1 Sayre, Experiments in lnlernaJional Administration, Appendix B, p. 185. See
also Article 16 of the Treaty of Paris, March 20, 1856, in Hertslet, II, 1258; Demorgny, IA question du Danube; Pitisteano, La question du Danube; Sayre, op. cit.,
pp. 38-47; Sturdza, Recueil des documents relaJifs d la liberU de navigation du
Danube.
The international commissions which have been created to supervise the navigation of the Rhine have also been authorized to reach decisions by majority vote,
but the decisions of these commissions have not been binding until approved by the
signatory governments. See Annex XVI of the Vienna Congress Treaty of 1815,
Articles Concerning the Navigation of the Rhine, Art. 17, in Hertslet, I, 84; Treaty
of March 31, 1831, Art. 94 1 in Clercq, Recueil des traiUs, IV, 53, and Martens,
Noufleau recueil, IX, 294; Treaty of October 17, 18681 Art. 461 in Martens, Ntnaeau
recueil glnlral, XX, 369; Sayre, op. cit., pp. 131-141 1 157.
The principle of majority decisions has also been invoked in other instances
which are not strictly relevant to the subject of permanent administrative institutions. In 1881, for example, the Great Powers intervened to establish the boundary
between Greece and Turkey. Article 1 of the Treaty provided: "this delimitation
will be fixed on the spot by a Commission composed of the Delegates of the Six
Powers and of the two parties interested. The Delimitation Commission will pass
their Resolutions by a majority of votes, each Power having but one vote." See
Hertslet, IV, 3044, 3o61, 3069. For another illustration, see the General Act of
the Algeciras Conference of 1C}o6, Art. 761 in Martens, Noufleau recueil ghltral, 2•
~r., XXXIV, 275.
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the member states is the International Sugar Commission

which was established by European states in 1902 in order

to do away with the abuses incident to the granting of

bounties to encourage the production and exportation of

sugar. This Commission, composed of delegates from the

contracting states, had authority to determine whether

bounties were granted in the contracting states, to determine

whether non-exporting states had become exporting states

and hence subject to certain restrictions contemplated in

the Convention, to determine whether bounties were granted

in non-contracting states and what special duties on sugar

from such states should be imposed in consequence, to au-

thorize an increased surtax in any one of the contracting

states on sugar from another contracting state in order to

protect the home market, to pass upon requests for admis-

sion to the Union from non-contracting states, to nominate

a Permanent Bureau, to fix the expenses of the Permanent

Bureau and of the Commission itself, and to decide upon

the method of apportioning these expenses among the con-
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tracting states. In addition to the above, the Commission

had important advisory functions. The important powers

vested in the Sugar Commission made it all the more signifi-

cant that its decisions were taken by majority vote.1 Mr.

Sayre concludes a recent discussion of the unanimity re-

quirement in international administration as follows:

1 See the Convention of March 5, 1902, Art. 7, and also the Final Protocol

appended thereto, in Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, XXllI, 582, 586. See also

the Additional Act of August 28, 1007, in Hertslet, op. ext., XXV, 547; Andr6, in

R. G.D.I. P. (1912), XDC, 665-689; P6litis,ia R.S.L.F. (1904), II, 1-27; Sayre,

Experiments in International Administration, pp. 117-131, 189-201. Referring to

the International Sugar Commission, Mr. Sayre says: "A striking feature of the

Commission is that it is given power to act by a majority vote. The usual diplo-

matic requirement of unanimity is thus brushed aside in the interest of efficiency;

the result adds immeasurably to the power and effectiveness of the Commission.

Thus it may come about that an individual state may be compelled to alter or

modify a tariff quite against its own sovereign wishes." Op. cit., p. 122.

the member states is the International Sugar Commission
which was established by European states in 1902 in order
to do away with the abuses incident to the granting of
bounties to encourage the production and exportation of
sugar. This Commission, composed of delegates from the
contracting states, had authority to determine whether
bounties were granted in the contracting states, to determine
whether non-exporting states had become exporting states
and hence subject to certain restrictions contemplated in
the Convention, to determine whether bounties were granted
in non-contracting states and what special duties on sugar
from such states should be imposed in consequence, to authorize an increased surtax in any one of the contracting
states on sugar from another contracting state in order to
protect the home market, to pass upon requests for admission to the Union from non-contracting states, to nominate
a Permanent Bureau, to fix the expenses of the Permanent
Bureau and of the Commission itself, and to decide upon
the method of apportioning these expenses among the contracting states. In addition to the above, the Commission
had important advisory functions. The important powers
vested in the Sugar Commission made it all the more significant that its decisions were taken by majority vote.1 Mr.
Sayre concludes a recent discussion of the unanimity requirement in international administration as follows:
1 See the Convention of March 5, 1902, Art. 7, and also the Final Protocol
appended thereto, in Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, XXIII, 582, 586. See also
the Additional Act of August 28, 1907, in Hertslet, op. cil., XXV, 547; Andre, in
R. G.D. I . P. (1912), XIX, 665-689; Politis, in R. S . L. F. (1904), II, 1-27; Sayre,
Experiments in International Administration, pp. 117-131, 189-201. Referring to
the International Sugar Commission, Mr. Sayre says: "A striking feature of the
Commission is that it is given power to act by a majority vote. The usual diplomatic requirement of unanimity is thus brushed aside in the interest of efficiency;
the result adds immeasurably to the power and effectiveness of the Commission.
Thus it may come about that an individual state may be compelled to alter or
modify a tariff quite against its own sovereign wishes." Op. cit., p. 1 22.
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To make the assertion that the unanimity requirement has, in one

way or another, been dispensed with whenever prompt and effective

action has seemed imperative, would be too sweeping a statement of

the case; for in a number of instances, where the organ is compara-

tively small, or where single blocking states can be coerced into line

through moral or social pressure, the unanimity requirement still

remains. Nevertheless, the fact that in those international organiza-

tions which have proved most successful the unanimity requirement

has in most instances been displaced by the rule of the majority vote,

is of sufficient significance to be worthy of serious consideration by

those who would give to the League of Nations an executive organ of

real efficiency.1

As regards the financial support of administrative unions,

a few conventions stipulate the rule of equality. The ex-

penses incurred by the International office at Zanzibar, in-

stituted under the Brussels Act of 1890 for the suppression

of the slave trade, are divided equally among the powers

To make the assertion that the unanimity requirement has, in one
way or another, been dispensed with whenever prompt and effective
action has seemed imperative, would be too sweeping a statement of
the case; for in a number of instances, where the organ is comparatively small, or where single blocking states can be coerced into line
through moral or social pressure, the unanimity requirement still
remains. Nevertheless, the fact that in those international organizations which have proved most successful the unanimity requirement
has in most instances been displaced by the rule of the majority vote,
is of sufficient significance to be worthy of serious consideration by
those who would give to the League of Nations an executive organ of
real efficiency.1

represented in the office.2 The same rule applies to the

maintenance of the Central American Bureau established

under the Convention of 1907.3 These cases, however, are
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quite exceptional. The International Bureau of the Union

for the Publication of Customs Tariffs is supported by the

contracting states in proportion to the amount of their com-

merce, while the Central Office of International Transports

is supported in proportion to railway mileage.4 Several ad-

ministrations require contributions in proportion to popu-

lation, among them the Bureau of Weights and Measures

at Paris, the Bureau of the American Republics at Wash-

ington, and two bureaus instituted by the Union of Ameri-

can Nations for the Protection of Trade Marks.6

1 Op. cit., p. 157. See also pp. 21-25, *9, 33. 46, S3, i", 135. 150-158-

1 Malloy, Treaties, II, 1985, Art. 76.

• Ibid., II, 2413, Art. 8.

4 Ibid., II, 1997, Art. 9; Martens, Nouveau recueti general, 2* s&r., XIX, 327,

Art. 1.

1 Malloy, Treaties, II, 1927; La vie int., I, 68, 73; A. J.I. L. Suppl. (1917),

XI, 17, 18.

As regards the financial support of administrative unions,
a few conventions stipulate the rule of equality. The expenses incurred by the International office at Zanzibar, instituted under the Brussels Act of 1890 for the suppression
of the slave trade, are divided equally among the powers
represented in the office. 2 The same rule applies to the
maintenance of the Central American Bureau established
under the Convention of 1907.3 These cases, however, are
quite exceptional. The International Bureau of the Union
for the Publication of Customs Tariffs is supported by the
contracting states in proportion to the amount of their commerce, while the Central Office of International Transports
is supported in proportion to railway mileage. 4 Several administrations require contributions in proportion to population, among them the Bureau of Weights and Measures
at Paris, the Bureau of the American Republics at Washington, and two bureaus instituted by the Union of American Nations for the Protection of Trade Marks. 5
Op. cit., p. 157. See also pp. 21-25, 29, 33, 46, 53, 122, 135, 150-158.
' Malloy, Trealies, II, 1985, Art. 76.
3 Ibid., II, 2413, Art. 8.
4 Ibid., II, 1997, Art. 9; Martens, Nouveau recueil gmlral, 2e ser., XIX, 327,
Art. I.
' Malloy, Trealies, II, 1927; La vie int., I, 68, 73; A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1917),
XI, 17, 18.
1
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The system of contributions that is coming to be more

widely adopted than any other for important administra-

tions involves the division of member states into classes

and a graded scheme of apportioning units of assessment

among the classes. For illustration, the expenses incurred

by the International Bureau of Industrial Property at Berne

are distributed as follows:

In order to determine the contributive part of each of the countries

in this sum total of the expenses, the contracting countries and those

which later join the Union shall be divided into six classes, each con-

tributing in proportion to a certain number of units, to wit:

The system of contributions that is coming to be more
widely adopted than any other for important administrations involves the division of member states into classes
and a graded scheme of apportioning units of assessment
among the classes. For illustration, the expenses incurred
by the International Bureau of Industrial Property at Berne
are distributed as follows:

Units

Class i 25

Class 2 20

Class 3 . 15

Class 4 10

Class 5 5

In order to determine the contributive part of each of the countries
in this sum total of the expenses, the contracting countries and those
which later join the Union shall be divided into six classes, each contributing in proportion to a certain number of units, to wit:

Class 6 • 3

Units
These coefficients shall be multiplied by the number of countries
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of each class, and the sum of the products thus obtained will furnish

the number of units by which the total expenses are to be divided.

The quotient will give the amount of the unit of expense.

Each of the contracting countries shall designate at the time of its

accession, the class in which it wishes to be ranked.1

The same principle is adopted by the International Tele-

graphic Union, the Universal Postal Union, the Interna-

tional Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic

Class I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Class 2.......................... . ...........
Class 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Class 4. . ........... . ......... . ..............
Class 5....... . ........... . ..... . ... . .... .. . .
Class 6 .......... . ......·.......... . ........ . .

25

20
15
IO

5
3

1 Malloy, Treaties, III, 374. Huber contends that classification to determine

contribution quotas is not inconsistent with equality, but his argument is not very

convincing. He says: "The classification of states for the purpose of apportioning

contribution quotas and the consequent legal inequalities can not be cited as proof

of inequality. For the classification is not into great powers and other states, but

is purely objective, resting upon population or other similar criteria. Again, this

is an inequality of obligations, not of rights, and only an inequality of rights would

be relevant. Finally, the financial element in these international organizations is

unimportant so far as being conclusive of a question of principle is concerned."

These coefficients shall be multiplied by the number of countries
of each class, and the sum of the products thus obtained will furnish
the number of units by which the total expenses are to be divided.
The quotient will give the amount of the unit of expense.
Each of the contracting countries shall designate at the time of its
accession, the class in which it wishes to be ranked. 1

Die Gleichheit der Staaten, p. 103.

The same principle is adopted by the International Telegraphic Union, the Universal Postal Union, the International Union for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
l Malloy, Treaties, III, 374. Huber contends that classification to determine
contribution quotas is not inconsistent with equality, but his argument is not very
convincing. He says: "The classification of states for the purpose of apportioning
contribution quotas and the consequent legal inequalities can not be cited as proof
of inequality. For the classification is not into great powers and other states, but
is purely objective, resting upon population or other similar criteria. Again, this
is an inequality of obligations, not of rights, and only an inequality of rights would
be relevant. Finally, the financial element in these international organizations is
unimportant so far as being conclusive of a question of principle is concerned."
Die Gleichheil d6 Staakn, p. 103.
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Works, and the International Wireless Telegraph Union.1

It applies to the maintenance of the International Institute

of Agriculture, the International Office of Public Hygiene,

and the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of

Arbitration at The Hague.2

The tendencies reviewed above, although still in a some-

what rudimentary stage, are significant as indicating the

probable course of future development. There are numer-

ous indications that inequality of representation will even-

tually become the rule rather than the exception. Inequality

of representation is most significant where it involves also

an inequality of voting strength. Inequality in voting is

most important where it prevails in the diplomatic confer-

ence or congress, as in the conference of the radiotelegraphy

Union, but its importance should not be underestimated in

purely administrative bodies like the Institute of Agricul-

ture or the Office of Public Hygiene. It is noted also that

in connection with the development of international admin-

istration the principle of majority decisions has been substi-

tuted for the unanimity rule in several important adminis-
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trative bodies, and to a limited extent, indeed, in conferences

of a diplomatic nature. Inequality in apportioning the

burdens of international administration has already become

a common practice. Although the functions of international

administration are usually technical, in a few instances ad-

ministrative bodies have been invested with a limited super-

national authority. All this seems to indicate that the

political equality of states is in process of becoming an

obsolete principle so far as the growth of international

administration is concerned.

1 La vie int., I, 260, 271; A.J.I. L. Suppi. (1913), VTJ, x2x; Malloy, Treaties,

m, 174.

'Ibid., II, 2143, 2218, 2026, 2237.

Works, and the International Wireless Telegraph Union. 1
It applies to the maintenance of the International Institute
of Agriculture, the International Office of Public Hygiene,
and the International Bureau of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration at The Hague.2
The tendencies reviewed above, although still in a somewhat rudimentary stage, are significant as indicating the
probable course of future development. There are numerous indications that inequality of representation will eventually bec<?me the rule rather than the exception. Inequality
of representation is most significant where it involves also
an inequality of voting strength. Inequality in voting is
most important where it prevails in the diplomatic conference or congress, as in the conference of the radiotelegraphy
Union, but its importance should not be underestimated in
purely administrative bodies like the Institute of Agriculture or the Office of Public Hygiene. It is noted also that
in connection with the development of international administration the principle of majority decisions has been substituted for the unanimity rule in several important administrative bodies, and to a limited extent, indeed, in conferences
of a diplomatic nature. Inequality in apportioning the
burdens of international administration has already become
a common practice. Although the functions of international
administration are usually technical, in a few instances administrative bodies have been invested with a limited supernational authority. All this seems to indicate that the
political equality of states is in process of becoming an
obsolete principle so far as the growth of international
administration is concerned.
1 La me inl., I, 26o, 271;
m, 174.
I

A. J. I . L. Suppl. (1913), VII, 121; Malloy, TreoJiu,

Il>UJ., II, 2143, 2218, 2026, 2237.
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SUPERNATIONAL JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS

SUPERNATIONAL JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS

The society of nations has developed thus far only the

most primitive types of judicial organization. A certain

amount of progress has been made, nevertheless, and the

problem has received enough attention to indicate the im-

portance of political equality as a principle which may be

involved in the composition, procedure, and authority of

such tribunals.

The five Central American republics have had until re-

cently a well organized court, called the Central American

Court of Justice, with real supernational authority.1 No

difficulty was experienced in preserving complete political

equality so far as the Court's composition was concerned,

for the tribunal was instituted by only five small states

having in common a strong tradition of confederation. Each

republic was permitted to appoint one justice, making a

tribunal of five. The Court's procedure and authority, on

the other hand, limited the extreme notion of political equal-

ity. Decisions were rendered by a majority vote, and the

states bound themselves to abide by the Court's decisions.
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When it is attempted to organize a court with jurisdiction

over a large number of states, differing widely in respect to

extent of territory, population, wealth, civilization, military

strength, and the like, the problem becomes infinitely more

complicated. Something has been made of the fact that the

so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague,

instituted by the Peace Conference of 1899 and perfected

at the second Conference in 1907, is based upon the prin-

ciple of equality.2 The institution named lacks all of the

attributes of a court, however, for it provides nothing more

1 See supra, p. 275.

1 See Bonds, Manuel, § 278, p. 155; Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, pp. 89,

91; La Deux. Confer. II, 160, 619, 625, 643. Of the organization adopted for the

so-called Permanent Court, Huber remarks: "It can therefore be said that the

First Peace Conference gave unqualified expression to the principle of the equality

of states." Op. cit., p. 91.

The society of nations has developed thus far only the
most primitive types of judicial organization. A certain
amount of progress has been made, nevertheless, and the
problem has received enough attention to indicate the importance of political equality as a principle which may be
involved in the composition, procedure, and authority of
such tribunals.
The five Central American republics have had until recently a well organized court, called the Central American
Court of Justice, with real supernational authority.1 No
difficulty was experienced in preserving complete political
equality so far as the Court's composition was concerned,
for the tribunal was instituted by only five small states
having in common a strong tradition of confederation. Each
republic was permitted to appoint one justice, making a
tribunal of five. The Court's procedure and authority, on
the other hand, limited the extreme notion of political equality. Decisions were rendered by a majority vote, and the
states bound themselves to abide by the Court's decisions.
When it is attempted to organize a court with jurisdiction
over a large number of states, differing widely in respect to
extent of territory, population, wealth, civilization, military
strength, and the like, the problem becomes infinitely more
complicated. Something has been made of the fact that the
so-called Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague,
instituted by the Peace Conference of 1899 and perfected
at the second Conference in 1907, is based upon the principle of equality.2 The institution named lacks all of the
attributes of a court, however, for it provides nothing more
See rnjrra, p. 275.
See Bonfils, Manuel,§ 278, p. 155; Huber, Die Gkichheit der St<wUn, pp. 89,
91; La Deux. Confir. II, 160, 619, 625, 643. Of the organization adopted for the
SO<alled Permanent Court, Huber remarks: "It can therefore be said that the
First Peace Conference gave unqualified expression to the principle of the equality
of states." Op. cit., p. 91.
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than a panel of arbitrators and a procedure which may be

resorted to in voluntary arbitration. As Mr. Choate ob-

served at the Second Peace Conference, it is " a court only

in name, — a framework for the selection of referees for

each particular case." 1

Statesmen have frequently referred to the Concert of the

great powers as a court of appeal for Europe. The opinion

is supported by a long record of cases in which the Congress

has required small or weak states to accept its decision in

controversies in which their interests were involved. Sev-

eral publicists have held a similar opinion, viewing certain

of the activities of the great powers as an indication of a

rudimentary development toward supernational judicial au-

thority. While there is a good deal to be said in support of

this inteipretation, it must be admitted that the develop-

ment is still very primitive. However it may be interpreted,

the Concert is the negation of political equality.

Two attempts were made at the Second Hague Peace

Conference in 1907 to prepare the way for the organization

of judicial tribunals with real supernational authority. The

Generated for facpubupdates (University of Michigan) on 2014-06-13 19:51 GMT / http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015069750274
Public Domain, Google-digitized / http://www.hathitrust.org/access_use#pd-google

first of these took shape in the Convention for the establish-

ment of an International Prize Court.2 The composition of

the proposed court was a question of great difficulty. The

British delegation first proposed a court to consist of one

judge and one deputy judge nominated by each power hav-

ing a merchant marine of more than 800,000 tons.3 This

1 La Deux. Conjer., II, 311; Scott, American Addresses, p. 81.

1 La Deux. Confer., I, 165-169; II, 11-33, 783, 856, 1071-1106; Brown, in A. J.

I. L. (1908), II, 476-489; Despagnet, Cours, § 683, p. 1161; Gregory, in A. J. I. L.

(1908), II, 458-475; Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 407-444; Huber, Die

Gleichheit der Staaten, pp. 91 ft.; Scott, in A. J. I. L. (1911), V, 302-324.

* La Deux. Confer., II, 1076. The report of the United States Commissioner of

Navigation for 1908 accredits the following powers with a combined steam and sail-

ing tonnage of over 800,000 tons: Great Britain, Germany, United States, France,

Norway, Japan, Italy, Russia, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Department of

Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Navigation, Report of the Commissioner of Na-

vigation (1908), pp. 71-75. See Barbosa's objections to the British proposals, in

La Deux. Confer., II, 797-799.

than a panel of arbitrators and a procedure which may be
resorted to in voluntary arbitration. As Mr. Choate observed at the Second Peace Conference, it is " a court only
in name, - a framework for the selection of referees for
each particular case." 1
Statesmen have frequently referred to the Concert of the
great powers as a court of appeal for Europe. The opinion
is supported by a long record of cases in which the Congress
has required small or weak states to accept its decision in
controversies in which their interests were involved. Several publicists have held a similar opinion, viewing certain
of the activities of the great powers as an indication of a
rudimentary development toward supernational judicial authority. While there is a good deal to be said in support of
this interpretation, it must be admitted that the development is still very primitive. However it may be interpreted,
the Concert is the negation of political equality.
Two attempts were made at the Second Hague Peace
Conference in i907 to prepare the way for the organization
of judicial tribunals with real supernational authority. The
first of these took shape in the Convention for the establishment of an International Prize Court. 2 The composition of
the proposed court was a question of great difficulty. The
British delegation first proposed a court to consist of one
judge and one deputy judge nominated by each power having a merchant marine of more than 8oo,ooo tons. 3 This
La Deux. Confb., II, 311; Scott, American Addresses, p. 81.
La Deux. Confb., I, 165-169; II, u-33, 783, 856, 1071-uo6; Brown, in A. J.
I. L. (1908), II, 476-489; Despagnet, Cours, § 683, p. u61; Gregory, in A. J . I . L.
(1<}08), II, 458-475; Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 407-444; Huber, Die
Gltichheit dcr Staalen, pp. 91 ff.; Scott, in A. J. I. L . (19u), V, 302- 324.
1 La Dew:. Confb., II, 1076. The report of the United States Commissioner of
Navigation for 19o8 accredits the following powers with a combined steam and sailing tonnage of over 800,000 tons: Great Britain, Gennany, United States, France,
Norway, Japan, Italy, Russia, the Netherlands, and Sweden. Department of
Commerce and Labor, Bureau of Navigation, Report of the Commissioner of Navigation (1<}08), pp. 71-75. See Barbosa's objections to the British proposals, in
La Deux. Confb., II, 797-799.
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plan was abandoned in the committee, however, and the

scheme of rotation was adopted, whereby every state would

appoint one judge and one deputy judge for a six year period,

but only the judges appointed by the eight great powers

would sit continuously throughout the entire period. Article

15 of the Convention provided:

The Judges appointed by the following Contracting Powers: Ger-

many, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Great

Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia, are always summoned to sit.

plan was abandoned in the committee, however, and the
scheme of rotation was adopted, whereby every state would
appoint one judge and one deputy judge for a six year period,
but only the judges appointed by the eight great powers
would sit continuously throughout the entire period. Article
15 of the Convention provided:

The Judges and Deputy Judges appointed by the other Contract-

ing Powers sit by rota as shown in the Table annexed to the present

Convention; their duties may be performed successively by the same

person. The same Judge may be appointed by several of the said

Powers.1

The shorter periods assigned to judges and deputy judges of

the lesser powers in the scheme of rotation were presumed

to bear some relation to the relative extent of the merchant

marine, commerce, and sea power of the states which they

represented.2 This plan made it possible to have a court of
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fifteen judges, on which all states would have some repre-

sentation, and which could always be dominated by the

The Judges appointed by the following Contracting Powers: Germany, the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, France, Great
Britain, Italy, Japan, and Russia, are always summoned to sit.
The Judges and Deputy Judges appointed by the other Contracting Powers sit by rota as shown in the Table annexed to the present
Convention; their duties may be performed successively by the same
person. The same Judge may be appointed by several of the said
Powers.1

eight great powers.3

The scheme of rotation was absolutely unacceptable to

some of the small states. The first delegate from the Do-

minican Republic is reported to have said in conversation:

I will not be a party to any convention which does not recognize

the same right in my country to a seat in the court as is recognized

to Great Britain; not merely a right, but the exercise of that right.4

1 The scheme of rotation is given in La Deux. Confer., II, 853-855; Higgins,

Hague Peace Conferences, p. 430.

* See remarks of Lammasch, in La Deux. Confer., II, 836; and of Renault, in

the report of the first committee, in ibid., I, 196.

* A small court and the preponderance of the great maritime nations were re-

garded as absolutely essential by the delegates of many of the great powers. See,

for example, Sir Edward Fry's declaration, in ibid., II, 817.

* Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 503. Cf. Admiral Beresford's protest in The

London Times, December 5, 1911, p. 8a.

The shorter periods assigned to judges and deputy judges of
the lesser powers in the scheme of rotation were presumed
to bear some relation to the relative extent of the merchant
marine, commerce, and sea power of the states which they
represented. 2 This plan made it possible to have a court of
fifteen judges, on which all states would have some representation, and which could always be dominated by the
eight great powers.3
The scheme of rotation was absolutely unacceptable to
some of the small states. The first delegate from the Dominican Republic is reported to have said in conversation:
I will not be a party to any convention which does not recognize
the same right in my country to a seat in the court as is recognized
to Great Britain; not merely a right, but the exercise of that right.•
1 The scheme of rotation is given in La Deux. Conftr., II, 853-855; Higgins,
Hague PeGle Conferences, p. 430.
1 See remarks of Lammasch, in La Deux. Conftr., II, 836; and of Renault, in
the report of the first committee, in ibid., I, 196.
a A small court and the preponderance of the great maritime nations were regarded as absolutely essential by the delegates of many of the great powers. See,
for example, Sir Edward Fry's declaration, in ibid., II, 817.
4 Scott, Hagtu: PeGle Conferences, I, 503. Cf. Admiral Beresford's protest in The
London Times, December 5, 1911, p. Sa.
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A similar attitude was assumed by the Venezuelan delega-

tion.1 On signing the Convention, no less than ten states

made reservations with respect to Article 15.*

Perhaps the most significant feature of the debates on

the composition of the proposed prize court was the extent

to which small state delegates and conspicuous exponents of

political equality admitted the principle of classification. A

number of delegations from the second rank powers ac-

cepted the proposed convention without any reservation,

simply making it clear that their course was not to be con-

strued as compromising in any sense the principle of equal-

ity on which they intended to insist in the composition of the

proposed court of arbitral justice. They took the position

that the prize court's jurisdiction would affect only a special

category of interests, with respect to which the principle of

classification might reasonably be admitted.3 Barbosa of

Brazil, the most vigorous exponent of unqualified political

equality present at the Conference, declared explicitly for

the principle of classification, while denouncing the plan of

rotation reported by the committee as an inequitable appli-
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cation of the principle. He said:

We, for our part, also declare openly for the principle of classification

among states, persuaded by the consideration that in the matter of

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 20, from which an extract is quoted supra, p. 182.

1 Reservations on the final vote are given in La Deux. Confer., 1,168; and res-

ervations at signing in Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, p. 441. The reservation

of Haiti is quoted supra, p. 182.

• La Deux. Confer., 1,166,167; II, 14, 15, 16, 18,19, 21, 838. Huber says that,

notwithstanding opposition from various quarters, the classification of states

according to objective criteria was in general regarded as acceptable in the constitu-

tion of a prize court. It was the subjective criteria that were absolutely unaccept-

able. He says further: "The opposition to the system of rotation, and to the

inequality coming to light in its application, was manifested much less in connection

with the prize court than with the court of arbitral justice. And in fact the situa-

tion was here quite different. As matters stand, the small and the secondary sea

powers — leaving the inland states entirely out of account — have enjoyed almost

no equality with the great powers in the exercise of prize rights in the existing situ-

ation; the retention of exclusively national prize court jurisdiction would offer them

A similar attitude was assumed by the Venezuelan delegation.1 On signing the Convention, no less than ten states
made reservations with respect to Article 15.2
Perhaps the most significant feature of the debates on
the composition of the proposed prize court was the extent
to which small state delegates and conspicuous exponents of
political equality admitted the principle of classification. A
number of delegations from the second rank powers accepted the proposed convention without any reservation,
simply making it clear that their course was not to be construed as compromising in any sense the principle of equality on which they intended to insist in the composition of the
proposed court of arbitral justice. They took the position
that the prize court's jurisdiction would affect only a special
category of interests, with respect to which the principle of
classification might reasonably be admitted.3 Barbosa of
Brazil, the most vigorous exponent of unqualified political
equality present at the Conference, declared explicitly for
the principle of classification, while denouncing the plan of
rotation reported by the committee as an inequitable application of the principle. He said:
We, for our pa.rt, also declare openly for the principle of classification
among states, persuaded by the consideration that in the matter of
La Deux. Confer., II, 20, from which an extract is quoted mpra, p. 182.
Reservations on the final vote are given in La De1n. Confer., I, 168; and reservations at signing in Higgins, Hague Peace Conferet1ces, p. 441. The reservation
of Haiti is quoted supra, p. 182.
1 La Deux. Confer., I, 166, 167; II, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 838. Huber says that,
notwithstanding opposition from various quarters, the classification of states
according to objective criteria was in general regarded as acceptable in the constitution of a prize court. It was the subjective criteria that were absolutely unacceptable. He says further: " The opposition to the system of rotation, and to the
inequality coming to light in its application, was manifested much less in connection
v.ith the prize court than with the court of arbitral justice. And in fact the situation was here quite different. As matters stand, the small and the secondary sea
powers - leaving the inland states entirely out of account - have enjoyed almost
no equality with the great powers in the exercise of prize rights in the existing situation; the retention of exclusively national prize court jurisdiction would offer them
1
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prizes the creation of international jurisdiction affects only the mari-

time interests of states, whose representation, therefore, should be

graduated in proportion to their position on the sea.1

If states may be represented on a prize court in pro-

portion to their maritime interests, it is difficult to under-

stand just why they may not be represented on a court of

other jurisdiction in proportion to other interests; but this

possibility was vigorously combated by the small state dele-

gations at the Second Peace Conference. An attempt was

made to agree upon a convention providing for a real judi-

cial tribunal, to be known as the Court of Arbitral Justice.2

The greatest difficulty was experienced in regard to the

proposed court's composition. Several plans were con-

sidered, including composition determined by election, by

equal representation, by representation in proportion to

population, as well as other principles;3 but the framers of

the project eventually adopted rotation as the most practi-

cable way of securing a small tribunal, with some represen-

tation for all states, and some recognition of the important
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diversities among different states. It was proposed that a

court of seventeen judges be organized for a period of twelve

years. Each state was to appoint a judge; the judges ap-

pointed by the eight great powers were to sit for the full

period, while those appointed by the other states were to

sit in rotation for periods varying from one to ten years, in

no advantage. The creation of an international prize court, however, means an

extensive limitation of autonomy to those states which alone actually take prizes,

namely, the great powers, and especially those which have a great navy at their

disposal." See Die Gleichheit der Staaien, pp. 92-95.

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 12. See his speeches, II, 11-13, 832-836, 840-852.

2 Ibid., I, 332-335; II, 144-160, 177-190. 309-3Si. 593-7o8, 1035-1070; Des-

pagnet, Cours, § 739, p. 1358; Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 498-517;

Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaien, pp. 92-94, 107; Scott, in A. J. I. L. (1908), II,

772-810; Scott, American Addresses; Scott, An International Court of Justice;

Scott, The Status of The International Court of Justice.

* La Deux. Confer., II, 1035-1070; Choate, in ibid., II, 689-693; Higgins, Hague

Peace Conferences, pp. 515-517; Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, I, 456-460.

prizes the creation of international jurisdiction affects only the maritime interests of states, whose representation, therefore, should be
graduated in proportion to their position on the sea. 1

If states may be represented on a prize court in proportion to their maritime interests, it is difficult to understand just why they may not be represented on a court of
other jurisdiction in proportion to other interests; but this
possibility was vigorously combated by the small state delegations at the Second Peace Conference. An attempt was
made to agree upon a convention providing for a real judicial tribunal, to be known as the Court of Arbitral Justice. 2
The greatest difficulty was experienced in regard to the
proposed court's composition. Several plans were considered, including composition determined by election, by
equal representation, by representation in proportion to
population, as well as other principles; 3 but the framers of
the project eventually adopted rotation as the most practicable way of securing a small tribunal, with some representation for all states, and some recognition of the important
diversities among different states. It was proposed that a
court of seventeen judges be organized. for a period of twelve
years. Each state was to appoint a judge; the judges appointed by the eight great powers were to sit for the full
period, while those appointed by the other states were to
sit in rotation for periods varying from one to ten years, in
no advantage. The creation of an international prize court, however, means an
extensive limitation of autonomy to those states which alone actually take prizes,
namely, the great powers, and especially those which have a great navy at their
disposal." See DU GleichMit der StaaJen, pp. 92--()5.
1 La Deux. Conftr., II, 1 2.
See his speeches, II, u-13, 832-836, 849-852.
2 Ibid., I, 332-335; II, 144-160, 177-190, 309-351, 593-7o8, 1035-1070; Despagnet, Coms, § 739, p. 1358; Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, pp. 498-517;
Huber, Die Gleichheit der Staaten, pp. 92--()4, 107; Scott, in A. J. I. L. {19o8), II,
77::r810; Scott, American Addresses; Scott, An International Court of Justice;
Scott, The Status of The Interna.Jional Court of lttstice.
• La Deux. Confer., II, 1035-1070; Choate, in ibid., II, 6~3; Higgins, Hague
Peace Conferences, pp. 515-517; Scott, Hague Peau Conferences, I, 456-460.
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proportion to the population, territorial extent, commerce,

and the like of the states which they represented. Mr.

Choate, head of the American delegation, has said:

We and Great Britain and Germany and France and Russia all

agreed that it should be constituted as the prize court was; that you

should take the eight great nations, the greatest in resources, in popu-

lation, in business, in matters that would come naturally before the

consideration of such a court, and that they should each have a judge

of the court all the time, and that the other nations, having less occa-

sion for the services and offices of the court, should be graded, accord-

ing to what we have considered their relative importance, from twelve

years, the term for which the eight great nations were to have perma-

nent judges, down to one year.1

The scheme of rotation proved to be absolutely unaccept-

able to the delegates from the smaller states. It was not

entirely clear, at least in the earlier discussions, that they

objected to the principle of classification per se. A delegate

from the Argentine Republic suggested that the court's com-

position might be based on the importance of foreign com-

proportion to the population 1 territorial extent1 commerce,
and the like of the states which they represented. Mr.
Choate 1 head of the American delegation, has said:
We and Great Britain and Germany and France and Russia all
agreed that it should be constituted as the prize court was; that you
should take the eight great nations, the greatest in resources, in population, in business, in matters that would come naturally before the
consideration of such a court, and that they should each have a judge
of the court all the time, and that the other nations, having less occasion for the services and offices of the court, should be gradt>d, according to what we have considered their relative importance, from twelve
years, the term for which the eight great nations were to have permanent judges, down to one year. 1
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merce; a delegate from Venezuela suggested that judges

might be apportioned equally among the three continents;

while the Chinese delegation favored population as a basis.2

As the debates progressed, however, the opposition to any

plan of proportional representation became uncompromising.

The American delegates attempted to convince the op-

ponents of rotation that by permitting every state to name

a judge for the full period equality would be preserved. It

was only in the exercise of the right of representation, so

the argument ran, that equality would be limited. Thus

Mr. Choate said of the plan presented by the committee:

It recognized, and was based upon, the equal sovereignty of the

Nations and took account at the same time of the differences that ex-

1 A.S.J.S. I. D. Proceedings (1910), p. 199.

* La Deux. Confer., II, 325, 339,602, 613,1044. Cf. Choate's reply to the argu-

ment for population, ibid., II, 691.

The scheme of rotation proved to be absolutely unacceptable to the delegates from the smaller states. It was not
entirely clear1 at least in the earlier discussions 1 that they
objected to the principle of classification per se. A delegate
from the Argentine Republic suggested that the court's composition might be based on the importance of foreign commerce; a delegate from Venezuela suggested that judges
might be apportioned equally among the three continents;
while the Chinese delegation favored population as a basis. 2
As the debates progressed, however, the opposition to any
plan of proportional representation became uncompromising.
The American delegates attempted to convince the opponents of rotation that by permitting every state to name
a judge for the full period equality would be preserved. It
was only in the exercise of the right of representation, so
the argument ran, that equality would be limited. Thus
Mr. Choate said of the plan presented by the committee:
It recognized, and was based upon, the equal sovereignty of the
Nations and took account at the same time of the differences that exA. S. J. S. I. D. Proceedings (1910), p. 199.
La Deux. Conj&., II, 325, 339, 6o2, 613, 1044. Cf. Choate's reply to the argument for population, ibid., II, 6g1.
1
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isted between them in population, in territory, in commerce, in lan-

guage, in systems of law and in other respects, and especially the

difference in the interests which the several nations would normally

and naturally have at stake in the proceedings before the Court and

in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It provided for a Court of seven-

teen judges to be organized for a period of twelve years and that of

the seventeen, eight nations, who will be generally recognized as

having the greatest interests at stake in the exercise by the Court of

its powers, should each have a judge sitting during the whole period

of the organization.

It provided also that each of the other Powers should appoint, in

the same way, and at the same time a judge for the same period but

who should be called to the exercise of judicial functions in the Court

for variously measured periods, according to their population, terri-

torial extent, commerce and probable interest at stake before the

Court. These measured periods ranging from ten years down to one.

By this method the absolute and equal sovereignty of each of the

forty-five Powers was duly respected and their differences in other

respects not lost sight of.1
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Mr. Scott also emphasized the distinction between the right

of representation and the exercise of the right:

Each state — be it large or small, an empire of hundred of millions

or a republic of a few hundred thousands — should possess the right

to appoint, and should actually appoint, a judge of its own choice for

the full period contemplated by the convention, namely twelve years.

The exclusion of a single state from the proposed court, or the denial

isted between them in population, in territory, in commerce, in language, in systems of law and in other respects, and especially the
difference in the interests which the several nations would normally
and naturally have at stake in the proceedings before the Court and
in the exercise of its jurisdiction. It provided for a Court of seventeen judges to be organized for a period of twelve years and that of
the seventeen, eight nations, who will be generally recognized as
having the greatest interests at stake in the exercise by the Court of
its powers, should each have a judge sitting during the whole period
of the organization.
It provided also that each of the other Powers should appoint, in
the same way, and at the same time a judge for the same period but
who should be called to the exercise of judicial functions in the Court
for variously measured periods, according to their population, territorial extent, commerce and probable interest at stake before the
Court. These measured periods ranging from ten years down to one.
By this method the absolute and equal sovereignty of each of the
forty-five Powers was duly respected and their differences in other
respects not lost sight of.1

of the right of a single state to appoint, would proclaim the principle

of juridical inequality and vitiate in advance a project, however care-

fully it be drawn and however acceptable it might otherwise be.

It may be admitted, however, that the exercise of the right might

Mr. Scott also emphasized the distinction between the right
of representation and the exercise of the right:

be regulated without in any way questioning the existence of the right.

If every nation has the right to appoint, and does appoint, a judge,

it is no derogation to the principle of sovereignty and equality that

the judges so selected may sit at various times and may sit in rotation.*

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 689.

1 Ibid., II, 606. See also ibid., II, 317-320, 606-608; American Addresses, pp. 00-

96,99-103; Hague Peace Conferences, I, 457. Kamarowsky suggested in Le tribunal

international (transl. by Westman), published in 1887, that the small states might

Each state - be it large or small, an empire of hundred of millions
or a republic of a few hundred thousands - should possess the right
to appoint, and should actually appoint, a judge of its own choice for
the full period contemplated by the convention, namely twelve years.
The exclusion of a single state from the proposed court, or the denial
of the right of a single state to appoint, would proclaim the principle
of juridical inequality and vitiate in advance a project, however carefully it be drawn and however acceptable it might otherwise be.
It may be admitted, however, that the exercise of the right might
be regulated without in any way questioning the existence of the right.
If every nation has the right to appoint, and does appoint, a judge,
it is no derogation to the principle of sovereignty and equality that
the judges so selected may sit at various times and may sit in rotation.2
La Deux. Conftr., II, 689.
• Ibid., II, 6o6. Sec also ibid., II, 317-3:zo, 6o6-<io8; American Addresses, pp. 9C>96, 91r103; /I ague Peaa Confer~, I, 457. Kamarowsky suggested in Le tribunal
inla'nalional (transl. by Westman), published in 1887, that the small states might
1
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This distinction between having a political right and be-

ing able to exercise it was refuted effectively by Barbosa.

The Brazilian delegate denounced the distinction as mani-

festement sophistique:

Well, then, if the enjoyment of a right may be reduced to one year

in twelve, without diminishing its substance, the twelve months of

that single year may likewise be still further reduced without impair-

ing the right. If the exercise is reduced to six months, to three months,

to one month, it is still only the exercise that is effected. And why

not limit it then to weeks? The right will not be prejudiced. Three

weeks, one week, even one day of functioning, it is always the exer-

cise that is in question. The immunity of the right would suffer

nothing.

Barbosa's argument was summarized in the following pas-

sage:

The conditions of exercise only respect the equality of a right when

they are equal for all those who possess it. On the other hand, in-

equality in the exercise implies inequality in the right itself, because

the value of a right is really measured only by the juridical possibility

of exercising it.

This distinction between having a political right and being able to exercise it was refuted effectively by Barbosa.
The Brazilian delegate denounced the distinction as manif estement sophistique:
Well, then, if the enjoyment of a right may be reduced to one year
in twelve, without diminishing its substance, the twelve months of
that single year may likewise be still further reduced without impairing the right. If the exercise is reduced to six months, to three months,
to one month, it is still only the exercise that is effected. And why
not limit it then to weeks? The right will not be prejudiced. Three
weeks, one week, even one day of functioning, it is always the exercise that is in question. The immunity of the right would suffer
nothing.
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And then, to conclude, let us distinguish, as should have been done

at the outset, in order to solve the difficulty. There are two distinct

rights: the right to nominate and the right to sit. In the right to

nominate we will all be equal. But in the right to sit we will be ab-

Barbosa's argument was summarized in the following passage:

solutely unequal. Well then! it is this inequality which violates the

equality of states.1

Led by Barbosa,2 the delegates of the smaller states were

able to defeat any agreement as to the composition of the

proposed court. Barbosa declared that it was impossible

waive their right to equal representation on an international court. "En vertu du

principe fondamental de l'egalitfi entre les fitats, ils auraient tous le droit de designer

un nombre egal de juges. Les petits Etats pourraient, s'ils le jugeaient a propos,

ne pas user de ce droit; cependant leur voix ne serait pas transmissible." Op. ext.,

p. 409.

1 la Deux. Conffr., II, 626, 619.

1 Ibid., II, 148-155, 618-622, 624-627, 643-650. See supra, p. 183.

The conditions of exercise only respect the equality of a right when
they are equal for all those who possess it. On the other hand, inequality in the exercise implies inequality in the right itself, because
the value of a right is really measured only by the juridical possibility
of exercising it.
And then, to conclude, let us distinguish, as should have been done
at the outset, in order to solve the difficulty. There are two distinct
rights: the right to nominate and the right to sit. In the right to
nominate we will all be equal. But in the right to sit we will be absolutely unequal. Well then! it is this inequality which violates the
equality of states.1

Led by Barbosa,2 the delegates of the smaller states were
able to defeat any agreement as to the composition of the
proposed court. Barbosa declared that it was impossible
waive their right to equal representation on an international court. " En vertu du
principe fondamental de l'~alite entre les ttats, ils auraient tousle droit de designer
un nombre egal de juges. Les petits ttats pourraient, s'ils le jugeaient a propos,
ne pas user de ce droit; cependant leur voil ne serait pas transmissible." Op. cit.,
p. 499.
1 La Deux. Conftr., II, 626, 619.
1 Ibid., II, 148-155, 618-622, 6:.14--627, 643--650. See sufwa, p. 183.
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for a state to renounce its equality.1 The delegate from

Mexico insisted that the court

for a state to renounce its equality.1 The delegate from
Mexico insisted that the court

ought to be an essentially juridical organism, and in it, in conformity

with the fundamental rule of international law — the equality of

States — all countries called to the Second Peace Conference, great

or small, strong or weak, ought to be represented on the basis of the

most absolute, the most perfect equality.*

The Danish delegate declared that

the proposal of a rotation which does not recognize the absolute equal-

ity of States will not be acceptable to the Government of Denmark.3

ought to be an essentially juridical organism, and in it, in conformity
with the fundamental rule of international law - the equality of
States- all countries called to the Second Peace Conference, great
or small, strong or weak, ought to be represented on the basis of the
most absolute, the most perfect equality.2

A member of the Chilean delegation insisted that the pro-

posed court should be constituted on the same principle as

The Danish delegate declared that

the Peace Conference itself:

And the reason for this is most logical. Why, if each State votes

in the Conference as a unit in the adoption of all and each of its reso-

the proposal of a rotation which does not recognize the absolute equality of States will not be acceptable to the Government of Denmark.3

lutions, should there be a different representation in the judicial or-

ganization charged with putting them into execution? Why, if each

Nation has the importance of a unit in the legislative power which

prescribes resolutions and laws, and which is, therefore, the principal
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and the most fundamental of all the powers, why should not each

Nation have an equal representation in the judicial power charged

A member of the Chilean delegation insisted that the proposed court should be constituted on the same principle as
the Peace Conference itself:

with their application ?4

A Vceu was incorporated in the Final Act of the Confer-

ence, calling the attention of the signatory powers to the

advisability of adopting the draft convention and of bring-

ing it into operation as soon as the powers could agree on

the court's composition. The adoption of this Vceu was

made the occasion for a series of formal declarations and

reservations with regard to equality. The Brazilian decla-

ration was as follows:

On making this declaration I am instructed, however, by the Bra-

zilian Government to insist, in as precise terms as possible, that it

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 619. » Ibid., II, 650. » Ibid., II, 148.

4 Ibid., II, 180. Cf. Scott, American Addresses, p. 91.

And the reason for this is most logical. Why, if each State votes
in the Conference as a unit in the adoption of all and each of its resolutions, should there be a different representation in the judicial organization charged with putting them into execution? Why, if each
Nation has the importance of a unit in the legislative power which
prescribes resolutions and laws, and which is, therefore, the principal
and the most fundamental of all the powers, why should not each
Nation have an equal representation in the judicial power charged
with their application ? 4

A V reu was incorporated in the Final Act of the Conference, calling the attention of the signatory powers to the
advisability of adopting the draft convention and of bringing it into operation as soon as the powers could agree on
the court's composition. The adoption of this V reu was
made the occasion for a series of formal declarations and
reservations with regard to equality. The Brazilian declaration was as follows:
On making this declaration I am instructed, however, by the Brazilian Government to insist, in as precise terms as possible, that it
1
t

2 Ibid., II, 650.
La Deux. Confh'., II, 619.
Ibid., II, 18o. Cf. Scott, .4maica11 Addresses, p. 91.

1

Ibid., II,

148.
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considers as implied in this vote the recognition of the principle of

equality among sovereign States, and, therefore, the absolute exclu-

sion — in every future negotiation aiming at the organization of the

Court of Arbitration — of both the system of periodicity or rotation

in the distribution of judges, and the selection of said judges by foreign

electors.1

The Chinese delegation voted for the Voeu, adding another

wish to the effect that

henceforth the sovereign and independent rights and the equality of

considers as implied in this vote the recognition of the principle of
equality among sovereign States, and, therefore, the absolute exclusion - in every future negotiation aiming at the organization of the
Court of Arbitration - of both the system of periodicity or rotation
in the distribution of judges, and the selection of said judges by foreign
electors. 1

States, which are the fundamental principles of international arbitral

justice, may never be disregarded, as has been done in so lamentable

a fashion, and that the new Court anticipated in this wish — in case

it should be some day constituted — may have as a basis the same

The Chinese delegation voted for the V reu, adding another
wish to the effect that

principle of equality which has served in the establishment of the

permanent Court of arbitration of i8oo.*

Fifteen states made reservations in the same spirit as those

quoted above, while six states, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,

Roumania, Switzerland, and Uruguay, abstained altogether.3

In the debates on the prize court and the court of arbi-

tral justice, the political equality of states was considered
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only in its bearing on the composition of the proposed tri-

bunals. It might have been suggested that the extreme

notion of political equality would also be compromised by

henceforth the sovereign and independent rights and the equality of
States, which are the fundamental principles of international arbitral
justice, may never be disregarded, as has been done in so lamentable
a fashion, and that the new Court anticipated in this wish - in case
it should be some day constituted - may have as a basis the same
principle of equality which has served in the establishment of the
permanent Court of arbitration of 1899.2

the provisions in each convention for majority decisions,

and by the authority which was contemplated for the tri-

bunals, particularly for the prize court.4 The controversy

centered, however, about the more important matter of rep-

resentation. Although neither of these projects has been

adopted, they represent the most considered as well as the

most widely discussed plans for supernational judicial or-

ganization thus far presented as within the limits of practi-

1 La Deux. Confer., II, 148 (Perez' transl.).

» Ibid., n, 160.

» Ibid., 1,332-335; 11,144-160,177-190,335; supra, pp. 182-183.

4 See Japanese declaration, ibid., II, 20.

Fifteen states made reservations in the same spirit as those
quoted above, while six states, Belgium, Denmark, Greece,
Roumania, Switzerland, and Uruguay, abstained altogether.3
In the debates on the prize court and the court of arbitral justice, the political equality of states was considered
only in its bearing on the composition of the proposed tribunals. It might have been suggested that the extreme
notion of political equality would also be compromised by
the provisions in each convention for majority decisions,
and by the authority which was contemplated for the tribunals, particularly for the prize court.4 The controversy
centered, however, about the more important matter of representation. Although neither of these projects has been
adopted, they represent the most considered as well as the
most widely discussed plans for supernational judicial organization thus far presented as within the limits of practiLa Deux. Cunf&., II, 148 (Perez' transl.).
Ibid., II, 16o.
1 Ibid., I, 332-335; II, 144-160, 177-190, 335; supra, pp. 182-183.
' See Japanese declaration, ibid., II, 20.
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cable possibility. As such, they contribute to justify the

conclusion that the extreme conception of political equality

and effective international organization are irreconcilable,

and that as the latter develops the former must be limited

or abandoned.

Summary

The fundamental distinction between the legal equality

of states in their mutual relations and their political equal-

ity in whatever pertains to the development of international

organization cannot be emphasized too frequently. In the

present chapter this distinction has been taken as the

starting point for the consideration of some of the more

important precedents for international organization with

particular reference to the bearing which they may have

upon political equality. The international congress or con-

ference has been presented as the earliest manifestation of

a rudimentary organization; and two types have been dis-

tinguished, the one truly international, the other more

accurately described as supernational. The form of politi-
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cal equality and no inconsiderable part of its substance are

preserved in the international congress or conference by

means of equality of representation, equality of voting

strength and the unanimity rule, and equality in accepting

or rejecting the decisions which are taken ad referendum.

It is significant, however, that political equality in such an

assembly becomes less and less substantial as the interests

at stake increase in consequence, and that seriously contro-

verted questions have been resolved in a majority of in-

stances by another type of assembly. The supernational

congress or conference denies the political equality of states

by limiting equal representation to a few of the more power-

ful states, by eUminating voting, and by making decisions

which non-participating states are required to accept. This

type of organization has been the subject of repeated pro-

cable possibility. As such, they contribute to justify the
conclusion that the extreme conception of political equality
and effective international organization are irreconcilable,
and that as the latter develops the former must be limited
or abandoned.
SUMMARY

The fundamental distinction between the legal equality
of states in their mutual relations and their political equality in whatever pertains to the development of international
organization cannot be emphasized too frequently. In the
present chapter this distinction has been taken as the
starting point for the consideration of some of the more
important precedents for international organization with
particular reference to the bearing which they may have
upon political equality. The international congress or conference has been presented as the earliest manifestation of
a rudimentary organization; and two types have been distinguished, the one truly international, the other more
accurately described as supernational. The form of political equality and no inconsiderable part of its substance are
preserved in the international congress or conference by
means of equality of representation, equality of voting
strength and the unanimity rule, and equality in accepting
or rejecting the decisions which are taken ad referendum.
It is significant, however, that political equality in such an
assembly becomes less and less substantial as the interests
at stake increase in consequence, and that seriously controverted questions have been resolved in a majority of instances by another type of assembly. The supernational
congress or conference denies the political equality of states
by limiting equal representation to a few of the more powerful states, by eliminating voting, and by making decisions
which non-participating states are required to accept. This
type of organization has been the subject of repeated pro-
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tests from the smaller and less powerful states. Its develop-

ment has been rudimentary at best. Nevertheless it is asso-

ciated with a long line of important precedents, and it has

exhibited tendencies which no study of political equality

may disregard. Another tendency, more recent, but quite

clearly denned, has made its appearance in connection with

the development of international administration. Some of

the most important administrative unions have limited the

principle of political equality by admitting dependencies to

representation, by giving votes to dependencies, distributing

votes in proportion to financial contributions and providing

for majority decisions, and by apportioning the burdens of

financial support according to population, subject-matter,

or voluntary classification. International organization for

the administration of justice has not developed far enough to

give any indication of its probable bearing upon the political

equality of states, but the impossibility of reconciling such

equality and effective judicial organization has been abun-

dantly demonstrated by the discussions at The Hague with

regard to the proposed International Prize Court and the
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Court of Arbitral Justice. The experience of the past cen-

tury certainly indicates that as the society of nations is

organized more effectively for the protection and the advance-

ment of common interests the traditional notion of political

equality will have to be redefined or abandoned.

tests from the smaller and less powerful states. Its development has been rudimentary at best. Nevertheless it is associated with a long line of important precedents, and it has
exhibited tendencies which no study of political equality
may disregard. Another tendency, more recent, but quite
clearly defined, has made its appearance in connection with
the development of international administration. Some of
the most important administrative unions have limited the
principle of political equality by admitting dependencies to
representation, by giving votes to dependencies, distributing
votes in proportion to financial contributions and providing
for majority decisions, and by apportioning the burdens of
financial support according to population, subject-matter,
or voluntary classification. International organization for
the administration of justice has not developed far enough to
give any indication of its probable bearing upon the political
equality of states, but the impossibility of reconciling such
equality and effective judicial organization has been abundantly demonstrated by the discussions at The Hague with
regard to the proposed International Prize Court and the
Court of Arbitral Justice. The experience of the past century certainly indicates that as the society of nations is
organized more effectively for the protection and the advancement of common interests the traditional notion of political
equality will have to be redefined or abandoned.

CHAPTER IX

CONCLUSIONS

The principle of state equality in international law was a

creation of the publicists. It was derived from the applica-

tion to nations of theories of natural law, the state of nature,

and natural equality. An analogy was drawn between na-

tions in international society and men in a state of nature.

CHAPTER IX

Thus the natural law became the law of nations, interna-

tional society was regarded as a state of nature, and nations

were presumed to enjoy a perfect equality of natural rights.

CONCLUSIONS

The conception of state equality was first developed as part

of a coherent theory by the naturalists of the seventeenth

and eighteenth centuries. Grotius neither discussed the

conception nor based his system upon it. It was not estab-

lished by the Peace of Westphalia. It had its beginning as

a naturalist doctrine in the writings of that school of pub-

licists who acknowledged the leadership of Pufendorf and

the inspiration of Thomas Hobbes. The early positivists

developed no such conception. It was not until the middle

of the eighteenth century, in the period of Burlamaqui,

Vattel, Wolff, and Moser, that publicists of all schools in-
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cluded the equality of states among their leading principles.

Once established by the process of reasoning summarized

above, the principle was reenforced by theories of sover-

eignty. The absolute equality of sovereign states became

one of the primary postulates of le droit des gens theorique.

The principle of equality has an important legal signifi-

cance in the modern law of nations. It is the expression of

two important legal principles. The first of these may be

called the equal protection of the law or equality before the

SM

THE principle of state equality in international law was a
creation of the publicists. It was derived from the application to nations of theories of natural law, the state of nature,
and natural equality. An analogy was drawn between nations in international society and men in a state of nature.
Thus the natural law became the law of nations, international society was regarded as a state of nature, and nations
were presumed to enjoy a perfect equality of natural rights.
The conception of state equality was first developed as part
of a coherent theory by the naturalists of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. Grotius neither discussed the
conception nor based his system upon it. It was not established by the Peace of Westphalia. It had its beginning as
a naturalist doctrine in the writings of that school of publicists who acknowledged the leadership of Pufendorf and
the inspiration of Thomas Hobbes. The early positivists
developed no such conception. It was not until the middle
of the eighteenth century, in the period of Burlamaqui,
Vattel, Wolff, and Moser, that publicists of all schools included the equality of states among their leading principles.
Once established by the process of reasoning summarized
above, the principle was reenforced by theories of sovereignty. The absolute equality of sovereign states became
one of the primary postulates of le droit des gens theorique.
The principle of equality has an important legal significance in the modern law of nations. It is the expression of
two important legal principles. The first of these may be
called the equal protection of the law or equality before the
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law. States are equal before the law when they are equally

protected in the enjoyment of their rights and equally com-

pelled to fulfil their obligations. Equality before the law

is not inconsistent with the grouping of states into classes

and the attributing to the members of each class of a status

which is the measure of capacity for rights. Neither is it in-

consistent with inequalities of representation, voting power,

and contribution in international organizations. The second

principle is usually described as equality of rights and obli-

gations or more often as equality of rights. The description

is a heritage from theories of natural law and natural right.

What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights.

Equality in this sense is the negation of status. If applied

without qualification in international organizations it re-

quires equal representation, voting power, and contribution.

Equality before the law is absolutely essential to a stable

society of nations. If it is denied the alternatives are uni-

versal empire or universal anarchy. Equality of capacity

for rights, on the other hand, is not essential to the reign of
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law. Strictly speaking, it has never been anything more

than an ideal in any system of law. Among states, where

there is such an utter want of homogeneity in the physical

bases for separate existence, there are important limitations

upon its utility even as an ideal.

Notwithstanding these limitations, equality of legal ca-

pacity has its place as an ideal in the system of international

law. It must be recognized that the international legal ca-

pacity of the state may be and frequently is restricted by

its organic constitution. It must also be recognized that

many important limitations upon the legal capacity of cer-

tain states are imposed by the positive law of nations. Thor-

ough investigation of these problems from a more rational

and more scientific point of view is urgently required. On

the other hand, it is vital that the fundamental distinction

law. States are equal before the law when they are equally
protected in the enjoyment of their rights and equally compelled to fulfil their obligations. Equality before the law
is not inconsistent with the grouping of states into classes
and the attributing to the members of each class of a status
which is the measure of capacity for rights. Neither is it inconsistent with inequalities of representation, voting power,
and contribution in international organizations. The second
principle is usually described as equality of rights and obligations or more often as equality of rights. The description
is a heritage from theories of natural law and natural right.
What is really meant is an equality of capacity for rights.
Equality in this sense is the negation of status. If applied
without qualification in international organizations it requires equal representation, voting power, and contribution.
Equality before the law is absolutely essential to a stable
society of nations. If it is denied the alternatives are universal empire or universal anarchy. Equality of capacity
for rights, on the other hand, is not essential to the reign of
law. Strictly speaking, it has never been anything more
than an ideal in any system of law. Among states, where
there is such an utter want of homogeneity in the physical
bases for separate existence, there are important limitations
upon its utility even as an ideal.
Notwithstanding these limitations, equality of legal capacity has its place as an ideal in the system of international
law. It must be recognized that the international legal capacity of the state may be and frequently is restricted by
its organic constitution. It must also be recognized that
many important limitations upon the legal capacity of certain states are imposed by the positive law of nations. Thorough investigation of these problems from a more rational
and more scientific point of view is urgently required. On
the other hand, it is vital that the fundamental distinction
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between equality of legal capacity and equality in interna-

tional organization be more widely understood and appre-

ciated. At the risk of repetition, this distinction may be

explained once more by reference to general legal principles

which are more or less familiar to everyone. It is generally

assumed that equality of legal capacity among persons sub-

ject to law is the ideal toward which a system of private

law ought to develop; but it has never been regarded as a

necessary corollary that the same principle should be taken

for an ideal in perfecting national organization, much less

that it should be given practical application in the form of

equal participation in government. No civilized state has

ever tried to combine universal suffrage, the folk-moot, and

the liberum veto. It may be suggested parenthetically that

the organization of human beings on such a basis would be

less unreal and would give greater promise of success than

the organization of nations on the same principle. The

problem of international organization should not be con-

fused and complicated by attempting to insist upon the
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application of the principle of state equality. Conceding

that equality of capacity for rights is sound as a legal prin-

ciple, its proper application is limited to rules of conduct

and to the acquiring of rights and the assuming of obliga-

tions under those rules. It is inapplicable from its very

nature to rules of organization. Insistence upon complete

political equality in the constitution and functioning of an

international union, tribunal, or concert is simply another

way of denying the possibihty of effective international

organization.

between equality of legal capacity and equality in international organization be more widely understood and appreciated. At the risk of repetition, this distinction may be
explained once more by reference to general legal principles
which are more or less familiar to everyone. It is generally
assumed that equality of legal capacity among persons subject to law is the ideal toward which a system of private
law ought to develop; but it has never been regarded as a
necessary corollary that the same principle should be taken
for an ideal in perfecting national organization, much less
that it should be given practical application in the form of
equal participation in government. No civilized state has
ever tried to combine universal suffrage, the folk-moot, and
the liberum veto. It may be suggested parenthetically that
the organization of human beings on such a basis would be
less unreal and would give greater promise of success than
the organi?.ation of nations on the same principle. The
problem of international organi?.ation should not be confused and complicated by attempting to insist upon the
application of the principle of state equality. Conceding
that equality of capacity for rights is sound as a legal principle, its proper application is limited to rules of conduct
and to the acquiring of rights and the assuming of obligations under those rules. It is inapplicable from its very
nature to rules of organization. Insistence upon complete
political equality in the constitution and functioning of an
international union, tribunal, or concert is simply another
way of denying the possibility of effective international
organization.

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN THE PEACE OF PARIS

The preceding pages were written while the World War was

still undetermined. The War has since come to an end and

the major terms of a new settlement have been drafted at

the Conference of Paris.1 The new settlement is at present

only partially completed. Many of its details, indeed, have

been formulated only in prospect; and of the terms already

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER

accepted there are some which seem likely to require an

early and perhaps a radical revision. It is already evident,

however, that much will be finally included which is note-

THE EQUALITY OF STATES IN THE PEACE OF PARIS

worthy with reference to the equality of states. Although

the materials for an exhaustive study are not yet available,

it is possible, from the record at hand,2 to indicate some-

1 The preliminary Conference of delegates representing the allied and asso-

ciated powers met at Paris. Its opening session was held on January 18, 1o1o, and

it was formally dissolved on January 21, 1920. It was this Conference which deter-

mined the content of treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hun-

gary and also of several other treaties and conventions intended to supplement the

treaties of peace. The German delegation received peace terms at Versailles, the

Austrian delegation at St. Germain, and the Bulgarian and Hungarian delegations
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at Neuilly. The settlement is described throughout the present chapter as the

Peace of Paris. At the date of writing, April 20, 1920, the treaties of peace with

Bulgaria and with Hungary are available only in unofficial summaries which indi-

cate that their principal provisions are in most respects similar, mutatis mutandis,

to the treaties with Germany and with Austria. The pending treaty with Turkey

is not available in any form.

* The following documentary sources are cited in this chapter by the short titles

indicated: Rules of the Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris, 1919 (cited Con-

ference Rules), in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 109; Covenant of the League of

Nations (cited League Covenant), English text in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XHI,

128, and in Sen. Doc., No. 49, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); French and English

THE preceding pages were written while the World War was
still undetermined. The War has since come to an end and
the major terms of a new settlement have been drafted at
the Conference of Paris.1 The new settlement is at present
only partially completed. Many of its details, indeed, have
been formulated only in prospect; and of the terms already
accepted there are some which seem likely to require an
early and perhaps a radical revision. It is already evident,
however, that much will be finally included which is noteworthy with reference to the equality of states. Although
the materials for an exhaustive study are not yet available,
it is possible, from the record at hand, 2 to indicate some-

texts in Sen. Doc., No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty of Peace with Ger-

many, June 28, 1919 (cited Treaty with Germany), English text in A. J. I. L.

Suppl. (1919), XIII, 151, and in Sen. Doc., No. 49, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919);
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1 The preliminary Conference of delegates representing the allied and associated powers met at Paris. Its opening session was held on January 18, 1919, and
it was formally dissolved on January 21, 1920. It was this Conference which determined the content of treaties of peace with Germany, Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary and also of several other treaties and conventions intended to supplement the
treaties of peace. The German delegation received peace terms at Versailles, the
Austrian delegation at St. Germain, and the Bulgarian and Hungarian delegations
at Neuilly. The settlement is described throughout the present chapter as the
Peace of Paris. At the date of writing, April 20, 1920, the treaties of peace with
Bulgaria and with Hungary are available only in unofficial summaries which indicate that their principal provisions are in most respects similar, mulatis mutandis,
to the treaties with Germany and with Austria. The pending treaty with Turkey
is not available in any form.
' The following documentary sources are cited in this chapter by the short titles
indicated: Rules of the Preliminary Peace Conference at Paris, 1919 (cited Conference Rules), in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 109; Covenant of the League of
Nations (cited League Covenant), English text in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII,
128, and in Sen. Doc., No. 49, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); French and English
texts in Sen. Doc., No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty of Peace with Germany, June 28, 1919 (cited Treaty with Germany), English text in A. J. I. L.
Suppl. (1919), XIII, 151, and in Sen. Doc., No. 49, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919);
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thing of the nature and significance of the more noteworthy

provisions. An examination of these provisions is justified

by the consideration that in important respects the Peace of

Paris is the natural sequence of much that was discussed in

the preceding chapters and also by the further consideration

that this Peace will constitute the point of departure for

important international developments in the twentieth

century.

Limitations Upon the Legal Capacity of States

It seems evident, in the first place, that the new settle-

ment will make questions of status in the law of nations

more important than ever before. Existing states will be

thing of the nature and significance of the more noteworthy
provisions. An examination of these provisions is justified
by the consideration that in important respects the Peace of
Paris is the natural sequence of much that was discussed in
the preceding chapters and also by the further consideration
that this Peace will constitute the point of departure for
important international developments in the twentieth
century.

subjected to new limitations.1 A number of new states have

French and English texts in Sen. Doc., No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Com-

ments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, May 29, 1919 (cited

LIMITATIONS UPON THE LEGAL CAPACITY OF STATES

German Comments), in International Conciliation, No. 143, October, 1919; Reply

of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation

on the Conditions of Peace, June 16, 1919 (cited Allied Reply), in International

Conciliation, No. 144, November, 1919; J. R. Clark, Data on German Peace Treaty
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(cited Clark, Data), a pamphlet digest prepared for the Senate Committee on

Foreign Relations, Washington, 1919; Treaty between the five Principal Allied

and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919 (cited Treaty with Poland),

French and English texts in Sen. Doc., No. 82, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty

It seems evident, in the first place, that the new settlement will make questions of status in the law of nations
more important than ever before. Existing states will be

subjected to new limitations.1 A number of new states have

of Peace with Austria, September 10, 1919 (cited Treaty with Austria), in Sen.

Doc., No. 92, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty between the five Principal

Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania, December 9,1919 (cited Treaty with

Roumania), in Current History (1920), XI, II, 531; Convention Relating to Inter-

national Air Navigation, 1919 (cited Air Convention), French and English texts in

Sen. Doc., No. 91, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).

1 It is worth noting that the treaties take account in several instances of internal

limitations upon equality. Article 299 of the Treaty with Germany, with reference

to the dissolution of contracts between enemies, contains the following clause:

"Having regard to the provisions of the constitution and law of the United States of

America, of Brazil, and of Japan, neither the present Article, nor Article 300, nor

the Annex hereto shall apply to contracts made between nationals of these states

and German nationals; nor shall Article 305 apply to the United States of America

or its nationals." Article 300, the Annex, and Article 305 contain further pro-

visions with reference to the adjustment of contracts and the competence of the

Mixed Arbitral Tribunals which are to be established between Germany and each

of the allied and associated powers. See also Allied Reply, p. 75; Treaty with

French and English texts in Sen. Doc., No. 85, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Comments by the German Delegation on the Conditions of Peace, May 29, 1919 (cited
German Comments), in International Concilialion, No. 143, October, 1919; Reply
of the Allied and Associated Powers to the Observations of the German Delegation
on the Conditions of Peace, June 16, 1919 (cited Allied Reply), in Internalional
Concilialion, No. 144, November, 1919; J. R. Clark, Data on German Peace Trealy
(cited Clark, Dala), a pamphlet digest prepared for the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, Washington, 1919; Treaty between the five Principal Allied
and Associated Powers and Poland, June 28, 1919 (cited Treaty with Poland),
French and English texts in Sen. Doc., No. 82, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty
of Peace with Austria, September 10, 1919 (cited Treaty with Austria), in Sen.
Doc., No. 92, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Treaty between the five Principal
Allied and Associated Powers and Roumania, December 9, 1919 (cited Treaty with
Roumania), in Cu"ent History (1920), XI, II, 531; Convention Relating to International Air Navigation, 1919 (cited Air Convention), French and English texts in
Sen. Doc., No. 91, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).
1 It is worth noting that the treaties take account in several instances of internal
limitations upon equality. Article 299 of the Treaty with Germany, with reference
to the dissolution of contracts between enemies, contains the following clause:
"Having regard to the provisions of the constitution and law of the United States of
America, of Brazil, and of Japan, neither the present Article, nor Article 300, nor
the Annex hereto shall apply to contracts made between nationals of these states
and German nationals; nor shall Article 305 apply to the United States of America
or its nationals." Article 300, the Annex, and Article 305 contain further provisions with reference to the adjustment of contracts and the competence of the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals which are to be established between Germany and each
of the allied and associated powers. See also Allied Reply, p. 75; Treaty with
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arisen out of the wreck of former empires, and several of

these states are likely to occupy an insecure position in the

family of nations for some time to come. Their respective

legal capacities as persons in the international community

will be conditioned by a variety of limitations.

Some of the new states will be limited because of their

geographical situation. Several of them are inland states,

while others have only a restricted access to the sea. A

great deal of attention was given to this problem at the

Conference of Paris, and a variety of provisions for mitigat-

ing the incapacities incident to the inland state's position

are included in the settlement.1 Poland, for example, is

given an outlet on the Baltic by making the Free City of

Danzig a Polish commercial port.2 Austria is promised free

Austria, Art. 251. The General Conference of the Labor Organization is authorized

to submit its proposals in the form of recommendations or draft conventions, but

it is further provided as follows: "In the case of a federal State, the power of which

to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the

discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which such limitations
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apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions of this Article with respect to

recommendations shall apply in such case." Treaty with Germany, Art. 405;

Treaty with Austria, Art. 350. The evolution within the British Empire of what

arisen out of the wreck of former empires, and several of
these states are likely to occupy an insecure position in the
family of nations for some time to come. Their respective
legal capacities as persons in the international community
will be conditioned by a variety of limitations.
Some of the new states will be limited because of their
geographical situation. Several of them are inland states,
while others have only a restricted access to the sea. A
great deal of attention was given to this problem at the
Conference of Paris, and a variety of provisions for mitigating the incapacities incident to the inland state's position
are included in the settlement. 1 Poland, for example, is
given an outlet on the Baltic by making the Free City of
Danzig a Polish commercial port. 2 Austria is promised free

Viscount Grey has recently described as a partnership between free and independ-

ent communities finds expression in the separate representation of the British

Dominions and India in the Conference itself and also in various institutions of the

permanent organization created by the settlement.

1 In his address to the United States Senate, January 22,1917, President Wilson

said: "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards

a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct out-

let to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of

territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under

the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of

arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the

world's commerce." Cong. Record, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1917), LIV, 1742.

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 104. "The town of Danzig has been constituted

as a free city, so that the inhabitants are autonomous and do not come under Polish

rule, and form no part of the Polish state. Poland has been given certain economic

rights in Danzig, and the city itself has been severed from Germany because in no

other way was it possible to provide for that ' free and secure access to the sea'

which Germany has promised to concede." Letter transmitting the Allied Reply,

in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 549. See Allied Reply, pp. 32,34.

Austria, Art. 25i. The General Conference of the Labor Organization is authorized
to submit its proposals in the form of recommendations or draft conventions, but
it is further provided as follows: "In the case of a federal State, the power of which
to enter into conventions on labor matters is subject to limitations, it shall be in the
discretion of that Government to treat a draft convention to which such limitations
apply as a recommendation only, and the provisions of this Article with respect to
recommendations shall apply in such case." Treaty with Germany, Art. 405;
Treaty with Austria, Art. 350. The evolution within the British Empire of what
Viscount Grey has recently described as a partnership between free and independent communities finds expression in the separate representation of the British
Dominions and India in the Conference itself and also in various institutions of the
permanent organization created by the settlement.
1 In his address to the United States Senate, January 22, 1917, President Wilson
said: "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling towards
a full development of its resources and of its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the great highways of the sea. Where this cannot be done by the cession of
territory, it can no doubt be done by the neutralization of direct rights of way under
the general guarantee which will assure the peace itself. With a right comity of
arrangement no nation need be shut away from free access to the open paths of the
world's commerce." Cong. Rec01'd, 64th Cong., 2d sess. (1917). LIV, 1742.
1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 104. "The town of Danzig has been constituted
as a free city, so that the inhabitants are autonomous and do not come under Polish
rule, and form no part of the Polish state. Poland has been given certain economic
rights in Danzig, and the city itself has been severed from Germany because in no
other way was it possible to provide for that ' free and secure access to the sea '
which Germany has promised to concede." Letter transmitting the Allied Reply,
in A. J. l. L. (1919), XIII, 549. See Allied Reply, pp. 32, 34.
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access to the Adriatic.1 Bulgaria and Hungary will be as-

sured an economic outlet on the Aegean and the Adriatic

respectively. Czecho-Slovakia is given the use of free zones

in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin,2 the right to run its

own trains over Austrian railways,3 and the right to have

trunk telegraph and telephone lines provided and main-

tained for the exclusive use of its transit traffic across Aus-

trian territory.4 Articles providing freedom of transit,

freedom of navigation, through transport service, free zones

in ports, and free passage for aircraft tend to alleviate the

disadvantages of the inland state's position.6 The right of

the inland state to have a maritime flag is expressly stipu-

lated as follows:

The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise the flag flown by

the vessels of any Contracting Party having no sea-coast, which are

1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 311. "The clauses relating to ports, waterways, and

railways assure to Austria under international guarantees access to the sea by land

and water." Letter of the Allied and Associated Powers transmitting the Treaty

with Austria, p. 7, in Sen. Doc., No. 121, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).
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• Treaty with Germany, Arts. 363, 364.

access to the Adriatic.1 Bulgaria and Hungary will be assured an economic outlet on the Aegean and the Adriatic
respectively. Czecho-Slovakia is given the use of free zones
in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin,2 the right to run its
own trains over Austrian railways,3 and the right to have
trunk telegraph and telephone lines provided and maintained for the exclusive use of its transit traffic across Austrian territory.4 Articles providing freedom of transit,
freedom of navigation, through transport service, free zones
in ports, and free passage for aircraft tend to alleviate the
disadvantages of the inland state's position. 6 The right of
the inland state to have a maritime flag is expressly stipulated as follows:

• Treaty with Austria, Arts. 322-324. 4 Ibid., Art. 327.

• On freedom of transit, see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 267, 321-326, 378;

Treaty with Austria, Arts. 220, 284-289, 326, 330; Treaty with Poland, Arts. 15,

The High Contracting Parties agree to recognise the flag flown by
the vessels of any Contracting Party having no sea-coast, which are

17; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 15. On freedom of navigation and the interna-

tionalization of waterways, see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 327, 331-362, 378;

Treaty with Austria, Arts. 200-308, 330; Treaty with Poland, Art. 18; Treaty

with Roumania, Art. 16. "Arising out of the territorial settlement are the pro-

posals in regard to the international control of rivers. It is clearly in accord with

the agreed basis of the peace that inland states should have secure access to the sea

along rivers which are navigable to their territory. They [the Allied and Associated

Powers] believe that the arrangements they propose are vital to the free life of the

inland states." Letter transmitting the Allied Reply, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII,

550. "Above all, they [the Allied and Associated Powers] have aimed at securing

freedom of communications and transit to or from young landlocked states, which,

in the absence of definite guarantees, would have regained their political independ-

ence only to fall once again under the economic tutelage of Germany." Allied

Reply, p. 84. On through transport service, see Treaty with Germany, Arts.

365-369, 378; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 312-316, 330. On free zones in ports,

see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 328-330, 378. On free passage for aircraft, see

ibid., Arts. 313-320; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 276-283; Air Convention, Art. 2.

See Clark, Data, pp. 27-30.

1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 311. "The clauses relating to ports, waterways, and
railways assure to Austria under international guarantees access to the sea by land
and water." Letter of the Allied and Associated Powers transmitting the Treaty
with Austria, p. 7, in Sen. Doc., No. 121, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).
2 Treaty with Gennany, Arts. 363, 364.
4 Ibid., Art. 327.
' Treaty with Austria, Arts. 32:z-324.
• On freedom of transit, see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 267, 321-326, 378;
Treaty with Austria, Arts. 220, 284-28<), 326, 330; Treaty with Poland, Arts. 15,
17; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 15. On freedom of navigation and the internationalization of waterways, see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 327, 331-362, 378;
Treaty with Austria, Arts. 290-308, 330; Treaty with Poland, Art. 18; Treaty
with Roumania, Art. 16. "Arising out of the territorial settlement are the proposals in regard to the international control of rivers. It is clearly in accord with
the agreed basis of the peace that inland states should have secure access to the sea
along rivers which are navigable to their territory. They [the Allied and Associated
Powers) believe that the arrangements they propose are vital to the free life of the
inland states." Letter transmitting the Allied Reply, in A. J . I. L. (1919), XIII,
550. "Above all, they [the Allied and Associated Powers) have aimed at securing
freedom of communications and transit to or from young landlocked states, which,
in the absence of definite guarantees, would have regained their political independence only to fall once again under the economic tutelage of Germany." Allied
Reply, p. 84. On through transport service, see Treaty with Germany, Arts.
365-369, 378; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 31:z-316, 330. On free zones in ports,
see Treaty with Germany, Arts. 328-330, 378. On free passage for aircraft, see
ibid., Arts. 313-320; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 276-283; Air Convention, Art. 2.
See Clark, Dala, pp. 27-30.
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registered at some one specified place situated in its territory; such

place shall serve as the port of registry of such vessels.1

These various provisions and others of similar effect are

registered at some one specified place situated in its territory; such
place shall serve as the port of registry of such vessels. 1

legally significant, first, because they improve the peculiar

legal condition of those inland states which are in a position

to take advantage of them, and, secondly, because they

concede in effect that the inland state has a peculiar legal

condition which is not improved by dogmatic generaliza-

tions about equality.

Other new states will be limited in legal capacity because

of the character of their civilization. The treaties recognize

that degree and character of civilization are essential fac-

tors in determining status. Provision is made in Article 22

of the League of Nations Covenant for the tutelage of

backward communities by more advanced nations as manda-

tories on behalf of the League. It is conceded that the

character of the mandate must differ according to the stage

of development attained by the community, and it is further

recognized that
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Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire

have reached a stage of development where their existence as inde-

pendent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the ren-

dering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until

such time as they are able to stand alone.

It is because of the peculiar character of the civilization

prevailing in the states of middle and southeastern Europe,

after long years of racial and religious mteirningling and

conflict, that those states are expressly limited to certain

stipulated principles of government in their treatment of

racial, religious, and linguistic minorities.2

1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 225- See also Treaty with Germany, Art. 273.

These various provisions and others of similar effect are
legally significant, first, because they improve the peculiar
legal condition of those inland states which are in a position
to take advantage of them, and, secondly, because they
concede in effect that the inland state has a peculiar legal
condition which is not improved by dogmatic generalizations about equality.
Other new states will be limited in legal capacity because
of the character of their civilization. The treaties recognize
that degree and character of civilization are essential factors in determining status. Provision is made in Article 22
of the League of Nations Covenant for the tutelage of
backward communities by more advanced nations as mandatories on behalf of the League. It is conceded that the
character of the mandate must differ according to the stage
of development attained by the community, and it is further
recognized that

* See Treaty with Germany, Art. 93; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 51, 60, 62-69;

Treaty with Poland, Arts. 1-12; Treaty with Roumania, Arts. 1-12; Clemenceau

to Paderewski, Paris, June 24, 1919, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 416.

Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire
have reached a stage of development where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognised subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until
such time as they are able to stand alone.

It is because of the peculiar character of the civilization

prevailing in the states of middle and southeastern Europe,
after long years of racial and religious intermingling and
conflict, that those states are expressly limited to certain
stipulated principles of government in their treatment of
racial, religious, and linguistic minorities.2
Treaty with Austria, Art. n5. See also Treaty with Germany, Art. 273.
See Treaty with Germany, Art. 93; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 51, 6o, 62-6<);
Treaty with Poland, Arts. 1-12; Treaty with Roumania, Arts. 1-12; Clemenceau
to Paderewski, Paris, June 24, 1919, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 416.
1
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The limitations upon legal capacity which are incident

to protection, guaranty, neutralization, the supervision of

finance, and intervention will continue to be important for

old states and new under the terms of the new settlement.

Suzerainty finds no place in the treaties concluded to date,

but may be revived in the pending Treaty with Turkey.1

The status of neutralization is terminated for northern

Savoy, Belgium, and Luxemburg, but continues in force for

Switzerland.2 The Free City of Danzig is placed under the

protection of the League of Nations,3 and the mandate

system contemplates for other communities a kind of pro-

tection to be exercised in each instance by the mandatory on

behalf of the League.4 The Constitution of Danzig is guar-

anteed by the League.6 Treaty provisions intended to

secure the protection of minorities in central and southeast-

ern Europe are declared obligations of international concern

and are guaranteed by the League.6 It is possible that the

League's protection or guaranty will be invoked in the set-

tlement of the Adriatic question or in the readjustment now

taking place in the Near East. The rehabilitation of the
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disordered finances of many of the smaller and weaker states

is almost certain to require supervision by the stronger

powers individually or on behalf of the League.7 Pending

the complete discharge of reparation obligations imposed by

the treaties, the central powers are placed under an extraor-

dinary regime of financial supervision administered by a

1 In the German Comments, p. 13, Danzig is referred to as "a Free State under

the suzerainty of Poland." The use of the term is inappropriate, however, and

finds no support in the treaty provisions.

1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 31, 40, 43s; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 83, 84,

375-

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 102. 4 League Covenant, Art. 22.

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 103.

• Treaty with Austria, Art. 69; Treaty with Poland, Art. 12; Treaty with

Roumania, Art. 12. See supra, p. 341, note 2.

'See agreement between Great Britain and Persia, August 9, 1919, in Sen. Doc.,

No. 00, 66th Cong., istsess. (1919).

The limitations upon legal capacity which are incident
to protection, guaranty, neutralization, the supervision of
finance, and intervention will continue to be important for
old states and new under the terms of the new settlement.
Suzerainty finds no place in the treaties concluded to date,
but may be revived in the pending Treaty with Turkey. 1
The status of neutralization is terminated for northern
Savoy, Belgium, and Luxemburg, but continues in force for
Switzerland. 2 The Free City of Danzig is placed under the
protection of the League of Nations,3 and the mandate
system contemplates for other communities a kind of protection to be exercised in each instance by the mandatory on
behalf of the League. 4 The Constitution of Danzig is guaranteed by the League. 6 Treaty provisions intended to
secure the protection of minorities in central and southeastern Europe are declared obligations of international concern
and are guaranteed by the League. 6 It is possible that the
League's protection or guaranty will be invoked in the settlement of the Adriatic question or in the readjustment now
taking place in the Near East. The rehabilitation of the
disordered finances of many of the smaller and weaker states
is almost certain to require supervision by the stronger
powers individually or on behalf of the League. 7 Pending
the complete discharge of reparation obligations imposed by
the treaties, the central powers are placed under an extraordinary regime of financial supervision administered by a
1 In the German Comments, p. 13, Danzig is referred to as "a Free State under
the suzerainty of Poland." The use of the term is inappropriate, however, and
finds no support in the treaty provisions.
1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 31, 40, 435; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 83, 84,

375.
4 League Covenant, Art. 22.
Treaty with Germany, Art. 102.
• Treaty with Germany, Art. 103.
• Treaty with Austria, Art. 6<); Treaty with Poland, Art. u; Treaty with
Roumania, Art. 12. See supra, p. 341, note 2.
7 See agreement between Great Britain and Persia, August 9, 1919, in Sen. Doc.,
No. 901 66th Cong., lSt sess. (1919).
1
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powerful Reparation Commission and auxiliary agencies.1

The right of intervention is of course a corollary of most of

these relationships. The noteworthy thing about the settle-

ment in this respect, however, is not that protection, guar-

anty, supervision, and intervention are likely to have fre-

quent application in the future. The significant feature of

the new order is that in many instances at least they may be

undertaken by or on behalf of the League of Nations rather

than by a single state or group of states. If the League

functions with any degree of success, the objection fre-

quently made that such relationships have no legal import

because not generally recognized will lose most of the force

which it may have had in the past. The legal character of

such limitations may hardly be gainsaid if the time ever

comes when they are imposed by an organization which is

authorized to act for international society as a whole.

The Peace of Paris also creates a variety of limitations

upon legal capacity of the nature of servitudes. The best

known, of course, are those imposed upon the central powers,

particularly those which relate to the matter of armament.
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The military and naval forces of the central powers are to be

limited as prescribed; their armed forces are to include no

.aircraft whatever; conscription is abolished; the manu-

facture of all war materials is to be rigorously supervised

and restricted; the import or export of war materials is pro-

hibited; the construction or acquisition of submarines for

any purpose is forbidden; and important unfortified areas

are created.2 Most of these limitations have an indefinite

1 See Treaty with Germany, Part VTH; Treaty with Austria, Part VIII; Clark,

Data, pp. 36-38; German Comments, pp. 14,60-79,106-112; Allied Reply, pp. 48-

54; Letter transmitting German Comments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 542; and

the author's discussion in M. L. R. (1920), XVHI, 490-496.

2 See Treaty with Germany, Part V; Art. 198; Arts. 173-179; Arts. 168, 171;

Art. 170; Art. 191; Arts. 42, 43, 97, 115, 180, 195; Treaty with Austria, Part V;

Art. 144; Arts. 119, 125-128; Arts. 132, 135; Art. 134; Art. 140; Art. 56; Clark,

Data, p. 31; Allied Reply, pp. 39-41.

powerful Reparation Commission and auxiliary agencies. 1
The right of intervention is of course a corollary of most of
these relationships. The noteworthy thing about the settlement in this respect, however, is not that protection, guaranty, supervision, and intervention are likely to have frequent application in the future. The significant feature of
the new order is that in many instances at least they may be
undertaken by or on behalf of the League of Nations rather
than by a single state or group of states. If the League
functions with any degree of success, the objection frequently made that such relationships have no legal import
because not generally recognized will lose most of the force
which it may have had in the past. The legal character of
such limitations may hardly be gainsaid if the time ever
comes when they are imposed by an organization which is
authorized to act for international society as a whole.
The Peace of Paris also creates a variety of limitations
upon legal capacity of the nature of servitudes. The best
known, of course, are those imposed upon the central powers,
particularly those which relate to the matter of armament.
The military and naval forces of the central powers are to be
limited as prescribed; their armed forces are to include no
.aircraft whatever; conscription is abolished; the manufacture of all war materials is to be rigorously supervised
and restricted; the import or export of war materials is prohibited; the construction or acquisition of submarines for
any purpose is forbidden; and important unfortified areas
are created. 2 Most of these limitations have an indefinite
1

See Treaty with Germany, Part VIII; Treaty with Austria, Part VIII; Clark,

D<Ua, pp. 36-38; German Comments, pp. 14, 00-79, 106-n:.z; Allied Reply, pp. 48-

54; Letter transmitting German Comments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 542; and
the author's discussion in M. L. R. {1920), XVIII, 490-496.
2 See Treaty with Germany, Part V; Art. 198; Arts. 173-179; Arts. 168, 171;
Art. 170; Art. 191; Arts. 42, 43, 97, n5, 18o, 195; Treaty with Austria, Part V;
Art. 144; Arts. 119, 125-128; Arts. 132, 135; Art. 134; Art. 140; Art. 56; Clark,
Dahl, p. 31; Allied Reply, pp. 39-41.
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duration. There are many other limitations which are

equally important from the legal point of view. Mention

may be made of the internationalizing of rivers,1 the crea-

tion of free zones in ports of one state for the benefit of

another state,2 the cession of the Saar mines,3 and the ces-

sion of the right to construct riparian works on the bank

of a boundary river.4 Stipulations intended to insure free-

dom of transit and the equitable treatment of foreign com-

merce as well as provisions for the protection of racial,

religious, and linguistic minorities are to be imposed upon

most of the states of central and southeastern Europe.8 The

provisions for the protection of minorities are declared

obligations of international concern and placed under the

guaranty of the League of Nations. They can only be modi-

fied with the assent of a majority of the League Council.

Each member of the Council may call attention to any

1 See supra, p. 340, note 5; German Comments, pp. 15, 83; Letter transmitting

German Comments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XTJI, 542. See also an Open Letter to the

Allied Nations, signed by prominent Polish citizens, in New York Times, November
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10, 1010, p. 3.

* See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 328-330, 363, 364, 378; Treaty with Austria,

Art. 311. It may be noted in this connection, as illustrating the legal effect of leases

or concessions on the lessor state, that articles abrogating leases held by the central

powers in China describe China as "restored to the full exercise of her sovereign

rights in the above areas." Treaty with Germany, Art. 132: Treaty with Austria,

duration. There are many other limitations which are
equally important from the legal point of view. Mention
may be made of the internationalizing of rivers,1 the creation of free zones in ports of one state for the benefit of
another state,2 the cession of the Saar mines,3 and the cession of the right to construct riparian works on the bank
of a boundary river. 4 Stipulations intended to insure freedom of transit and the equitable treatment of foreign commerce as well as provisions for the protection of racial,
religious, and linguistic minorities are to be imposed upon
most of the states of central and southeastern Europe.6 The
provisions for the protection of minorities are declared
obligations of international concern and placed under the
guaranty of the League of Nations. They can only be modified with the assent of a majority of the League Council.
Each member of the Council may call attention to any

Art. 116.

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 45, and Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. I.

4 Treaty with Germany, Art. 358 (described as a servitude in the Treaty);

Treaty with Austria, Art. 306. See other limitations of similar nature, in Treaty

with Germany, Arts. 6S, 66, 67, 98.

6 On freedom of transit and equitable treatment of foreign commerce, see

Treaty with Germany, Arts. 264-281; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 217-233; Treaty

with Poland, Arts. 13-20; Treaty with Roumania, Arts. 13-17; supra, p. 340,

note 5, p. 341, note 2. For digest of limitations imposed on Germany's control of

its external and internal commerce, see Clark, Data, pp. 25-30. Pending a general

readjustment of international trade and commerce, it was insisted that "Germany

should temporarily be deprived of the right she claims to be treated on a footing of

complete equality with other nations." Allied Reply, p. 60.

On protection of minorities, see supra, p. 341, note 2. The stipulations for the

protection of minorities were the subject of vigorous protests from several of the

small states concerned.

1 See supra, p. 340, note 5; German Comments, pp. 15, 83; Letter transmitting
German Comments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 542. See also an Open Letter to the
Allied Nations, signed by prominent Polish citizens, in New York Times, November
10, 1919, p. 3·
2 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 328-330, 363, 364, 378; Treaty with Austria,
Art. 311. It may be noted in this connection, as illustrating the legal effect of leases
or concessions on the lessor state, that articles abrogating leases held by the central
powers in China describe China as "restored to the full exercise of her sovereign
rights in the above areas." Treaty with Germany, Art. 132: Treaty with Austria,
Art. u6.
' Treaty with Germany, Art. 45, and Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. I.
4 Treaty with Germany, Art. 358 (described as a servitude in the Treaty);
Treaty with Austria, Art. 3o6. See other limitations of similar nature, in Treaty
with Germany, Arts. 65, 66, 67, 98.
' On freedom of transit and equitable treatment of foreign commerce, see
Treaty with Germany, Arts. 264-281; Treaty with Austria, Arts. :117-233; Treaty
with Poland, Arts. 13-20; Treaty with Roumania, Arts. 13-17; supra, p. 340,
note 5, p. 341, note 2. For digest of limitations imposed on Germany's control of
its external and internal commerce, see Clark, Data, pp. 25-30. Pending a general
readjustment of international trade and commerce, it was insisted that "Germany
should temporarily be deprived of the right she claims to be treated on a footing of
complete equality with other nations." Allied Reply, p. 6o.
On protection of minorities, see supra, p. 341, note 2. The stipulations for the
protection of minorities were the subject of vigorous protests from several of the
small states concerned.
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threatened infraction of the obligations imposed and the

Council may take whatever action it considers proper and

effective. Every controversy between a state which is sub-

ject to special obligations in regard to the protection of

minorities and a state which is represented on the Council,

whether involving questions of fact or of law, is to be con-

sidered a dispute of an international character which may

be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice

for final decision.1

Two unique international persons are created by the

Treaty with Germany. By the terms of Article 49, Ger-

many renounces the government of the Saar Basin in favor

of the League of Nations in the capacity of trustee. The

government is entrusted to a Commission appointed by the

League Council and invested with all the powers of govern-

ment within the Saar Basin which have appertained hitherto

to the German Empire, Prussia, or Bavaiia. It is the Com-

mission's duty "to ensure, by such means and under such

conditions as it may deem suitable, the protection abroad of
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the interests of the inhabitants of the territory of the Saar

Basin." This anomalous regime may be made permanent,

provided a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years favors that

solution in preference to union with either Germany or

France, in which case Germany agrees "to make such

renunciation of her sovereignty in favour of the League of

Nations as the latter shall deem necessary." 2 By Article

100 of the same Treaty, Germany renounces all rights and

title over the city of Danzig and a district at the mouth of

the Vistula in favor of the United States, the British Em-

pire, France, Italy, and Japan. The five powers undertake

1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 69; Treaty with Poland, Art. i2; Treaty with

Roumania, Art. 12.

1 Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, pars. 16,17,19, 21, 34, 35. See German Comments,

pp. 32-36; Allied Reply, pp. 24-26; Letter transmitting the Allied Reply, in

A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 549-

threatened infraction of the obligations imposed and the
Council may take whatever action it considers proper and
effective. Every controversy between a state which is subject to special obligations in regard to the protection of
minorities and a state which is represented on the Council,
whether involving questions of fact or of law, is to be considered a dispute of an international character which may
be referred to the Permanent Court of International Justice
for final decision. 1
Two unique international persons are created by the
Treaty with Germany. By the terms of Article 49, Germany renounces the government of the Saar Basin in favor
of the League of Nations in the capacity of trustee. The
government is entrusted to a Commission appointed by the
League Council and invested with all the powers of government within the Saar Basin which have appertained hitherto
to the German Empire, Prussia, or Bavaria. It is the Commission's duty "to ensure, by such means and under such
conditions as it may deem suitable, the protection abroad of
the interests of the inhabitants of the territory of the Saar
Basin." This anomalous regime may be made permanent,
provided a plebiscite at the end of fifteen years favors that
solution in preference to union with either Germany or
France, in which case Germany agrees "to make such
renunciation of her sovereignty in favour of the League of
Nations as the latter shall deem necessary." 2 By Article
100 of the same Treaty, Germany renounces all rights and
title over the city of Danzig and a district at the mouth of
the Vistula in favor of the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan. The five powers undertake
1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 69; Treaty with Poland, Art. 12; Treaty with
Roumania, Art. 12.
2 Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, pars. 16, 17, 19, 21, 34, 35. See German Comments,
pp. 3z-36; Allied Reply, pp. 24-26; Letter transmitting the Allied Reply, in
A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 549.
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to establish the city and territory as a Free City which will

be placed under the protection of the League of Nations.

The Constitution of the City will be placed under the

League's guaranty. The five powers further undertake to

negotiate a treaty between Danzig and Poland which will

include the Free City within the Polish customs frontiers,

establish a free area within the port, ensure to Poland the

free use of port facilities, the control of the transportation

system, and the right to develop port facilities and the trans-

portation system, protect persons of Polish origin, speech,

or citizenship against discrimination, and provide that

"the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the

foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the

diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad."1

It was suggested in an earlier chapter that where a limited

number of states set up a supernational organization in-

equalities of capacity must arise between those states and

other states outside the organization. The point is well

illustrated in the Paris settlement. In order to ensure peace
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and promote international cooperation, the treaties provide

for a League of Nations with a well defined organization, a

carefully outlined plan for the peaceful adjustment of inter-

national disputes, a number of important covenants, and

sanctions to ensure their observance. All this involves im-

portant limitations upon the capacity of each member

state. Among member states, of course, these limitations

are expected to be more than compensated by the increased

security and mutual benefits attained. All states, however,

will not be member states. It is by no means assured that

each of the forty-five states and self-governing dominions

enumerated as original members of the League or as states

1 Arts. 102-104. See German Comments, pp. 45-46; Allied Reply, pp. 33-34;

supra, p. 339, note 2; address of President Wilson to United States Senate, July io,

1919, in A.J.I. L. (1919), XIII, 577.

to establish the city and territory as a Free City which will
be placed under the protection of the League of Nations.
The Constitution of the City will be placed under the
League's guaranty. The :five powers further undertake to
negotiate a treaty between Danzig and Poland which will
include the Free City within the Polish customs frontiers,
establish a free area within the port, ensure to Poland the
free use of port facilities, the control of the transportation
system, and the right to develop port facilities and the transportation system, protect persons of Polish origin, speech,
or citizenship against discrimination, and provide that
"the Polish Government shall undertake the conduct of the
foreign relations of the Free City of Danzig as well as the
diplomatic protection of citizens of that city when abroad." 1
It was suggested in an earlier chapter that where a limited
number of states set up a supernational organization inequalities of capacity must arise between those states and
other states outside the organization. The point is well
illustrated in the Paris settlement. In order to ensure peace
and promote international cooperation, the treaties provide
for a League of Nations with a well defined organization, a
carefully outlined plan for the peaceful adjustment of international disputes, a number of important covenants, and
sanctions to ensure their observance. All this involves important limitations upon the capacity of each member
state. Among member states, of course, these limitations
are expected to be more than compensated by the increased
security and mutual benefits attained. All states, however,
will not be member states. It is by no means assured that
each of the forty-five states and self-governing dominions
enumerated as original members of the League or as states
1 Arts. 102-104. See German Comments, pp. 45-46; Allied Reply, pp. 3J-34i
supra, p. 339, note 2; address of President Wilson to United States Senate, July lo,
1919, in A . J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 577-
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invited to accede will join at the outset.1 Moreover, the

former belligerents, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary,

the Russian states, and Turkey, and the former neutrals,

Abyssinia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and

Mexico, are neither included among the original members

nor among the states invited to accede. They may be ad-

mitted only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly in which

all members of the League are represented.2 Meanwhile

Article 17 of the Covenant contemplates that substantially

the same methods shall be invoked by the League against

non-member as against member states in order to compel

them to settle their disputes without resorting to war.* So

long as the League continues and states are divided into

members and non-members, the situation will present some

interesting and important inequalities of legal capacity

among the persons of international law.4

In one respect the Paris settlement undertakes to make

questions of status much less important. It has been pointed

out that the recognition of self-help as a legitimate remedial
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process in the law of nations makes it necessary, in deter-

mining a state's legal capacity, to take account of whatever

makes self-help an effective remedy. The treaties of 1919

attempt to amend flbis situation. In the League of Nations

Covenant and supplementary provisions throughout the

treaties there is outlined a comprehensive plan for restrict-

1 None of the treaties have been ratified by the United States at the date of

writing.

1 League Covenant, Art. 1.

* "The members of the league and the nonmembers are required, the former by

their covenant, the latter by an enforced obligation, to submit all differences be-

tween them not capable of being settled by negotiation to arbitration before a

tribunal composed as the parties may agree." Taft, in A. P. S. R. (1919), XIII, 183.

1 See German Comments, pp. 17, 25,91,117; Letter transmitting German Com-

ments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 542; Allied Reply, p. 22; Majority Report of

Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 10, 1919, p. 7,

in Sen. Rep., No. 176, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Root to Hays, March 29,1919,

regarding the League Covenant, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 580, 594-

invited to accede will join at the outset.1 Moreover, the
former belligerents, Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary,
the Russian states, and Turkey, and the former neutrals,
Abyssinia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and
Mexico, are neither included among the original members
nor among the states invited to accede. They may be admitted only by a two-thirds vote of the Assembly in which
all members of the League are represented.2 Meanwhile
Article r7 of the Covenant contemplates that substantially
the same methods shall be invoked by the League against
non-member as against member states in order to compel
them to settle their disputes without resorting to war. 3 So
long as the League continues and states are divided into
members and non-members, the situation will present some
interesting and important inequalities of legal capacity
among the persons of international law:'
In one respect the Paris settlement undertakes to make
questions of status much less important. It has been pointed
out that the recognition of self-help as a legitimate remedial
process in the law of nations makes it necessary, in determining a state's legal capacity, to take account of whatever
makes self-help an effective remedy. The treaties of r9r9
attempt to amend ftiis situation. In the League of Nations
Covenant and supplementary provisions throughout the
treaties there is outlined a comprehensive plan for restrictNone of the treaties have been ratified by the United States at the date of
writing.
s League Covenant, Art. x.
1 "The members of the league and the nonmembers are required, the former by
their covenant, the latter by an enforced obligation, to submit all differences between them not capable of being settled by negotiation to arbitration before a
tribunal composed as the parties may agree." Taft, in A. P. S. R. (1919), XIII, 183.
4 See German Comments, pp. 17, 25, 91, 117; Letter transmitting German Comments, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 542; Allied Reply, p. 22; Majority Report of
Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, September 10, 1919, p. 7,
in Sen. Rep., No. l 76, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919); Root to Hays, March 29, 1919,
regarding the League Covenant, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 58o, 594.
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ing self-help and substituting processes which are legislative,

administrative, or judicial in nature. Actual coercion,

except in extreme cases, is only to be invoked by or on be-

half of the League. This proposed substitution of organized

force for self-help, if at all successful, will do more than

anything else possibly could do to establish a real distinction

between physical or material capacity and legal capacity

among states.

Limitations Upon the Political Capacity

of States

The outstanding feature of the Peace of Paris, so far as

the equality of states is concerned, is its extensive disregard

ing self-help and substituting processes which are legislative,
administrative, or judicial in nature. Actual coercion,
except in extreme cases, is only to be invoked by or on behalf of the League. This proposed substitution of organized
force for self-help, if at all successful, will do more than
anything else possibly could do to establish a real distinction
between physical or material capacity and legal capacity
among states.

for the traditional conception of political equality.1 This is

strikingly manifested in the organization and procedure of

the Peace Conference itself, in the temporary organization

LIMITATIONS UPON THE POLITICAL CAPACITY

created to execute the settlement, and in the permanent

organization established to execute the settlement, promote

OF STATES

international cooperation, and preserve peace.

As regards the Peace Conference itself, it was hardly to be
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anticipated that even the appearance of political equality

would be preserved except among the five great powers, the

United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and

Japan. These powers alone among the great powers emerged

from the World War unshaken by external defeat or internal

revolution. It was the force at their disposal which deter-

mined the outcome of the war.2 It was the same force which

might be expected to dictate the terms of peace. Nor did the

event belie expectation. Representatives of the five great

powers summoned the Preliminary Peace Conference, which

held its first meeting at Paris on January 18,1919, and deter-

1 For the recognition of internal limitations upon political equality, see supra,

p. 338, note 1.

1 See Clemenceau to Paderewski, Paris, June 24, 1919, in A. J. I. L. Suppl.

(1919), XIII, 416, 418; Finch, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 159, 173.

The outstanding feature of the Peace of Paris, so far as
the equality of states is concerned, is its extensive disregard
for the traditional conception of political equality.1 This is
strikingly manifested in the organization and procedure of
the Peace Conference itself, in the temporary organization
created to execute the settlement, and in the permanent
organization established to execute the settlement, promote
international cooperation, and preserve peace.
As regards the Peace Conference itself, it was hardly to be
anticipated that even the appearance of political equality
would be preserved except among the :five great powers, the
United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and
Japan. These powers alone among the great powers emerged
from the World War unshaken by external defeat or internal
revolution. It was the force at their disposal which determined the outcome of the war. 2 It was the same force which
might be expected to dictate the terms of peace. Nor did the
event belie expectation. Representatives of the :five great
powers summoned the Preliminary Peace Conference, which
held its first meeting at Paris on January 18, 1919, and deter1 For the recognition of internal limitations upon political equality, see supra,
p. 338, note 1.
2 See Clemenceau to Paderewski, Paris, June 24 1919, in A. J. I. L. Suppl.
1
(1919), XIII, 416, 418; Finch, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 159, 173·
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mined in advance its organization and procedure.1 For the

mined in advance its organization and procedure.1 For the

purposes of representation and participation in the Pre-

liminary Conference, they divided the states into three

groups. The first group included the belligerent powers

with general interests, namely, the United States, the British

Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, whose delegates were en-

titled to attend all sessions of the Conference and of com-

missions. The second group included the belligerent powers

with special interests, namely, Belgium, Brazil, the British

Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala,

Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama,

Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Servia, Siam, and the Czecho-

slovak Republic, whose delegates were entitled to attend

sessions at which questions concerning them were discussed.

The third group was made up of the powers which had

broken off diplomatic relations with enemy states, namely,

Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, whose delegates also

were entitled to attend sessions at which questions concern-

ing them were discussed. It was also provided that neutral
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states and states in process of formation should be heard,

either orally or in writing, on being summoned by the five

great powers, at sessions devoted especially to questions in

which they were directly concerned and only in so far as

those questions were concerned. The apportionment of

delegates gave five to each of the five great powers, three

each to Belgium, Brazil, and Servia,2 two each to Australia,

Canada, China, Greece, the Hedjaz, India, Poland, Portu-

gal, Roumania, Siam, South Africa, and the Czecho-Slovak

Republic, and one each to the remaining states represented

at the Conference and to New Zealand.3

1 See Conference Rules, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 109; Fenwick, in

A. P. S. R. (1919). Xm, 199-212; Finch, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 159-186.

* Belgium and Servia were at first assigned two delegates each, but the protest

which followed the announcement of this decision resulted in the assignment to

each of an additional delegate.

* Conference Rules, sees. 1, 2. Each delegation was regarded as a unit.

purposes of representation and participation in the Preliminary Conference, they divided the states into three
groups. The first group included the belligerent powers
with general interests, namely, the United States, the British
Empire, France, Italy, and Japan, whose delegates were entitled to attend all sessions of the Conference and of commissions. The second group included the belligerent powers
with special interests, namely, Belgium, Brazil, the British
Dominions and India, China, Cuba, Greece, Guatemala,
Haiti, the Hedjaz, Honduras, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama,
Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Servia, Siam, and the CzechoSlovak Republic, whose delegates were entitled to attend
sessions at which questions concerning them were discussed.
The third group was made up of the powers which had
broken off diplomatic relations with enemy states, namely,
Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay, whose delegates also
were entitled to attend sessions at which questions concerning them were discussed. It was also provided that neutral
states and states in process of formation should be heard,
either orally or in writing, on being summoned by the five
great powers, at sessions devoted especially to questions in
which they were directly concerned and only in so far as
those questions were concerned. The apportionment of
delegates gave five to each of the five great powers, three
each to Belgium, Brazil, and Servia,2 two each to Australia,
Canada, China, Greece, the Hedjaz, India, Poland, Portugal, Roumania, Siam, South Africa, and the Czecho-Slovak
Republic, and one each to the remaining states represented
at the Conference and to New Zealand. 3
1 See Conference Rules, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 109; Fenwick, in
A. P. S. R. (1919), XIII, 1w-212; Finch, in A. J . I. L. (1919), XIII, 15~186.
1 Belgium and Servia were at first assigned two delegates each, but the protest
which followed the announcement of this decision resulted in the assignment to
each of an additional delegate.
• Conference Rules, secs. 1 1 2. Each delegation was regarded as a unit.
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The great powers of course controlled the Conference

organization. At the first meeting the permanent President,

four Vice-Presidents, and the Secretary General were chosen

from among the delegates of the five great powers, and rep-

resentatives from the same powers were selected to con-

stitute the Secretariat, the Committee on Credentials, and

the Drafting Committee. These officers and committees

constituted the Bureau of the Conference.1 At the second

plenary session on January 25, 1919, the Bureau submitted

draft resolutions providing for commissions to investigate

and report on a league of nations, responsibility for the war

and the enforcement of penalties, reparation, international

labor legislation, and international control of ports, water-

ways, and railways. The commission on reparation was to

consist of not more than three representatives from each of

the five great powers and not more than two each from

Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Servia. The

other commissions were to be composed in each instance of

two representatives from each of the five great powers and

five representatives to be elected by the lesser nations.
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Small state delegates protested against this allotment of

representatives and eventually received additional repre-

sentation on two of the commissions. In no case, however,

were the smaller nations allotted more than a minority of

the places on any commission or committee.2 The com-

missions sent on missions to Poland and Teschen, the com-

missions instituted to examine the territorial claims of

Roumania, Greece, and Czecho-Slovakia, the Economic

Drafting Commission, the Financial Drafting Commission,

and the Baltic Commission, among others, were each com-

posed of five representatives designated by the five great

powers.

1 See Conference Rules, sees. 5, 6, 7,15; Finch, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 167-

169.

* See ibid., 169-175, 182-184.

The great powers of course controlled the Conference
organization. At the first meeting the permanent President,
four Vice-Presidents, and the Secretary General were chosen
from among the delegates of the five great powers, and representatives from the same powers were selected to constitute the Secretariat, the Committee on Credentials, and
the Drafting Committee. These officers and committees
constituted the Bureau of the Conference. 1 At the second
plenary session on January 25, 1919, the Bureau submitted
draft resolutions providing for commissions to investigate
and report on a league of nations, responsibility for the war
and the enforcement of penalties, reparation, international
labor legislation, and international control of ports, waterways, and railways. The commission on reparation was to
consist of not more than three representatives from each of
the five great powers and not more than two each from
Belgium, Greece, Poland, Roumania, and Servia. The
other commissions were to be composed in each instance of
two representatives from each of the five great powers and
five representatives to be elected by the lesser nations.
Small state delegates protested against this allotment of
representatives and eventually received additional representation on two of the commissions. In no case, however,
were the smaller nations allotted more than a minority of
the places on any commission or committee.2 The commissions sent on missions to Poland and Teschen, the commissions instituted to examine the territorial claims of
Roumania, Greece, and Czecho-Slovakia, the Economic
Drafting Commission, the Financial Drafting Commission,
and the Baltic Commission, among others, were each composed of five representatives designated by the five great
powers.
1

See Conference Rules, secs. 51 6, 71 15; Finch, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 167-

169.
I

See ibid. 1 16()-1751 182-184.
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At no time, indeed, was the participation of the lesser

states in the work of the Conference really significant. The

Preliminary Conference held only a few plenary sessions

before the German delegates were called in to receive the

terms at Versailles, and these plenary sessions were con-

fined to the mere formality of receiving and ratifying reports

from the various commissions. The real Conference was

made up of representatives from the great powers who alone

under the rules were entitled to attend all sessions. Their

meetings were as much meetings of the Peace Conference as

the plenary sessions and their decisions were not subject to

confirmation or review by the larger body. They functioned

at first through the so-called Council of Ten made up of two

representatives from each of the five powers, later through

the Council of Five consisting of one representative of each

of the five powers, and finally, when it proved unnecessary

to have a Japanese representative present except as the in-

terests of Japan were involved, through the Council of Four

composed of the President of the United States and the

prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy. All
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important decisions were made by these inner cabinets of

the Conference sitting in secret session.1

Political equality has been disregarded quite as completely

in the temporary organization established to ensure the

execution of the settlement. This organization is one of the

striking features of the Peace of Paris. Its typical instru-

mentality is a commission created to supervise, control, or

actually undertake the execution of terms imposed upon

1 For a vivid and very critical account, see Keynes, Economic Consequences of the

Peace, ch. 3. Cf. accounts of the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Paris, and the

Congress of Berlin by Hazen, Thayer, and Lord, in Three Peace Congresses of the

Nineteenth Century, pp. 1-69. When the Conference was dissolved on January 21,

1920, a Council of Ambassadors was constituted to supervise routine matters con-

nected with the execution of the settlement, while important issues of international

policy were remitted to the decision of the Council of Premiers dominated by the

allied great powers of Europe. Current History (1920), XI, II, 384.

At no time, indeed, was the participation of the lesser
states in the work of the Conference really significant. The
Preliminary Conference held only a few plenary sessions
before the German delegates were called in to receive the
terms at Versailles, and these plenary sessions were confined to the mere formality of receiving and ratifying reports
from the various commissions. The real Conference was
made up of representatives from the great powers who alone
under the rules were entitled to attend all sessions. Their
meetings were as much meetings of the Peace Conference as
the plenary sessions and their decisions were not subject to
confirmation or review by the larger body. They functioned
at first through the so-called Council of Ten made up of two
representatives from each of the five powers, later through
the Council of Five consisting of one representative of each
of the five powers, and finally, when it proved unnecessary
to have a Japanese representative present except as the interests of Japan were involved, through the Council of Four
composed of the President of the United States and the
prime ministers of Great Britain, France, and Italy. All
important decisions were made by these inner cabinets of
the Conference sitting in secret session. 1
Political equality has been disregarded quite as completely
in the temporary organization established to ensure the
execution of the settlement. This organization is one of the
striking features of the Peace of Paris. Its typical instrumentality is a commission created to supervise, control, or
actually undertake the execution of terms imposed upon
1 For a vivid and very critical account, see Keynes, &onomic Consequences of the
Peace, ch. 3. Cf. accounts of the Congress of Vienna, the Congress of Paris, and the
Congress of Berlin by Hazen, Thayer, and Lord, in Three Peace Congresses of the
NineteenJh Century, pp. 1-6<). When the Conference was dissolved on January 21,
1920, a Council of Ambassadors was constituted to supervise routine matters connected with the execution of the settlement, while important issues of international
policy were remitted to the decision of the Council of Premiers dominated by the
allied great powers of Europe. Cuffent History (1920), XI, II, 384.
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defeated states.1 Thus the various military, naval, and air

disarmament clauses, for the execution of which a time limit

is prescribed, are to be executed under the supervision of

Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.2 Plebiscites in Upper

Silesia, East Prussia, Schleswig, and the Klagenfurt area are

each to be conducted under the control of an International

Commission.3 New boundaries are to be delimited by

Boundary Commissions.4 The Saar Basin, renounced in

favor of the League of Nations as trustee, is to be governed

for fifteen years at least by a Governing Commission repre-

senting the League.6 The whole question of reparation in

all its ramifications is referred for administration to a power-

ful Reparation Commission.6 The allied and associated

powers are represented in the occupied territory of Germany

by the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission.7 Other commis-

sions and tribunals participate in the execution of less im-

1 For fuller discussion of the temporary organization provided in the Treaty with

Germany, see the author's article in M. L. R. (1920), XVIII, 484-507.

J Treaty with Germany, Arts. 203-210; Protocol supplementary to Treaty
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with Germany, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 385; Treaty with Austria, Arts.

140-155. It may be anticipated that similar commissions will be provided in the

other treaties.

• Treaty with Germany, Art. 88 and Part III, Sec. VIII, Annex; Arts. 04-95;

Arts. 96-97; Art. 109; Treaty with Austria, Art. 50. It may be anticipated that

similar commissions will be created wherever plebiscites are provided in the other

defeated states.1 Thus the various military, naval, and air
disarmament clauses, for the execution of which a time limit
is prescribed, are to be executed under the supervision of
Inter-Allied Commissions of Control.2 Plebiscites in Upper
Silesia, East Prussia, Schleswig, and the Klagenfurt area are
each to be conducted under the control of an International
Commission.3 New boundaries are to be delimited by
Boundary Commissions. 4 The Saar Basin, renounced in
favor of the League of Nations as trustee, is to be governed
for fifteen years at least by a Governing Commission representing the League. 5 The whole question of reparation in
all its ramifications is referred for administration to a powerful Reparation Commission. 6 The allied and associated
powers are represented in the occupied territory of Germany
by the Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission.7 Other commissions and tribunals participate in the execution of less im-

treaties.

4 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 35, 48, 83, 87, 101, 111; Treaty with Austria,

Arts. 29, 36, 48, 55. It may be anticipated that similar commissions will be pro-

vided in the other treaties.

• Treaty with Germany, Art. 49 and Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. II.

• Treaty with Germany, Part VIII, Sec. I; Treaty with Austria, Part VHI,

Sec. I; M. L. R. (1920), XVIII, 490-496. The Reparation Commission is created

by the Treaty with Germany. The same Commission administers the reparation

problem under the Treaty with Austria with a slight modification as regards the

representation of small nations and with a special section of consultative or dele-

gated powers only to consider special questions raised by the application of that

Treaty. See infra, p. 354. It is not unlikely that the same Commission will at least

supervise reparation under the other treaties.

7 Agreement between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France,

and Germany, with reference to the military occupation of the Rhine, Art. 2, in

Sen. Doc. No. 75, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).

1 For fuller discussion of the temporary organization provided in the Treaty with
Germany, see the author's article in M. L. R. (1920), XVIII, 484-507.
2 Treaty 'With Germany, Arts. 203-210; Protocol supplementary to Treaty ·
with Germany, in A. J. I. L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 385; Treaty with Austria, Arts.
14cr-155. It may be anticipated that similar commissions will be provided in the
other treaties.
1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 88 and Part III, Sec. VIII, Annex; Arts. 94-95;
Arts. 96-1)7; Art. lOQi Treaty with Austria, Art. 50. It may be anticipated that
similar commissions will be created wherever plebiscites are provided in the other
treaties.
• Treaty with Germany, Arts. 35 1 48 1 83, 87 1 101, 111; Treaty with Austria,
Arts. 29, 36, 48, 55. It may be anticipated that similar commissions will be provided in the other treaties.
6 Treaty with Germany, Art. 49 and Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. II.
• Treaty with Germany, Part VIII, Sec. I; Treaty with Austria, Part VIII,
Sec. I; M. L. R. (1920), XVIII, 4~496. The Reparation Commission is created
by the Treaty with Germany. The same Commission administers the reparation
problem under the Treaty with Austria with a slight modification as regards the
representation of small nations and with a special section of consultative or delegated powers only to consider special questions raised by the application of that
Treaty. See infra, p. 354. It is not unlikely that the same Commission will at least
supervise reparation under the other treaties.
7 Agreement between the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, France,
and Germany, with reference to the military occupation of the Rhine, Art. 2, in
Sen. Doc. No. 75, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919).
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portant provisions of the settlement. Mention may be made

of the commissions in charge of the repatriation of war

prisoners and interned civilians, the identification and care

of war graves, the apportionment of social and state insur-

ance reserves, the apportionment of railway rolling stock,

the repurchase price of the Saar mines, and the delimitation

of free zones in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin.1 The

treaties also provide for Mixed Arbitral Tribunals to decide

many of the questions which may arise under clauses dealing

with debts, property rights and interests, contracts, pre-

scriptions, judgments, and industrial property.2

The salient characteristics of this temporary organization

are squarely in conflict with the traditional idea of political

equality. In the first place, the regime is dominated at

every point by the great powers.3 The Inter-Allied Com-

missions of Control are appointed by the great powers. The

same powers appoint the International Commissions in con-

trol of the plebiscite areas, except that Japan makes no

appointment in Upper Silesia or the Klagenfurt, while Nor-
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way and Sweden are each invited to appoint one member in

Schleswig and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Austria are

represented in the first and second zones respectively of the

Klagenfurt district. Interested states are represented on

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 215; Art. 225; Art. 312; Art. 371; Part III,

Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. Ill, par. 36; Art. 364; Treaty with Austria, Art. 161; Art.

171; Art. 275; Arts. 318, 319. It may be anticipated that commissions similar to

some of the above will be provided in the other treaties.

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 304 and Annex; Treaty with Austria, Art. 256 and

Annex. It may be anticipated that similar tribunals will be provided in the other

treaties.

■ Only Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan of the great powers have been

represented on the various commissions to date. The defeat of ratification in the

United States Senate has prevented participation by the United States. One of

the reservations proposed by the majority party in the Senate would prevent the

appointment of representatives by the United States except pursuant to an act of

Congress providing for the appointment and defining the appointee's powers and

duties. See Cong. Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919), LViil, 8773, and 2d sess.

portant provisions of the settlement. Mention may be made
of the commissions in charge of the repatriation of war
prisoners and interned civilians, the identification and care
of war graves, the apportionment of social and state insurance reserves, the apportionment of railway rolling stock,
the repurchase price of the Saar mines, and the delimitation
of free wnes in the ports of Hamburg and Stettin. 1 The
treaties also provide for Mixed Arbitral Tribunals to decide
many of the questions which may arise under clauses dealing
with debts, property rights and interests, contracts, prescriptions, judgments, and industrial property.2
The salient characteristics of this temporary organization
are squarely in conflict with the traditional idea of political
equality. In the first place, the regime is dominated at
every point by the great powers.3 The Inter-Allied Commissions of Control are appointed by the great powers. The
same powers appoint the International Commissions in control of the plebiscite areas, except that Japan makes no
appointment in Upper Silesia or the Klagenfurt, while Norway and Sweden are each invited to appoint one member in
Schleswig and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state and Austria are
represented in the first and second wnes respectively of the
Klagenfurt district. Interested states are represented on

(1920), LDC, daily number, March 4,1920, 4147-4149.

Treaty with Germany, Art. 215; Art. 225; Art. 312; Art. 371; Part III,
Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. III, par. 36; Art. 364; Treaty with Austria, Art. 161; Art.
171; Art. 275; Arts. 318, 319. It may be anticipated that commissions similar to
some of the above will be provided in the other treaties.
1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 304 and Annex; Treaty with Austria, Art. 256 and
Annex. It may be anticipated that similar tribunals will be provided in the other
treaties.
1 Only Great Britain, France, Italy, and Japan of the great powers have been
represented on the various commissions to date. The defeat of ratification in the
United States Senate bas prevented participation by the United States. One of
the reservations proposed by the majority party in the Senate would prevent the
appointment of representatives by the United States except pursuant to an act of
Congress providing for the appointment and defining the appointee's powers and
duties. See Cong. Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919), LVIII, 8773, and 2d sess.
(1920), LIX, daily number, March 4, 1920, 4147-4149.
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the International Boundary Commissions, but three of the

five or five of the seven commissioners, as the case may be,

are appointed in each instance by the great powers. The

great powers control the Governing Commission of the

Saar through their control of the League Council which ap-

points and removes members of the Commission. The

Reparation Commission, as constituted by the Treaty with

Germany, is composed of seven delegates, one appointed by

each of the great powers, one by the Serb-Croat-Slovene

state, and one by Belgium. The working membership, how-

ever, is always limited to the delegates of five powers. Those

appointed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and

Italy always participate, while those appointed by the other

three powers participate in turn according to the nature of

the question before the Commission.1 Under the Treaty

with Austria, the place occupied by the Serb-Croat-Slovene

representative is taken by a delegate appointed for one year

by the representatives of Greece, Poland, Roumania, the

Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-Slovakia and chosen
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successively from the nationals of each of those states. A

section of the Commission with consultative or delegated

powers only, created to consider special questions raised by

the application of the Austrian Treaty, consists of repre-

sentatives of four of the great powers and the five states

named above, but it is significant that the great powers

represented are given two votes each.2 The Inter-Allied

Rhineland Commission is composed of representatives of

the four powers whose armies are in the occupied territory,

namely, the United States, Belgium, the British Empire,

and France.3 The principal powers also control several of

the less important commissions. In addition to dominating

1 Part VIII, Sec. I, Annex II, par. 2.

1 Ibid., pars. 2, 3. The great powers will undoubtedly dominate any agencies

created to administer the reparation problem in other states.

3 Agreement, Art. 2, cited supra, p. 352, note 7.

the International Boundary Commissions, but three of the
five or five of the seven commissioners, as the case may be,
are appointed in each instance by the great powers. The
great powers control the Governing Commission of the
Saar through their control of the League Council which appoints and removes members of the Commission. The
Reparation Commission, as constituted by the Treaty with
Germany, is composed of seven delegates, one appointed by
each of the great powers, one by the Serb-Croat-Slovene
state, and one by Belgium. The working membership, however, is always limited to the delegates of five powers. Those
appointed by the United States, Great Britain, France, and
Italy always participate, while those appointed by the other
three powers participate in turn according to the nature of
the question before the Commission.1 Under the Treaty
with Austria, the place occupied by the Serb-Croat-Slovene
representative is taken by a delegate appointed for one year
by the representatives of Greece, Poland, Roumania, the
Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-Slovakia and chosen
successively from the nationals of each of those states. A
section of the Commission with consultative or delegated
powers only, created to consider special questions raised by
the application of the Austrian Treaty, consists of representatives of four of the great powers and the five states
named above, but it is significant that the great powers
represented are given two votes each. 2 The Inter-Allied
Rhineland Commission is composed of representatives of
the four powers whose armies are in the occupied territory,
namely, the United States, Belgium, the British Empire,
and France.3 The principal powers also control several of
the less important commissions. In addition to dominating
Part VIII, Sec. I, Annex II, par. 2.
Ibid., pars. 2, 3. The great powers will undoubtedly dominate any agencies
created to administer the reparation problem in other states.
3 Agreement, Art. 2, cited s11pra, p. 352, note 7.
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all important institutions of the temporary organization

described above, the great powers constitute themselves a

directing committee to which are entrusted a host of im-

portant functions in connection with the execution of the

settlement. The major treaties begin with a distinction set

forth in the preamble between the great powers, described

as "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," and the

other powers "constituting with the Principal Powers men-

tioned above the Allied and Associated Powers." 1 Import-

ant functions throughout are entrusted either to the Prin-

cipal Powers or to some institution which they expect to

control. So it is that in addition to their control of the Inter-

Allied Commissions the Principal Powers as such are in

charge of the disarmament of defeated states;2 in addition

to their predominant position on the Boundary Commis-

sions they are recognized in several instances as the supreme

authority in control of the delimitation of frontiers;3 they

receive and undertake to dispose of territory renounced by

defeated states,4 as well as other property rights and in-

terests; 6 they undertake to constitute the Free City of
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Danzig and to negotiate a treaty which will make it for

most practical purposes a part of the Polish Republic;6

1 Treaty with Germany; Treaty with Austria. The secondary powers signing

these treaties included one African state, Liberia, three Asiatic states, China, the

Hedjaz, and Siam, seven European states, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal,

Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-Slovakia, and eleven Latin

American states, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,

Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.

* See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 182, 184, 185,

186,188,192,193,195,197, 202; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 130,131,133,136,141,

143,148.

* See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 80, 81, 88, 11o; Treaty with Austria, Arts.

29. S9. 89-

* See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 99, 11o; Treaty with Austria, Art. 91. The

great powers will of course undertake most of the mandates over territories re-

nounced by the defeated states.

all important institutions of the temporary organization
described above, the great powers constitute themselves a
directing committee to which are entrusted a host of important functions in connection with the execution of the
settlement. The major treaties begin with a distinction set
forth in the preamble between the great powers, described
as "the Principal Allied and Associated Powers," and the
other powers "constituting with the Principal Powers mentioned above the Allied and Associated Powers." 1 Important functions throughout are entrusted either to the Principal Powers or to some institution which they expect to
control. So it is that in addition to their control of the InterAllied Commissions the Principal Powers as such are in
charge of the disarmament of defeated states; 2 in addition
to their predominant position on the Boundary Commissions they are recognized in several instances as the supreme
authority in control of the delimitation of frontiers; 3 they
receive and undertake to dispose of territory renounced by
defeated states,' as well as other property rights and interests; 6 they undertake to constitute the Free City of
Danzig and to negotiate a treaty which will make it for
most practical purposes a part of the Polish Republic; 6

1 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 107, 118, Part VTH, Sec. I, Annex VTJ, Art.

259; Treaty with Austria, Art. 95, Part VIII, Sec. I, Annex VI, Arts. 210, 300.

■ See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 100, 102, 104; supra, p. 346.

Treaty with Germany; Treaty with Austria. The secondary powers signing
these treaties included one African state, Liberia, three Asiatic states, China, the
Hedjaz, and Siam, seven European states, Belgium, Greece, Poland, Portugal,
Roumania, the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, and Czecho-Slovakia, and eleven Latin
American states, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and Uruguay.
1 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 163, 166, 167, 168, 169, 172, 182, 184, 185,
186, 188, 192, 193, 195, 197, 202; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 130, 131, 133, 136, 141,
1

143, 148.
' See Treaty with Germany, Arts. Bo, 81, 88, no; Treaty with Austria, Arts.
29, 59, 89.
• See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 99, no; Treaty with Austria, Art. 91. The

great powers will of course undertake most of the mandates over territories renounced by the defeated states.
1 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 107, n8, Part VIII, Sec. I, Annex VII, Art.
259; Treaty with Austria, Art. 95, Part VIII, Sec. I, Annex VI, Arts. 210, 300.
1 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. loo, 102, 104; supra, p. 346.
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they control the supply of food and raw materials to the

defeated states;1 and they undertake to negotiate treaties

with the states of central and southeastern Europe which

will ensure the protection of minorities, freedom of transit,

and the equitable treatment of foreign commerce.2

In the second place, many of the commissions and the

Mixed Arbitral Tribunals reach their decisions by majority

vote. The need for effective action has resulted in a sweep-

ing modification of the time-honored unanimity rule. Ma-

jority decisions are expressly stipulated for the plebiscite

Commissions, the Boundary Commissions, the Governing

Commission of the Saar, the commissions on the apportion-

ment of insurance reserves, the commission on the repur-

chase price of the Saar mines, and the Mixed Arbitral

Tribunals. The Reparation Commission is bound by the

unanimity requirement in deciding six enumerated kinds of

questions, but other questions are decided by majority

vote. In the special section of this Commission created by

the Austrian Treaty majority control is assured to the great
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powers by giving each of their representatives two votes.

In the absence of express provision to the contrary, the

chairman of each commission created by the treaties is

given a second vote in case of a tie.3

In the third place, the institutions of the temporary or-

ganization are invested in varying degree with real powers

of control. So far from being mere diplomatic bodies, whose

decisions are made ad referendum, they are real governing

institutions within the more or less limited scope of their

authority. This is of course conspicuously true in case of a

1 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 23S, 251; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 181, 200.

2 See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 86, 93; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 51, 57, 60;

Treaty with Poland; Treaty with Roumania; Clemenceau to Paderewski, Paris,

June 24, 1919, in A. J. I. L. Sup pi. (1919), XIII, 416, 417-419. See also Treaty

with Germany, Arts. 31, 41, 65, 227; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 83, 380; Treaty

with Poland, Art. 21.

• Treaty with Germany, Art. 437; Treaty with Austria, Art. 379.

they control the supply of food and raw materials to the
defeated states; 1 and they undertake to negotiate treaties
with the states of central and southeastern Europe which
will ensure the protection of minorities, freedom of transit,
and the equitable treatment of foreign commerce.2
In the second place, many of the commissions and the
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals reach their decisions by majority
vote. The need for effective action has resulted in a sweeping modification of the time-honored unanimity rule. Majority decisions are expressly stipulated for the plebiscite
Commissions, the Boundary Commissions, the Governing
Commission of the Saar, the commissions on the apportionment of insurance reserves, the commission on the repurchase price of the Saar mines, and the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunals. The Reparation Commission is bound by the
unanimity requirement in deciding six enumerated kinds of
questions, but other questions are decided by majority
vote. In the special section of this Commission created by
the Austrian Treaty majority control is assured to the great
powers by giving each of their representatives two votes.
In the absence of express provision to the contrary, the
chairman of each commission created by the treaties is
given a second vote in case of a tie.3
In the third place, the institutions of the temporary organization are invested in varying degree with real powers
of control. So far from being mere diplomatic bodies, whose
decisions are made ad referendum, they are real governing
institutions within the more or less limited scope of their
authority. This is of course conspicuously true in case of a
See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 235, 251; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 181, 200.
See Treaty with Germany, Arts. 86, 93; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 51, 57, 6o;
Treaty with Poland; Treaty with Roumania; Clemenceau to Paderewsk.i, Paris,
June 24, 1919, in A. J. I . L. Suppl. (1919), XIII, 416, 417-419. See also Treaty
with Germany, Arts. 31, 41, 65, 227; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 83, 38o; Treaty
with Poland, Art. 21.
1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 437; Treaty with Austria, Art. 379.
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body like the Governing Commission of the Saar Basin. It

would seem to be true in some degree at least of such agencies

as the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which represent

the governments of the Principal Powers in all that pertains

to the disarmament of the defeated states. It is a striking

characteristic of other agencies of the temporary regime.

The International Commissions in control of plebiscite

areas are invested with important powers of government

and administration. The International Boundary Com-

missions are empowered to delimit frontiers on the spot,

taking account of local boundaries and economic interests,

and it is expressly stipulated that their decisions shall be

binding upon the parties concerned. The Reparation Com-

mission is the most powerful of all the instrumentalities

established primarily to execute the settlement.1 It is

charged with general supervision and control over an extraor-

dinarily complicated reparation program.2 The greater

number of its functions, of course, are ministerial in nature.

It receives all money, goods, and valuable rights which are
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1 For an exhaustive analysis of the Commission's functions under the Treaty

with Germany, see the author's article in M. L. R. (1920), XVIII, 491-496. The

Commission is invested with similar functions, mutatis mutandis, under the Treaty

with Austria.

The German delegation protested vigorously against the powers accorded the

Reparation Commission. "The Commission is plainly to have power to administer

Germany like the estate of a bankrupt." "It is impossible for any state, especially

for a democratic one, to renounce its sovereign rights to the extent demanded."

"The Reparation Commission, as is planned at present, would actually be the abso-

lute master of Germany. It would order Germany's economic affairs at home and

abroad." "The Commission, which is to have its permanent seat outside Germany,

will possess incomparably greater rights in Germany than a German emperor has

ever had; under its regime the German people would be for many decades without

rights, deprived of all independence and of all initiative in commerce and industry

and even in popular education, to a greater extent than ever a nation was in the

time of absolutism." German Comments, pp. 14, 66, io8, 11o. While the German

protest was undoubtedly exaggerated, the allied reply is hardly consistent with the

obvious meaning of important treaty provisions. See Allied Reply, p. 50.

* "The vast extent and manifold character of the damage caused to the Allied

and Associated Powers in consequence of the war has created a reparation problem

of extraordinary magnitude and complexity, only to be solved by a continuing body.

body like the Governing Commission of the Saar Basin. It
would seem to be true in some degree at least of such agencies
as the Inter-Allied Commissions of Control which represent
the governments of the Principal Powers in all that pertains
to the disarmament of the defeated states. It is a striking
characteristic of other agencies of the temporary regime.
The International Commissions in control of plebiscite
areas are invested with important powers of government
and administration. The International Boundary Commissions are empowered to delimit frontiers on the spot,
taking account of local boundaries and economic interests,
and it is expressly stipulated that their decisions shall be
binding upon the parties concerned. The Reparation Commission is the most powerful of all the instrumentalities
established primarily to execute the settlement.1 It is
charged with general supervision and control over an extraordinarily complicated reparation program.2 The greater
number of its functions, of course, are ministerial in nature.
It receives all money, goods, and valuable rights which are
1 For an exhaustive analysis of the Commission's functions under the Treaty
with Germany, see the author's article in M. L. R. (1920) , XVIII, 491-4<)6. The
Commission is invested with similar functions, mutaJis mutandis, under the Treaty
with Austria.
The German delegation protested vigorously against the powers accorded the
Reparation Commission. "The Commission is plainly to have power to administer
Germany like the estate of a bankrupt." "It is impossible for any state, especially
for a democratic one, to renounce its sovereign rights to the extent demanded."
"The Reparation Commission, as is planned at present, would actually be the absolute master of Germany. It would order Germany's economic affairs at home and
abroad." "The Commission, which is to have its permanent seat outside Germany,
will possess incomparably greater rights in Germany than a German emperor has
ever had; under its regime the German people would be for many decades without
rights, deprived of all independence and of all initiative in commerce and industry
and even in popular education, to a greater extent than ever a nation was in the
time of absolutism." German Comments, pp. 14, 66, 108, no. While the German
protest was undoubtedly exaggerated, the allied reply is hardly consistent with the
obvious meaning of important treaty provisions. See Allied Reply, p. 50.
2 "The vast extent and manifold character of the damage caused to the Allied
and Associated Powers in consequence of the war has created a reparation problem
of extraordinary magnitude and complexity, only to be solved by a continuing body.
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required to be paid over or transferred as a part of the rep-

aration program, approves estimates, assesses the value of

various kinds of property for credit on the reparation ac-

counts, makes calculations of one sort or another according

to principles denned in the treaties, and prescribes the de-

tails of a great variety of transactions. In its most import-

ant functions, however, the Commission is by no means

restricted to ministerial administration. The determination

of the total reparation obligation which the defeated states

will be expected to assume in each instance may be de-

scribed more appropriately as a judicial function. The

power to hear and decide claims in regard to the physical

restoration of invaded areas is of a similar nature. Other

important powers are administrative in the sense in which

that term is understood in Europe and in which it has more

recently come to be understood in America. They involve

wide discretion in matters of the greatest moment, including

the construction and delivery of merchant shipping, de-

liveries of coal and other products, the acquisition and sur-
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render of interests in public utilities and concessions abroad,

investigations of the resources of defeated states, and the

securing and discharging of enormous reparation obliga-

tions. The Commission's decisions, made in accordance

with the powers conferred upon it, go into effect at once

without further ratification or approval. As regards Ger-

many, at least, they are sanctioned by an express provision

for the use of military force.1 The Inter-Allied Rhineland

Commission is invested with authority to issue ordinances

having the force of law, both for the occupying military

limited in personnel and invested with broad powers to deal with the problem in

relation to the general economic situation. The Allied and Associated Powers,

recognizing this situation, themselves delegate power and authority to a Reparation

Commission." Allied Reply, p. 49.

1 If the Commission finds at any time that Germany refuses to observe its

reparation obligations, parts of the Rhine territory which have been evacuated by

forces of the allied and associated powers will be immediately reoccupied. Art. 430.

required to be paid over or transferred as a part of the reparation program, approves estimates, assesses the value of
various kinds of property for credit on the reparation accounts, makes calculations of one sort or another according
to principles defined in the treaties, and prescribes the details of a great variety of transactions. In its most important functions, however, the Commission is by no means
restricted to ministerial administration. The determination
of the total reparation obligation which the defeated states
will be expected to assume in each instance may be described more appropriately as a judicial function. The
power to hear and decide claims in regard to the physical
restoration of invaded areas is of a similar nature. Other
important powers are administrative in the sense in which
that term is understood in Europe and in which it has more
recently come to be understood in America. They involve
wide discretion in matters of the greatest moment, including
the construction and delivery of merchant shipping, deliveries of coal and other products, the acquisition and surrender of interests in public utilities and concessions abroad,
investigations of the resources of defeated states, and the
securing and discharging of enormous reparation obligations. The Commission's decisions, made in accordance
with the powers conferred upon it, go into effect at once
without further ratification or approval. As regards Germany, at least, they are sanctioned by an express provision
for the use of military force. 1 The Inter-Allied Rhineland
Commission is invested with authority to issue ordinances
having the force of law, both for the occupying military
limited in personnel and invested with broad powers to deal with the problem in
relation to the general economic situation. The Allied and Associated Powers,
recognizing this situation, themselves delegate power and authority to a Reparation
Commission." Allied Reply, p. 49.
1 If the Commission finds at any time that Germany refuses to observe its
reparation obligations, parts of the Rhine territory which have been evacuated by
forces of the allied and associated powers will be immediately reoccupied. Art. 430.
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authorities and the German civil authorities, "so far as may

be necessary for securing the maintenance, safety, and re-

quirements of the allied and associated forces," and also to

declare a state of siege in all or part of the occupied territory

whenever it is deemed necessary.1 Reference thus far has

been made only to the formally constituted commissions.

It should also be observed that wherever the great powers

have constituted themselves an informal council or com-

mittee to execute the settlement there is real power of con-

trol coupled with sanctions of the most effective sort.

The temporary regime created to ensure the execution of

the Peace of Paris is an experiment in international organ-

ization of unusual interest and significance. It is significant

as regards the political equality of states chiefly because of

its extensive departures from principles which have been

considered essential to political equality. A theory which

has been thought to require equality of representation,

unanimity, and decisions ad referendum may hardly be said

to have figured largely in a regime in which effective repre-
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sentation is generally limited to the great powers, in which

decisions are frequently taken by majority vote, and in

which the various agencies are invested with real authority

over matters of important international concern.

Probably the most significant feature of the Peace of

Paris, so far as the political equality of states is concerned,

is its departure from the traditional applications of the

principle in the provisions for a permanent organization.

This organization consists of the League of Nations and

auxiliary institutions. The original membership is planned

to include twenty-seven states, four self-governing domin-

ions, and India, all signatories of the Treaty with Germany,

and as many of the enumerated non-signatory states as

accede without reservation. The former belligerents, Aus-

1 Agreement, Arts. 3, 5, 13, cited supra, p. 352, note 7.

authorities and the German civil authorities, "so far as may
be necessary for securing the maintenance, safety, and requirements of the allied and associated forces," and also to
declare a state of siege in all or part of the occupied territory
whenever it is deemed necessary. 1 Reference thus far has
been made only to the formally constituted commissions.
It should also be observed that wherever the great powers
have constituted themselves an informal council or committee to execute the settlement there is real power of control coupled with sanctions of the most effective sort.
The temporary regime created to ensure the execution of
the Peace of Paris is an experiment in international organization of unusual interest and significance. It is significant
as regards the political equality of states chiefly because of
its extensive departures from principles which have been
considered essential to political equality. A theory which
has been thoug~t to require equality of representation,
unanimity, and decisions ad referendum may hardly be said
to have figured largely in a regime in which effective representation is generally limited to the great powers, in which
decisions are frequently taken by majority vote, and in
which the various agencies are invested with real authority
over matters of important international concern.
Probably the most significant feature of the Peace of
Paris, so far as the political equality of states is concerned,
is its departure from the traditional applications of the
principle in the provisions for a permanent organization.
This organization consists of the League of Nations and
auxiliary institutions. The original membership is planned
to include twenty-seven states, four self-governing dominions, and India, all signatories of the Treaty with Germany,
and as many of the enumerated non-signatory states as
accede without reservation. The former belligerents, Aus1

Agreement, Arts. 31 51 13, cited supra, p. 3521 note 7.
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tria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, the Russian states, and

Turkey, and the former neutrals, Abyssinia, Costa Rica, the

Dominican Republic, and Mexico, are included in neither

group; but provision is made for the subsequent admission

of any state, dominion, or colony which shall give effective

guaranties of its intention to observe international obliga-

tions and shall accept regulations prescribed by the League

in regard to armament.1 The League's principal instru-

mentalities are an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent

Secretariat. The Assembly is a large body consisting of

representatives of all the members.2 The Council, on the

other hand, is a small body made up at the outset of repre-

sentatives of the five great powers and of four other powers

selected by the Assembly.3 The Secretariat includes a

Secretary-General, appointed by the Council with the ap-

proval of a majority of the Assembly, and the necessary

secretaries and staff.4 There is also a permanent Labor

Organization consisting of a General Conference and an

International Labor Office controlled by a Governing body.6
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Each member sends four delegates to the General Conference,

two representing the Government, one the employers, and

one the workers.6 The Governing Body in control of the

1 League Covenant, Art. 1; Annex. The Covenant of the League has been in-

corporated in each of the peace treaties concluded to date as Part I, Arts. 1-26.

The League organization was formally launched at a meeting of the Council at

Paris on January 16, 1920. Current History (1920), XI, II, 200, 400.

* League Covenant, Art. 3. The defeat of ratification in the United States

Senate has prevented the representation of the United States on any of the League

institutions organized to date. One of the reservations proposed by the majority

party in the Senate would prevent the appointment of representatives by the United

States except pursuant to an act of Congress providing for the appointment and

defining the appointee's powers and duties. See supra, p. 353, note 3.

* League Covenant, Art. 4. Until the appointment of representatives by the

four other powers first selected by the Assembly, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and

Spain are to be represented on the Council.

* Ibid., Art 6.

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 388. The articles providing for the permanent

Labor Organization have also been incorporated in each of the peace treaties con-

cluded to date. • Ibid., Art. 389.

tria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, the Russian states, and
Turkey, and the former neutrals, Abyssinia, Costa Rica, the
Dominican Republic, and Mexico, are included in neither
group; but provision is made for the subsequent admission
of any state, dominion, or colony which shall give effective
guaranties of its intention to observe international obligations and shall accept regulations prescribed by the League
in regard to armament. 1 The League's principal instrumentalities are an Assembly, a Council, and a permanent
Secretariat. The Assembly is a large body consisting of
representatives of all the members. 2 The Council, on the
other hand, is a small body made up at the outset of representatives of the five great powers and of four other powers
selected by the Assembly.3 The Secretariat includes a
Secretary-General, appointed by the Council with the approval of a majority of the Assembly, and the necessary
secretaries and staff.4 There is also a permanent Labor
Organization consisting of a General Conference and an
International Labor Office controlled by a Governing body. 6
Each member sends four delegates to the General Conference,
two representing the Government, one the employers, and
one the workers. 6 The Governing Body in control of the
1 League Covenant, Art. 1; Annex. The Covenant of the League has been incorporated in each of the peace treaties concluded to date as Part I, Arts. 1-26.
The League organization was formally launched at a meeting of the Council at
Paris on January 16, 1920. Cu"enJ History (1920), XI, II, 200, 400.
2 League Covenant, Art. 3. The defeat of ratification in the United States
Senate has prevented the representation of the United States on any of the League
institutions organized to date. One of the reservations proposed by the majority
party in the Senate would prevent the appointment of representatives by the United
States except pursuant to an act of Congress providing for the appointment and
defining the appointee's powers and duties. See s11pra, p. 353, note 3.
1 League Covenant, Art. 4. Until the appointment of representatives by the
four other powers first selected by the Assembly, Belgium, Brazil, Greece, and
Spain are to be represented on the Council.
4 Ibid., Art 6
• Treaty with Germany, Art. 388. The articles providing for the permanent
Labor Organization have also been incorporated in each of the peace treaties concluded to date.
• Ibid., Art. 389.
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Labor Office is composed of twenty-four persons, of whom

twelve are selected to represent Governments, six are

elected by delegates to the General Conference representing

employers, and six by delegates representing workers. Of

the twelve selected to represent Governments, eight are

nominated by the members which are of the chief industrial

importance and four by members selected for the purpose

by the Government delegates of the other states at the Con-

ference. Any question as to which are the member states of

chief industrial importance is to be decided by the Council

of the League.1 The Labor Office is in charge of a Director

who is appointed by the Governing Body and assisted by a

staff of his own selection.2 The League will have no judicial

institutions at the outset, but plans for a Permanent Court

of International Justice are to be formulated by the Council

and submitted to the members for adoption.3 Of adminis-

trative institutions, in addition to those already mentioned,

there will be a great variety. One permanent commission

will be created to advise the Council in regard to the limita-
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tion of armaments and another to receive and examine the

reports of mandatories and to advise the Council on matters

relating to the observance of mandates.4 The European

Commission of the Danube and the Rhine Central Com-

mission are continued with important changes of represen-

tation, and provision is made for several new international

commissions to take charge of the administration of other

rivers.6 All the river commissions include representatives

of non-riparian states. The proposed Convention relating

to International Air Navigation provides for an Interna-

tional Commission for Air Navigation composed of one

representative of Great Britain and one of each of the

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 393. 1 League Covenant, Art. 14.

1 Ibid., Arts. 394, 395. * Ibid., Arts. 9, 22.

• Treaty with Germany, Arts. 340, 341, 342, 346, 347, 354, 355; Treaty with

Austria, Arts. 301, 302.

Labor Office is composed of twenty-four persons, of whom
twelve are selected to represent Governments, six are
elected by delegates to the General Conference representing
employers, and six by delegates representing workers. Of
the twelve selected to represent Governments, eight are
nominated by the members which are of the chief industrial
importance and four by members selected for the purpose
by the Government delegates of the other states at the Conference. Any question as to which are the member states of
chief industrial importance is to be decided by the Council
of the League. 1 The Labor Office is in charge of a Director
who is appointed by the Governing Body and assisted by a
staff of his own selection. 2 The League will have no judicial
institutions at the outset, but plans for a Permanent Court
of International Justice are to be formulated by the Council
and submitted to the members for adoption.3 Of administrative institutions, in addition to those already mentioned,
there will be a great variety. One permanent commission
will be created to advise the Council in regard to the limitation of armaments and another to receive and examine the
reports of mandatories and to advise the Council on matters
relating to the observance of mandates.4 The European
Commission of the Danube and the Rhine Central Commission are continued with important changes of representation, and provision is made for several new international
commissions to take charge of the administration of other
rivers. 6 All the river commissions include representatives
of non-riparian states. The proposed Convention relating
to International Air Navigation provides for an International Commission for Air Navigation composed of one
representative of Great Britain and one of each of the
Treaty with Germany, Art. 393.
a League Covenant, Art. 14.
Ibid., Arts. 394, 395.
' Ibid. , Arts. 9, 22.
• Treaty with Germany, Arts. 340, 341, 342, 346, 347, 354, 355; Treaty with
Austria, Arts. 301, 302.
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British Dominions and of India, two representatives of

each of the other four great powers, and one representative

of each of the other contracting states.1 Existing interna-

tional bureaus, so far as the consent of the parties to the

general treaties by which they are established can be ob-

tained, and all international bureaus and commissions

established in the future are to be placed under the direction

of the League.2

The covenants of the League of Nations are perhaps of

greater importance than its organization. In Article 10 the

member states "undertake to respect and preserve as against

external aggression the territorial integrity and existing

political independence of all members of the League." In

Article 12 they "agree that if there should arise between

them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will sub-

mit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the

Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until

three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report

by the Council." Measures for fulfilling the obligation im-
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posed by Article 10 are to be recommended by the Council

in each case. More detailed provision is made for the execu-

tion of Article 12. The controversies to be settled by arbi-

tration are defined as those which the members "recognize

to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which can-

not be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy." This definition

is expressly made to include controversies in regard to the

interpretation of treaties, questions of international law,

questions of material fact, and questions involving the

extent and nature of reparation. The parties to the dispute

may either agree upon a court of arbitration or it may be

stipulated in any convention existing between them. It is

agreed that arbitral awards will be carried out in good faith

and that no state will resort to war against a member which

1 Art. 35.

League Covenant, Art. 24.

British Dominions and of India, two representatives of
each of the other four great powers, and one representative
of each of the other contracting states. 1 Existing international bureaus, so far as the consent of the parties to the
general treaties by which they are established can be obtained, and all international bureaus and commissions
established in the future are to be placed under the direction
of the League. 2
The covenants of the League of Nations are perhaps of
greater importance than its organization. In Article IO the
member states "undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing
political independence of all members of the League." In
Article I 2 they "agree that if there should arise between
them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, they will submit the matter either to arbitration or to inquiry by the
Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until
three months after the award by the arbitrators or the report
by the Council." Measures for fulfilling the obligation imposed by Article IO are to be recommended by the Council
in each case. More detailed provision is made for the execution of Article 12. The controversies to be settled by arbitration are defined as those which the members "recognize
to be suitable for submission to arbitration and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy." This definition
is expressly made to include controversies in regard to the
interpretation of treaties, questions of international law,
questions of material fact, and questions involving the
extent and nature of reparation. The parties to the dispute
may either agree upon a court of arbitration or it may be
stipulated in any convention existing between them. It is
agreed that arbitral awards will be carried out in good faith
and that no state will resort to war against a member which
1

Art. 35.

1

League Covenant, Art. 24.

IN THE PEACE OF PARIS
IN THE PEACE OF PARIS

363

complies with the award. If a member fails to comply, the

Council will propose measures for making the award effec-

tive.1 All serious controversies which are not submitted to

arbitration must be submitted to an inquiry by the Council.

Either party may accomplish this by giving notice to the

Secretary-General, whereupon the parties must communi-

cate statements of their case with all relevant facts and

papers to the Secretary-General and the Council will attempt

to settle the dispute. Failing a settlement, the Council will

publish a report of the case with recommendations.2 If this

report is approved by all members of the Council, other

than representatives of parties to the controversy, it is

agreed that no member shall go to war with the member

which complies with the recommendations. Otherwise

complete liberty of action is reserved. The Council may

refer any dispute to the Assembly, and is obliged to do so if

either party requests it within fourteen days after submis-

sion.3

Sanctions are provided to ensure the observance of the
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covenants. Resort to war in disregard of the covenants is

to be regarded as ipso facto an act of war against all other

members; and the members undertake to sever trade and

financial relations, prohibit all intercourse between their

nationals and nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and

prevent all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse

between nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the

1 League Covenant, Art. 13.

1 If the dispute is claimed by one party and is found by the Council to arise out

of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of

that party, the Council will report accordingly and will make no recommendations.

Ibid., Art. 15.

'In attempting to settle disputes thus referred, the Assembly will be controlled

by the same provisions which apply to the Council, except that its report and

recommendations, failing a settlement, will become effective if concurred in by the

delegates of all members represented on the Council and by a majority of the

delegates of other members, exclusive in each case of delegates representing parties

to the dispute. Ibid., Art. 15.

complies with the award. If a member fails to comply, the
Council will propose measures for making the award effective.1 All serious controversies which are not submitted to
arbitration must be submitted to an inquiry by the Council.
Either party may accomplish this by giving notice to the
Secretary-General, whereupon the parties must communicate statements of their case with all relevant facts and
papers to the Secretary-General and the Council will attempt
to settle the dispute. Failing a settlement, the Council will
publish a report of the case with recommendations.2 If this
report is approved by all members of the Council, other
than representatives of parties to the controversy, it is
agreed that no member shall go to war with the member
which complies with the recommendations. Otherwise
complete liberty of action is reserved. The Council may
refer any dispute to the Assembly, and is obliged to do so if
either party requests it within fourteen days after submission.3
Sanctions are provided to ensure the observance of the
covenants. Resort to war in disregard of the covenants is
to be regarded as ipso facto an act of war against all other
members; and the members undertake to sever trade and
financial relations, prohibit all intercourse between their
nationals and nationals of the covenant-breaking state, and
prevent all financial, commercial, or personal intercourse
between nationals of the covenant-breaking state and the
League Covenant, Art. lJ.
If the dispute is claimed by one party and is found by the Council to arise out
of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of
that party, the Council will report accordingly and will make no recommendations.
Ibid., Art. 15.
a In attempting to settle disputes thus referred, the Assembly v.ill be controlled
by the same provisions which apply to the Council, except that its report and
recommendations, failing a settlement, will become effective if concurred in by the
delegates of all members represented on the Council and by a majority of the
delegates of other members, exclusive in each case of delegates representing parties
to the dispute. Ibid., Art. 15.
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nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League

or not. The use of joint forces to protect the covenants of

the League is also contemplated, although not expressly

made obligatory, and free passage is promised for such

forces. The members agree to a fair apportionment of the

burdens incident to all coercive measures. Covenant-

breaking states may be expelled from the League by a

unanimous vote of the Council, disregarding, of course, any

vote cast by a representative of the expelled state.1 More-

over, the above sanctions may be applied to states which

are not members of the League. In the event of a dispute

between a member and a non-member, or between non-

members, the parties may be invited to accept the obliga-

tions of membership for the purpose of such dispute upon

conditions prescribed by the Council. If a state refuses the

invitation and resorts to war against a member, all the

sanctions outlined above are to be invoked against the ag-

gressor. If both parties to a dispute refuse such an invita-

tion, the Council may take such measures and make such

recommendations as will prevent hostilities and bring about
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a settlement of the controversy.2

Covenants and sanctions are made more efficacious by an

agreement upon certain new principles. In the first place,

it is agreed that any war or threat of war, whether imme-

diately affecting members or not, is to be regarded as a mat-

ter of concern to the whole League; and it is declared to be

the friendly right of each member to bring to the attention

of the Assembly or the Council any circumstance whatever

affecting international relations which threatens to disturb

1 League Covenant, Art. 16. "Armed force is in the background of this program,

but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the

physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended

as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war." Address of President Wilson on

presenting the draft of the Covenant to the third plenary session, February 14,

1919, in A.J. I. L. (1919), XHI, 570, 573.

* League Covenant, Art. 17.

nationals of any other state, whether a member of the League
or not. The use of joint forces to protect the covenants of
the League is also contemplated, although not expressly
made obligatory, and free passage is promised for such
forces. The members agree to a fair apportionment of the
burdens incident to all coercive measures. Covenantbreaking states may be expelled from the League by a
unanimous vote of the Council, disregarding, of course, any
vote cast by a representative of the expelled state. 1 Moreover, the above sanctions may be applied to states which
are not members of the League. In the event of a dispute
between a member and a non-member, or between nonmembers, the parties may be invited to accept the obligations of membership for the purpose of such dispute upon
conditions prescribed by the Council. If a state refuses the
invitation and resorts to war against a member, all the
sanctions outlined above are to be invoked against the aggressor. If both parties to a dispute refuse such an invitation, the Council may take such measures and make such
recommendations as will prevent hostilities and bring about
a settlement of the controversy. 2
Covenants and sanctions are made more efficacious by an
agreement upon certain new principles. In the first place,
it is agreed that any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting members or not, is to be regarded as a matter of concern to the whole League; and it is declared to be
the friendly right of each member to bring to the attention
of the Assembly or the Council any circumstance whatever
affecting international relations which threatens to disturb
1 League Covenant, Art. 16. " Armed force is in the background of this program,
but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the
physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended
as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war." Address of President Wilson on
presenting the draft of the Covenant to the third plenary session, February 1.i,
1919, in A. J . I. L. (1919), XIII, 570, 573.
s League Covenant, Art. 17.
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international peace.1 The second principle is publicity for

international transactions in order that public opinion may

have an opportunity to operate. More or less of publicity

will always accompany the settlement of controversies by

arbitration. In case of controversies referred to the Council

for inquiry, the publication of everything submitted may be

ordered forthwith. If the dispute is settled the terms and

appropriate explanations are to be made public, and if it

is not settled the report and recommendations are made

public. Moreover, any member represented on the Council

may publish a statement of the facts and of its own con-

clusions.2 All treaties or international engagements entered

into hereafter by any member of the League are to be regis-

tered with the Secretariat and published by it as soon as

possible. They are to become binding only when registered.3

The third principle establishes a right to have decisive in-

dividual action by any state delayed until public opinion

has had an opportunity to find expression in measures which

may prevent war. The principle is formulated in the cov-

enant of Article 12 that members will in no case resort to
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war until three months after an award by arbitrators or a

report by the Council.

It is a conservative prediction that if the League of Na-

tions functions with any degree of success the traditional

conception of political equality among states will become

obsolete. The League denies the political equality of states

at the outset in the provision which is made for the admis-

sion of members. The first group of original members in-

cludes twenty-seven states, four self-governing dominions,

and India, and the second group includes thirteen states

which are invited to accede. It has already been pointed out

that a number of states are included in neither group. Al-

though the League's pacific machinery is intended to have the

1 League Covenant, Art. 11. 1 Ibid., Art. 15. * Ibid., Art. 18.

international peace. 1 The second principle is publicity for
international transactions in order that public opinion may
have an opportunity to operate. More or less of publicity
will always accompany the settlement of controversies by
arbitration. In case of controversies referred to the Council
for inquiry, the publication of everything submitted may be
ordered forthwith. If the dispute is settled the terms and
appropriate explanations are to be made public, and if it
is not settled the report and recommendations are made
public. Moreover, any member represented on the Council
may publish a statement of the facts and of its own conclusions.2 All treaties or international engagements entered
into hereafter by any member of the League are to be registered with the Secretariat and published by it as soon as
possible. They are to become binding only when registered.3
The third principle establishes a right to have decisive individual action by any state delayed until public opinion
has had an opportunity to find expression in measures which
may prevent war. The principle is formulated in the covenant of Article 1 2 that members will in no case resort to
war until three months after an award by arbitrators or a
report by the Council.
It is a conservative prediction that if the League of Nations functions with any degree of success the traditional
conception of political equality among states will become
obsolete. The League denies the political equality of states
at the outset in the provision which is made for the admission of members. The first group of original members includes twenty-seven states, four self-governing dominions,
and India, and the second group includes thirteen states
which are invited to accede. It has already been pointed out
that a number of states are included in neither group. Although the League's pacific machinery is intended to have the
1

League Covenant, Art.

11.

1

Ibid., Art. 15.

I

Ibid., Art. 18.
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most important effects upon non-member states, such states

may be admitted to membership only by a two-thirds vote

of the Assembly after giving guaranties and after accepting

regulations in regard to armament.1 There are also im-

portant inequalities of representation in the League and in

its various instrumentalities. The list of original members

includes the British Empire, four British self-governing

dominions, and India. Article i provides that "any fully

self-governing State, Dominion or Colony" may be ad-

mitted to membership by the Assembly. The representation

of dominions or colonies is calculated to give the great

colonial powers a larger representation in League institu-

tions than is accorded to other states. The effect is mani-

fest in such an institution as the Assembly where all members

have equal representation. Representation on the Council,

which is in all respects the League's most important instru-

mentality, is limited to the five great powers and to four

other powers designated by the Assembly.2 Additional

members may be given representation by the Council with
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the Assembly's approval, but in view of international expe-

rience it is safe to predict that effective control will always

be retained by the more powerful states. It is stipulated,

following the precedent established at Aix-la-Chapelle, that

any member not represented on the Council shall be in-

1 See supra, pp. 346,347. "The whole agreement is at present necessarily tenta-

tive. It cannot really be a League of Peace in operation for a number of years to

come. It is now and in the immediate future must be rather an alliance of ap-

proximately one-half of the active world against or for the control of the other half."

Root to Hays, regarding the League Covenant, in A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 580, 594.

* "This covenant of the league of nations is an alliance and not a league, as is

amply shown by the provisions of the treaty with Germany which vests all essential

power in five great nations. Those same nations, the principal allied and associated

powers, also dominate the league through the council." Majority Report from the

Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, September 10, 1919,

p. 7. "It is regrettable that there are no technical authorities or impartial tribunals

to offset the select committee controlled by the Great Powers, which may submit

the whole civilized world to its control at the expense of the independence and

equality of rights of the smaller states." German Comments, p. 17.
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vited to send a delegate when matters specially affecting the

interests of that member are under consideration. An ap-

portionment of representation favorable to the more power-

ful states appears in other League institutions. Thus, of

the twelve Government delegates on the Governing Body of

the International Labor Office, it has been pointed out that

eight are nominated by the member states which are of the

chief industrial importance and that it is left to the Council

of the League to decide which member states belong in this

category. The more powerful states also receive most of the

non-riparian representation on the international river com-

missions. As a provisional measure, it is said, Great Britain,

France, and Italy, with Roumania, are the only states to be

represented on the European Commission of the Danube.

The same non-riparian states will be represented on the new

International Commission in control of the Danube above

the point where the competence of the European Commis-

sion ceases. Great Britain and Italy each have two repre-

sentatives on the Rhine Central Commission; Great Britain,
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France, Italy, and Belgium each have a representative on

the Elbe Commission, and Great Britain, France, Den-

mark, and Sweden each have a representative on the Oder

Commission.1 The proposed International Commission for

1 The central powers protested against the apportionment of representation on

the commissions. "The German river system, with all its rivers and canals, is to be

administered by international commissions, in which Germany in no case is to have

a majority." German Comments, pp. 83, 15. The reasons for non-riparian repre-

sentation were set forth in the Allied Reply. "Delegates from non-riparian states

are included in the River Commissions as well as representatives of the riparian

states, in the first place as representing the general interest in free circulation on the

rivers regarded as transit routes; and, secondly, so that within the River Com-

missions themselves they may act as a check on the strongest riparian state abusing

her preponderating influence to the detriment of the others." Allied Reply, p. 85.

"The provision for the presence of representatives of important non-riparian states

on the commissions is security that the commissions will consider the interests of

all." Letter transmitting the Allied Reply, in A. J. /. L. (1919), XITJ, 550. See also

Letter transmitting the Treaty with Austria, p. 42.
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Air Navigation includes one representative of Great Britain

and one of each of the British Dominions and of India, two

representatives of each of the other four great powers, and

one representative of each of the other contracting states.

Inequalities in voting power and majority decisions are

no less significant than inequalities of representation. In-

equality of representation usually involves inequality of

voting power. The Covenant of the League provides that

each member shall have one vote in the Assembly. This

means that an empire with colonial representation wields

several times the voting power of a state without multiple

representation.1 Voting power in such institutions as the

each case the voting is so weighted as to place Germany in a clear minority. On the

Elbe Commission Germany has four votes out of ten; on the Oder Commission

three out of nine; on the Rhine Commission four out of nineteen; on the Danube

Commission, which is not yet definitely constituted, she will be apparently in a

small minority. On the government of all these rivers France and Great Britain are

represented; and on the Elbe for some undiscoverable reason there are also repre-

sentatives of Italy and Belgium. Thus the great waterways of Germany are handed

Air Navigation includes one representative of Great Britain
and one of each of the British Dominions and of India, two
representatives of each of the other four great powers, and
one representative of each of the other contracting states.
Inequalities in voting power and majority decisions are
no less significant than inequalities of representation. Inequality of representation usually involves inequality of
voting power. The Covenant of the League provides that
each member shall have one vote in the Assembly. This
means that an empire with colonial representation wields
several times the voting power of a state without multiple
representation. 1 Voting power in such institutions as the
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over to foreign bodies with the widest powers; and much of the local and domestic

business of Hamburg, Magdeburg, Dresden, Stettin, Frankfurt, Breslau, and Ulm

will be subject to a foreign jurisdiction. It is almost as though the powers of Con-

tinental Europe were to be placed in a majority on the Thames Conservancy or the

port of London." Keynes, Economic Consequences of the Peace, p. 11o.

1 This feature of the Covenant has been vigorously assailed in the United States

Senate. "Great Britain now has under the name of the British Empire one vote in

the council of the league. She has four additional votes in the assembly of the

league for her self-governing dominions and colonies, which are most properly

members of the league and signatories to the treaty. She also has the vote of India,

which is neither a self-governing dominion nor a colony but merely a part of the

Empire and which apparently was simply put in as a signatory and member of the

league by the peace conference because Great Britain desired it. Great Britain also

will control the votes of the Kingdom of Hedjaz and of Persia. With these last two

of course we have nothing to do. But if Great Britain has six votes in the league

assembly no reason has occurred to the committee and no argument had been made

to show why the United States should not have an equal number. If other countries

like the present arrangement, that is not our affair; but the committee failed to see

why the United States should have but one vote in the assembly of the league when

the British Empire has six." Majority Report of the Committee on Foreign Rela-

tions, p. 4. The Senate has of course debated the question at great length. For

example, see Cong. Record, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919), LVIII, 5971-5983, 6326-

&33i, 6439-644S, 7355-7373. 7431-7439. 7488-7504, 7548-7559. and 2d sess. (1920),
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League Council, the Governing Body of the Labor Office,

and the river commissions is of course restricted to the states

which are represented. In the proposed Commission for Air

Navigation an apportionment of votes is adopted which

assures control to the great powers. For the puipose of

voting, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and India

count as one state, but each of the five great powers is given

"the least whole number of votes which, when multiplied

by five, will give a product exceeding by at least one

vote the total number of votes of all the other contracting

States." The other contracting states have one vote each.1

In a number of instances majority decisions have been sub-

stituted for the unanimity requirement. Article 5 lays down

the rule that "except where otherwise expressly provided

. . . decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the

Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of

the League represented at the meeting." It is otherwise

expressly provided for a limited number of decisions of

considerable consequence. The same Article provides that
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all matters of procedure may be decided by majority vote

in the Assembly and in the Council. The Assembly approves

the nomination of additional members to be represented on

LLX, daily numbers, March 8, 1920, 4306-4314, March 9, 1920, 4357-4370- The

point is covered by one of the proposed reservations, recently amended to read as

follows: "Until part 1, being the covenant of the League of Nations, shall be so

amended as to provide that the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of

votes equal to that which any member of the league and its self-governing domin-

ions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate shall be entitled to cast, the

United States assumes no obligation to be bound, except in cases where Con-

gress has previously given its consent, by any election, decision, report, or find-

ing of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its self-

governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast

more than one vote. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any

decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute

between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any

League Council, the Governing Body of the Labor Office,
and the river commissions is of course restricted to the states
which are represented. In the proposed Commission for Air
Navigation an apportionment of votes is adopted which
assures control to the great powers. For the purpose of
voting, Great Britain, the British Dominions, and India
count as one state, but each of the five great powers is given
"the least whole number of votes which, when multiplied
by five, will give a product exceeding by at least one
vote the total number of votes of all the other contracting
States." The other contracting states have one vote each.1
In a number of instances majority decisions have been substituted for the unanimity requirement. Article 5 lays down
the rule that "except where otherwise expressly provided
. . . decisions at any meeting of the Assembly or of the
Council shall require the agreement of all the Members of
the League represented at the meeting." It is otherwise
expressly provided for a limited number of decisions of
considerable consequence. The same Article provides that
all matters of. procedure may be decided by majority vote
in the Assembly and in the Council. The Assembly approves
the nomination of additional members to be represented on

self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically

has voted." Ibid., 4370. Cf. Viscount Grey's Letter to The London Times,

printed in Current History (1920), XI, II, 399.

1 Air Convention, Art. 35.

LIX, daily numbers, March 8, 1920, 43o6-4314, March 9, 1920, 4357-4370. The
point is covered by one of the proposed reservations, recently amended to read as
follows: "Until part 1, being the covenant of the League of Nations, shall be so
amended as to provide that the United States shall be entitled to cast a number of
votes equal to that which any member of the league and its self-governing dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate shall be entitled to cast, the
United States assumes no obligation to be bound, except in cases where Congress has previously given its consent, by any election, decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly in which any member of the league and its selfgoveming dominions, colonies, or parts of empire, in the aggregate have cast
more than one vote. The United States assumes no obligation to be bound by any
decision, report, or finding of the council or assembly arising out of any dispute
between the United States and any member of the league if such member, or any
self-governing dominion, colony, empire, or part of empire united with it politically
has voted." Ibid., 4370. Cf. Viscount Grey's Letter to The London Times,
printed in Current History (1920), XI, II, 399.
1 Air Convention, Art. 35.
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the Council and the appointment of the Secretary-General

by a majority vote. It admits new members to the League

by two-thirds majority. Its report on disputes referred to

it by the Council may operate to prevent war if concurred

in by the delegates of members represented on the Council

and by a majority of the other delegates, exclusive in each

case of representatives of parties to the dispute.1 In the Coun-

cil a number of important matters connected with the exe-

cution of the settlement may be decided by majority vote.

The Council acts by majority, for example, in all matters

pertaining to the Saar Basin, in extending the period during

which certain articles in regard to the treatment of nationals

of the allied and associated powers are to remain in force,

in ordering any investigation in Germany or Austria while

the treaties remain in force, in assenting to the modification

of treaty stipulations for the protection of minorities, in

approving the proposed treaties for assistance to France as

engagements consistent with the League Covenant, and in

deciding that the treaties last mentioned may be safely
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terminated.2 In contrast with the Assembly and the Coun-

cil, the General Conference of the Labor Organization, except

where otherwise expressly provided, decides all questions

"by a simple majority of the votes cast by the Delegates

present." In excluding delegates, deciding to meet else-

where than at the seat of the League, including items in

its agenda over the objection of a member's Government,

adopting recommendations or draft conventions, and initiat-

ing amendments to the labor clauses of the treaties, the

1 See League Covenant, Arts. 4, 6, 1, 15.

* See Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. Ill, par. 40; Art.

280; Art. 213; Treaty with Austria, Art. 232; Art. 159; Art. 69; Treaty with

Poland, Art. 12; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 12; Treaty between the United

States and France, Art. 3, and Treaty between Great Britain and France, Art. 3, in

Sen. Doc., No. 63, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919). It may be anticipated that the

Council will be authorized to act by majority in deciding a limited number of ques-

tions involved in the execution of the other treaties.

the Council and the appointment of the Secretary-General
by a majority vote. It admits new members to the League
by two-thirds majority. Its report on disputes referred to
it by the Council may operate to prevent war if concurred
in by the delegates of members represented on the Council
and by a majority of the other delegates, exclusive in each
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which certain articles in regard to the treatment of nationals
of the allied and associated powers are to remain in force,
in ordering any investigation in Germany or Austria while
the treaties remain in force, in assenting to the modification
of treaty stipulations for the protection of minorities, in
approving the proposed treaties for assistance to France as
engagements consistent with the League Covenant, and in
deciding that the treaties last mentioned may be safely
terminated.2 In contrast with the Assembly and the Council, the General Conference of the Labor Organization, except
where otherwise expressly provided, decides all questions
"by a simple majority of the votes cast by the Delegates
present." In excluding delegates, deciding to meet elsewhere than at the seat of the League, including items in
its agenda over the objection of a member's Government,
adopting recommendations or draft conventions, and initiating amendments to the labor clauses of the treaties, the
See League Covenant, Arts. 4, 6, 1, 15.
See Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. III, par. 40; Art.
28o; Art. 213; Treaty with Austria, Art. 232; Art. 159; Art. 6Q; Treaty with
Poland, Art. 12 ; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 12; Treaty between the United
States and France, Art. 3, and Treaty between Great Britain and France, Art. 3, in
Sen. Doc., No. 63, 66th Cong., 1st sess. (1919). It may be anticipated that the
Council will be authorized to act by majority in deciding a limited number of questions involved in the execution of the other treaties.
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Conference's decisions are made by two-thirds vote of the

delegates present.1 There are no decisions for which the

unanimity requirement is stipulated. As regards the river

commissions, it has already been pointed out that the

European Commission of the Danube decides administra-

tive questions and fixes tolls by majority vote.2 It is ex-

pressly provided that the new Commission in control of the

upper Danube shall take its decisions by majority.3 Similar

stipulations will no doubt be incorporated in the new agree-

ments which are to define the powers of the other commis-

sions.4 The proposed Commission for Air Navigation may

admit states which participated in the recent war and which

are not members of the League to adhere to the Air Con-

vention after January 1, 1923, by a three-fourths vote. It

may amend the technical annexes by three-fourths vote,

propose amendments to the Convention by two-thirds vote,

and decide disputes in regard to the technical regulations by

simple majority. The point is not covered by an express

provision, but it would seem that where the necessary ma-
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jority has not been indicated a simple majority vote would

be enough.6

Inequalities of representation and voting strength are

peculiarly significant in institutions which have real power

over matters of international concern. It is noteworthy

that League institutions have a little real power. Their

functions may be said in general to be concerned with two

problems: their immediate business is to ensure the execu-

tion of the new settlement; their ultimate function is to

1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 403, 389, 391, 402, 405, 422. Although the point

is not covered by express provision, it seems probable that the Governing Body of

the Labor Office will act by majority vote in the absence of provision to the contrary.

See ibid., Art. 412.

1 See supra, pp. 316-317.

* Treaty with Austria, Art. 303.

4 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 343, 344, 348, 354.

s Air Convention, Art. 35.

Conference's decisions are made by two-thirds vote of the
delegates present. 1 There are no decisions for which the
unanimity requirement is stipulated. As regards the river
commissions, it has already been pointed out that the
European Commission of the Danube decides administrative questions and fixes tolls by majority vote. 2 It is expressly provided that the new Commission in control of the
upper Danube shall take its decisions by majority.3 Similar
stipulations will no doubt be incorporated in the new agreements which are to define the powers of the other commissions.4 The proposed Commission for Air Navigation may
admit states which participated in the recent war and which
are not members of the League to adhere to the Air Convention after January 1, 1923, by a three-fourths vote. It
may amend the technical annexes by three-fourths vote,
propose amendments to the Convention by two-thirds vote,
and decide disputes in regard to the technical regulations by
simple majority. The point is not covered by an express
provision, but it would seem that where the necessary majority has not been indicated a simple majority vote would
be enough. 6
Inequalities of representation and voting strength are
peculiarly significant in institutions which have real power
over matters of international concern. It is noteworthy
that League institutions have a little real power. Their
functions may be said in general to be concerned with two
problems: their immediate business is to ensure the execution of the new settlement; their ultimate function is to
1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 403, 389, 391, 402, 405, 422. Although the point
is not covered by express provision, it seems probable that the Governing Body of
the Labor Office will act by majority vote in the absence of provision to the contrary.
See ibid., Art. 412.
2 See supra, pp. 316-317.
1 Treaty with Austria, Art. 303.
' Treaty with Germany, Arts. 343, 344, 348, 354.
6 Air Convention, Art. 35.
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promote international cooperation and preserve peace.

Certain League institutions have been equipped for the

execution of the settlement with important special powers.

The League itself becomes trustee for the Saar Basin, under-

takes to protect Danzig and guarantee its constitution, and

exercises an ill-defined supervision over the mandatories to

which former colonies and territories of the central powers

are entrusted.1 Further responsibilities may be assumed

under treaties still pending. The Council of the League

makes several appointments to positions in the temporary

regime, including three members of the Saar Boundary

Commission, the Governing Commission of the Saar, one of

the three experts on the price of the Saar mines, the High

Commissioner of Danzig, the president of the Mixed Arbitral

Tribunal in each instance in which the parties fail to agree

on a candidate, and a number of special arbitrators.2 Several

important decisions in connection with the execution of the

treaties are left to the League. The League decides, for

example, on the effect to be given the plebiscite in Eupen

and Malm&iy; it decides on the permanent disposition to be
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made of the Saar Basin after the plebiscite; it decides dis-

putes in regard to the revival of treaties; and it must ap-

prove any general conventions relating to the international

regime of transit, waterways, ports, or railways.3 The Coun-

cil of the League fixes the conditions, methods, and date of

voting in the Saar plebiscite; it settles the arrangements in

regard to amounts of coal, duration of contracts, and prices

1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 49, 102, 103; League Covenant, Art. 22.

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 48; Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. II, pars. 16,17,

18, Chap. Ill, par. 36; Arts. 103,304; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 256, 309, 310, 320,

321, 327-

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 34; Part HI, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. Ill, par. 35;

Arts. 289, 338, 379; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 241, 299, 331. After the Polish

mandate has been in effect for twenty-five years the League will decide on the dis-

position to be made of Eastern Galicia. Current History (1919), XI, I, 400. Other

decisions may be entrusted to the League as the settlement is completed.

promote international cooperation and preserve peace.
Certain League institutions have been equipped for the
execution of the settlement with important special powers.
The League itself becomes trustee for the Saar Basin, undertakes to protect Danzig and guarantee its constitution, and
exercises an ill-defined supervision over the mandatories to
which former colonies and territories of the central powers
are entrusted. 1 Further responsibilities may be assumed
under treaties still pending. The Council of the League
makes several appointments to positions in the temporary
regime, including three members of the Saar Boundary
Commission, the Governing Commission of the Saar, one of
the three experts on the price of the Saar mines, the High
Commissioner of Danzig, the president of the Mixed Arbitral
Tribunal in each instance in which the parties fail to agree
on a candidate, and a number of special arbitrators.2 Several
important decisions in connection with the execution of the
treaties are left to the League. The League decides, for
example, on the effect to be given the plebiscite in Eupen
and Malmedy; it decides on the permanent disposition to be
made of the Saar Basin after the plebiscite; it decides disputes in regard to the revival of treaties; and it must approve any general conventions relating to the international
regime of transit, waterways, ports, or railways.3 The Council of the League fixes the conditions, methods, and date of
voting in the Saar plebiscite; it settles the arrangements in
regard to amounts of coal, duration of contracts, and prices
Treaty with Germany, Arts. 49, 102, 103; League Covenant, Art. 22.
Treaty with Germany, Art. 48; Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. II, pars. 16, 17,
18, Chap. III, par. 36; Arts. 103, 304; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 256, 309, 310, 320,
1

2

321, 327.
1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 34; Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. III, par. 35;
Arts. 28<), 338, 379; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 241, 299, 331. After the Polish
mandate has been in effect for twenty-five years the League will decide on the disposition to be made of Eastern Galicia. CumJnt Hiskwy (1919), XI, I, 400. Other
decisions may be entrusted to the League as the settlement is completed.
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in the event that the Saar mines are eventually restored to

Germany and France acquires in consequence the stipulated

right to purchase coal for industrial and domestic needs; it

may assent to the alienation of Austrian independence; it

may extend the period of certain treaty obligations; it must

decide finally the conditions of transfer of social and state

insurance reserves unless these conditions are settled by

special conventions between the parties; it may order any

investigations of the central powers which it considers neces-

sary; it must approve the proposed treaties between the

United States and France and between Great Britain and

France for assistance to the latter in case of unprovoked

aggression by Germany and it is to decide when these treaties

may be safely terminated; and it may take measures to en-

sure the observance of treaty provisions for the protection of

minorities and may also assent to the modification of such

provisions.1 Finally, the League through one or more of its

institutions is entrusted with the execution of several im-

portant transactions relating to the settlement. After the
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plebiscite in the Saar and the League's decision as to the

future of the region, the Council will make all necessary

provisions for the establishment of the permanent regime.2

If Germany and Poland fail to agree, the terms of conven-

tions between them relative to railroad, telegraphic, and

telephonic facilities will be settled by the Council.1 After

Germany has been admitted to the League, the armament

establishment fixed in the Treaty may be modified by the

Council.4 The League will provide a river commission for

the Niemen on request from any riparian state.6 Several of

1 Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. Ill, pars. 34, 37; Arts.

80, 280, 378, 312, 213; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 88, 232, 330, 27S, 159, 69; Treaty

between United States and France, Art. 3, and between Great Britain and France,

Art. 3; Treaty with Poland, Art. 12; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 12.

* Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. m, par. 39.

« Ibid., Art. 98.

* Ibid., Art. 164. • Ibid., Art. 342.

in the event that the Saar mines are eventually restored to
Germany and France acquires in consequence the stipulated
right to purchase coal for industrial and domestic needs; it
may assent to the alienation of Austrian independence; it
may extend the period of certain treaty obligations; it must
decide finally the conditions of transfer of social and state
insurance reserves unless these conditions are settled by
special conventions between the parties; it may order any
investigations of the central powers which it considers necessary; it must approve the proposed treaties between the
United States and France and between Great Britain and
France for assistance to the latter in case of unprovoked
aggression by Germany and it is to decide when these treaties
may be safely terminated; and it may take measures to ensure the observance of treaty provisions for the protection of
minorities and may also assent to the modification of such
provisions. 1 Finally, the League through one or more of its
institutions is entrusted with the execution of several important transactions relating to the settlement. After the
plebiscite in the Saar and the League's decision as to the
future of the region, the Council will make all necessary
provisions for the establishment of the permanent regime.2
If Germany and Poland fail to agree, the terms of conventions between them relative to railroad, telegraphic, and
telephonic facilities will be settled by the Council.3 After
Germany has been admitted to the League, the armament
establishment fixed in the Treaty may be modified by the
Council.4 The League will provide a river commission for
the Niemen on request from any riparian state.6 Several of
1 Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. III, pars. 34, 37; Arts.
So, 28o, 378, 312, 213; Treaty with Austria, Arts. 88, 232, 330, 275, 159, 69; Treaty
between United States and France, Art. 3, and between Great Britain and France,
Art. 3; Treaty with Poland, Art. 12; Treaty with Roumania, Art. 12.
1 Treaty with Germany, Part III, Sec. IV, Annex, Chap. III, par. 39.
I Ibid., Art. 98.
• Ibid., Art. 164.
' Ibid., Art. 342.
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the articles relating to commerce and transport may be re-

vised by the Council after a few years from the date at which

ratification brings them into effect.1

In so far as League institutions are equipped to ensure

permanent peace, their most important powers, with a few

exceptions, are of an advisory or ministerial character. The

Assembly has almost no power at all. In presenting the

draft of the Covenant to the third plenary session, President

Wilson remarked that the Assembly had been given "un-

limited rights of discussion." 2 It may discuss "any matter

within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the

peace of the world," but it has few powers of any real im-

portance. Probably the most important are the power to

admit new members to the League by two-thirds vote, to

select the states which are to be represented on the Council

with the five great powers, and to settle disputes referred to

it by the Council.3 The powers of the Council are defined in

the same generous terms and with somewhat greater effect.

The Council is the League's most powerful institution. The
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most important of its functions are advisory; for example,

the duty to formulate and submit plans for a permanent

court, to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments, to

endeavor to settle disputes referred to it for inquiry and,

failing a settlement, to make a report with recommendations,

to advise as to the means of fulfilling the obligation imposed

by Article 10, and to recommend the forces to be contributed

by members in order to protect the covenants of the League.4

In a few instances it has real power to control. It is au-

thorized, for illustration, to change the seat of the League

at any time, to define the authority of mandatories in the

absence of previous agreement among League members, to

1 Treaty with Germany, Art. 378; Treaty with Austria, Art. 330.

» A. J. 1. L. (1919), XIII, S72.

'League Covenant, Arts. 1, 3, 4, 15.

* Ibid., Arts. 14, 8, 15, 10, 16.

the articles relating to commerce and transport may be revised by the Council after a few years from the date at which
ratification brings them into effect. 1
In so far as League institutions are equipped to ensure
permanent peace, their most important powers, with a few
exceptions, are of an advisory or ministerial character. The
Assembly has almost no power at all. In presenting the
draft of the Covenant to the third plenary session, President
Wilson remarked that the Assembly had been given "unlimited rights of discussion." 2 It may discuss "any matter
within the sphere of action of the League or affecting the
peace of the world," but it has few powers of any real importance. Probably the most important are the power to
admit new members to the League by two-thirds vote, to
select the states which are to be represented on the Council
with the five great powers, and to settle disputes referred to
it by the Council.3 The powers of the Council are defined in
the same generous terms and with somewhat greater effect.
The Council is the League's most powerful institution. The
most important of its functions are advisory; for example,
the duty to formulate and submit plans for a permanent
court, to formulate plans for the reduction of armaments, to
endeavor to settle disputes referred to it for inquiry and,
failing a settlement, to make a report with recommendations,
to advise as to the means of fulfilling the obligation imposed
by Article 10, and to recommend the forces to be contributed
by members in order to protect the covenants of the League.4
In a few instances it has real power to control. It is authorized, for illustration, to change the seat of the League
at any time, to define the authority of mandatories in the
absence of previous agreement among League members, to
Treaty with Germany, Art. 378; Treaty with Austria, Art. 330.
A. J. I. L. (1919), XIII, 572.
a League Covenant, Arts. 1, 3, 4, 15.
4 Ibid., Arts. 14, 8, 15, 10, 16.
1

2
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prescribe the conditions and modifications under which the

covenant may be applied to disputes in which states outside

the League are parties, and to expel a covenant-breaking

state from the League.1 It may increase its own member-

ship with the approval of the Assembly.2 In the event of

war or threat of war, it may join the Assembly in taking

"any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safe-

guard the peace of nations."3 The most important func-

tions of the Labor Organization are advisory or ministerial

in character* The river commissions will exercise an exten-

sive adnunistrative control over the navigation of rivers,6

and if the proposed Commission for Air Navigation is es-

tablished it will probably enjoy a somewhat less extensive

administrative control over the navigation of the air.6

The expenses of the League Secretariat are apportioned

among member states according to the familiar unit and

1 League Covenant, Arts. 7, 22, 17, 16. J Ibid., Art. 4.

* Ibid., Art. 11. This clause is of course much less significant than it appears to

be because neither the Council nor the Assembly has power to do anything more in
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such an event than to recommend and advise.

4 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 400 ff. The General Conference of the Labor

Organization discusses labor questions of international importance and submits

proposals to the member states in the form of recommendations or of draft conven-

tions. It also initiates amendments to the labor clauses of the treaties. The Gov-

erning Body of the Labor Office prescribes the form and content of annual reports of

members, prepares the agenda for meetings of the Conference, controls the pre-

prescribe the conditions and modifications under which the
covenant may be applied to disputes in which states outside
the League are parties, and to expel a covenant-breaking
state from the League.1 It may increase its own membership with the approval of the Assembly. 2 In the event of
war or threat of war, it may join the Assembly in taking
"any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations." 3 The most important functions of the Labor Organization are advisory or ministerial
in character.• The river commissions will exercise an extensive administrative control over the navigation of rivers,6
and if the proposed Commission for Air Navigation is established it will probably enjoy a somewhat less extensive
administrative control over the navigation of the air. 6
The expenses of the League Secretariat are apportioned
among member states according to the familiar unit and

liminary procedure when controversies arise in regard to the observance of labor

conventions, and exercises a general supervision over the administration of the

Labor Office. The principal business of the Labor Office is to collect and distribute

information.

1 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 346, 354, 348, 343, 344; Treaty with Austria,

Arts. 301, 303. See Sayre, Experiments in International Administration, pp. 38-47,

131-141.

• The Commission is authorized to determine its own procedure (Art. 35), to

exercise a variety of ministerial or administrative functions (Arts. 9, 15, 17, 28, 29,

35, Annex H, 3), to settle disputes relating to the technical regulations (Art. 38), to

fix regulations for the issuance of certificates and licenses (Art. 13, Annex B, Annex

E), to regulate the methods of employing wireless on aircraft of a prescribed capac-

ity engaged in public transport and extend the obligation to carry wireless to other

classes of aircraft (Art. 14), to amend the technical annexes, and to initiate modifi-

cations of the Convention (Art. 35).

2 lbia., Art. 4.
League Covenant, Arts. 7, 22, 17, 16.
Ibid., Art. 11. This clause is of course much less significant than it appears to
be because neither the Council nor the Assembly has power to do anything more in
such an event than to recommend and advise.
4 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 400 ff. The General Conference of the Labor
Organization discusses labor questions of international importance and submits
proposals to the member states in the form of recommendations or of draft conventions. It also initiates amendments to the labor clauses of the treaties. The Governing Body of the Labor Office prescribes the form and content of annual reports of
members, prepares the agenda for meetings of the Conference, controls the preliminary procedure when controversies arise in regard to the observance of labor
conventions, and exercises a general supervision over the administration of the
Labor Office. The principal business of the Labor Office is to collect and distribute
information.
6 Treaty with Germany, Arts. 346, 354, 348, 343, 344; Treaty with Austria,
Arts. 301, 303. See Sayre, Experiments in lnJernalional Administralion, pp. 38-47,
1

1

131-141.
1 The

Commission is authorized to determine its own procedure (Art. 35), to
exercise a variety of ministerial or administrative functions (Arts. 9, 15, 17, 28, 29,
35, Annex H, 3), to settle disputes relating to the technical regulations (Art. 38), to
fix regulations for the issuance of certificates and licenses (Art. 13, Annex B, Annex
E), to regulate the methods of employing wireless on aircraft of a prescribed capacity engaged in public transport and extend the obligation to carry wireless to other
classes of aircraft (Art. 14), to amend the technical annexes, and to initiate modifications of the Convention (Art. 35).
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voluntary classification system in force for the International

Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.1 Included among

these expenses are the sums paid out by the Secretary-

General for the support of the Labor Organization.2 The

proposed Commission for Air Navigation will be supported

by the contracting states in proportion to the number of

votes at their disposal.3

Whatever its immediate future may be, the League of

Nations must be regarded as a remarkable attempt to

provide the international community with a permanent

organization. The precedents which it establishes are note-

worthy. Inequalities resulting from the exclusion of certain

states may be explained as temporary incidents which will

disappear when the world is eventually restored to a normal

peace basis. On the other hand, inequalities in the appor-

tionment of representation, voting strength, and contribu-

tions are intended to be permanent. They indicate a deeply

rooted conviction that the world cannot be organized on the

basis of political equality as political equality has been tra-

ditionally understood. It is especially noteworthy that the
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institutions which have been constituted with the least

regard for traditional conceptions of equality are the institu-

tions which have been invested with the greatest powers

both in connection with the execution of the settlement and

with the plan for securing peace.

Summary

It is impossible at this date to say how much of the settle-

ment consummated at Paris will prove relatively permanent

and how much will be amended in the readjustments which

1 League Covenant, Art. 6. The scheme for determining contributions in support

of the Postal Union Bureau divides the member states into seven classes. States in

the first class contribute twenty-five times as much as states in the seventh class.

See Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, XXV, 492.

* Treaty with Germany, Art. 399. 'Air Convention, Art. 35.

voluntary classification system in force for the International
Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.1 Included among
these expenses are the sums paid out by the SecretaryGeneral for the support of the Labor Organization.2 The
proposed Commission for Air Navigation will be supported
by the contracting states in proportion to the number of
votes at their disposal.3
Whatever its immediate future may be, the League of
Nations must be regarded as a remarkable attempt to
provide the international community with a permanent
organization. The precedents which it establishes are noteworthy. Inequalities resulting from the exclusion of certain
states may be explained as temporary incidents which will
disappear when the world is eventually restored to a normal
peace basis. On the other hand, inequalities in the apportionment of representation, voting strength, and contributions are intended to be permanent. They indicate a deeply
rooted conviction that the world cannot be organized on the
basis of political equality as political equality has been traditionally understood. It is especially noteworthy that the
institutions which have been constituted with the least
regard for traditional conceptions of equality are the institutions which have been invested with the greatest powers
both in connection with the execution of the settlement and
with the plan for securing peace.
SUMMARY

It is impossible at this date to say how much of the settlement consummated at Paris will prove relatively permanent
and how much will be amended in the readjustments which
League Covenant, Art. 6. The scheme for determining contributions in support
of the Postal Union Bureau divides the member states into seven classes. States in
the first class contribute twenty-five times as much as states in the seventh class.
See Hertslet, CommerciaJ TrcaJics, XXV, 492.
z Treaty with Germany, Art. 399.
• Air Convention, Art. 35.
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appear to be imminent. Perhaps it is not important to know.

The terms are not significant because of their content so

much as they are for the principles applied and the tenden-

cies manifested. These principles and tendencies are not

likely to be much amended. In general, as regards limitations

upon the legal capacity of states, the Peace of Paris presents

a logical application of familiar principles. Certain types of

limitation are more conspicuous than others. The problem

of the inland state receives more attention than ever before.

Financial supervision is uniquely illustrated in the repara-

tion program. Stipulations for disarmament, the interna-

tional control of waterways, and the protection of minorities

afford interesting examples of limitations of the nature of

servitudes. A few international persons of limited capacity

are created. The legal nature of these and other limitations

is definitively established in so far as they are now sanc-

tioned by the collective approval of the League of Nations.

If the League functions with any degree of success, an im-

portant step will have been taken in the direction of sub-
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stituting orderly processes for self-help and the most serious

limitation upon the legal equality of states will have been

substantially mitigated.

The outstanding feature of the Peace of Paris is its tend-

ency to limit the political equality of states. This is quite in

accord with earlier precedents but is more strikingly mani-

fested in the new settlement than ever before. Attention

has been directed to limitations upon political equality in

the Peace Conference itself, in the temporary regime created

to ensure the execution of the settlement, and in the per-

manent organization established to execute the settlement

and preserve peace. In the Conference itself small states

were invited to participate and meetings were actually

held; but only the five great powers were permitted to be

represented at all sessions and these powers dominated the

appear to be imminent. Perhaps it is not important to know.
The terms are not significant because of their content so
much as they are for the principles applied and the tendencies manifested. These principles and tendencies are not
likely to be much amended. In general, as regards limitations
upon the legal capacity of states, the Peace of Paris presents
a logical application of familiar principles. Certain types of
limitation are more conspicuous than others. The problem
of the inland state receives more attention than ever before.
Financial supervision is uniquely illustrated in the reparation program. Stipulations for disarmament, the international control of waterways, and the protection of minorities
afford interesting examples of limitations of the nature of
servitudes. A few international persons of limited capacity
are created. The legal nature of these and other limitations
is definitively established in so far as they are now sanctioned by the collective approval of the League of Nations.
If the League functions with any degree of success, an important step will have been taken in the direction of substituting orderly processes for self-help and the most serious
limitation upon the legal equality of states will have been
substantially mitigated.
The outstanding feature of the Peace of Paris is its tendency to limit the political equality of states. This is quite in
accord with earlier precedents but is more strikingly manifested in the new settlement than ever before. Attention
has been directed to limitations upon political equality in
the Peace Conference itself, in the temporary regime created
to ensure the execution of the settlement, and in the permanent organization established to execute the settlement
and preserve peace. In the Conference itself small states
were invited to participate and meetings were actually
held; but only the five great powers were permitted to be
represented at all sessions and these powers dominated the
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Conference organization and settled the peace terms. In the

temporary regime representation was limited to a few states

and for most practical purposes to the five great powers; the

principle of majority decisions was extensively substituted

for the unanimity requirement; and the commissions were

invested in varying degree with real powers of control. Simi-

lar limitations are even more significant in the League or-

ganization which is intended to be permanent. Inequalities

of representation and voting strength, majority decisions in

a few noteworthy instances, and a limited amount of real

authority over matters of international concern are features

of the permanent organization which cannot be reconciled

with traditional notions of political equality. If this most

recent adventure in international organization is an indica-

tion of the probable course of future development, as there

is reason to believe, the traditional idea of political equality

will have to be regarded as an obsolete conception in theory
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as well as in fact.

Conference organization and settled the peace terms. In the
temporary regime representation was limited to a few states
and for most practical purposes to the five great powers; the
principle of majority decisions was extensively substituted
for the unanimity requirement; and the commissions were
invested in varying degree with real powers of control. Similar limitations are even more significant in the League organization which is intended to be permanent. Inequalities
of representation and voting strength, majority decisions in
a few noteworthy instances, and a limited amount of real
authority over matters of international concern are features
of the permanent organization which cannot be reconciled
with traditional notions of political equality. If this most
recent adventure in international organization is an indication of the probable course of future development, as there
is reason to believe, the traditional idea of political equality
will have to be regarded as an obsolete conception in theory
as well as in fact.
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Constitutions.
Brazilian Coffee Case, I58.
British Empire. See Great Britain.
British Order in Council, American protest, 184.

British Trade Union Conference, Lloyd
George on equality, 186.
Britton, state of nature, 28.
Brown, state equality denied, 134, 145.
Brusa, primacy of great powers, 139.
Brussels, Conference of 1874, rules of
land warfare, 282; Conference of 1889,
abolition of slave trade, 282; Conference of 1890, publication of customs
tariffs, 312; Act of I890, suppression of
slave trade, 319.
Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, 172, 173, I74,
276.

Buenz, argument in Venezuelan Arbitration, 167.
Bulgaria, treaty power, I96, 207; autonomy and independence, 234, 304;
vassalage 238, 304; excluded from
London Conference, 304; Treaty of
Neuilly, 337 n . 1; outlet on Aegean,
340; excluded from League, 347, 36o.
See Constitutions.
Burlamaqui, rejected distinction between
natural law and law of nations, 45 , 87;
state equality, 86-88, IOO, 187; life
and works, 87 n. 1.
Bynkershoek, anticipated by Gentilis, 39;
life and works, 92 n. 7; law of nations,
92, 93 n. 2.

Calvo, state equality, common statement, IOO, equality of rights, 105, derived from nature of international
society, I I 1.
Canada, foreign relations and treaty
power, 20I, 201 n. 1; war power, 204;
protection of aliens, 2I6; at Conference of Paris, 349.
Canon law, tripartite classification, 20;
disputed during Reformation, 21; natural equality and slavery, 24.
Capacity, legal, 190.
Carlyle, A. J., natural equality, 14; state
of nature in Roman law, 27.
Camazza Amari, state equality, equality
of legal capacity, Io7, I49, justified by
analogy, 112, and inequalities of form,
I I 7, proved a priori, I 20.
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INDEX

Casdagli v. Casdagli, 224, n. 2.

Central America, Court of Justice, Sal-

vador v. Nicaragua, 172, organization

and jurisdiction, 275-276, political

equality in, 322; union of states of,

207 n. 3, 208 n. 2; International Bu-

reau, 319.

Charkieh, The, 238 n. 3.

Chatillon, Congress of, 293.

Chaumont, Treaty of, 293, 293 n. 4, 296.

Chile, treaty power, 198; war power, 203;

admission of foreign troops, 205;

sending abroad of national troops, 205;

neutralization of Straits of Magellan,

255; opposed inequality in proposed

Arbitral Court, 330. See American

republics, and Constitutions.

China, protest against Lansing-Ishii

agreement, 174; treaty power, 196 n. 2;
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war power, 202; United States ex-

traterritorial jurisdiction, 225-227;

Chinese immigration into United

States, 229; suzerainty over Mongolia,

239; possible protection of, 245; inter-

vention in, 262; servitudes, 267; me-

morial on Second Hague Conference,

291; plan for composition of proposed

Arbitral Court, 327; opposed inequal-

ity in proposed Arbitral Court, 331;

abrogation of leases, 344 n. 2; at Con-

ference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1. See

Constitutions.

Choate, comment on Permanent Court of

Arbitration, 323; composition of pro-

posed Arbitral Court, 327.

Chrfitien, state equality, equality of legal

capacity, 108,149, a natural right, 11o,

in international conferences, 126;

primacy of great powers, 130, 138.

Christianity. See Patristic writings.

Cicero, as a political writer, 8 n. 1; nat-

ural law, 8, 9, 10; jus gentium and jus

naturale, 12; natural equality, 13, 14;

influence on patristic thought, 17, 18;

state of nature, 26; cited by Grotius,

39-

Civilization, limitations on equality in-

cident to character of, 133, 163, 223-

229, 262, 277, 341; basis for interven-

tion, 262.

Cobbett, state equality, equality of

rights, 106; primacy of great powers,

140.

Colombia, treaty power, 195, 198, 199;

war power, 203; admission of foreign

troops, 205; stationing of foreign war-

ships in territorial waters, 206; status

of aliens, 214; neutralization of Pan-

ama Canal, 255; reservation in regard

to forcible collection of contract debts,

274. See American republics, and

Constitutions.

Concert of Europe, 292-310, origin, 293;

significance, 293 n. 4, 308-310; Treaty

of Paris, 294; Congress of Vienna, 294-

296; alliance and concert renewed,

296; Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296-

299, 299 n. 1; denied political equality,

Casdagli v. Casdagli, 224, n. '2.
Central America, Court of Justice, Salvador v. Nicaragua, 172, organization
and jurisdiction, 275-276, political
equality in, 322; union of states of,
207 n. 3, 208 n. 2; International Bureau, 319.
Charkieh, The, 238 n. 3.
Chritillon, Congress of, '293·
Chaumont, Treaty of, 293, 293 n. 4, 296.
Chile, treaty power, 198; war power, 203;
admission of foreign troops, 205;
sending abroad of national troops, 205;
neutralization of Straits of Magellan,
255; opposed inequality in proposed
Arbitral Court, 330. See American
republics, and Constitutions.
China, protest against Lansing-Ishii
agreement, 174; treaty power, 196 n. 2;
war power, 202; United States extraterritorial jurisdiction, 225-227;
Chinese immigration into United
States, 229; suzerainty over Mongolia,
239; possible protection of, 245; intervention in, 262; servitudes, 267; memorial on Second Hague Conference,
291; plan for composition of proposed
Arbitral Court, 327; opposed inequality in proposed Arbitral Court, 331;
abrogation of leases, 344 n. 2; at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1. Sec
Constitutions.
Choate, comment on Permanent Court of
Arbitration, 323; composition of proposed Arbitral Court, 327.
Chretien, state equality, equality of legal
capacity, 108, 149, a natural right, 110,
in international conferences, 126;
primacy of great powers, 130, 138.
Christianity. See Patristic writings.
Cicero, as a political writer, 8 n. 1; natural law, 8, 9, 10; jus gentium and jus
naturale, 12; natural equality, 13, 14;
influence on patristic thought, 17, 18;
state of nature, '26; cited by Grotius,

n9, 262, 277, 341; basis for interven·
tion, 262.
Cobbett, state equality, equality of
rights, 1o6; primacy of great powers,
140.
Colombia, treaty power, 195, 198, 199;
war power, 203; admission of foreign
troops, 205; stationing of foreign warships in territorial waters, 206; status
of aliens, 214; neutralization of Panama Canal, 255; reservation in regard
to forcible collection of contract debts,
274. See American republics, and
Constitutions.
Concert of Europe, 292-310, origin, 293;
significance, 293 n. 4, 308-310; Treaty
of Paris, 294; Congress of Vienna, 294296; alliance and concert renewed,
296; Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296299, 299 n. 1; denied political equality,
300, 308-310; the Near East, 301-305;
affairs in Western Europe, 305-307;
World Concert, 307-308; attitude of
publicists and statesmen, 309; a court
of appeal, 310, 323. See Great powers.
Concert of great powers. See Great
powers.
Confederations. See Imperfect unions.
Conferences. See Congresses.
Congo, neutrality, 254.
Congress of Arts and Sciences, state
equality discussed, 142.
Congresses, international, 28o-292, 281
n. 1, 332; supernational, 281 n. x, 292310, 332.
Conquest, proposal to abolish title by,
2iO n. 2.
Constantinople, Conferences, pacification of Syria, 302; Conference of 1876,
303; Superior Board of Health, 316.
Constitutions, national, guaranties of
equality in, xo4 n. 1; method of citation, 192 n. 1.
Consular jurisdiction. See Extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Continuous voyage, 222.
39·
Civilization, limitations on equality in- Contraband, conditional, 222.
cident to character of, 133, 163, 223- Contract debts. See Debts.
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Contributions, support of international

institutions, 125, 280; administrative

unions, 311, 310-321, 333; League in-

stitutions, 375.

Copenhagen, Conference of 1857, 282.

Costa Rica, treaty power, 198, 208; war

power, 203; status of aliens, 214; ex-

cluded from League, 347, 360. See

American republics, and Constitutions.

Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 268 n. 2, 275

n. 1, 276 n. 2.

Court of Arbitral Justice, International,

composition of, 120,181,182-184, 326-

331, 333', Vctu in regard to, 330.

Court of Arbitration. See The Hague

Court of Arbitration.

Court of International Justice, League of

Nations, protection of minorities, 345;

formulation of plans for, 361, 374.
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Court of Prize, International, composi-

tion of, 181,182,323-326,333; appeals

from national courts, 217; Bulgaria

represented, 238; proposed location of,

308 n. 1; jurisdiction and procedure,

33i-

Courts, supernational, 126,126 n. 2, 280,

322-332. 333. 361, 374-

Cracow, suppression of, 173 n. 4; protec-

tion of, 241.

Crete, European Concert and affairs in,

143. 301. 301 n. 4, 302, 304, 305, 309;

autonomy and vassalage, 234, 238.

Crimean War, 302.

Cuba, treaty power, 198, 207, 208; war

power, 204; protection of, 246, 251;

intervention in, 262, 263; at Confer-

ence of Paris, 349, 3SS n. 1. See

American republics, and Constitutions.

Cutting's Case, 228 n. 1.

Cyprus, assigned to England, 234 n. 7.

Czecho-Slovakia, access to sea, 340; at

Conference of Paris, 349,355 n. 1; rep-

resented on Reparation Commission,

354-

Dainese v. United States, 224 n. 2.

Danish Sound dues, abolition of, 282.

Danube, European Concert and naviga-

tion of, 174, 301 n. 4, 302, 304; Euro-

pean Commission, 266, 316-317, 361,

367; new International Commission,

367. 371-

Danzig, Free City of, a Polish commercial

port, 339, 339 n. 2, 342 n. 1, 346, 355;

League's protection and guaranty, 342,

34S. 372.

Dardanelles, closing of confirmed, 302.

Debts, public, collection of, 123; forcible

collection of, 272-274; Hague Con-

vention, 273, small states ratifying

without reservation, 273 n. 4, reserva-

tions on ratification of, 273-274.

Declaration of Independence, United

States, 154, 155, 176, 176 n. 2.

Declaration of London, 222.

Declaration of Rights of Nations, Ameri-

can Institute of International Law,

iS4-I55. 175. 187.

De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 158 n. 1.

Contributions, support of international
institutions, 125, 28o; administrative
unions, 311, 31()-321, 333; League institutions, 375.
Copenhagen, Conference of 1857, 282.
Costa Rica, treaty power, 198, 208; war
power, 203; status of aliens, 214; excluded from League, 347, 36o. See
American republics, and Constitutions.
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 268 n. 2, 275
n. 1, 276 n. 2.
Court of Arbitral Justice, International,
composition of, 120, 181, 182-184, 326331, 333; V iru in regard to, 330.
Court of Arbitration. See The Hague
Court of Arbitration.
Court of International Justice, League of
Nations, protection of minorities, 345;
formulation of plans for, 361, 374.
Court of Prize, International, composition of, 181, 182, 323-326, 333; appeals
from national courts, 217; Bulgaria
represented, 238; proposed location of,
308 n. 1; jurisdiction and procedure,

tion of, 174, 301 n. 4, 302, 304; European Commission, 266, 316-317, 361,
367; new International Commission,
367, 371.

Danzig, Free City of, a Polish commercial
port, 339, 339 n. 2, 342 n. 1, 346, 355;
League's protection and guaranty, 342,
345, 372.

Dardanelles, closing of confirmed, 302.
Debts, public, collection of, 123; forcible
collection of, 272-274; Hague Convention, 27 3, small states ratifying
without reservation, 27 3 n. 4, reservations on ratification of, 273-274.
Declaration of Independence, United
States, 154, 155, 176, 176 n. 2.
Declaration of London, 222.
Declaration of Rights of Nations, American Institute of International Law,
154-155, 175, 187.

De Haber v. Queen of Portugal, 158 n. 1.
Denmark, imprisonment of Pufendorf,
76; treaty power, 196; war power, 202;
succession and integrity, 251 n. 5; representation at international confer331.
Courts, supemational, 1 26, 126 n. 2, 28o,
ences, 281; European Concert and
322-332, 333, 361, 374.
crisis in, 305; opposed inequality in
Cracow, suppression of, 173 n. 4; protecproposed Arbitral Court, 330; abstained on Vmu in regard to proposed
tion of, 241.
Crete, European Concert and affairs in,
Arbitral Court, 331; represented on
143, 301, 301 n. 4, 302, 304, 305, 309;
Oder Commission, 367. See Constitutions.
autonomy and vassalage, 234, 238.
Crimean War, 302.
Derffiinger, The, 224 n. 2.
Cuba, treaty power, 198, 207, 208; war Despagnet, state equality, justified by
power, 204; protection of, 246, 251; : analogy, I I 2; relation of constitutional
intervention in, 262, 263; at Conferlaw to law of nations, 189.
ence of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1. See Diplomatic precedence and ceremonial,
101 n. 1, 123, 1s2.
American republics, and Constitutions.
Cutting's Case, 228 n. 1.
Diplomatic protection of citizens, 123,
Cyprus, assigned to England, 234 n. 7.
208, 214-216; limitation on equality,
Czecho-Slovakia, access to sea, 340; at
227-228, 228 n. 1; intervention to assure, 262.
Confcrence of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1; represented on Reparation Commission, Divine law, Ii, 20, 21, 22, 40, 71, 77.
354.
Dominican Republic, negotiations for
acquisition by United States, 177;
Dainese t•. United States, 224 n. 2.
declaration on equality of delegate to
Danish Sound dues, abolition of, 282.
Hague Conference, 183; treaty power,
Danube, European Concert and naviga198, 207, 2u; war power, 203, 211;
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protection of aliens, 214; protection of,

247; financial control of, 257, 258 n. 1;

intervention in, 264; opposed inequal-

ity in proposed Prize Court, 324; ex-

cluded from League, 347, 360. See

American republics, and Constitu-

tions.

Drago, declaration on equality, 175, 272.

Duke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover,

158 n. 1.

Dunning, influence of Hobbes and Gro-

tius on Pufendorf, 76 n. 3.

Duress, municipal law and law of na-

tions compared, 270; proposed limita-

tion, 270 n. 2.

Eclectics, or Grotians, school of, 68, 69,

95-<>o-

Ecuador, treaty power, 198; war power,

203; admission of foreign troops, 205;
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stationing of foreign warships in terri-

torial waters, 205; admission of aliens,

212; at Conference of Paris, 349, 355

n. 1. See American republics, and

Constitutions.

Egypt, autonomy, vassalage, and British

protectorate, 235, 238; financial con-

trol of, Commission of 1880, 256; inter-

vention in, 263; European Concert

and affairs in, 305.

Elizabeth, Queen, manumission commis-

sion, 24 n. 1, 28 n. 1.

Engelbert of Volkersdorf, anthropomor-

phism, 30.

Equal protection of law. See Equality

before the law.

Equality, as a principle of law, 3-5. See

Equality before the law, Equality of

capacity for rights, and Equality of

states.

Equality, in law of nature. See Natural

equality.

Equality, political, analytically con-

sidered, 137, 146, 148, 280, 332; limi-

tations upon, 280-333, 348-378. See

Equality of states.

Equality before the law, definition, 3;

distinguished from equality of capac-

ity for rights, 4, 149, 166-167; con-

fused with equality of capacity for

rights, 5, 104» 148; in Grotian system,

35; in writings of modern publicists,

104, 105, 131; vindicated at West-

phalia, 233. See Equality of capacity

for rights, and Equality of states.

Equality of capacity for rights, defini-

tion, 4; distinguished from equality

before the law, 4, 149, 166-167; con-

fused with equality before the law, 5,

104, 148; in Grotian system, 35; in

writings of modern publicists, 105-

109, 132; distinguished from political

equality, 137, 146, 148, 280, 332;

effect of internal limitations on form of

transactions, 206, 2n, 218, on capacity

for transactions, 206, 210, 211, 219, on

capacity for rights, 212, 219; effect of

external limitations on legal capacity,

221. See Equality, political, Equality

protection of aliens, 214; protection of,
ity for rights, 4, 149, 166-167; confused with equality of capacity for
247; financial control of, 257, 258 n. 1;
rights, 5 1 104, 148; in Grotian system,
intervention in, 264; opposed inequality in proposed Prize Court, 324; ex35; in writings of modern publicists,
104, 105, 131; vindicated at Westcluded from League, 347, 36o. See
American republics, and Constituphalia, 233. See Equality of capacity
for rights, and Equality of states.
tions.
Drago, declaration on equality, 175, 272. Equality of capacity for rights, definiDuke of Brunswick v. King of Hanover,
tion, 4; distinguished from equality
before the law, 4, 149, 166-167; con158 n. 1.
Dunning, influence of Hobbes and Grofused with equality before the law, 5,
104, 148; in Grotian system, 35; in
tius on Pufendorf, 76 n. 3.
Duress, municipal law and law of nawritings of modern publicists, 105tions compared, 270; proposed limita109, 132; distinguished from political
tion, 270 n. 2.
equality, 137, 146, 148, 28o, 332;
effect of internal limitations on form of
Eclectics, or Grotians, school of, 68, 69,
transactions, 206, 2u, 218, on capacity
for transactions, 2o6, 210, 211, 219, on
95-<J9·
Ecuador, treaty power, 198; war power,
capacity for rights, 212, 219; effect of
203; admission of foreign troops, 205;
external limitations on legal capacity,
stationing of foreign warships in terri221. See Equality, political, Equality
torial waters, 205; admission of aliens,
before the law, and Equality of states.
212; at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 Equality of contributions. See Contributions.
n. 1. See American republics, and
Constitutions.
Equality of rights. See Equality of capacEgypt, autonomy, vassalage, and British
ity for rights.
protectorate, 235, 238; financial con- Equality of states, meaning, 5; sources of
trol of, Commission of 188o, 256; interprinciple, 5-33; in Grotian system, 34vention in, 263; European Concert
67; origin of principle, 68---<)Q; in writand affairs in, 305.
ings of modern publicists, 1cxr-15 2;
Elizabeth, Queen, manumission commisin documentary sources, 153-188; insion, 24 n. 1, 28 n. 1.
ternal limitations upon, l&)-220, 338
Engelbert of Volkersdorf, anthropomorn. 1; external limitations upon, 221phism, 30.
279, 338-348, 377; limitations upon
Equal protection of law. See Equality
political equality, 28o-333, 348-376,
before the law.
377-378; conclusions, 334-336; in
Equality, as a principle of law, 3-5. See
Peace of Paris, 337-378.
Equality before the law, Equality of Esher, Lord, state equality, Mighell v.
capacity for rights, and Equality of
Sultan of Johore, 158 n. 1.
states.
European Concert. See Concert of
Equality, in law of nature. See Natural
Europe, and Great Powers.
equality.
Evans, L. B., state equality denied, 136
Equality, political, analytically conn. I.
sidered, 137, 146, 148, 28o, 332; limi- Evans, Sir Samuel, inequality of states,
tations upon, 28o-333, 348-378. See
The Mowe, 163.
Equality of states.
Expositions. See International ConferEquality before the law, definition, 3;
ence on.
distinguished from equality of capac- Extradition, 209, 211, 219.
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Extraterritorial jurisdiction, limitation

on equality, 121 n. 4, 224-227; inter-

vention to conserve, 262.

Fathers of Christian Church. See Pa-

tristic writings.

Felice, edition of Burlamaqui, state

equality, 88.

Fenix, The, 144 n. 1, 163 n. 2, 222 n. 2.

Figgis, state equality in Grotian system,

61; international state of nature, 75

n. 2.

Financial control of debtor states, limi-

tations incident to, 256-260, 278, 302,

342. 343. 377-

Fiore, comment on theory of punitive

war, 49 n. 2; state equality, equality of

legal capacity, 108, 149, and inequali-

ties of fact, 119, ideal character of, 121;

Antoine's notes, 122; primacy of great
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powers, 129; limitations incident to

civilization, 223.

Fishing rights, servitudes, 168-171, 264,

268.

Florentinus, natural equality, 15; state of

nature, 27.

Foix, Counts of, suzerainty over An-

dorra, 239.

Foster, state equality, justified by anal-

ogy, 113 n. 1.

France, equality of, 89, 113; a great

power, 130; Schooner Exchange t>.

M'Faddon, 156; Le Louis, 159; Ven-

ezuelan Arbitration, 165; Agidir in-

cident, 172; protest against suppression

of Cracow, 173 n. 4; denied equality of

United States, 176 n. 2; treaty power,

197; war power, 203; suzerainty over

Andorra, 239; Moroccan protectorate,

242-243; protection of Abyssinia, 245;

guaranty of Peace of Westphalia, 247;

treaties of Utrecht, 249; guaranty of

independence of Greece, 250, of in-

tegrity of Norway, 251, of neutraliza-

tion of Switzerland, Belgium, and

Luxemburg, 252-254; right to inter-

vene under Westphalian guaranties,

262; representation at international

conferences, 281-282; initiative at

Conference of Copenhagen, 284; in-

fluence at Conference of Geneva, 284;

Congress of Vienna, 204-296; Congress

of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296-299; affairs of

Greece, 301; pacification of Syria, 302;

coercion of Holland, 306; dependencies

represented in Wireless Telegraph

Union, 313; merchant marine tonnage,

323 n. 3; representation on proposed

Prize Court, 324; rights in Saar Basin,

344, 34S. 372; disposition of Danzig,

345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;

represented on Reparation Commis-

sion, 354, on Inter-Allied Rhincland

Commission, 354, on river commis-

sions, 367, 367 n. 1; treaties for assist-

ance to, 370, 373. See Concert of

Europe, Constitutions, and Great

powers.

Fiy, report on Second Hague Conference,

I

conferences, 281-282; initiative at
Conference of Copenhagen, 284; influence at Conference of Geneva, 284;
Congress of Vienna, 294-296; Congress
I
Fathers of Christian Church. See Pa- I of Abe-la-Chapelle, 296-299; affairs of
tristic writings.
I Greece, 301; pacification of Syria, 302;
coercion of Holland, 3o6; dependencies
F~lice, edition of Burlamaqui, state i
equality, 88.
I represented in Wireless Telegraph
Union, 313; merchant marine tonnage,
Fenix, The, 144 n. 1, 163 n. 2, 222 n. 2.
Figgis, state equality in Grotian system,
323 n. 3; representation on proposed
Prize Court, 324; rights in Saar Basin,
61; international state of nature, 75
I
n. 2.
I
344, 345, 372; disposition of Danzig,
Financial control of debtor states, limi345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;
tations incident to, 256-26o, 278, 302,
represented on Reparation Commission, 354, on Inter-Allied Rhineland
342, 343, 377.
Commission, 354, on river commisFiore, comment on theory of punitive
war, 49 n. 2; state equality, equality of
sions, 367, 367 n. 1; treaties for assistlegal capacity, 108, 149, and inequaliance to, 370, 373. See Concert of
Europe, Constitutions, and Great
ties of fact, 119, ideal character of, 121;
Antoine's notes, 122; primacy of great
powers.
powers, I 29; limitations incident to Fry, report on Second Hague Conference,
civilization, 223.
28Q, 307.
Fishing rights, servitudes, 168-171, 264, Funck-Brentano, state equality denied,
Extraterritorial jurisdiction, limitation
on equality, 121 n. 4, 224-227; inter1
vention to conserve, 262.

268.

Florentinus, natural equality, 15; state of
nature, 27.
Foix, Counts of, suzerainty over Andorra, 239.
Foster, state equality, justified by analogy, 113 n. 1.
France, equality of, SQ, 113; a great
power, 130; Schooner Exchange v.
M'Faddon, 156; Le Louis, l59i Venezuelan Arbitration, 165; Agidir incident, 172; protest against suppression
of Cracow, 173 n. 4; denied equality of
United States, 176 n. 2; treaty power,
197; war power, 203; suzerainty over
Andorra, 239; Moroccan protectorate,
242-243; protection of Abyssinia, 245;
guaranty of Peace of Westphalia, 247;
treaties of Utrecht, 249; guaranty of
independence of Greece, 2501 of integrity of Norway, 251, of neutralization of Switzerland, Belgium, and
Luxemburg, 252-254; right to intervene under Westphalian guaranties,
262; representation at international

132.

Caius, jus cit.Uc and j11S genlium, 11; jus
naJurale and j us genlium, 1 2, 1 2 n. 1.
Gefkken, primacy of great powers, 139;
state equality and pacific blockade,
271.

Geneva, Conference of 1864, 282, 283;
Conference of 1868, 282, 283; Conference of 1<}06, 238, 282, 283; Convention of 1864 extended to maritime
warfare, 282.
Gentilis, life and works, 38 n. 3; law of
nations and state equality, 38-39.
Geographical situation, limitations incident to, 221-223, 277, 33Q-341, 339
n. 1, 340 n. 1, n. 2, 377.
German Confederation, 235; Luxemburg
united with, 253; created at Vienna,
295.

Germany, a great power, 130; Venezuelan
Arbitration, 164, 167; Agidir incident,
172; declarations on equality, 186;
treaty power, 197; war power, 203;
Hague maritime conventions and in-
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land states, 222, 222 n. 2; Moroccan

treaties, 242-243; guaranty of Nor-

way's integrity, 251; coercion of Vene-

zuela, 272; representation at interna-

tional conferences, 281-282; influence

at Conference of Geneva, 284; de-

pendencies represented in Wireless

Telegraph Union, 313; merchant ma-

rine tonnage, 323 n. 3; representation

on proposed Prize Court, 324; Treaty

of Versailles, 337 n. x, 351; cession

of Danzig, 339, 339 n. 2, 345; conces-

sions to Czecho-Slovakia, 340; denied

equality, 344 n. 5; cessions in Saar

Basin, 345; excluded from League, 347,

360; military occupation of Rhine

territory, 352,354,358; protest against

powers of Reparation Commission,

3S7 n. 1; sanction for reparation pro-

visions, 358, 358 n. 1; protest against
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composition of river commissions, 367

n. 1; investigations in, 370; treaties for

assistance to France, 373; treaties with

Poland, 373. See Concert of Europe,

Constitutions, Great powers, and

Prussia.

Granada, New. See Colombia.

Grant, President, San Domingo negotia-

tions, 177.

Gratian, definitions of law, 20; natural

equality, 24.

Gray, comment on Austinian theory, 191

n. 1.

Great Britain, influence of Grotian tradi-

tion, 34; a great power, 130; equality

of, 134, 144; opinion of British writers,

140; The Parlement Beige, 157; Le

Louis, 159; Venezuelan Arbitration,

164, 166; North Atlantic Fisheries

Arbitration, 168-171; Agidir incident,

172; negotiations with United States,

176; restrictions on neutral trade, 184;

Lloyd George on state equality, 186;

treaty power, 195, 200-201; war

power, 202, 204; protection of aliens,

216; Hague maritime conventions and

inland states, 222, 222 n. 2; acquisition

of Cyprus, 234 n. 7; control and ac-

quisition of Egypt, 235; suzerainty

over South African Republic, 239;

protection of Ionian Islands, 241, of

Persia, 243; recognition of Korean in-

dependence, 243, of Japanese interests

in Korea, 244; protection of Abys-

sinia, 245; guaranty of Peace of

Utrecht, 248-249, of independence of

Greece, 250, of integrity of Norway,

251, of neutralization of Switzerland,

Belgium, and Luxemburg, 252-254;

neutralization of Panama Canal, 255;

coercion of Venezuela, 272; representa-

tion at international conferences, 281-

282; initiative at Conference of Copen-

hagen, 284; influence at Conference of

Geneva, 284; Congress of Vienna, 294-

296; Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle,

296-299; attitude toward Holy Al-

liance, 300; affairs in Greece, 300, 301;

proposed conference on Italian affairs,

quisition of Egypt, 235; suzerainty
land states, 222, 222 n. 2; Moroccan
over South African Republic, 239;
treaties, 242-243; guaranty of Norprotection of Ionian Islands, 241, of
way's integrity, 251; coercion of VenePersia, 243; recognition of Korean inzuela, 27 2; representation at internadependence, 243, of Japanese interests
tional conferences, 281-282; influence
in Korea, 244; protection of Abysat Conference of Geneva, 284; desinia, 245; guaranty of Peace of
pendencies represented in Wireless
Utrecht, 248-249, of independence of
Telegraph Union, 313; merchant maGreece, 250, of integrity of Norway,
rine tonnage, 323 n. 3; representation
251, of neutralization of Switzerland,
on proposed Prize Court, 324; Treaty
Belgium, and Luxemburg, 25i-254;
of Versailles, 337 n. 1, 351; cession
neutralization of Panama Canal, 255;
of Danzig, 339, 339 n. 2, 345; concescoercion of Venezuela, 272; representasions to Czecho-Slovakia, 340; denied
tion at international conferences, 281equality, 344 n. 5; cessions in Saar
282; initiative at Conference of CopenBasin, 345; excluded from League, 34 7,
hagen, 284; influence at Conference of
36o; military occupation of Rhine
Geneva, 284; Congress of Vienna, 294territory, 352, 354, 358; protest against
powers of Reparation Commission,
296; Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle,
2(}6-299; attitude toward Holy Al357 n. I; sanction for reparation provisions, 358 1 358 n. 1; protest against
liance, 300; affairs in Greece, 300, 301;
composition of river commissions, 367
proposed conference on Italian affairs,
n. 1; investigations in, 370; treaties for
305; coercion of Holland, 306; London
assistance to France, 373; treaties with
Naval Conference, 307; dependencies
Poland, 373. See Concert of Europe,
represented in Wireless Telegraph
Constitutions, Great powers, and
Union, 313; proposal for Prize Court,
Prussia.
323, 324 n. 3; merchant marine tonGranada, New. See Colombia.
nage, 323 n. 3; representation on proGrant, President, San Domingo negotiaposed Prize Court, 324; recent contions, 177.
stitutional developments, 338 n. l;
Gratian, definitions of law, 20; natural
disposition of Danzig, 345; Conequality, 24.
ference of Paris, 348-351; represented
Gray, comment on Austinian theory, 191
on Reparation Commission, 354, on
n. l.
Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission,
Great Britain, influence of Grotian tradi354, on proposed Air Commission, 361,
tion, 34; a great power, 130; equality
368, 369, on river commissions, 367,
of, 134, 144; opinion of British writers,
367 n. 1; vote in League institutions,
140; The Parlement Beige, 157; Le
368 n. l; treaties for assistance to
Louis, 159; Venezuelan Arbitration,
France, 373. Sec Concert of Europe,
164, 166; North Atlantic Fisheries
and Great powers.
Arbitration, 168-17 l; Agidir incident, Great powers, primacy of, 117-119, 126172; negotiations with United States,
131, 133-1341 138-145; protection of
l 76; restrictions on neutral trade, 184;
citizens abroad, 228; collective guaranLloyd George on state equality, 186;
ties, 241)-252, 252-254; intervention
treaty power, 195 1 200-201; war
by, 263; use of pacific blockade, 272;
power, 202, 204; protection of aliens,
influence in international conferences,
216; Hague maritime conventions and
281, 284, 290, 291; concerted action of,
inland states, 222, 222 n. 2; acquisition
292-310; delimitation of Graecoof Cyprus, 234 n. 7; control and acTurkish boundary, 317 n. 1; dominated

INDEX

INDEX

411

411

proposed Prize Court, 324; dominated

proposed Arbitral Court, 326; at Con-

ference of Paris, 348-351, 377; after

dissolution of Conference of Paris, 351

n. 1; dominated temporary organiza-

tion created at Paris, 353-35°. 359.

377. 378; dominated League organiza-

tion, 366-375,377,378. See Concert of

Europe.

Greece, philosophers of antiquity, 6;

joint action of great powers, 143; ex-

cluded from deliberations of great

powers, 173, 173 n. 4; treaty power,

196; war power, 202; acquisition of

Crete, 235, of Ionian Islands, 242;

protection by great powers, 242;

guaranty of independence, 250; neu-

tralization of Ionian Islands, 255;

financial control of, 256; intervention
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in, 263, 264; proposed conference on

affairs of, 300; European Concert and

affairs in, 301, 301 n. 4, 302, 303, 309,

317 n. 1; abstained on Veeu in regard

to proposed Arbitral Court, 331; at

Conference of Paris, 349, 350, 355 n.i;

represented on Reparation Commis-

sion, 354. See Constitutions.

Gresham, state equality, 178.

Grotians. See Eclectics.

Grotius, forerunners, 23, 36-39; did not

develop principle of state equality, 34,

40; Dejure belli ac pacts, 34,39.54. 83,

85; life and works, 39 n. 2; sources of

system, 39; natural law, 40-47; state

of nature, 47-49; analogy, 49-50;

natural equality, 51-55; Mare Hberitm,

52,53; sovereignty, 55-60; illustrations

of Grotian tradition, 60-67, 136 n. 1;

divergent tendencies among succes-

sors, 68; eclectics or Grotians, 69;

compared with Hobbes, 70, 71, with

Pufendorf, 76, 76 n. 4, 77, 77 n. 3, 79;

influence on Pufendorf, 76, 76 n. 3, 79;

compared with Barbeyrac, 84; Zouche

a disciple of, 91; war as remedial

process, 269; duress, 270.

Guaranty, limitations incident to, 133,

247-252, 255, 278, 301, 342, 343, 344;

of Balkan states, 234; intervention a

corollary, 262, 263; system of guaran-

ties and intervention, 292, 293.

Guatemala, treaty power, 198; war

power, 204; protection of aliens, 214,

215; at Conference of Paris, 349, 355

n. 1. See American republics, and

Constitutions.

Hague Conferences. See The Hague

Conference.

Hague Conventions. See The Hague

Conventions.

Hague Tribunal. See The Hague Tribu-

nal.

Haiti, coercion by United States, 177;

reservation in regard to composition of

proposed Prize Court, 182; treaty

power, 198, 199; war power, 203, 204;

status of aliens, 214; protection of

aliens, 215; protection of, 247, 251;

proposed Prize Court, 324; dominated
of Balkan states, 234; intervention a
corollary, 262, 263; system of guaranproposed Arbitral Court, 326; at Conference of Paris, 348-351, 377; after
ties and intervention, 292, 293.
dissolution of Conference of Paris, 351 ' Guatemala, treaty power, 198; war
n. l; dominated temporary organizapower, 204; protection of aliens, 214,
215; at Conference of Paris, 349, 355
tion created at Paris, 353-356, 359,
377, 378; dominated League organizan. l. See American republics, and
tion, 366-375, 377, 378. See Concert of
Constitutions.
Europe.
Greece, philosophers of antiquity, 6; Hague Conferences. See The Hague
joint action of great powers, 143; exConference.
eluded from deliberations of great Hague Conventions. See The Hague
powers, 173, 173 n. 4; treaty power,
Conventions.
196; war power, 202; acquisition of Hague Tribunal. See The Hague TribuCrete, 235, of Ionian Islands, 242;
nal.
protection by great powers, 242; Haiti, coercion by United States, 177;
guaranty of independence, 250; neureservation in regard to composition of
tralization of Ionian Islands, 255; J proposed Prize Court, 182; treaty
financial control of, 256; intervention
power, 198, 199; war power, 203, 204;
in, 263, 264; proposed conference on
status of aliens, 214; protection of
affairs of, 300; European Concert and
aliens, 215; protection of, 247, 251;
affairs in, 301, 301 n. 4, 302, 303, 309,
financial control of, 258-260; inter317 n. l; abstained on V re1' in regard
vention in, 264; at Conference of Paris,
to proposed Arbitral Court, 331; at
349, 355 n. 1. See American reConference of Paris, 349, 350, 355 n.1;
publics, and Constitutions.
represented on Reparation CommisHall, independence of states, 132 n. I.
sion, 354. See Constitutions.
Halleck, state equality, a natural right,
Gresham, state equality, 178.
IIO.
Grotians. See Eclectics.
.
.
Hanotaux, Concert of Europe, 310.
Grotius, forerunners,
23, 36-39; did
·
. .
. not I H ed'Jaz, The, a t Con ferenceof p ans,J49,
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/ 355 n. 1; voe m
ague ssem y,
40; De Jttre beUi ac pacis, 34, 39, 54, 83,
68
.
d
f I 3 n. i.
.
85; hfe an works, 39 n. 2; sources o I ff
l't f l l
He ter state equa11ty, equa 1 y o ega
system, 39; natural law, 40-47; state
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o6
o6
b d
.
_ .
capacity, l , l
n. 4, ase on
of nature, 47-49, ana1ogy, 49 50,
·
'd l h
t
f
.
.
so•·ere1gnty II4 1 ea c arac er o ,
natural equality, 51-55; .lfore liberwn,
'
'
.
-6 .
.
. 121 121n.4.
52, 53; sovereignty, 55 o; 111ustrat1ons;
'
of Grotian tradition, 6o-67, 136 n. l; : Helen~, The, 159 n. 2• 163 n. I. .
1
.
t t end enCies
·
d 1vergen
among succes- Hely, mfluence of Hobbes and Grotius on
sors, 68; eclectics or Grotians, 6<);
Pufendorf, 76 n. 3·
compared with Hobbes, 70 , 71 , with Heraclitus, natural right, 6.
Pufendorf, 76, 16 n. 4, 77, 77 11. 3, 19; i Hershey, state equality, in Grotian systern, 67, ~quality of rights, lo6, based
influence on Pufendorf, 76, 76 n. 3, 19;
compared with Barbeyrac, 84; Zouche
on sovereignty, u4.
a clisciple of, 91; war as remedial Hicks, state equality, in Grotian system,
65; equality in Romanj1's gentiwn, 66
process, 269; duress, 270.
Guaranty, limitations incident to, x33,
n. l; state equality denied, 135, 144;
247-252, 255, 278, 301, 342, 343, 344;
alternative principle, 148 n. 3.

I

412

412

INDEX

INDEX

Hobbes, analogy, 31, 73, 112; influence,

44, 69, 70, 75,98; De cive, 70; life and

works, 70 n. 1; compared with Grotius,

70, 71; Leviathan, 70, 73; natural law,

71; state of nature, 72, 75 n. 2, 78;

natural equality, 73; sovereignty, 74;

law of nations and state equality, 74-

75; influence on Pufendorf, 76, 76 n. 3,

77, 79, 80, on Barbeyrac, 84, on Bur-

lamaqui, 87, on Vattel, 97.

Hodges, intervention, 261 n. 3.

Holland. See Netherlands.

Holtzendorff, primacy of great powers,

128,139.

Holy Alliance, 299, 300.

Holy Roman Empire, quasi-sovereign ties

of, 169, 232; disintegration, Peace of

Westphalia, 231-233; execution of

Peace of Westphalia, 247-248; inter-
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vention in, 262.

Honduras, treaty power, 198, 209; war

power, 203, 204; extradition, 211;

navigation of interior rivers, 212;

status of aliens, 214; protection of

aliens, 215; proposed financial control

of, 258 n. 1; at Conference of Paris,

349, 355 n. 1. See American republics,

and Constitutions.

Huber, state equality, derived from na-

ture of international society, 111 n. 4,in

law of organization, 125, 126 n. 1, 148

n. 1, and primacy of great powers, 127,

142 n. 1, in Second Hague Conference,

181 n. 1, positive limitations denied,

221 n. 1, in international administra-

tion, 310 n.3, in Institute of Agri-

culture, 315 n. 1, contributions to ad-

ministrative unions, 320 n. 1, in Per-

manent Court of Arbitration, 322 n. 2;

inequality in proposed Prize Court,

325 n. 3-

Hungary, Treaty of Peace, 337 n. 1;

outlet on Adriatic, 340; excluded from

League,347,360. See Austria-Hungary.

Hurtige Hane, The, 159 n. 2,163 n. 1.

Imperfect unions, in Grotian system, 58;

distribution of treaty power, 199-201,

209, of war power, 204; protection of

aliens, 216; limitations incident to,

230-236, 278, 338 n. 1.

Imperial Japanese Government v. Pen-

insular and Oriental Steam Naviga-

tion Co., 224 n. 2.

India, at Conference of Paris, 349; mem-

ber of League of Nations, 359, 365;

represented on Air Commission, 362,

369-

Indian Chief, The, 224 n. 2.

Industrial Property, International Bu-

reau of, 320.

Inland state, right to maritime flag, 121,

340; limitations incident to geographi-

cal situation, i2i, 163, 191 n. 2, 221-

223, 330-341, 34o n. 5, 377.

Institute of International Law, state

equality, pacific blockade, 120, 120

n. 2, 271; exclusion of aliens, 229.

International American Conference,

Hobbes, analogy, 31, 73, 112; influence,
:z09, of war power, 204; protection of
aliens, 216; limitations incident to,
44, 69, 70, 75, 98; De cive, 70; life and
works, 70 n. 1; compared with Grotius,
:z30--:z36, :z78, 338 n. 1.
70, 71; Leviathan, 70, 73; natural law, Imperial Japanese Government !.'. Pen71; state of nature, 72, 75 n. 2, 78;
insular and Oriental Steam Naviganatural equality, 73; sovereignty, 74;
tion Co., 224 n. 2.
law of nations and state equality, 74- India, at Conference of Paris, 349; mem75; influence on Pufendorf, 76, 76 n. 3,
ber of League of Nations, 359, 365;
represented on Air Commission, 362,
77, 79, 80, on Barbeyrac, 84, on Burlamaqui, 87, on Vattel, 97.
369.
Hodges, intervention, 261 n. 3.
Indian Chief, The, 224 n. 2.
Holland. See Netherlands.
Industrial Property, International BuHoltzendorff, primacy of great powers,
reau of, 320.
Inland state, right to maritime flag, 1:zi,
128, 139.
Holy Alliance, 299, 300.
340; limitations incident to geographiHoly Roman Empire, quasi-sovereignties
cal situation, 121 1 163, 191 n. 2, 221of, 169 1 232; disintegration, Peace of. 223, 33cr341, 340 n. 5, 377.
Westphalia, 231-:z33; execution of Institute of International Law, state
Peace of Westphalia, 247-248; interequality, pacific blockade, 120, 120
vention in, 262.
n. 2, 271; exclusion of aliens, 229.
Honduras, tr~ty power, 198, 209; war International American Conference,
power, 203, 204; extradition, :zu;
Third, 155, 175, 178, 285 n. 2; reprenavigation of interior rivers, 212;
sentation and voting, 282, 283.
status of aliens, 214; protection of International Conference on Expositions,
aliens, 215; proposed financial control
312, 313.
of, 258 n. 1; at Conference of Paris, International Institute of Agriculture,
349, 355 n. 1. See American republics,
201, 312, 314-315, 315 n. 1, 321.
and Constitutions.
International Law. See Law of Nations.
Huber, state equality, derived from na- International Office of Public Hygiene,
ture of international society, 111 n. 4,in
314, 321.
law of organization, 125, 126 n. 1, 148 International persons. See State.
n. 1, and primacy of great powers, 127, International Sanitary Conference, 312.
142 n. 1, in Second Hague Conference, International Sugar Commission, 317181 n. 1, positive limitations denied,
318, 318 n. 1.
221 n. 1, in international administra- International Telegraphic Union, 312,
313,320.
tion, 310 n.3, in Institute of Agriculture, 315 n. 1, contributions to ad- International Transports, Central Office
ministrative unions, 320 n. 1, in Perof, 319.
manent Court of Arbitration, 322 n. 2; International Union for Protection of
inequality in proposed Prize Court,
Literary and Artistic Works, 320.
325 n. 3.
International Union for Publication of
Hungary, Treaty of Peace, 337 n. 1;
Customs Tariffs, 312, 319.
outlet on Adriatic, 340; excluded from International Union of Weights and
League,347,36o. SeeAustria-Hungary.
Measures, 312, 313, 319.
Hurtige Hane, The, 159 n. 2, 163 n. 1.
International Wireless Telegraph Union,
201,312,313,321.
Imperfect unions, in Grotian system, 58; Intervention, limitations incident to,
distribution of treaty power, 199-201,
121 n. 4, 178, 26o--264, 278, 342 1 343;
1

INDEX

INDEX

413

413

in Turkey, 233-235, 236-239, 202,

264, 301-305; in China, 230-240, 245,

263; in Morocco, 242; in Korea, 243-

245; in Abyssinia, 245; in Cuba, 246,

262; in Greece, 250, 263, 264,301,302;

in Holland, 253; effect of neutraliza-

tion, 255; in Mexico, 263; in Panama,

263; in Dominican Republic, 264; in

Haiti, 264; collection of public debts,

272-274; system of guaranties and in-

tervention, 292, 293; invoked by Holy

Alliance, 299, 300.

Ionian Islands, protection of, 241;

united with Greece, 242, 250; neutral-

ization, 255.

Ionian Ships, The, 241 n. 5.

Italy, a great power, 130; Venezuelan

Arbitration, 164; treaty power, 196;

war power, 202; protection of San
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Marino, 242, of Abyssinia, 245;

coercion of Venezuela, 272; represen-

tation at international conferences,

281-282; influence at Conference of

Geneva, 284; proposed congress on

affairs of, 295; affairs discussed at Con-

gress of Paris, 302; European Concert

and crisis in, 305; proposed conference

on affairs of, 30S; admission to Eu-

ropean Concert, 306; dependencies

represented in Wireless Telegraph

Union, 313; merchant marine tonnage,

323 n. 3; representation on proposed

Prize Court, 3 24; disposition of Danzig,

345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;

represented on Reparation Commis-

sion, 354, on river commissions, 367,

367 n. 1. See Concert of Europe, Con-

stitutions, Great powers, and Sar-

dinia.

Japan, treaty power, 194; war power,

202; admission to normal status, 228;

protection and annexation of Korea,

243-245; possible protection of China,

245; participation in London Naval

Conference, 307, 308; dependencies

represented in Wireless Telegraph

Union, 313; merchant marine tonnage,

323 n. 3; representation on proposed

Prize Court, 324; disposition of Dan-

zig, 345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;

representation on plebiscite commis-

sions, 353, on Reparation Commission,

354. See Constitutions, and Great

powers.

Japanese House Tax Arbitration, 264

n. 4.

Jay, equality in negotiations with Eng-

land, 176.

Jefferson, equality of United States, 176

n. 2.

Jews, equality demanded for, 175 n. 1.

John of Salisbury, anthropomorphism,

30.

Johnson, equality in United States

foreign policy, 176 n. 2.

Jurisdiction, constitutional limitations,

212-216, 219; external limitations,

224-229, 264-268, 277, 278, 343-345,

in Turkey, 233-235, 236-239 1 262,
264 1 301-305; in China, 23()-2401 245,
263; in Morocco, 242; in Korea, 243245; in Abyssinia, 245; in Cuba, 246 1
262; in Greece, 250, 263, 264, 301, 302;
in Holland, 253; effect of neutralization, 255; in Mexico, 263; in Panama,
263; in Dominican Republic, 264; in
Haiti, 264; collection of public debts,
272-274; system of guaranties and intervention, 292, 293; invoked by Holy
Alliance, 299, 300.
Ionian Islands, protection of, 241;
united with Greece, 242, 250; neutralization, 255.
Ionian Ships, The, 241 n. 5.
Italy, a great power, 130; Venezuelan
Arbitration, 164; treaty power, 196;
war power, 202; protection of San
Marino, 242, of Abyssinia, 245;
coercion of Venezuela, 272; representation at international conferences,
281-282; influence at Conference of
Geneva, 284; proposed congress on
affairs of, 295; affairs discussed at Congress of Paris, 302; European Concert
and crisis in, 305; proposed conference
on affairs of, 305; admission to European Concert, 3o6; dependencies
represented in Wireless Telegraph
Union, 313; merchant marine tonnage,
323 n. 3; representation on proposed
PrizeCourt,324; disposition of Danzig,
345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;
represented on Reparation Commission, 354, on river commissions, 367,
367 n. I. See Concert of Europe, Constitutions, Great powers, and Sar-

323 n. 3; representation on proposed
Prize Court, 324; disposition of Danzig, 345; Conference of Paris, 348-351;
representation on plebiscite commissions, 353, on Reparation Commission,
354. Su Constitutions, and Great
powers.
Japanese House Tax Arbitration, 264
n.4.
Jay, equality in negotiations with England, i76.
Jefferson, equality of United States, i76
n. 2.
Jews, equality demanded for, 175 n . x.
John of Salisbury, anthropomorphism,
30.
Johnson, equality in United States
foreign policy, 176 n. 2.
Jurisdiction, constitutional limitations,
212-216, 219; external limitations,
224-229, 264-268, 277, 278, 343-345,
377-

Jus civile, compared withjus gentium, n;
status in, 16.
Jus gentium, early development, 1crn;
relation to jus nalurale, n-13, 15-17,
27, 31, 46, 84 n. 7, 88 n. l; as law between states, 37; in Grotian system,
46-47, 50.
Jus nalurale. See Natural law.

Kamarowsky, representation on international court, 328 n. 2.
Kebedgy, state equality, based on sovereignty, 115, and inequalities of fact,
II8.
Kent, state equality, equality before the
law, 105.
dinia.
King v. Earl of Crewe, 241 n. 1.
Koch, guaranty of Peace of Westphalia,
Japan, treaty power, 194; war power,
248.
202; admission to normal status, 228; Korea, independence, 243; Japanese
protection and annexation of Korea,
protectorate, 244; annexation, 245.
243-245; possible protection of China,
245; participation in London Naval Labor Organization. See League of NaConference, 307, 3o8; dependencies
tions.
represented in Wireless Telegraph Lactantius, Cicero's De republica, 9; natUnion, 313; merchant marine tonnage,
ural equality, 18; state of nature, 27.

INDEX
4H

INDEX

Laibach, Conference of, 300.

Lansing-Ishii agreement, 174.

Law, definition and classification, Aris-

totle, 7; Cicero, 8; St. Isidore and

Gratian, 20; St. Thomas Aquinas, 21,

22; Grotius, 40, 71; Hobbes, 71;

Selden, 71 n. 4; Pufendorf, 77; Bar-

beyrac, 84.

Law of Nations, derivation by early

publicists, 32; forerunners of Grotius,

37, 38; Grotius, definition, 41, dis-

tinguished from natural law, 41-45,

from Roman jus gentium, 46; early de-

velopment by publicists, 68; concep-

tions held by different schools, 69, 89;

influence of Hobbes, 69, 74; Pufendorf,

80; Thomasius, 82; Barbeyrac, 84;

Rutherforth, 85, 86 n. 4; Erskine, 86

n. 3; Burlamaqui, 87; Zouche, 90;
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Rachel, 92; Bynkershoek, 92; Moser,

93; G. F. von Martens, 94; Leibnitz,

95; Wolff, 95; Vattel, 97; real and

theoretical distinguished, 132; relation

to constitutional law, 189-220.

Lawrence, state equality, in Grotian sys-

tem, 63-65, denied, 140-142, 142 n. 1;

intervention, 261.

Le Louis, 155, 159.

League of Nations, 359-376, 378; Labor

Organization, 338 n. 1, 360, 360 n. 5,

361, 367, 369, 370, 371 n. 1, 375, 375

n. 4, 376; mandate system, 341, 342,

355 n. 4, 372, 374; protection of Dan-

zig, 342,346,372; protection of minori-

ties, 342,344; significance of, 343,346,

347. 365. 376, 378; Council, 344, 354,

360 ff.; Saar Basin trusteeship, 345,

352,372; membership in, 346-347,359,

365, 366; Assembly, 347, 36off.; or-

ganization of, 360-362; Secretariat,

360, 363, 365, 375; covenants and

sanctions, 362-365; inequalities in,

36S-376,378.

League to Enforce Peace, inequality of

representation and unanimity, 153

n. 1.

Leased territory, servitudes, 268, 344

n. 2.

Legnano, reprisals, 269 n. 1.

Leibnitz, compared with Wolff, 76 n. 4;

law of nations, 95; life and works, 95

n.5.

Levi, state equality, ideal character of,

121 n. 4.

Liberia, equality of, 134; inequality in-

cident to civilization, 223; relations

with United States, 258 n. 1; at Con-

ference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1.

Limitations upon equality of states, in-

ternal, 189-220, 338 n. 1; external,

221-279, 338-348, 377; upon political

equality, 280-333,348-378. See Equal-

ity of states.

Literary and Artistic Works. See Inter-

national Union for Protection of.

Lloyd George, state equality, 186.

London, Conference of 1883, 174, 304;

Naval Conference, 217,307; Treaty of

Laibach, Conference of, 300.
Legnano, reprisals, :26<} n. 1.
Lansing-Ishii agreement, 174.
Leibnitz, compared with Wolff, 76 n. 4;
Law, definition and classification, Arislaw of nations, 95; life and works, 95
totle, 7; Cicero, 8; St. Isidore and
n. 5.
Gratia.n, :20; St. Thomas Aquinas, 21, Levi, state equality, ideal character of,
n; Grotius, 40, 71; Hobbes, 71;
121 n. 4.
Selden, 71 n. 4; Pufendorf, 77; Bar- Liberia, equality of, 134; inequality incident to civilization, ::123; relations
beyrac, 84.
with United States, :258 n. li at ConLaw of Nations, derivation by early
publicists, 32; forerunners of Grotius,
ference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1.
37, 38; Grotius, definition, 41, dis- Limitations upon equality of states, intinguished from natural law, 41-45,
temal, l&}-220, 338 n. li external,
from Romanjus gentium, 46; early de221-279, 338-348, 377; upon political
equality, 28o--333, 348-378. See Equalvelopment by publicists, 68; conceptions held by different schools, 6<), 89;
ity of states.
influence of Hobbes, 6<), 74; Pufendorf, Literary and Artistic Works. Su Inter80; Thomasius, 82; Barbeyrac, 84;
national Union for Protection of.
Rutherforth, 85, 86 n. 4; Erskine, 86 Lloyd Geor~e, state equality, 186.
n. 3; Burlamaqui, 87; Zouche, 90; London, Conference of 1883, 174 1 304;
Naval Conference, 217, 307; Treaty of
Rachel, 92; Bynkershoek, 92; Moser,
93; G. F. von Martens, 94; Leibnitz,
1831, 253; Treaty of 18671 254; Con95; Wolff, 95; Vattel, 97; real and
ference of 1831, 3o6; Conference of
theoretical distinguished, 132; relation
1867, 3o6.
to constitutional law, l&}-220.
London Times, The, criticism of Hague
Lawrence, state equality, in Grotian sysConference, 286, 287, 288.
tern, 63-65 1 denied, 140-142, 142 n. 1; Lorimer, state equality, equality of
intervention, 261.
rights, 105, denied, 136; compared v.ith
Le Louis, 155, 159·
natur.dists, 136; alternative principle,
146; world organization, 148; equality
League of Nations, 359-376, 378; Labor
Organization, 338 n. l, 360, 360 n. 5,
before the law, 149·
361, 367, 369, 370, 371 n. l, 375, 3751 L~cca, Republic of, equality of, 89.
n. 4 1 376; mandate system, 341, 342, Lutzow, The, :124 n. 2.
355 n. 4, 372, 374; protection of Dan- Luxemburg, equality of, 144; treaty
zig134213461372; protection of minoripower, 196, 207; war power, 202;
ties, 342, 344; significance of, 343, 346,
guaranty of neutralization, :250, 3o6;
347, 365, 376, 378; Council, 344, 354,
neutralization, 253-254, 255, 3o6;
360 ff.; Saar Basin trusteeship, 345,
neutralization terminated, 342. See
352, 372; membership in, 346-347, 359,
Constitutions.
365, 366; Assembly, 347, 36off.; organization of, 360-362; Secretariat, Macedonia, Commission of 19o6-09, 256;
360, 363, 365, 375; covenants and
European Concert and affairs in, 305.
sanctions, 362- 365; inequalities in, Machiavelli, on republics and princes,
192.
365-376, 378.
League to Enforce Peace, inequality of l\fadonna Del Burso, The, 159 n. 2, 163.
representation and unanimity, 153 Madrid, Conference of 1880, 281.
n. 1.
.Magellan, Straits of, neutralization, 255.
Leased territory, servitudes, 268, 344 Maine, Sir Henry, jus ge11Jittm and jus
n. 2.
nat11rale, 12 n. l; state equality, in

I

INDEX

INDEX

Grotian system, 62, 63; Pollock's

criticism, 62 n. 1, n. 2; Ancient Law,62,

63,122.

Malmesbury, proposed conference on

Italian affairs, exclusion of Sardinia,

305-306.

Mare liberum, Grotius, 39 n. 2, 52;

founded on natural law, 41, 52; nat-

ural equality, 51 n. 1; state equality,

S*-

Marianna Flora, The, 160 n. 1.

Marshall, state equality, The Antelope,

155,160-162,187, Schooner Exchange

v. M'Faddon, 156, 157.

Marsilius of Padua, state of nature, 28;

analogy, 30.

Martens, F. de, state equality, an in-

heient quality, 102, derived from na-

ture of international society, 11o, and

inequalities of fact, 118, 119.
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Martens, G. F. von, life and works, 93

n. 4; law of nations and state equality,

94-95-

Maximilian of Baden, state equality, 186.

Merchant ships, enemy, at outbreak of

hostilities, 222 n. 2.

Mexico, treaty power, 198, 200, 200 n. 2,

208, 209; war power, 203, 204; admis-

sion of foreign troops, 205, 206; sta-

tioning of foreign warships in territorial

waters, 205, 206; sending abroad of

national troops, 206; expulsion of

aliens, 213; protection of aliens, 213;

intervention in, 263; Treaty of Wash-

ington between Central American re-

publics, 275; excluded from League,

347, 360. See American republics, and

Constitutions.

Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 120 n. 1, 158

n. 1.

Minorities, protection of, Peace of Paris,

341, 342, 344, 344 n- 5, 356, 377.

Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, Peace of Paris,

338 n. 1,353,35°, 372-

Moldavia. See Roumania.

Monaco, equality of, 109, 115.

Mongolia, autonomy and vassalage, 239-

240; protection of, 245.

Monroe Doctrine, relation to state

equality, 178-180.

Montague, state equality, justified by

analogy, 113 n. 1.

Montenegro, limitations incident to

geographical situation, 144, 163, 222,

222 n. 2; equality of, 186; treaty power,

196; war power. 202; servitudes, 267;

excluded from Congress of Berlin, 303;

recognition of independence, 303. See

Constitutions.

Moore, definition of war, 270 n. i.

Morocco, extraterritorial jurisdiction.

225 n. 1; Act of Algeciras, 242; French

protectorate, 242-243; representation

at international conferences, 281, 282.

Moser, life and works, 93 n. 3; law of na-

tions and state equality, 93-94, 100,

150,IS1-

Mowe, The, 144 n. 1, 163, 222 n. 2.

Munster, Count, exclusion of Roumania

Grotian system, 62, 63; Pollock's
criticism, 62 n.1, n. 2; Ancient Law,62,
63, 122.
Malmesbury, proposed conference on
Italian affairs, exclusion of Sardinia,
305-3o6.
Mare liberum, Grotius, 39 n.2, 52;
founded on natural law, 41, 52; natural equality, 51 n. l; state equality,
52.
Marianna Flora, The, 160 n. 1.
Marshall, state equality, The Antelope,
155, l6o-162, 187, Schooner Exchange
v. M'Faddon, 156, 157.
Marsilius of Padua, state of nature, 28;
analogy, 30.
Martens, F. de, state equality, an inherent quality, 102, derived from nature of international society, no, and
inequalities of fact, 118, 119.
Martens, G. F. von, life and works, 93
n. 4; law of nations and state equality,
94""""95·
Maximilian of Baden, state equality, 186.
Merchant ships, enemy, at outbreak of
hostilities, 222 n. 2.
Mexico, treaty power, 198, 200, 200 n. 2,
2o8, 209; war power, 203, 204; admission of foreign troops, 205, 2o6; stationing of foreign warships in territorial
waters, 205, 2o6; sending abroad of
national troops, 2o6; expulsion of
aliens, 213; protection of aliens, 215:
intervention in, 263; Treaty of \Vashington between Central American republics, 275; excluded from League,
347 1 360. See American republics, and
Constitutions.
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, 120 n. 11 158
n. I.
Minorities, protection of, Peace of Paris,
341, 342, 344, 344 n. 5, 356, 377·
Mixed Arbitral Tribunals, Peace of Paris,
338 n. 1, 353, 356, 372.
Moldavia. See Roumania.
Monaco, equality of, 109 1 115.
Mongolia, autonomy and vassalage, 239240; protection of, 245.

Monroe Doctrine, relation to state
equality, 178-18o.
Montague, state equality, justified by
analogy, 113 n. 1.
Montenegro, limitations inci~ent to
geographical situation, 144, 163 1 122,
222n.2;equalityof,186;treatypower,
196; war power, 202; servitudes, 267;
excluded from Congress of Berlin, 303;
recognition of independence, 303. See
Constitutions.
l\foore, definition of war, 270 n. 1.
Morocco, extraterritorial jurisdiction.
225 n. 1; Act of Algeciras, 242; French
protectorate, 242-243; representation
at international conferences, 281, 282.
Moser, life and works, 93 n. 3; law of nations and state equality, 93--<)4, 100,
150, 151.
Mowe, The, 144 n. 1, 163, 222 n. 2.
Munster, Count, exclusion of Roumania
from Conference of London, 304, 304
n. 2.
Munster, Treaty of. See Westphalia,
Peace of.
Muscovy. See Russia.
l\fusgrove i•. Chun Teeong Toy, 229 n. 2.
Naples, revolution in, 299.
Natural equality, source of principle of
state equality, 6, 13-20, 23-25, 31-33;
in Roman juristic writings, 12; in
antiquity, 13-15; in Roman legal system, 15-17; in patristic writings, 1720; in Middle Ages, 23-25; ideal character of, 25, 31; applied to states, 33;
in Grotian system, 34, 35, 51-55 1 51
n. 1; forerunners of Grotius, 37, 38;
translated into law of nations, 6<) ff.
Natural law, source of principle of state
equality, 5-1:h 17 1 1g-23, 31-33; in
antiquity, 5-13; ideal character of, 16,
19, 31; in patristic writings, 17; in
Middle Ages, 20-23; immutability, 22,
23, 24, 31, 45; applied to states, 33; in
Grotian system, 35, 40-47; forerunners
of Grotius, 36-39; translated into law
of nations, 69 ff.

INDEX
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INDEX

Naturalists, compared with Grotius, 42-

45, 47; origin of principle of state

equality, 44, 45, 69, 81, 82; school of,

68,69,69-89; influence of Hobbes, 69-

75, 75 n- 31 Abdy's comment on, 89

n. 2; state equality, compared with

eclectics, 99; Lorimer compared, 136;

influence on modern publicists, 100-

131, 148-152; influence in documen-

tary sources, 187.

Netherlands, Grotius on freedom of seas,

52; influence on doctrine of equality,

61; treaty power, 196; war power, 202;

intervention and neutralization of Bel-

gium, 253, 306; representation at

international conferences, 281, 282;

influence at Conference of Geneva,

284; invitation to First Hague Con-

ference, 287; united with Belgium, 295;
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coercion of, 306; participation in Lon-

don Naval Conference, 308 n. 1;

dependencies represented in Wireless

Telegraph Union, 313; merchant

marine tonnage, 323 n. 3. See Con-

stitutions.

Neuilly, peace treaties of, 337 n. 1.

Neutralization, limitations incident to,

133» 2S2_*SS» 278, 342; autonomous,

211 n. 3.

New Zealand, at Conference of Paris,

349-

Nicaragua, Bryan-Chamorro Treaty,

i72, r73, !74, 27°; Salvador v. Nica-

ragua, 172; treaty power, 198, 209;

war power, 203; admission of foreign

troops, 205; sending abroad of na-

tional troops, 205; extradition, 211;

status of aliens, 214; protection of

aliens, 215; financial control of, 258;

at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1.

See American republics, and Constitu-

tions.

Nicholas of Cues, anthropomorphism, 30.

North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 164,

168-171, 264.

Norway, treaty power, 194, 207; war!

power, 203; guaranty of integrity, 251,

252; representation at international I

conferences, 281, at Second Hague

Conference, 285; guaranty of great

powers, 307; merchant marine tonnage,

323 n. 3; represented on Schleswig ple-

biscite commission, 353. See Constitu-

tions.

Nys, state equality, and inequalities of

fact, 118, 118 n. 1; primacy of great

powers, 129, 130, 138.

Olney, state equality denied, 134.

Oppenheim, state equality, an invariable

quality, 102; primacy of great powers,

126,127.

Osnabriick, Treaty of. See Westphalia,

Peace of.

Pacific blockade, limitation on equality,

120, 120 n. 2, 121 n. 4, 271, 272, 274,

301.

Palmerston, comment on Congress of

Vienna, 295.

Naturalists, compared with Grotius, 42conferences, 281, at Second Hague
45, 47; origin of principle of state
Conference, 285; guaranty of great
equality, 44, 45, 6<), 81, 82; school of,
powers, 307; merchant marine tonnage,
68, 6<), 6<)-8<); influence of Hobbes, 69323 n. 3; represented on Schleswig ple751 75 n. 3; Abdy's comment on, &)
biscite commission, 353. See Constitun. 2; state equality, compared with
tions.
eclectics, 99; Lorimer compared, 136; Nys, state equality, and inequalities of
influence on modem publicists, 100-fact, n8, u8 n. 1; primacy of great
131, 148-152; influence in documenpowers, 129, 130, 138.
tary sources, 187.
Netherlands, Grotius on freedom of seas, Olney, state equality denied, 134.
52; influence on doctrine of equality, Oppenheim, state equality, an invariable
61; treaty power, 196; war power, 202;
quality, 102; primacy of great powers,
intervention and neutralization of Bel126, 127.
gium, 253, 300; representation at Osnabri.ick, Treaty of. See Westphalia,
Peace of.
international conferences, ::z81, ::z82;
influence at Conference of Geneva,
284; invitation to First Hague Con- Pacific blockade, limitation on equality,
ference, 287; united with Belgium, 295;
120, 120 n. 2, 121n.4, 271, 272, 274,
coercion of, 300; participation in Lon301.
don Naval Conference, 3o8 n. 1; Palmerston, comment on Congress of
dependencies represented in Wireless
Vienna, 295.
Telegraph Union, 313; merchant Panama, treaty power, 198; war power,
204; jurisdiction over national domain,
marine tonnage, 323 n. 3. See Con212; status of aliens, 214; protection of,
stitutions.
247, 251; neutralization of Panama
Neuilly, peace treaties of, 337 n. 1.
Neutralization, limitations incident to,
Canal , 255; intervention in, 263; servitudes, 268; at Conference of Paris,
133, 252-255, 278, 34::z; autonomous,
349, 355 n. 1. See American republics,
211 n. 3.
New Zealand, at Conference of Paris,
and Constitutions.
Panama
Canal, neutralization, 255; con349·
Nicaragua, Bryan-Chamorro Treaty,
cession of rights to United States, 268.
172, 173, 174, ::z76; Salvador v. Nica- Pan-American Conferences. See International American Conferences.
ragua, 172; treaty power, 198, 209;
war power, 203; admission of foreign Pan-American Scientific Congress, Sectroops, 205; sending abroad of naond, 179.
tional troops, 205; extradition, 2n; Papayanni v. Russian Steam Navigation
status of aliens, 214; protection of
and Trading Co., 224 n. 2.
aliens, 215; financial control of, 258; Paraguay, treaty power, 198; war power,
203; admission of foreign troops, 205;
at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 n . 1.
See American republics, and Constitusending abroad of national troops, 205;
tions.
navigation of interior rivers, 212; adNicholas of Cues, anthropomorphism, 30.
mission of aliens, 212; status of aliens,
North Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 1641
214. See American republics, and
Constitutions.
168-171, 264.
Norway, treaty power, 194, 207; war Paris, Congress of 1856, 143, 302; Treaty
power, 203; guaranty of integrity, 251,
of 18561 230, 234, 250, 265, 302;
::z5::z; representation at international
Treaty of x814, 294; Declaration of

INDEX
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1856, 302; Conference of 1010-20,

337, 337 n. 1, 339, inequalities in,

348-351, 377; Peace of 1010-20, state

equality in, 337-378, limitations on

legal capacity, 338-348, 377. limita-

tions on political capacity, 348-378.

Parlement Beige, The, 157.

Patristic writings, law of nature and

natural equality, 17-20; influence on

mediaeval thought, 20, 24; state of

nature, 27, 28; cited by Grotius, 39.

Peking, Conference of 1900,282.

Pelletier's Case, 177.

Penfield, argument in Venezuelan Arbi-

tration, 165.

Persia, treaty power, 194; war power,

202; protection of, 243; participation

in Congress of Berlin, 303; vote in

League of Nations, 368 n. 1. See Con-
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stitutions.

Peru, treaty power, 198, 208; war power,

203; admission of foreign troops, 205;

status of aliens, 214; at Conference of

Paris, 349, 355 n. 1. See American re-

publics, and Constitutions.

Phillimore, state equality, a principle,

103, a natural right, 11o, derived from

nature of international society, 11o,

practical application, 123; relation of

constitutional law to law of nations,

100; war as remedial process, 269;

definition of war, 270.

Pickering, state equality, 176.

Pifidelievre, state equality, justified by

analogy, 112, and inequalities of fact,

116; definition of guaranty, 247.

Pillet, state equality denied, 133; pri-

macy of great powers, 139; alternative

principle, 146.

Plato, natural right, 6.

Piatt Amendment, 246, 256.

Plebiscites, Peace of Paris, 345, 352,353.

3S6,357, 37*, 373-

Poland, unrepresented at Westphalia,

281; partition confirmed, 295; Euro-

pean Concert and crisis in, 305; access

to sea, 339, 339 n. 2; treaty with Dan-

zig, 346, 355; at Conference of Paris,

349, 350. 3SS n- 1! represented on

Reparation Commission, 354; Galician

mandate, 372 n.3; treaties with Ger-

many, 373.

Political equality. See Equality, poli-

tical.

Pollard v. Bell, 162 n. 1.

Pollock, state equality, ideal character

of, 122.

Pomeroy, state equality, an essential

characteristic, 102, practical applica-

tion, 123.

Pope, German reply to Pope Benedict's

peace note, 186; protection of San

Marino, 242.

Portsmouth, Peace of, 244.

Portugal, inequality of, 116; The Ante-

lope, 160; treaty power, 198, 198 n. 1;

war power, 203, 210, 211 n. 1; Treaty

of Utrecht, 249; representation at in-

1856, 302; Conference of 191cr-20,
349, 350, 355 n. 1; represented on
337, 337 n. 1, 339, inequalities in,
Reparation Commission, 354; Galician
mandate, 372 n. 3; treaties with Ger348-351, 377; Peace of 191cr-20, state
many, 373.
equality in, 337-378, limitations on
legal capacity, 338-348, 377, limita- Political equality. See Equality, politions on political capacity, 348-378.
tical.
Pollard v. Bell, 162 n. 1.
Parlement Beige, The, 157.
Patristic writings, law of nature and · Pollock, state equality, ideal character
natural equality, 17-20; influence on
of, 122.
mediaeval thought, 20, 24; state of Pomeroy, state equality, an essential
nature, 27, 28; cited by Grotius, 39.
characteristic, 102, practical application, 123.
Peking, Conference of 1900, 282.
Pelletier's Case, 177.
Pope, German reply to Pope Benedict's
Penfield, argument in Venezuelan Arbipeace note, 186; protection of San
tration, 165.
Marino, 242.
Persia, treaty power, 194; war power, Portsmouth, Peace of, 244.
202; protection of, 243; participation Portugal, inequality of, 116; The Antelope, 160; treaty power, 198, 198 n. 1;
in Congress of Berlin, 303; vote in
war power, 203, 210, 211 n. l; Treaty
League of Nations, 368 n. 1. See Constitutions.
of Utrecht, 249; representation at inPeru, treaty power, 198, 2o8; war power,
temational conferences, 28I, 282;
203; admission of foreign troops, 205;
signed Treaty of Paris, 294; depcndstatus of aliens, 214; at Conference of
encies represented in Wireless Telegraph Union, 3I3; at Conference of
Paris, 349, 355 n. 1. See American republics, and Constitutions.
I Paris, 349 1 355 n. 1. See ConstituPhillimore, state equality, a principle,
tions.
103, a natural right, uo, derived from ~ Posidonius, Cicero's teacher, 8; the
nature of international society, no, I Golden Age, 26.
practical application, I 23; relation of Positivists, anticipated by Gen tills, 38,
&);schoolof,68,6Q , 89-<J5.
constitutional law to law of nations,
I9o; war as remedial process, 269; Postal Union. See Universal Postal
definition of war, 2jO.
Union.
Pickering, state equality, I76.
. Pradier-Fodfre, state equality, origin, 51
Piedelievre, state equality, justified by I n. 2, a fundamental right, IOI, I03,
analogy, II2, and inequalities of fact, I equality of legal capacity, Io7, I49,
u6; definition of guaranty, 247.
I justified by analogy, 112, and inequalities of fact, 116, proved a priori, 120.
Pillet, state equality denied, 133; primacy of great powers, 139; alternative : Pretoria, Convention of, 239.
principle, 146.
Prins Frederik, The, 157 n. 2.
Plato, natural right, 6.
Protection, in Grotian system, 50, 55,
Platt Amendment, 246, 256.
58; of Roumania, 233-234; of Egypt,
Plebiscites, Peace of Paris, 345, 352, 353,
235; of Mongolia, 239, 245; limitations
356, 357, 372, 373.
incident to, 240-247, 278, 342, 343;
guaranty a form of, 247; financial conPoland, unrepresented at Westphalia,
28I; partition confirmed, 295; Eurotrol a form of, 256; intervention a
pean Concert and crisis in, 305; access
corollary, 263.
to sea, 339, 339 n. 2; treaty with Dan- Prussia, protection of Cracow, 24I;
zig, 346, 355; at Conference of Paris,
Treaty of Utrecht, 249; guaranty of
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INDEX

neutralization of Switzerland, Bel-

gium, and Luxemburg, 252-254; initia-

tive at Conference of Copenhagen,

284; Congress of Vienna, 294-296;

Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296-299;

Holy Alliance, 299; opposed coercion

of Holland, 306. See Concert of

Europe, Constitutions, Germany, and

Great powers.

Ptolomaeus of Lucca, anthropomor-

phism, 30.

Public Hygiene. See International Office

of.

Publication of Customs Tariffs. See In-

ternational Union for.

Publicists, meaning of state equality, 5;

influence, 5, 63, 68; reception of

sources, 31-33; derivation of law of

nations, 32-33; divergent tendencies
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among, 32, 68-99; state equality in

writings of, 100-152; external limita-

tions recognized, 277. See Equality of

states.

Pufendorf, analogy, 31, 79, 80, 81; com-

pared with Grotius, 43,44, 76, 76 n. 4,

77, 77 n. 3; natural law and law of

nations, 44, 80; translated by Bar-

beyrac, 54, 83; De jure natura el

gentium, 54, 76, 77, 83; leader of nat-

uralists, 69, 82; citation of Hobbes,

75 n. 3; law of nations and state equal-

ity, 75-82; life and works, 76 n. 2;

influence of Hobbes and Grotius, 76,

76 n. 3, 77, 79, 80; Lorimer compared,

136.

Rachel, anticipated by Gentilis, 39; life

and works, 91 n. 5; law of nations and

state equality, 91-92.

Recognition, right to, 123.

Remedial processes, limitations incident

to, 164-168, 260-274, 278, 347-348,

377-

Renault, equality in Hague Conferences,

144; unanimity rule, 289.

Reparation, Peace of Paris, 342, 377;

Commission, 352, 352 n. 6, 354, 356,

3S7-3S8,3S7n. 1, n. 2,358 n. 1.

Representation, diplomatic and consu-

lar, 123, 295, 297; in international in-

stitutions, 125, 126, 280; in interna-

tional conferences and congresses,

281-282, 332; in Hague Peace Con-

ferences, 285, 286, 290; in superna-

tional conferences and congresses, 292,

294,308,332; in administrative unions,

201, 311, 312, 313, 321, 333; in super-

national judicial tribunals, 322-332,

333; at Conference of Paris, 348-351,

377; in temporary organization created

at Paris, 353-356, 359, 378; in League

of Nations, 366-368, 376, 378.

Revue gtnerale de droit international pub-

lic, equality and exclusion of aliens,

229.

Rhine, Central Commission, voting, 314

n- 3, 317 n- i, reorganization, 361,

367.

Rights, meaning, 4; definition, 190; in-

neutralization of Switzerland, Bel- Representation, diplomatic and consugium, and Luxemburg, 252-254; initialar, 123, 295, 297; in international intive at Conference of Copenhagen,
stitutions, 125, 126, 280; in intema284; Congress of Vienna, 294-296;
tional conferences and congresses,
Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296--299;
281-282, 332; in Hague Peace ConHoly Alliance, 299; opposed coercion
ferences, 285, 286, 290; in supernaof Holland, 3o6. See Concert of
tional conferences and congresses, 292,
Europe, Constitutions, Germany, and
294, 3o8, 332; in administrative unions,
201, 311, 312, 313, 321, 333; in superGreat powers.
Ptolomaeus of Lucca, anthropomornational judicial tribunals, 322-332,
phism, 30.
333; at Conference of Paris, 348-351,
Public Hygiene. See International Office I 377; in temporary organization created
of.
at Paris, 353-356, 359, 378; in League
Publication of Customs Tariffs. Sec Inof Nations, 366--368, 376, 378.
ternational Union for.
' Revue gtntrale de droit inlffnatwnal pubPublicists, meaning of state equality, 5; I lie , equality and exclusion of aliens,
influence, 5, 63, 68; reception of : 229.
sources, 31-33; derivation of law of Rhine, Central Commission, voting, 314
nations, 32-33; di,·ergent tendencies
n. 3, 317 n. 1 1 reorganization, 361,
among, 32, 68-Q9; state equality in [ 36;.
writings of, lOO-I52; external limita- Rights, meaning, 4; definition , 190; intions recognized, 277. See Equality of , ternal limitations on capacity for,
states.
212-216, 219, 338 n. 1; external limiPufendorf, analogy, 31, 79, So, 81; com-' tations on capacity for, 221-279 1 338pared with Grotius, 43, 44, 76, 76 n. 4, I 348 1 377; limitations on capacity for
77 1 77 n. 3; natural law and la\v of I political rights, 216--218, 219, 28~333,
nations, 44, 80; translated by Bar348- 3i8.
be)Tac, 54, 83; De jt1re natrm:e ct I Rivers, free navigation, 295; intemagenti11m, 54, 76, 77 1 83; leader of nattionalization, 340 n. 5, 344 1 361, 367,
uralists, 69, 82; citation of Hobbes,
371, 373, 375, 377.
75 n. 3; law of nations and state equal- Rivier, state equality, a principle, 103,
ity, 75- 82; life and works, 76 n. 2;
based on sovereignty, u4, ideal charinfluence of Hobbes and Grotius, 76,
acter of, 121 , 122 n. 1; primacy of great
76 n. 3, 77, 79, 80; Lorimer compared,, powers, 127.
I Roman Law, natural law, 6, 9-13; nat136.
• ural equality, 12, 15- 17; influence on
Rachel, anticipated by Gentilis, 39; life I patristic thought, lS, on mediaeval
and works, 91 n. 5; law of nations and
thought, 20, 23; during Reformation,
state equality, 91-i,)2.
21; state of nature, 27; in Grotian sys.Recognition, right to, 123.
tern, 39, 46--47, 50.
Remedial processes, limitations incident Root, state equality, Third Pan-Amerito, 164- 168, 269-274, 278, 347-348,
can Conference, 155, 175, 178, 179,
377.
Second Pan-American Scientific ConRenault, equality in Hague Conferences,
gress, 1;9.
144; unanimity rule, 289.
Roumania, excluded from Conference of
Reparation, Peace of Paris, 342, 377;
London, 174.304.304 n. 2; equality of,
Commission, 352, 352 n. 6, 354 , 356,
186; treaty power, 196, 207; admission
357-358, 357 n. 1, n. 2, 358 n. I.
of foreign troops, 205; autonomy and
1
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independence 233-234, 237, 303;

vassalage, 236-237; guaranty of in-

dependence, 250; servitudes, 266;

participation in Congress of Berlin,

303; abstained on Vau in regard to

proposed Arbitral Court, 331; at Con-

ference of Paris, 349, 350. 355 ». xj

represented on Reparation Commis-

sion, 354, on Danube Commission,

367. See Constitutions.

Roumelia, autonomy and union with

Bulgaria, 234, 304; European Concert

and affairs in, 305.

Rufmus, natural equality, 24.

Russia, equality of, 109, 113, 115, 116,

134, 161; a great power, 130; treaty

power, 193; war power, 202; autonomy

of Danubian principalities, 233; diplo-

matic representation in Bulgaria, 238;
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agreements in regard to Mongolia, 239;

protection of Cracow, 241, of Persia,

243; recognition of Korean independ-

ence, 243, 0f Japanese interests in

Korea, 244; protection of Mongolia,

245; guaranty of independence of

Greece, 250, of integrity of Norway,

251, of neutralization of Switzerland,

Belgium, and Luxemburg, 252-254;

neutralization of Black Sea, 255, 265,

266,266 n. 1; representation at interna-

tional conferences, 281-282; initiative

in calling Hague Conferences, 290;

Congress of Vienna, 294-296; Con-

gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296-299;

Holy Alliance, 299; proposed con-

ference on affairs in Greece, 300;

affairs in Greece,301; warwith Turkey,

303; opposed coercion of Holland, 306;

dependencies represented in Wireless

Telegraph Union, 313; merchant

marine tonnage, 323 n. 3; representa-

tion on proposed Prize Court, 324;

excluded from League, 347, 360. See

Concert of Europe, Constitutions, and

Great powers.

Rutherforth, life and works, 85 n. 4; law

of nations and state equality, 85-86,

86 n. 4.

Saar, cession of mines, 344, 353, 372;

government, 345, 352, 354, 356, 370,

372,373-

St. Augustine, natural equality, 18, 19;

the Fall, 19.

St. Germain, Treaty of, 337 n. 1.

St. Gregory, natural equality, 18.

St. Isidore of Seville, natural law, 20;

natural equality, 24.

St. Paul, universal law, 17; quoted by

Grotius, 60.

St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law, 20, 2x,

22; natural equality, 25; theory de-

veloped by Suarez, 36.

Saint-Pierre, l'abte de, 75 n. 2.

Salisbury, European Concert, 309.

Salvador, protest against Bryan-Cha-

morro Treaty, 174; treaty power, 198,

207, 208, 209; war power, 203; extra-

dition, 211; status of aliens, 214;

independence 233-234, 237, 303; Saar, cession of mines, 344, 353, 3i2i
vassalage, 236-237; guaranty of ingovernment, 345, 352, 354 1 356, 370,
dependence, 250; servitudes, 266;
372,373.
participation in Congress of Berlin, St. Augustine, natural equality, 18, 19;
the Fall, 19.
303; abstained on V iru in regard to
proposed Arbitral Court, 331; at Con- St. Germain, Treaty of, 337 n. 1.
ference of Paris, 349, 350, 355 n. l; St. Gregory, natural equality, 18.
represented on Reparation Commis- St. Isidore of Seville, natural law, 20;
sion, 354 1 on Danube Com.mission,
natural equality, 24.
367. Su Constitutions.
St. Paul, universal law, 17; quoted by
Roumelia, autonomy and union with
Grotius, 60.
Bulgaria, 234, 304; European Concert St. Thomas Aquinas, natural law, 20, 21,
and affairs in, 305.
22; natural equality, 25; theory developed by Suarez, 36.
Rufinus, natural equality, 24.
Russia, equality of, 109, u3, n5, n6, Saint-Pierre, l'ab~ de, 75 n. 2.
134, 161; a great power, 130; treaty Salisbury, European Concert, 309.
power, 193; war power, 202; autonomy ·Salvador, protest against Bryan-Chaof Danubian principalities, 233; diplo-1 morro Treaty, 174; treaty power, 1981
matic representation in Bulgaria, 238;
207 1 2o8, 209; war power, 203; extra~
agreements in regard to Mongolia, 239;
dition, 2n; status of aliens, 214;
protection of Cracow, 241 1 of Persia,
protection of aliens, 215; Salvador u.
243; recognition of Korean independNicaragua, 172. Su American reence, 243, of Japanese interests in
publics, and Constitutions.
Korea, 244; protection of Mongolia, Salvador v. Nicaragua, 172, 276 n. 2.
245; guaranty of independence of Salvian, natural equality, 18.
Greece, 250, of integrity of Norway, Sanitary Conference. See International
251, of neutralization of Switzerland,
Sanitary Conference.
Belgium, and Luxemburg, 252-254; Sanitary Convention, International, 316.
neutralization of Black Sea, 255, 265 1 San Marino, equality of, Sg, u3; protection of, 242.
266, 266 n. 1; representation at international conferences, 281-282; initiative Sardinia, neutralization of Savoy, 265;
in calling Hague Conferences, 290;
proposed conference on Italian affairs,
Congress of Vienna, 294-296; Con305 1 3o6. See Italy.
gress of Aix-la-Chapelle, 296-299; Savoy, neutralization, 255; servitude of
Holy Alliance, 299; proposed conneutrality, 265; neutralization terminated, 342.
ference on affairs in Greece, 300;
affairs in Greece,301; war with Turkey, Sayre, equality of votes, 145 n. 2; una303; opposed coercion of Holland, 3o6;
nimity, 318; Sugar Commission,
majority decisions, 318 n. 1.
dependencies represented in Wireless
Telegraph Union, 313; merchant Schooner Exchange v• .M'Faddon, 156,
157.
marine tonnage, 323 n. 3; representation on proposed Prize Court, 324; Scotia, The, 162 n. 1.
excluded from League, 347, 360. Su Scott, J.B., state equality, and inequaliConcert of Europe, Constitutions, and
ties of fact, 120; nature of Hague
Great powers.
Conferences, 290 n. 1; influence of
great powers at Hague Conferences,
Rutherforth, life and works, 85 n. 4; law
290 n. ~; composition of proposed
of nations and state equality, 85-86,
Arbitral Court, 328.
86 n. 4.
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Scott, Sir William (Lord Stowell), state

equality, Le Louis, 155, 159, 161, 172,

187, inequality, The Madonna Del

Burso, 163, The Helena, 163 n. 1.

Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, Pill-

ing and Co., 224 n. 2.

Seneca, natural law, 9; natural equality,

14; state of nature, 14, 26, 27, 28;

influence on patristic thought, 18;

cited by Grotius, 39.

Serb-Croat-Slovene State, represented on

Klagenfurt Commission, 353, on Repa-

ration Commission, 354; at Conference

of Paris, 355 n. 1. See Servia.

Servia, limitations incident to geo-

graphical situation, 163, 222, 222 n. 2;

equality of, 186; treaty power, 196,

207; war power, 202; autonomy and

independence, 234, 303; vassalage,
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237; guaranty of independence, 250;

financial control of, 256; excluded from

Congress of Berlin, 303; participation

in Conference of London, 304; at Con-

ference of Paris, 349, 349 n- 2, 350.

355 n. 1. See Constitutions, and Serb-

Croat-Slovene State.

Servitudes, in Grotian system, 58; limi-

tations incident to, 168-171, 264-268,

278,343-345.377-

Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 243.

Siam, at Conference of Paris, 349, 355

n. 1.

Sorel. See Funck-Brentano.

Slave.trade, court decisions, 159-162,

162 n. 1; suppression of, 295, 319.

Slavery, Aristotle, 13; Seneca, 14; Ro-

man Law, 15, 27,46; the early Church,

17; patristic writings, 18, 27; civilians,

23; canonists, 24; St. Thomas Aquinas,

25; other mediaeval sources, 28, 28

n. 1; Grotius, 48, 51, conquered states

compared, 50,59,60.

Snow, primacy of great powers, 141 n. 2.

Socrates, natural right, 6.

Sophists, natural right, 6.

South Africa, at Conference of Paris, 349.

South African Republic, vassalage, 239.

South America. See American republics.

Sovereignty, universal rejected, 37, 57;

in Grotian system, 50, 53, 55-60, 61,

66-67; part-sovereign states, 50, 55,

58, 91, 92 n. 6, 93, 93 n. 6, 119, 133,

169; early development of idea, 56, 57;

relation to origin of principle of state

equality, 56, 74, 79,84 n. 6, 90,93,99;

justification for state equality, 114,

115, 150; supern;itional organization,

138; Pillet's alternative principle, 146;

servitudes, 168-171; Gray's comment

on Austinian theory, 191 n. 1; internal

limitations on capacity distinguished,

191; effect of incapacity to make

treaties, 210; effect of intervention,

261 n. 3.

Spain, equality of, 89; The Antelope,

160; Venezuelan Arbitration, 166,167;

treaty power, 196,198 n. 1; war power,

202; admission of foreign troops, 205;

Scott, Sir William (Lord Stowell), state Sovereignty, universal rejected, 37, 57;
equality, Le Louis, 155, 159, 161, 172,
in Grotian system, 50, 53, 55--6o, 61,
187, inequality, The Madonna Del
66-67; part-sovereign states, 50, 55,
Burso, 163, The Helena, 163 n. l.
58, 91, 92 n. 6, 93, 93 n. 6, n9, 133,
Secretary of State v. Charlesworth, Pill16<}; early development of idea, 56, 57;
ing and Co., 224 n. 2.
relation to origin of principle of state
Seneca, natural law, 9; natural equality,
equality, 56, 74, 79, 84 n. 6, 90, 93, 99;
14; state of nature, 14, 26, 27, 28;
justification for state equality, 114,
influence on patristic thought, 18;
115, 150; supernational organization,
cited by Grotius, 39.
138; Pillet's alternative principle, 146;
Serb-Croat-Slovene State, represented on
servitudes, 168-171; Gray's comment
Klagenfurt Commission, 353, on Repaon Austinian theory, 191 n. 1; internal
ration Commission, 354; at Conference
limitations on capacity distinguished,
191; effect of incapacity to make
of Paris, 355 n. l. See Servia.
Servia, limitations incident to geotreaties, 210; effect of intervention,
graphical situation, 163, 222, 222 n. 2;
261 n. 3.
equality of, 186; treaty power, 196, Spain, equality of, SQ; The Antelope,
207; war power, 202; autonomy and
160; Venezuelan Arbitration, 166, 167;
independence, 234, 303; vassalage,
treaty power, 196, 198 n. l; war power,
237; guaranty of independence, 250;
202; admission of foreign troops, 205;
financial control of, 256; excluded from
admission of aliens, 212; representation at international conferences, 281,
Congress of Berlin, 303; participation
282; signed Treaty of Paris, 294; revoin Conference of London, 304; at Conlution in, 299; dependencies repreference of Paris, 349, 349 n. 2, 350,
sented in Wireless Telegraph Union,
355 n. x. See Constitutions, and Serb313. See Constitutions.
Croat-Slovene State.
Servitudes, in Grotian system, 58; limi- Spectator, The, criticism of Hague Contations incident to, 168--171, 264-268,
ference, 287.
Spheres of influence, limitation on equal278, 343-345, 377.
Shimonoseki, Treaty of, 243.
ity, 121 n. 4.
Siam, at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 State, equality, general principles, 3-5;
D. I.
legal personality, 31, 111, 1501 18Q;
Sorel. See Funck-Brentano.
society of states, 32; conception of the
Slave. trade, court decisions, 15Q-162 1
state, 37, 57, 71, 79, 80, 87, 97; legal
capacity as international person, 190;
162 n. l; suppression of, 295, 319.
Slavery, Aristotle, 13; Seneca, 14; Rointernal capacity, 191 n. 1; effect of
constitutional amendment, 191, 200.
man Law, 15, 27, 46; the early Church,
See Analogy between natural persons
17; patristic writings, 18, 27; civilians,
and states, Equality, political, Equal23; canonists, 24; St. Thomas Aquinas,
ity before the law, Equality of capacity
25; other mediaeval sources, 28, 28
for rights, Equality of states, and
n. 1; Grotius, 48, 51, conquered states
Sovereignty.
compared, 50, 59, 60.
Snow, primacy of great powers, 141 n. 2. State, inland. See Inland state.
State of nature, source of principle of
Socrates, natural right, 6.
Sophists, natural right, 6.
state equality, 6, 14, 18, 26-29, 31-33;
South Africa, at Conference of Paris, 349.
in Grotian system, 35, 47-49, 52;
South African Republic, vassalage, 239.
forerunners of Grotius, 36 1 37; identiSouth America. See American republics.
fied with international society, 6<), 77,
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80, 80 n.4, 81, 84, 86, 86 n.4, 87, 88,

94, 96, 97, 98; revived by Hobbes, 70,

72, 75 n. 2; state equality derived

from nature of international society,

11o, i11, 11 1 n.4, 149; international

application repudiated, 132; super-

national organization, 138.

Status, 3-5,91,92 n. 6,94, 95, 123, 124.

See Equality before the law, Equality

of capacity for rights, and Equality of

states.

Stead, criticism of Hague Conference,

286 n. 2.

Stockton, London Naval Conference,

308.

Stoics, natural law, 7; influence, 10, 17;

state of nature, 26.

Story, state equality, The Marianna

Flora, 160 n. 1, United States v.

n. 1.
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Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 162

Stowell, state equality denied, 136 n. 1.

Stowell, Lord. See Scott, Sir William.

Streit, state equality, and inequalities of

fact, 118; primacy of great powers,

128.

Suarez, natural law, 22, 36, 37; law of

nations and state equality, 36-38;

life and works, 36 n. 4; compared with

Grotius, 43.

Suez Canal, neutralization, 255.

Sugar Commission. See International

Sugar Commission.

Sumner, state equality, resolutions on

San Domingo negotiations, 177.

Supernational organization, and state

equality, 123, 125-131, 137-145, M7.

148 n. 1; internal limitations, 216-218;

limitations incident to, 275-276, 292-

310, 322-333, 346-347. 347 n. 3, 348-

378.

Suzerainty, in Grotian system, 58; in

system of Zouche, 91; in disintegra-

tion of Holy Roman Empire, 119, 231-

232, 236; in disintegration of Ottoman

Empire, 233-235, 236-239; limitations

incident to, 236-240, 278; in Peace of

Paris, 342.

Sweden, treaty power, 194,194 n. 3, 207;

war power, 202; Treaty of Osnabrück,

231; guaranty of Peace of Westphalia,

247, 262; representation at interna-

tional conferences, 281, 282; instruc-

tions of delegate to Hague Conference,

290 n. 2; signed Treaty of Paris, 294;

merchant marine tonnage, 323 n. 3;

represented on Schleswig plebiscite

commission, 353, on Oder Commis-

sion, 367. See Constitutions.

Switzerland, equality of, 134, 137, 161;

remarks on equality of delegate to

Hague Conference, 183; treaty power,

198, 200, 209; war power, 204; limita-

tion on import duties ,212; guaranty of

neutralization, 249; neutralization,

252, 295; interest in neutralization of

Savoy, 265; abstained on Voeu in re-

gard to proposed Arbitral Court, 331;

80, 8o n. 4, 81, 84 1 86, 86 n. 4, 87 1 88, J Sweden, treaty power, 194 1 194 n. 3 1 207;
94 1 96, 97, 98; revh·ed by Hobbes, 70 1
war power, 202; Treaty of Osnabrock,
72 1 75 n. 2; state equality derived
231; guaranty of Peace of Westphalia,
247 1 262; representation at intemafrom nature of international society,
uo, 111 1 III n. 4 1 149; international
tional conferences, 281, 282; instructions of delegate to Hague Conference,
application repudiated, 132; supernational organization, 138.
290 n. 2; signed Treaty of Paris, 294;
Status, 3-5 1 91, 92 n. 6, 94, 95, 123, 124.
merchant marine tonnage, 323 n. 3;
See Equality before the law, Equality . represented on Schleswig plebiscite
commission, 353, on Oder Corn.misof capacity for rights, and Equality of
states.
sion, 367. See Constitutions.
Stead, criticism of Hague Conference, Switzerland, equality of, 134, 137, 161;
remarks on equality of delegate to
286 n. 2.
Hague Conference, 183; treaty power,
Stockton, London Naval Conference,
3o8.
198, 200, 209; war power, 204; 1.inUtaStoics, natural law, 7; influence, 10, 17;
tion on import duties, 212; guaranty of
state of nature, 26.
neutralization, 249; neutralization,
Story, state equality, The Marianna
252, 295; interest in neutralization of
Flora, 160 n. 1, United States ti.
Savoy, 265; abstained on Va'1l in regard to proposed Arbitral Court, 331;
Schooner La Jeune Eugenie, 162
n. 1.
neutralization affirmed, 342. See
Stowell, state equality denied, 136 n. 1.
Constitutions.
Stowell, Lord. See Scott, Sir William.
Syria, pacification of, 302.

I

Streit, state equality, and inequalities of
fact, u8; primacy of great powers,
128.
Suarez, natural law, 22, 36, 37; law of
nations and state equality, 36-38;
life and works, 36 n. 4; compared with
Grotius, 43.
Suez Canal, neutralization, 255.
Sugar Commission. See International
Sugar Commission.
Sumner, state equality, resolutions on
San Domingo negotiations, 177.
Supernational organization, and state
equality, 123, 125-131, 137-145, 147,
148 n. 1; internal limitations, 216-218;
limitations incident to, 275-276, 29z;JIO, 322-333, 346-347, 347 n. 31 348-

Taylor, state equality, in Grotian system,
66, citations of Grotius, 66 n. 3 1 equality of rights, 1o6, a natural right, no;
primacy of great powers, 140; equality
in Peace of Westphalia, 232 1 233.
Telegraphic Union. See International
Telegraphic Union.
Textor, life and works, 91 n. 6; law of nations and state equality, 91-1)2, 92 n. 6.
The Hague, protocol of 19101 recourse to
proposed Prize Court, 2 1 7.
The Hague Conference, First, equality in
constitution and procedure, 1441 180,
187; remarks of Bourgeois on equality,
181 1 271; Bulgaria represented, 238;
representation at, 282 1 285; voting,
283, 287; invitation to, 287; diploma378.
tic character of, 28Q, 290 n. 1; inSuzerainty, in Grotian system, 58; in
system of Zouche, 91; in disintegrafluence of great powers, 290, 290 n. 2,
tion of Holy Roman Empire, n9, 231291; Permanent Court of Arbitration,
2321 236; in disintegration of Ottoman
322.
Empire, 233-235 1 236-239; limitations The Hague Conference, Second, remarks
of Bourgeois on equality before the law,
incident to, 236-240, 278; in Peace of
3; equality in proposed tribunals, 120,
Paris, 342.
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120 n. 3, 126 n. 2, 181-184, 219, 323-

332, 333; equality in constitution and

procedure, 144, 180, 181 n. 1, 187;

maritime conventions and inland

states, 163, 222, 222 n. 2; equality

championed by American republics,

175, 180-184; Bulgaria's rank, 238;

exclusion of Korean delegates, 245;

status and voting of Luxemburg, 255;

proposed limitation on duress, 270

n. 2; conventions framed, 270; forcible

collection of contract debts, 273-274;

representation at, 282, 285, 285 n. 2,

286; voting, 283, 287-289, 289 n. 3,

290 n. 1; diplomatic character of, 283,

284 n. 1, 280-290, 290 n. 1, 291, 292;

influence of great powers, 290, 290

n. 2, 291; London Naval Conference,

307,308; Permanent Court of Arbitra-
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tion, 322; proposed Prize Court, 323-

32*>, 333; proposed Arbitral Court,

326-331,333.

The Hague conventions, maritime con-

ventions and inland states, 163, 222,

222 n. 2; ratifications withheld, 284,

284 n. 1, 290.

The Hague Court of Arbitration, Ven-

ezuelan Arbitration, 164-168; North

Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 164,

168-171, 264; political equality in,

181 n. 2, 322, 322 n. 2; Bulgaria repre-

sented, 238; Bureau of, 321.

Thomasius, natural law and law of na-

tions, 44; law of nations and state

equality, 82-83; life and works, 82

n.3.

Thucydides, on equality, S3, 00.

Transaction, legal, 4; distinguished from

right, 190; internal limitations on form

of, 191-206, 218; on capacity for, 206-

212, 219.

Treaty power, in national constitutions,

192-201, 207-210, 219; in Holy Roman

Empire, 232; in German Confedera-

tion, 235; effect of neutralization, 255.

Troops, admission of foreign, 205, 205

n. 2; sending abroad of national, 205,

205 n. 6.

Troppau, Conference of, 209.

Tryphoninus, natural equality, 15; state

of nature, 27.

Tunis, financial control of, 256.

Turkey, inequality incident to civiliza-

tion, 163, 223; treaty power, 193, 196,

207; war power, 202; extraterritorial

jurisdiction, 225 n. 1; disintegration

compared with Holy Roman Empire,

233-235; suzerainty over Balkan

states, 234, 236-238; over Crete and

Egypt, 234, 235, 238; independence of

Greece, 250; neutralization of Black

Sea, 255, 265; intervention in, 262,

264, 301-305; representation at inter-

national conferences, 281, 282, 204;

European Concert and affairs in

Greece, 301; admitted to European

system, 302; Constantinople Board of

Health, 316; boundary fixed by great

120 n. 3, 126 n. 2, 181-184, 219, 323- Troppau, Conference of, 299.
332, 333; equality in constitution and Tryphoninus, natural equality, 15; state
procedure, 144, 18o, 181 n. 1, 187;
of nature, 27.
maritime conventions and inland Tunis, financial control of, 256.
states, 163, 222, 222 n. 2; equality Turkey, inequality incident to civilizachampioned by American republics,
tion, 163, 223; treaty power, 193, 196,
175, 180-184; Bulgaria's rank, 238;
207; war power, 202; extraterritorial
exclusion of Korean delegates, 245;
jurisdiction, 225 n. 1; disintegration
status and voting of Luxemburg, 255;
compared with Holy Roman Empire,
proposed limitation on duress, 270
233-235; suzerainty over Balkan
n. 2; conventions framed, 270; forcible
states, 234, 236-238; over Crete and
collection of contract debts, 273-274;
Egypt, 234, 235, 238; independence of
representation at, 282, 285, 285 n. 2,
Greece, 250; neutralization of Black
286; voting, 283, 287-289, 289 n. 3,
Sea, 255, 265; intervention in, 262,
290 n. 1; diplomatic character of, 283,
264, 301-305; representation at inter284 n. r, 2&)-290, 290 n. 1, 291, 292;
national conferences, 281, 282, 294-;
influence of great powers, 290, 290
European Concert and affairs in
n. 2, 291; London Naval Conference,
Greece, 301; admitted to European
system, 302; Constantinople Board of
307, 3o8; Pennanent Court of ArbitraHealth, 316; boundary fixed by great
tion, 322; proposed Prize Court, 323powers, 317 n. l; Treaty of Peace, 337
326, 333; proposed Arbitral Court,
n. 11 342; application of mandate sys326-331, 333·
The Hague conventions, maritime contem, 341; excluded from League, 347,
ventions and inland states, 163, 222,
360. See Constitutions.
222 n. 2; ratifications withheld, 284, Twiss, state equality, in Grotian system,
66, equality of legal capacity, 109, de284 n. I 1 290.

rived from nature of international soThe Hague Court of Arbitration, Venezuelan Arbitration, 164-168; North
ciety, l 10, and inequalities of fact, 119.
Atlantic Fisheries Arbitration, 164,
168-171, 264; political equality in, Ulpian, natural equality, 15; patristic
181 n. 2, 322, 322 n. 2; Bulgaria repreparallel, 18; state of nature, 27.
sented, 238; Bureau of, 321.
United States, influence of Grotian
Thomasius, natural law and law of natradition, 34; hegemony in western
tions, 44; law of nations and state
hemisphere, 129, 140; opinion of
equality, 82-83; life and works, 82
American writers, 140; Declaration of
Independence, 154, 155, 176, 176 n. 2;
n. 3·
Schooner Exchange 1'. M'Faddon, 156;
Thucydides, on equality, 53, 90.
Transaction, legal, 4; distinguished from
Brazilian Coffee Case, 158; The Antelope, 16o; Venezuelan Arbitration,
right, 190; internal limitations on form
164, 165; North Atlantic Coast Fishof, 191-2o6, 218; on capacity for, 2o6eries Arbitration, 168-171; Bryan212, 219.
Chamorro Treaty, 172, 174, 2j6;
Treaty power, in national constitutions,
equality in foreign policy, 175-180,
192-201, 207-210, 219; in Holy Roman
Empire, 232; in German Confedera184-185; sovereignty in, 191 n. 1;
tion, 235; effect of neutralization, 255.
treaty power, 195, 198, 209; war power,
Troops, admission of foreign, 205, 205
204; relation to Cuba, 207 n. 1; protection of aliens, 216; constitutional
n. 2; sending abroad of national, 205,
limitations on political equality, 218;
205 n. 6.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction in China,

225-227; Chinese immigration, 229;

Act of Algeciras, 242; protection of

Cuba, 246, 251, of Panama, Domini-

can Republic, and Haiti, 247;guaranty

of Panama's independence, 251; rela-

tion to Haiti, 251; neutralization of

Panama Canal, 255; financial control

of Cuba, 256, of Dominican Republic,

256» 257, of Nicaragua, 258, of Haiti,

258-260; intervention in Cuba, 262,

263, in Mexico, 263, in Panama, 263,

in Dominican Republic and Haiti, 264;

concessions in Panama, 268; comment

of delegate to Hague Conference, 270;

Treaty of Washington between Cen-

tral American republics, 275; repre-

sentation at international conferences,

281, 282; secured Latin-American
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representation at Second Hague Con-

ference, 285, 285 n. 2; participation in

London Naval Conference, 307, 308;

dependencies represented in Wireless

Telegraph Union, 313; report on mer-

chant marine tonnage, 323 n. 3; rep-

resentation on proposed Prize Court,

324; composition of proposed Arbitral

Court, 327,328; disposition of Danzig,

345; failure to ratify Paris treaties,

347 n. 1; at Conference of Paris, 348-

351; unrepresented in temporary or-

ganization of Peace of Paris, 353 n. 3;

proposed representation on Repara-

tion Commission, 354; representation

on Inter-Allied Rhineland Commis-

sion, 354; unrepresented on League

institutions, 360 n. 2; Senate reserva-

tion in regard to inequality of votes,

368 n. 1; treaties for assistance to

France, 373. See Constitutions, and

Great powers.

United States v. One Hundred Barrels of

Cement, 162 n. 1.

United States v. The Schooner La Jeune

Eugenie, 159 n. 1,160 n. 3,162 n. 1.

Universal Peace Congress, 153.

Universal Postal Union, 201, 312, 313,

316,320, 376, 376 n. 1.

Urgel, Bishop of, suzerainty over An-

dorra, 239.

Uruguay, treaty power, 198, 109; war

power, 203, 210; admission of foreign

troops, 205; sending abroad of national

troops, 205; abstained on Vaeu in re-

gard to proposed Arbitral Court, 331;

at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1.

See American republics, and Con-

stitutions.

Utrecht, Peace of, system of guaranties,

248-249, and intervention, 262, 292;

Congress of, representation, 281.

Vasquez, life and works, 36 n. 2; law of

nations and state equality, 36-38.

Vattel, derived rights of states from nat-

uralist theories, 51 n. 2; influence on

Felice's Burlamaqui, 88; life and

works, 97 n. 2; law of nations and state

equality, 97-98, 100, 187; state equal-

extraterritorial jurisdiction in China,
n5-227; Chinese immigration, :129;
Act of Algeciras, 242; protection of
Cuba, 246, 251, of Panama, Dominican Republic, and Haiti, 247; guaranty
of Panama's independence, 251; relation to Haiti, 251; neutralization of
Panama Canal, 255; financial control
of Cuba, 256 1 of Dominican Republic,
256, 257, of Nicaragua, 258, of Haiti,
25S-26o; intervention in Cuba, 262,
263, in Mexico, 263, in Panama, 263,
in Dominican Republic and Haiti, 264;
concessions in Panama, 268; comment
of delegate to Hague Conference, 270;
Treaty of Washington between Central American republics, 27 5; representation at international conferences,
281, 282; secured Latin-American
representation at Second Hague Conference, 285, 285 n. 2; participation in
London Naval Conference, 307, 3o8;
dependencies represented in Wireless
Telegraph Union, 313; report on merchant marine tonnage, 323 n. 3; representation on proposed Prize Court,
324; composition of proposed Arbitral
Court, 327, 328; disposition of Danzig,
345; failure to ratify Paris treaties,
347 n. 1; al Conference of Paris, 34S351; unrepresented in temporary organization of Peace of Paris, 353 n. 3;
proposed representation on Reparation Commission, 354; representation
on Inter-Allied Rhineland Commission, 354; unrepresented on League
institutions, 360 n. 2; Senate reservation in regard to inequality of votes,
368 n. 1; treaties for assistance to
France, 373. See Constitutions, and
Great powers.
United States 11. One Hundred Barrels of
Cement, 162 n. 1.
United States 11. The Schooner La Jeune
Eugenie, 159 n. 1, 160 n. 3, 162 n. 1.
Universal Peace Congress, 153·
Universal Postal Union, 201, 312, 313,
316, 320, 376, 376 D. I,

Urge), Bishop of, suzerainty over Andorra, 239.
Uruguay, treaty power, 198, 199; war
power, 203, 210; admission of foreign
troops, 205; sending abroad of national
troops, 205; abstained on V tEU in regard to proposed A.rbitral Court, 331;
at Conference of Paris, 349, 355 n. 1.
See American republics, and Constitutions.
Utrecht, Peace of, S,Ylltem of guaranties,
24S-249, and intervention, 262, 292;
Congress of, representation, 281.
Vasquez, life and works, 36 n. 2; law of
nations and state equality, 3Cr-38.
Vattel,derived rights of states from naturalist theories, 51 n. 2; influence on
Felice's Burlamaqui, 88; life and
works, 97 n . 2; law of nations and state
equality, 97-<}8, 100, 187; state equality, an attribute, 101; described as a
theorl!t, 132.
Vavasseur 11. Krupp, 158 n. 1.
Venezuela, Venezuelan Arbitration, 164168; declaration on equality at Hague
Conference, 182; treaty power, 198,
199, 207, 2o8, 211, 211 n. 2; war power,
203, 204, :211, 211n.2; admission and
expulsion of aliens, 213; protection of
aliens, 215; coercion of, 272; forcible
collection of contract debts, 273;
opposed inequality in proposed Prize
Court, 325; composition of proposed
A.rbitral Court, 327. See American
republics, and Constitutions.
Venezuelan Arbitration, 109 n. 3, 164168, 232 n. 2, 270, 272 n. 3.
Verona, Congress of, 173, 300.
Versailles, Treaty of, 337 n. 1, 338 n. I,
338 ff.
Victoria, life and works, 36 n. 1; law of
nations and state equality, 3Cr-38; war
as remedial process, 269.
Vienna, Treaty of, 230, 241, 252, 255,
265, 314 n. 3; Congress of, 235, 252,
253, 255, 265, 281, 294-296.
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INDEX

Voting, in international institutions, 120,

125, 145 n. 2, 280; in international

conferences and congresses, 282-283,

292,332; in Hague Peace Conferences,

286-289, 289 n.3, 290, 290 n. 1, 292;

in supernational conferences and con-

gresses, 309, 332; in administrative

unions, 311, 313-319. 3". 333". in

supernational judicial tribunals, 331;

in temporary organization created at

Paris, 356, 359, 378; in League of

Nations, 368-371, 376, 378.

Walker, state equality, based on sov-

ereignty, 114.

Wallachia. See Roumania.

War. See Remedial processes.

War, World, state equality in diplo-

matic papers, 184-187; Hague con-

ventions, 222, 222 n. 2, 284, 284 n. 1;
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Peace of Paris, 337-378.

War power, in national constitutions,

201-205, 210-211, 219; in Holy Ro-

man Empire, 232; in German Con-

federation, 235; effectof neutralization,

Ward, Hobbes' use of state of nature, 75

n. 2, 80 n. 4.

Warships, foreign, stationing in terri-

torial waters, 205-206.

Washington, President, foreign policy

and state equality, 176 n. 2.

Washington, Treaty of 1907, Central

American Court, 275.

Weights and Measures. See Interna-

tional Union of.

Westlake, primacy of great powers, 128,

143; independence of states, 132 n. 1;

application of equality, 137 n. 1; pro-

posed limitation on reprisals, 270 n. 2;

voting in Hague Conferences, 289.

Westphalia, Peace of, state equality, 5

n. 2, 232-233; Grotius' alleged in-

fluence, 66; primacy of great powers

developed since, 140; general act of

international community, 230; politi-

cal settlement, 231-232; guaranty of

execution, 247-248; system of guaran-

ties overturned, 249; guaranties and

intervention, 262, 292; Congress of,

281.

Wheat on, state equality, a natural right,

11o, derived from nature of inter-

national society, 111.

White, position of lesser states of Eu-

rope, 290 n. 2.

William of Ockham, classification of

natural law, 23; natural equality, 25.

William the Silent, apology, 61, 173.

Wilson, G. G., state equality, equality of

legal capacity, 109; proposed weight-

ing of votes in Hague Conferences, 289

n.3.

Wilson, President, state equality, 180,

184-185, 185 n. 4; international im-

portance of state's constitution, 193;

access to sea for inland states, 339 n. 1;

functions of League Assembly, 374.

Wireless Telegraph Union. See Inter-

national Wireless Telegraph Union.

Voting, in international institutions, 1201
n. 2, 232-233; Grotius' alleged influence, 66; primacy of great powers
125 1 145 n. 2 1 280; in international
developed since, 140; general act of
conferences and congresses, 282-283 1
292 1 332; in Hague Peace Conferences,
international community, 230; political settlement, 231-232; guaranty of
286-28<), 28<) n. 3, 290, 290 n. 1, 292;
in supernational conferences and conexecution, 247-248; system of guaranties overturned, 249; guaranties and
gresses, 309 1 332; in administrative
intervention, 262, 292; Congress of,
unions, 311 1 313-319 1 321, 333 ; in
281.
supernational judicial tribunals, 331;
in temporary organization created at Wheaton, state equality, a natural right,
110, derived from nature of interParis, 356, 359, 378; in League of
national society, 111.
Nations, 368-371 1 376, 378.
White, position of lesser states of Europe, 290 n. 2.
Walker, state equality, based on sovereignty, 114.
William of Ock.ham, classification of
Wallachia. Su Roumania.
natural law, 23; natural equality, 25.
'war. See Remedial processes.
William the Silent, apology, 61, 173.
War, World, state equality in diplo- Wilson, G. G., state equality, equality of
matic papers, 184-187; Hague conlegal capacity, 109; proposed weightventions, 222 1 222 n. 21 284 1 284 n. 1;
ing of votes in Hague Conferences, 28<)
Peace of Paris, 337-378.
n. 3.
War power, in national constitutions, Wilson, President, state equality, 18o,
201-205, 210-2n, 219; in Holy Ro184-185, 185 n. 4; international imman Empire, 232; in German Conportance of state's constitution, 193;
federation, 235; effect of neutralization,
access to sea for inland states, 339 n. l;
functions of League Assembly, 374.
255.
Ward, Hobbes' use of state of nature, 75 Wireless Telegraph Union. Su International Wireless Telegraph Union.
n.2,8on.4.
Warships, foreign, stationing in terri- Wolff, compared with Leibnitz, 76 n. 4;
torial waters, 205- 206.
anticipated by Barbeyrac, 84 n. 7;
Washington, President, foreign policy
life and works, 95 n. 6; law of nations
and state equality, 176 n. 2.
and state equality, 95--()7, 96 n. 1,
Washington, Treaty of 1907, Central
n. 2; influence on Vattel, 97.
American Court, 275.
Woolf, state equality denied, 145·
Weights and Measures. See Interna- Wilrtemburg, protest of, 173·
tional Union of.
Wycliffe, natural equality, 25.
Westlake, primacy of great powers, 128,
143; independence of states, 132 n. 1; Zanzibar, International Office at, 319.
application of equality, 137 n. 1; pro- Zouche, anticipated by Gentilis, 39, &),
91; life and works,&) n. 3; law of naposed limitation on reprisals, 270 n. 2;
voting in Hague Conferences, 28<).
tions and state equality, 8<)--c)1; war as
Westphalia, Peace of, state equality, 5
remedial process, 269.
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